




**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

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October 19, 1984  
RBG-19214  
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV, Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Mr. Martin:

River Bend Station Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458  
Final Report/DR-192

On September 19, 1984, GSU notified Region IV by telephone that it had determined DR-192 to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). This deficiency concerns three duct pieces fabricated by McCroskey Sheet Metal. The attachment to this letter is GSU's final 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) with regard to this deficiency.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker  
Manager-Engineering,  
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*JEBH*  
JEB/PJD/lp

Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

## ATTACHMENT

October 19, 1984  
RBG-19214

### DR-192 Three Duct Pieces Fabricated by McCroskey Sheet Metal

#### Background and Description of the Problem

The problem involves three duct pieces fabricated by McCroskey Sheet Metal. The duct pieces were fabricated to the wrong design criteria due to a misinterpretation of the engineers' drawings by the vendor's designer. This nonconformance was not detected during the vendor's checking process. The three duct pieces adjoining the radiation monitor air flow stations in the fuel building ventilation system exhaust ductwork were fabricated from 18-gauge sheet metal with no reinforcement instead of reinforced 12 gauge sheet metal as required to meet the specified design pressure.

#### Safety Implication

It can be conservatively assumed that as a result of a tornado event, the 18-gauge ductwork would collapse under the 10 inches of water pressure to which it would be subjected before the downstream tornado damper would close.

Collapsing of the duct would result in higher than design temperatures in the safety-related fuel pool cooling pump cubicles. The resulting temperature would be greater than the maximum temperature for which the pump motors are qualified. This could cause the pump motor to fail and prevent the fuel pool cooling pumps from removing decay heat from the spent fuel storage pool.

#### Corrective Action

The vendor has been instructed to conform to the applicable sections of his QA program to ensure that this type of problem will be identified during the checking stage of his shop drawings. In addition, SWEC shop inspectors have been instructed to perform a 100-percent inspection of all duct pieces, which will be reviewed to SWEC design drawings.

These three pieces will be refabricated to an acceptable design by means of implementation of the disposition assigned in Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) No. 5841.

The extent of the problem has been determined to be limited only to the three duct pieces identified in N&D No. 5841.