U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/84-07(DRP)

Docket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48226

Facility Name: Enrico Fermi Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2

Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI

Inspection Conducted: April 1, 1984, through June 15, 1984

Inspectors: P. M. Byron

M. E. Parker

Approved By: RFWarnick for
R. C. Knop, Chief
Projects Section 1C

7/12/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 1 through June 15, 1984 (Report No. 50-341/84-07 (DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Identified Items; Headquarters Requests; Regional Requests; IE Bulletin; IE Circular; Preoperational Test Witnessing; Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes; Licensee's Initial Implementation of Strike Plans; Security Personnel Training and Qualifications; Allegations; Independent Inspection; Fire Protection; Inspection Preparatory to Operating License Issuance; Management Meetings; Meetings with Local Officials; and Plant Tours. The inspection involved a total of 546 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors, including 97 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the 16 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*F. Agosti, Manager, Nuclear Operations
*T. Alessi, Director, Corporate QA
*L. Bregni, Licensing Engineer
*J. DuBay, Director, Planning and Control
O. Earle, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Eberhardt, Acting Rad-Chem Engineer
*W. Fahrner, Manager, Fermi 2 Project
A. Godoshian, Systems Completion Director
*E. Griffing, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Operations
*C. Heidel, President, DECo
*W. Holland, Vice-President, Fermi 2 Project
*W. Jens, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
R. Kunkle, Director, SAFETEAM
S. Leach, Director, Nuclear Security
J. Leman, Maintenance Engineer
*R. Lenart, Superintendent, Nuclear Production
R. Mays, Director, Project Planning
*W. Miller, QA Supervisor, Operational Assurance
T. Mintun, Startup Director
*T. Nickelson, Startup Engineer
*S. Noetzel, Site Manager
J. Nyquist, Acting Assistant Superintendent, Nuclear Production
*G. Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Startup
J. Plona, Technical Engineer
E. Preston, Acting Operations Engineer
*G. Trahey, Director, Nuclear QA
*R. Vance, Assistant Project Manager, Engineering
D. Wells, Manager, QA

*Denotes those that attended the exit meeting.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Identified Items

(Closed) Open Item (341/81-10-08(DPRP)). Section 9.5.4.1 of the Fermi 2 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0798) requires that an automatic prelube be added to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and the skid mounted relays be relocated to a panel off the skid. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's package for the changes. The licensee changed the lube oil modification design from that described in the SER (9.5.7) to one which was supplied by the manufacturer, Fairbanks-Morse. The revised design was reviewed by NRR in SSER No. 2. The inspectors reviewed the package and noted that the work had been performed by Field Modification Requests (FMRs) and verified by Punch List Cards (PLCs). The inspectors verified that the modifications had QC signoffs and that the work was complete. The inspectors also verified that the installation of both modifications had been completed for the four EDGs. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) Open Item (341/81-10-21(DPRP)). Automatic restart of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system on low water level. SER Item. The inspectors reviewed Field Modification Request (FMR) No. 4354, Revision A, dated October 18, 1982, which provided the necessary equipment to provide for an automatic RCIC system restart at reactor low water level. The work was performed by Control Center Traveler (CCT) No. H11P621-007 and PN-21 No. 363308. The inspectors reviewed the CCT package and noted that QC signed the work off as being complete on September 22, 1983. The inspectors consider this open item to be closed.

(Closed) Open Item (341/81-10-22(DPRP)). Installation of Modification of HPCI and RCIC steam break detection logic. The inspectors reviewed Field Modification Request (FMR) No. 4352 Revision 0 dated August 12, 1982, which added time delay relays to the HPCI and RCIC steam break detection logic. The work was performed by Control Center Traveler (CCT) No. H11P621-007 and PN-21 No. 363308. The inspectors reviewed the CCT package and noted that QC signed the work off as being complete on September 22, 1983. The inspectors consider this open item to be closed.

(Open) Open Item (341/81-17-07(DPRP)). SER Item II.B.4. Degraded Core Training. This item concerns implementation of a training program to teach the use of installed equipment and systems to control or mitigate accidents in which the core is severely damaged. The inspectors attended a course held for reactor operators during the week of May 7, 1984. The inspectors thought the course was both well structured and well presented.

The inspectors noted that not all individuals required by NUREG-0737 and the Fermi 2 SER have taken the required training. The inspectors also noted that the course does not cover all the topics required by the Radiation Monitoring section of the SER, specifically, methods of determining dose rates inside containment from measurements taken outside containment. The inspectors have discussed these items with the training staff and were informed that these items were not specifically covered as the actual plant procedures have not been developed to date. When these plant procedures are issued, the training department intends to have these items covered in requalification training or a review course at which time these items along with any changes will be covered. This item is to remain open pending upgrading and completion of training by the licensee.

(Closed) Open Item (341/82-06-02(DPRP)). Section 9.5.7 of the Fermi 2 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 2 (NUREG-0798) contains the staff's evaluation of the manufacturer's modification of the EDG lubricating oil system. This item (modification) is included in Open Item 341/81-10-08(DPRP). The closure of the aforementioned open item also closes this open item.

(Open) Open Item (341/84-06-01(DPRP)). This item concerns discrepancies between draft Technical Specifications (TS) and operating procedures. The licensee has met with the inspectors concerning this item and has provided a list of those procedures which they believe adequately reflect draft TS and are ready for NRC review. Concerning those procedures that

do not reflect draft TS, the licensee is maintaining their position to hold off on updating/revising these procedures pending issuance of the Proof and Review copy of TS, which is expected to be issued in mid-July. The inspectors have notified the licensee that they will continue with their operating procedure review on Emergency Operations Procedures, the only operating procedures identified as being ready for review. This item will remain open pending updating of operating procedures.

The inspectors are concerned about the large number of open items which must be closed prior to the issuance of the operating license. The licensee continues to have problems in providing adequate information to close out the items. The task force set up by the licensee to coordinate the closeout of open items has not been able to markedly improve the quality of the review packages. The problems encountered by the inspectors during their review indicate that the licensee has not adequately addressed the previous concern of inadequate review. The licensee took steps at the end of the inspection period to address the inspectors' concerns. The inspectors will address the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action in a subsequent inspection report.

3. Followup on Headquarters Requests

A meeting was held at Headquarters on May 4, 1984, to discuss certain aspects of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) which was performed by Cygna Energy Services. Representatives from Cygna, DECo, RIII, the Senior Resident Inspector, and NRR staff were in attendance. Cygna presented their program to respond to staff concerns which were raised after the submittal of Volume 4 of the IDVP. The staff reviewed the rules of protocal with Cygna and DECo. Cygna presented the proposed format and schedule of their response which is tentatively scheduled for June 4, 1984. The staff may schedule another meeting after their review of the submittal.

4. Followup on Regional Requests

a. SAFETEAM Interviews Containing Safety-Related Concerns

The inspectors reviewed the forty-six interviews made by the Fermi 2 SAFETEAM during the inspection period. It was determined that approximately ten of the interviews contained potential safety-related concerns. The inspectors will review the SAFETEAM responses to these concerns. The inspectors also reviewed the forty-two responses issued by the SAFETEAM during the inspection period. The responses adequately addressed the concerns.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b. Plant Tour by Region III Management

The Region III Deputy Regional Administrator, Director of the Division of Engineering, Chief of Project Section 1C, NRR project managers, and other Regional personnel accompanied the inspectors on a tour of

the Fermi 2 plant on June 12, 1984. The purpose of the tour was to assess the licensee's preparations and readiness for issuance of the operating license. The Deputy Regional Administrator met with licensee and craft personnel to discuss various aspects of the construction and test programs. Several members of the tour group met with licensee management to discuss their observations and to review licensee completion schedules of items which are required for closeout prior to operating license issuance.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility. If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

(Closed) IE Bulletin 73-06, "Inadvertent Criticality in a Boiling Water Reactor." This bulletin concerns an inadvertent criticality incident where the licensee jumpered the refuel interlock to perform core verification concurrently with control rod timing and friction testing, permitting more than one control rod to be withdrawn from the core. The bulletin requested the licensee to perform a procedural review, review of management controls, and ensure adequate training has been provided for licensed operators in order to prevent recurrence of this event. The inspectors reviewed DECo letters NP-84-127 dated January 30, 1984, NP-84-440 dated March 26, 1984, and EF2-68199 dated April 12, 1984. The licensee has performed the requested action and has taken adequate steps to prevent a similar inadvertent criticality incident. This bulletin is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IE Bulletin 83-08, "Electrical Circuit Breakers With an Undervoltage Trip Feature In Use in Safety-Related Applications Other Than the Reactor Trip System." This bulletin describes findings involving circuit breakers with undervoltage trip attachments (UVTA's) being used in safety-related applications other than as reactor trip breakers (RTB's). Holders of construction permits were asked to: (1) identify safety-related application of the breakers and systems in which they are used, (2) review adequacy of the design, testing, and maintenance, and (3) evaluate the need to take corrective measures to ensure proper operation of the breakers. The inspectors reviewed DECo letters EF2-67820 dated March 14, 1984, and SU-84-0605 dated March 27, 1984, which stated that Fermi 2 does not employ W type DB, W type DS, or GE type AK-2 circuit breakers in any safety-

related system. To ensure that they are not used in the future, these breakers have been added to the Fermi 2 "Restricted Materials/Equipment/ Services List." Fermi 2 does use Brown Boveri 480v low voltage circuit breakers on plant safety-related power busses. As a result of initial testing, design changes were made to remove the UV trip device from the breakers. The UV trip device has been removed and the breakers have satisfactorily passed subsequent testing. Undervoltage tripping of the safety-related busses is now provided by buss load shedding strings initiated by Brown Boveri type 27-R undervoltage relays. This bulletin is considered to be closed.

(Closed) IE Bulletin 84-01, "Cracks in Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Vent Headers." This bulletin was issued to boiling water reactor facilities holding an operating license, to determine whether cracks exist in the Mark I containment vent header. Operating plants currently in cold shutdown were requested to visually inspect the entire vent header for cracks and report the results to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed DECo letter EF2-68308 dated May 2, 1984, which stated that the licensee has examined the vent header and that the examinations showed no cracking existed. This bulletin is considered to be closed.

6. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

(Open) IE Circular 77-12, "Dropped Fuel Assemblies at BWR Facilities." This circular describes several reported events involving dropped fuel assemblies at BWR facilities, and suggested several steps and measures that should be implemented to minimize the possibility of a fuel assembly dropping incident. The inspectors reviewed DECo letter EF2-57268 dated March 9, 1982, which stated that the recommended modifications to the fuel grapple had not been performed and the project had taken the position that only those modifications required to make a system operate will be considered. The inspectors have notified the licensee that the response to this circular is inadequate in that no justification is provided for stating that no modifications to the grapple hook are required at Fermi 2. The licensee has in turn notified the inspectors that justification for no modification to the grapple hook is available and will be added to the package. This circular is to remain open pending licensee action and further review by the inspectors.

(Open) IE Circular 77-14, "Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from Noncontaminated Plant System." This circular describes an incident where the domestic water system became contaminated by water from the primary water storage tank. The circular recommended that the licensee review their systems and as-built drawings, identify all interconnections between contaminated and noncontaminated water systems and review the interconnection design to assure that separation has been provided. The circular

also recommended review of operating procedures which could lead to inadvertent contamination of domestic water systems. The inspectors reviewed DECo letters EF2-67670 dated February 29, 1984, and EF2-59079 Rev. A dated April 25, 1984, which provided adequate assurance that Fermi 2 potable and demineralized water systems have adequate separation from contaminated systems. The inspectors have also reviewed plant piping and instrument drawings to confirm separation. The inspectors have requested the licensee to provide additional information and references concerning their review of interconnections between contaminated and noncontaminated water systems. This item is to remain open pending action by the licensee and further review by the inspectors.

(Closed) IE Circular 80-02, "Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours." This circular provides guidance on working hours for plant staff performing safety-related functions and has been modified by Generic Letters 82-02 and 82-12 and NUREG-0737. The licensee has issued Plant Order EFP-1056, Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours, dated March 22, 1984, which complies with the suggested guidelines of the circular as modified by the generic letters. These guidelines have also been added to Fermi's SER, EF2-FSAR, and draft technical specifications. This circular is considered to be closed.

7. Preoperational Test Witnessing

The inspectors reviewed portions of preoperational test procedures, reviewed procedure results completed to date, toured the areas containing system equipment, interviewed personnel, and observed test activities of those preoperational tests identified below.

During this review, the inspectors noted that the latest revision of the test procedure was available and in use by crew members, the minimum crew requirements were met, the test prerequisites were met, appropriate plant systems were in service, the special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service, the test was performed as required by approved procedures, temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked per established administrative controls, and test results for the tests observed by the inspectors indicated that acceptance criteria were met.

a. Standby Liquid Control System Test

The inspectors reviewed portions of Preoperational Test Procedure PRET. C4100.001, Revision 3, "Standby Liquid Control System" (SLC). The inspectors observed the following portions of Pret C4100.001: Standby Liquid Control Flow Verification and Squib Valve Actuation.

This test consisted of pumping demineralized water from the storage tank through the "A" pump and squib valve to the reactor vessel. The "B" squib valve was electrically disconnected as it had been previously tested. During testing, the inspectors verified proper actuation of the squib valve and indication of injection into the vessel. This test consisted of pumping down the storage tank to the

pump suction piping at the "0" level in the storage tank, at which point the pump was secured. No cavitation was observed during this test.

One item of concern to the inspectors was the lack of indications on testable check valves C41-F006 and C41-F007. The check valve actuator and disk position indicators did not indicate "open" during the injection. The Startup test engineer indicated that the check valve indicators had been repaired two weeks earlier and were working properly at that time. A PN-21 (Maintenance Order) has been initiated to reset the limit switches on the check valves in coordination with a surveillance test. This is considered an open item (341/84-07-01 (DRP)).

b. Emergency/Standby Power Supply System

The inspectors observed the performance of the following sections of Preoperational Test Procedure R3000.001, Revision 2, "Emergency Diesel Generator System" (EDG): Full Load Run Test - EDG No. 11, Full Load Run Test - EDG No. 12, Reliability Starts - EDG No. 11, Reliability Starts - EDG No. 12, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems - EDG No. 14, and Fuel Oil System - EDG No. 14.

During the performance of the 22nd reliability start on EDG No. 12, the diesel generator tripped, due to a spurious oil high temperature alarm. This non-essential alarm would be bypassed during an emergency start. Regulatory Guide 1.108 states that non-essential trips bypassed during an emergency operating mode are not considered valid tests or failures. Therefore, the licensee was allowed to continue with the 23 reliability starts. The reliability starts were subsequently completed with no other problems identified.

The inspectors noted that testing was performed in accordance with the procedure and that the test results were within the limits prescribed by the procedure.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

c. Engineered Safety Features Test

The inspectors reviewed portions of Preoperational Test Procedure PRET B2100.001, Revision 1, "Nuclear Boiler System." The inspectors observed the following portions of PRET B2100.000: Verification of Redundant Control Power, Automatic Depressurization Logic, Recorder Auto Speed Changes and Low-Low Set Actuation.

During the performance of testing, the inspectors observed that the shift test engineer was in control of testing activities, that testing was being performed in accordance with the procedure, and that testing was performed with no problems identified.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes

The Detroit Edison union labor contract which covers non-licensed operators, I & C technicians, maintenance and warehouse workers, among others, expired on June 4, 1984. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's strike plans and have found them to be adequate for the plant in its current unlicensed condition. However, it should be noted that the strike plans reviewed by the inspectors would be inadequate if an operating license had been issued.

The inspectors reviewed two revisions of the Fermi 2 strike plans and found the same inadequacies in both revisions. The review concluded that the plan was sketchy and neither sufficiently definitive nor specific in the description of duties and responsibilities. The plan was also deficient in the area of staffing. The inspectors stated their concern to the licensee who agreed to address the inspectors' concerns.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Licensee's Initial Implementation of Strike Plans

On June 3, 1984, Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of America voted to strike Detroit Edison Company (DECo). The current contract expired at 12:00 am on June 5, 1984. The membership consists of 3600 DECo employees of which 139 are assigned to the Fermi 2 plant. These employees work in the following areas: 51 Operations (non-licensed reactor operators), 47 maintenance, 19 I&C, 11 warehousing, and 11 food service.

The plant is currently in the preoperational test phase with construction virtually complete. The licensee is currently performing limited pre-operational testing. Nuclear Supervising Operators (Reactor Operators) are performing the non-licensed operator functions and have encountered no problems. In the maintenance area, 15 maintenance foremen along with Bechtel crafts have been performing selected maintenance activities. Review of the effect of the strike on the preoperational test program has identified no major problems or delays.

The inspectors have observed storage of new unirradiated fuel at Fermi 2 to determine if the fuel is being maintained in a manner consistent with license requirements and that protection is provided to maintain the fuel in a clean condition. The inspectors verified that security measures were in place, the security force was aware of the activities on the refueling floor and access control was effective. The inspectors concluded that the licensee is meeting the requirements of the Special Nuclear Materials license.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Security Personnel Training and Qualifications

The inspectors observed weapons qualification for some officers of the Nuclear Security Force on May 3, 1984. The inspectors witnessed pistol

qualifications for the most recent officer training class. All shooters met the required qualifications. The inspectors are scheduled to observe night firing during the next inspection period and will document their inspection in a subsequent inspection report.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Allegations

a. Substitution of Foreign Made Materials in Pipes Supplied by A. O. Smith (RIII-84-A-0001)

The licensee had been made aware of the allegation in January 1984. The licensee initiated a search of procurement records and could find no record of any flanges or pipe being purchased from A. O. Smith. The licensee also researched their purchasing documents to see if any material had been purchased from Midwest Products and Engineering which is owned by the alleged importer of the material. In addition, the licensee requested Bechtel, Ann Arbor, to perform a search of their procurement records. Bechtel's search revealed neither pipes nor flanges were purchased from either source for use at Fermi 2.

The licensee believes that if any of the material had been purchased for Fermi 2, it could have only been purchased by Monroe Plumbing and Heating and its use would be limited to ordinary plumbing applications.

The inspectors consider that the licensee's actions were responsible and thorough. The allegation could not be substantiated and the inspectors consider this item to be closed.

b. Harassment/Intimidation of Aero-Detroit QC inspector at Fermi 2

A contract Aero-Detroit QC inspector made an allegation to the inspectors that he had been terminated from his job at Fermi because he had raised concerns regarding safety grade equipment. The QC inspector stated that he had raised concerns relating to using parts from one Limitorque valve operator on another which was being repaired and this action was not specifically authorized by Attachment A of the PN-21 (Operating and Maintenance Order). He also alleged that Loctite was used in the RHR complex without being specifically authorized by Attachment A of the PN-21 and Loctite was prohibited material unless specifically authorized. The inspector alleged in both cases that after-the-fact approval was issued.

The inspectors informed the QC inspector that the issue of his termination as a result of his raising quality concerns fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor (DOL). The inspectors also informed the QC inspector that he had thirty days to file with DOL if he chose to file.

The QC inspector stated that the Limitorques in question were worked on between December 19 and 30, 1983. The inspectors reviewed all documentation related to the Limitorques which were worked on during this time period. The review did not reveal any documentation which allowed using parts from another valve operator. The inspectors also reviewed all changes initiated by the individual alleged to have made the after-the-fact authorization and were unable to find any changes relating to Limitorques. The inspectors were unable to substantiate this allegation.

The inspectors also reviewed all documentation relating to the use of Loctite in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) complex. The review revealed that loctite was used and a memo dated December 29, 1983, authorized the usage of loctite, which was after the material was used (as alleged). This allegation was substantiated. However, DECo memo NE-84-0164 dated February 13, 1984, authorized site wide usage of loctite with three exceptions. The application described by the QC inspector did not fall under any of the exceptions. Though the allegation was substantiated, the February 13, 1984, memo gives it no technical merit. The inspectors consider this allegation to be closed.

12. Independent Inspection

a. Construction Assessment Inspection Meeting

Detroit Edison has contracted with the Duke Power Company to perform a construction assessment inspection at Fermi 2 to verify that the as-built conditions are reflected in the design and quality documentation in support of the utility's application for an operating license. The assessment commenced June 5, 1984, and is scheduled to be complete July 15, 1984. An NRC resident inspector has been temporarily assigned to Fermi to observe the Duke assessment with the assistance of the resident inspectors.

NRC Region III management attended meetings at the Region III office on May 16, 1984 and at Fermi on June 11, 1984, to discuss the work plan which delineated the tasks necessary to perform the assessment. The licensee stated that the finalized work plan would be transmitted to Region III by June 18, 1984.

The Duke Power assessment of Fermi 2 will be fully documented in Inspection Report (50-341/84-21).

b. Followup on Item Identified by Licensee Audit

The licensee reported to the inspectors on December 9, 1983, that while conducting an audit (A-OA-C-83-29) covering Fuel Handling and Special Nuclear Materials, it was determined that several Fuel Inspector Certifications contained discrepancies. Two certifications lacked the date of the visual examination and one certification did not contain the name of the examiner. Subsequently the

audit team reviewed fifty-three fuel inspector certifications and found that ten of the certifications had what appeared to be a forgery of the visual examiner's signature.

The licensee initiated an investigation and verified that the signatures were forgeries. The investigation also determined the identity of the individual who signed the certifications. The licensee retested all of the individuals involved and all but one passed the retest. The fuel bundles inspected by the inspector who failed the visual re-examination were successfully reinspected. The individual who forged the examiner's signature was disciplined.

The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's followup and corrective action and consider it to be satisfactory. This item is considered to be closed.

13. Fire Protection

Region III inspectors with support from NRR and Brookhaven National Laboratory commenced a fire prevention/protection inspection at Fermi 2 on May 14, 1984. The inspection team did not complete their inspection. Meetings were held in Bethesda on June 11 and 12, 1984, to discuss several issues raised by the inspection team. The inspection team, Senior Resident Inspector, I & E staff, and NRR staff met on June 11, 1984, to review the team's concerns. The same group, Region III and NRR management met with the licensee on June 12, 1984, to discuss the team's concerns. The staff proposed to the licensee that they review the team's concerns and return at a later date to present DECo's resolution to the concerns. The licensee is scheduled to present their proposed resolutions to NRR on July 12, 1984, in Bethesda. This inspection and associated meetings will be documented in Inspection Report (50-341/83-16).

14. Inspection Preparatory to Operating License Issuance

A meeting was held at Fermi 2 on June 13, 1984, with Region III personnel and the inspectors to review the required data for inclusion into the monthly status letter. The inspectors reviewed each item and its status. The necessary data is in the process of being collected. The status letter will be issued by Region III during the next inspection period.

15. Enforcement Conference

The inspectors attended an enforcement conference on April 18, 1984, at Region III to discuss possible enforcement actions which could occur as a result of the findings of the Regional QA inspection held November 1983. The noncompliances were presented to DECo management who supplied supplemental information and responded to Region III staff questions. The enforcement conference and the inspection report are documented in Inspection Report (50-341/83-31).

16. Meeting with Local Officials

The resident inspectors and Region III personnel held a meeting with local officials at the Monroe County Office of Civil Prepardness on April 25, 1984. In attendance were representatives from Berlin, Frenchtown, and Monroe Townships, the City of Monroe Fire and Police Departments, the Sheriff, members of Monroe city and county governments, as well as representatives from the Michigan Department of Public Health.

The resident inspectors were introduced and the NRC's role at Fermi 2 was discussed. The inspectors and Region III staff responded to questions from the floor.

17. Plant Tours

During the months of April, May, and June 1984, the inspectors conducted tours of the RHR complex, the Reactor Building, the Auxiliary Building, the Turbine Buildings, and the Radwaste area, including the fifth floor of the Reactor Building, the Control Room, and the cable spreading rooms. These areas were inspected for general housekeeping and fire prevention practices, work controls, and maintenance of safety-related system integrity. The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operations.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

18. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 7.

19. Exit Interview

The Inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.