

ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO:

50-322-0L

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the matter of: :
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION : Docket No. 50-322-0L
(Long Island Light Company :
----- X

State Office Building
Veterans Memorial Highway
Hauppauge, New York
Monday, September 17, 1984

The hearing in the above-entitled matter was convened at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice.

- BEFORE:
- JUDGE LAWRENCE BRENNER,
Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
 - JUDGE PETER A. MORRIS,
Member, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
 - JUDGE GEORGE A. FERGUSON,
Member, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

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APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Applicant:

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Office of the Executive Legal Director

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C O N T E N T S

2	WITNESS	DIRECT	CROSS
3	PAUL JOHNSTON)		
4	EUGENE MONTGOMERY)		
5	ROGER L. McCARTHY)	22,606	22,611
6		(by LILCO)	(by Suffolk County)
7	FRANZ F. PISCHNGER)		
8	EDWARD Y. YOUNGLING)		
9	LUNCHEON RECESS	22,657	
10	AFTERNOON RECESS	22,710	
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ERRATA FOLLOWS PAGE NO. 22,610

(Errata to Testimony on behalf of Long Island
Lighting Company regarding crankshafts)

LAY-INS FOLLOWS PAGE NO. 22,610

(Testimony of McCarthy, Johnston, Montgomery
and Chen regarding replacement
crankshafts; Testimony of Youngling and
Pischinger regarding replacement crankshafts.)

E X H I B I T S

1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24
25					
1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24
25					
	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	IDENT.	REC'D	REJECTED
		LILCO DIESEL EXHIBIT:			
	C-1	Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshafts at Shoreham and Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Stations prepared for TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group dated May 22, 1984 (hereinafter "Owners Group Crankshaft Report"), Figure 3-4		22,610	
	C-2	Specification for Diesel Generator Sets, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1, Spec. No. SH1-89, Revision 2, January 26, 1983, page 1-20		22,610	
	C-3	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2, December 1979		22,610	
	C-4	IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Std 387-1977.		22,610	

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E X H I B I T S

2	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	IDENT.	REC'D	REJECTED
3	LILCO DIESEL EXHIBIT:				
4	C-5	Transcript of July 11, 1984		22,610	
5		meeting of the TDI Diesel			
6		Generator Owners Group, pages			
7		124-125.			
8	C-6	Available Logged Hours of		22,610	22,673
9		Operation of DSR-48, Rated			
10		3500 kw at 450 rpm.			
11	C-7	TDI Diesel Generator Run		22,610	
12		History - Shoreham Nuclear			
13		Power Station - Unit 1			
14		August 6, 1984.			
15	C-8	Results of non-destructive		22,610	
16		examinatins of replacement			
17		crankshafts at Shoreham after			
18		.100 hours of operation at full			
19		load or greater.			
20	C-9	American Bureau of Shipping		22,610	
21		Rules, for Building and Classing			
22		Steel Vessels(1983) Sec. 37.17.1.			
23	C-10	American Bureau of Shipping,		22,610	
24		Rules for Building and Classing			
25		Steel Vessels (1983) Table 34.3			

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E X H I B I T S

2	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	IDENT.	REC'D
3	LILCO DIESEL EXHIBIT:			
4	C-11	TDI Crankshaft Drawing		22,610
5		Number 03-310-05-AC.		
6	C-12	American Bureau of Shipping		22,610
7		Reports on Castings or		
8		Forgings of Replacement Crankshafts		
9	C-13	American Bureau of Shipping		22,610
10		letter to TDI dated May 3, 1984		
11	C-14	Diesel Engine Manufacturers		22,610
12		Association Standard Practices		
13		for Low and Medium Speed		
14		Stationary Diesel and Gas Engines		
15		1972 ed., pages 53-56		
16	C-15	TDI Proposed Torsional		22,610
17		and Lateral Critical Speed Analysis,		
18		August 22, 1983.		
19	C-16	Field Test of Emergency Diesel		22,610
20		Generator 103 with 13 x 12		
21		crankshaft, April 1984		
22	C-17	Owners Group Crankshaft Report		22,610
23				
24				
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E X H I B I T S

2	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	IDENT.	REC'D
3	LILCO DIESEL EXHIBIT:			
4	C-18	Crankshaft Torsional Stress		22,610
5		Calculations for 8L 17 x 21		
6		Engine Generator Set, July 19, 1984		
7	C-19	Table 2.2 from Owners Group		22,610
8		Crankshaft Report showing natural		
9		frequencies from TDI analysis		
10	C-20	Table 2.4 from Owners Group		22,610
11		Crankshaft Report showing		
12		single order nominal stresses		
13		from TDI analysis.		
14	C-21	Table 2.5 from Owners Group		22,610
15		Crankshaft Report showing nominal		
16		stresses calculated from torsigraph		
17	C-22	Crankshaft Torsional Stress		22,610
18		Calculations for 8L17 x 21		
19		Engine-Generator Set, July 19, 1984 page 11.		
20	C-23	Figure 3-3 from Owners Group Report		22,610
21		showing comparison of measured		
22		and calculated torque.		
23	C-24	Tables 3.6 and 3.7 from Owners		22,610
24		Group Crankshaft Report showing		
25		comparison between analytical and		
26		test results.		

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E X H I B I T S

1	2	3	4	5
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	IDENT.	REC'D	
3	LILCO DIESEL EXHIBIT:			
4	C-25	Failure 3-13 from Owners	22,610	
5		Group Crankshaft Report showing		
6		fatigue endurance limit of		
7		replacement crankshafts on		
8		Goodman diagram.		
9	C-26	Oberg and Jones, Machinery's	22,610	
10		Handbook (18th Ed.) pages		
11		352-53; Shigley, Mechanical		
12		Engineering Design (McGraw-Hill		
13		pages 212-13; Rothbart (Editor)		
14		Mechanical Design and Systems		
15		Handbook (McGraw-Hill) page 18-4.		
16				
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1 PROCEEDINGS

2 JUDGE BRENNER: Good morning. We're back
3 on the record.

4 We won't bother going through the
5 appearances for each party every week.

6 If they're going to change or you have a
7 new lawyer you would like to introduce, you can feel
8 free to do that. I would note that there is no
9 counsel for New York State present, so the only
10 appearance noted would be for LILCO, NRC Staff and
11 Suffolk County.

12 MR. STROUPE: I might just add that David
13 Dreifus on my right was not introduced last week and
14 he will be acting as counsel for LILCO.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: We met Mr. Dreifus at a
16 previous conference hearing.

17 The Board has no preliminary matters.
18 Does anyone else have preliminary matters?

19 MR. STROUPE: I have a couple of
20 preliminaries. As you can observe we're missing Dr.
21 Simon Chen from the panel. He missed his plane
22 apparently at O'Hare because of some mechanical
23 difficulty. He has indicated that he believes he
24 can be here by lunch time or shortly after lunch
25 time, so to that extent, we will be minus one

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1 panelist for the morning session.

2 With regard to the photograph, the
3 original photographs that we talked about last week
4 with regard to the piston testimony, I have been told
5 that we will have those original photographs
6 inserted in the copies to be bound to be given to
7 the reporter by this afternoon, and we will be more
8 than happy to insert those original photographs or
9 copies thereof in the copies of the testimony that
10 the judges have in their possession, if you wish
11 that we do that.

12 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We would
13 appreciate that, and beyond that, the most important
14 thing is to assure that the three copies of the
15 exhibits with the official record be conformed.
16 You'll have to work it out with careful instructions
17 to the court reporting firm because I don't know
18 where those exhibits are physically at this moment.

19 In addition, Suffolk County will have to
20 do the same as they said they would with their
21 exhibit, Diesel 71, and the Board will have to
22 receive those original photographs for our own
23 groups of D-71 also.

24 All right. Why don't you introduce the
25 witnesses that are present and I'll swear them in.

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1 MR. STROUPE: We may start with the first
 2 witness, Dr. McCarthy, each of you introduce
 3 yourselves, indicate your business address and your
 4 business affiliation.

5 DR. MC CARTHY: My name is Roger McCarthy.
 6 I'm president of Failure Analysis Associates, 2225
 7 East Bay Shore Road in Palo Alto, California.

8 DR. JOHNSTON: My name is Paul Johnston.
 9 I am manager of the structural analysis group at
 10 Failure Analysis Associates, business address is
 11 2225 East Bay Shore Road, Palo Alto, California.

12 MR. MONTGOMERY: My name is Eugene
 13 Montgomery. I'm a stress analyst in the Nuclear
 14 Engineering Department.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: You're going to have to
 16 speak a lot louder.

17 MR. MONTGOMERY: I'm a stress analyst --

18 JUDGE BRENNER: Louder. I don't mean to
 19 badger you on your first words but it's better done
 20 on something as simple as your name. I'm going to
 21 have trouble hearing the testimony unless you speak
 22 louder.

23 MR. MONTGOMERY: My name is Eugene
 24 Montgomery. I'm a stress analyst within the nuclear
 25 engineering department of Long Island Lighting

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1 Company at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in
2 Wading River, New York.

3 MR. YOUNGLING: My name is Edward J.
4 Youngling. I work for the Long Island Lighting
5 Company as the manager of the Nuclear Engineering
6 Department at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
7 Wading River, New York.

8 DR. PISCHINGER: My name is Franz
9 Pischinger. I am president and owner of FEV Company
10 and at the same full-time professor at the Aachen
11 Technical University. My address is, I will spell
12 it. I-M-E-R-K-F-E- L-D, No. 4-D-5100, Aachen.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Welcome back to the three
14 of you and welcome to Dr. Johnston and Mr.
15 Montgomery.

16 Why don't you all stand as a panel and
17 raise your right hands, please.
18 Whereupon,

19 PAUL JOHNSTON,
20 EUGENE MONTGOMERY,
21 ROGER L. McCARTHY,
22 FRANZ F. PISCHINGER,
23 and
24 EDWARD J. YOUNGLING

25 were called as witnesses on behalf of the Applicant

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1 and, having been previously duly sworn, were
2 examined and testified as follows:

3 JUDGE BRENNER: In the future, I think we
4 can save time and skip the addresses at least and --
5 for those witnesses we know, you can even skip the
6 business affiliations and just introduce the new
7 ones.

8 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, we have
9 filed and served on the parties hereto an errata
10 sheet dated September 11, 1984 making certain
11 changes and corrections to the two volumes of
12 testimony involved herewith and the three volumes of
13 exhibits.

14 We have penned in the changes so they are,
15 in fact, in the copies that were filed with the
16 judges, so we would be more than happy to have the
17 chairman of the panel, Mr. Youngling, read into the
18 record those changes if the Board so desires.

19 JUDGE BRENNER: I don't believe it's
20 necessary.

21 DIRECT EXAMINATION

22 BY MR. STROUPE:

23 Q. Dr. McCarthy, do you have in front of you
24 a copy of the testimony on behalf of LILCO dated
25 August 14, 1984 in this proceeding entitled the

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1 Testimony of Roger L. McCarthy, Paul R. Johnston,
2 Eugene M. Montgomery and Dr. Simon Chen on behalf of
3 Long Island Lighting Company on Suffolk County's
4 contention regarding replacement crankshafts
5 on diesel generators at Shoreham along with three
6 volumes of crankshaft exhibits containing Exhibits
7 C-1 through C-26.

8 DR. MC CARTHY: I do.

9 Q. To the best of your knowledge, is that
10 testimony and the exhibits with the corrections
11 noted on the errata sheet true and correct?

12 DR. MC CARTHY: It is.

13 Q. Do you adopt it as your own?

14 DR. MC CARTHY: I do.

15 Q. Dr. Johnston, I would ask you the same
16 question with regard to the same documents. Is it
17 true and correct to the best of your knowledge?

18 DR. JOHNSTON: It is.

19 Q. And do you adopt it as your own?

20 DR. JOHNSTON: I do.

21 Q. Mr. Montgomery, I would again ask you the
22 same question.

23 MR. MONTGOMERY: It is.

24 Q. And do you adopt it as your own?

25 MR. MONTGOMERY: I do.

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1 Q. Mr. Youngling, do you have in front of
2 you the volume of testimony dated August 14, 1984
3 entitled Testimony of Edward J. Youngling and Franz
4 F. Pischinger on behalf of Long Island Lighting
5 Company on Suffolk County's contention regarding
6 replacement crankshafts on diesel generators at
7 Shoreham along with three volumes of exhibits
8 containing Crankshaft Exhibit C-1 through 26?

9 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes, I do.

10 Q. Is this testimony and the three volumes
11 of exhibits true and correct to the best of your
12 knowledge?

13 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes, it is.

14 Q. Do you adopt it as your own?

15 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes, I do.

16 Q. Dr. Pischinger, I would ask you the same
17 question.

18 DR. PISCHINGER: Yes. I adopt it as my
19 own. It's true to the best of my knowledge

20 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, we hereby
21 tender the witnesses for cross-examination. First
22 of all, I would like to move that the testimony and
23 the exhibits be introduced into evidence and
24 admitted into evidence.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. In the

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1 absence of any objection, we would — let's put in
2 the errata sheet also since you had wanted to read
3 it and that way the parties can see the source of
4 the pen and ink changes. At this point we will bind
5 in the following sequence the errata to the
6 testimony and then the testimony of Roger L.
7 McCarthy et al., followed by the testimony of
8 Youngling and Pischinger. And we can admit them
9 into evidence and bind them in here.

10 In addition, we will admit into evidence
11 the exhibits identified as LILCO Diesel Exhibits C-1
12 through 39 and they, of course, will not be
13 physically bound in. We will carry three copies of
14 them with you.

15 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, C-1 through
16 C-39 also, that would include Volume 4 which is
17 really related to the shot peening exhibits.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: You only want to admit
19 through C-26 at this point?

20 MR. STROUPE: At this point.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: Changing that error on my
22 part and we will admit into evidence LILCO Diesel
23 Exhibits C-1 through C-26 and ask the reporter for
24 the index page of the transcript to copy those
25 titles through C-26 only from the index provided

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1 before C-1 and three copies of those exhibits will
2 be with the official record.

3 I will assume that the version of C-17
4 which LILCO wanted to move into evidence has been
5 substituted in the official record, that is, the May
6 22, 1984 version.

7 MR. STROUPE: That is correct.

8 (The Transcript of Testimony of
9 McCarthy, Johnston, Montgomery, and
10 Chen regarding replacement
11 crankshafts; Transcript of
12 Testimony of Youngling and
13 Pischinger; regarding placement
14 crankshafts; Errata to Testimony on
15 Behalf of Long Island Lighting
16 Company regarding crankshafts;
17 Crankshaft Exhibits C-1 through
18 C-26 are incorporated in the
19 transcript at this point.)

20 JUDGE BRENNER: You have nothing further,
21 Mr. Stroupe, correct?

22 MR. STROUPE: That's correct, Your Honor.

23 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Dynner?

24 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, I'll be
25 conducting the cross-examination.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

In the Matter of)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY) Docket No. 50-322-OL
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,)
Unit 1))

ERRATA TO TESTIMONY ON BEHALF
OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
REGARDING CRANKSHAFTS

The following are changes to LILCO's testimony
regarding crankshafts:

Testimony of Pischinger and Youngling

1. Page 4, line 18 - change "600" to "1200".
2. Page 4, line 24 - change "13%" to "6%".
3. Page 5, line 22 - change "600" to "1200".
4. Page 6, line 2 - change "600" to "1200".

Testimony of McCarthy,
Johnston, Montgomery and Chen

1. Page 4, line 13 - change "Industry" to
"Industries".

2. Page 41, line 18 - change "would my opinion" to "would be my opinion."

Testimony of Wells, Johnson,
Wachob, Seaman, Cimino and Burrell

1. Page 11, line 15 - change "insure" to "ensure".

2. Page 16, line 13 - change "Exhibit C-33" to "Exhibit C-31". After the reference to "Exhibit C-31", the following sentence should be inserted: "LILCO's ultrasonic testing as well as magnetic particle and liquid penetrant testing likewise revealed no relevant inclusions or voids. See Exhibit C-33 and Exhibit C-32, respectively."

3. Page 17, line 9 - change "journels" to "journals".

Exhibits

Exhibit C-17 - The Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshafts at Shoreham and Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Stations prepared for TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group dated April 19, 1984, should be replaced by a report of the same title dated May 22, 1984.

Exhibit C-25 - Figure 3-13 from the April 19, 1984 Crankshaft Report should be replaced by Figure 3-13 from the May 22, 1984 Crankshaft Report.

Respectfully submitted,

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

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DATED: September 11, 1984

LILCO, August 14, 1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

In the Matter of)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power)
Station, Unit 1))

TESTIMONY OF ROGER L. McCARTHY, PAUL R. JOHNSTON,
EUGENE F. MONTGOMERY AND SIMON K. CHEN ON BEHALF OF
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON
SUFFOLK COUNTY'S CONTENTION REGARDING
REPLACEMENT CRANKSHAFTS ON DIESEL GENERATORS AT SHOREHAM

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I. INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

1. Please state your names, business affiliations and addresses.

A. (McCarthy) My name is Dr. Roger L. McCarthy and I am employed by Failure Analysis Associates as president and chief executive officer. My business address is 2225 East Bayshore Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303.

(Johnston) My name is Dr. Paul R. Johnston. I am employed by Failure Analysis Associates as manager of the structural analysis group. My business address is 2225 East Bayshore Road, Palo Alto, California, 94303.

(Montgomery) My name is Eugene F. Montgomery. I am employed by Long Island Lighting Company as a stress analyst. My business address is Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Long Island Lighting Company, Wading River, New York.

(Chen) My name is Dr. Simon K. Chen. I am a professional engineer registered in the State of Wisconsin and the owner and president of Power and Energy International, Inc., a private consulting firm. My business address is 555 Lawton Ave., Beloit, Wisconsin, 53511.

2. Please summarize your professional qualifications and your role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham.

A. (McCarthy) I am principal design engineer for FaAA

and hold five degrees, including a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from M.I.T. My specialty is mechanical design. My resume is Attachment 1.

My role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham has been to personally inspect the broken crankshafts and the replacement crankshafts, to perform the final review of the FaAA reports and to oversee the corporate performance of FaAA's evaluation of the crankshafts.

(Johnston) I obtained my undergraduate degree in Civil Engineering (B.A.I.) in 1976 from Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Thereafter, I attended Stanford University where I received a M.S. in Structural Engineering in 1977 and a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering in 1981. I have worked for FaAA since 1978, principally in the analysis of failures in structures and machinery. From 1981 to 1983, I also served as a Consulting Assistant Professor at Stanford University, where I taught graduate courses in finite elements and structural dynamics. I am co-author of the book Finite Elements for Structural Analysis. My resume is Attachment 2.

My role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham has been to evaluate the adequacy of the crankshafts by analysis and by using the results of dynamic tests on the original and replacement crankshafts.

(Montgomery) I received my undergraduate degrees in Mechanical Engineering (B.A., B.S.) in 1973 under a combined 3/2-year program at Queens College in the City University of New York and Columbia University. Thereafter, I attended Columbia University where I received an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering in 1974 and an M.E. (Professional Degree) in Mechanical Engineering in 1981. I have worked for LILCO since 1981, principally in the area of engineering mechanics for safety-related piping, equipment and support structures. From 1980 to 1981, I was a senior engineer in the Piping Stress Analysis Department of Burns & Roe, Inc., Woodbury, N.Y. Prior to that time, I was employed as a senior engineer in the Stress Analysis Department of Ebasco Services, Inc., Jericho, N.Y. from 1978 to 1980. My resume is Attachment 3.

My role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham has been to serve as LILCO's engineering specialist providing technical review and direction to the work performed by LILCO's consultants: Failure Analysis Associates, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, and Power and Energy International.

(Chen) I received my undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (B.S.M.E.) in 1947 from National Chiao Tung University. In 1949 I received a masters degree in mechanical engineering (M.S.M.E.) from the University of Michigan, and in 1952

I received a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from the University of Wisconsin. I also received an M.B.A. from the University of Chicago in 1964. For the past four and one-half years I have been the owner and president of Power and Energy International, Inc. (PEI), a private consulting firm. Prior to forming PEI, I was president and chief technical officer of the Beloit Power System Division of Louis Allis Litton Industries from 1973 until 1979. From 1971 until 1973 I was vice-president of engineering and applications of the entire Fairbank Morse Power System Division. From 1969 until 1971, I was vice-president and general manager of the large engine division of the Fairbank Morse Power Systems Division of Colt Industry^{ies}. From 1952 until 1969 I was employed by International Harvester. My first job was project engineer in charge of combustion development. My last job at International Harvester was divisional chief engineer in charge of all engine research and development. My resume is Attachment 4.

My role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham has been to perform a critical review of all analyses and testing of the crankshafts and to conduct an independent analysis of the adequacy of the crankshafts.

3. What issues have you been asked to address in your testimony?

A. (All) We have been asked to address Emergency Diesel

Generator Contention 1(a), admitted by the Board in its July 17, 1984 Memorandum and Order, which is whether:

The replacement crankshafts at Shoreham are not adequately designed for operating at full load (3500 KW) or overload (3900 KW), as required by FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.5, because they do not meet the standards of the American Bureau of Shipping, Lloyd's Registry of Shipping, or the International Association of Classification Societies. In addition, the replacement crankshafts are not adequately designed for operating at overload, and their design is marginal for operating at full load, under the German criteria used by FEV.

In summary, this testimony demonstrates that the replacement crankshafts are suitable for unlimited operation in the emergency diesel generators at Shoreham. The structural integrity of the replacement crankshafts has been extensively evaluated by testing, analysis and inspections. There is no requirement that the crankshafts comply with the design standards of the American Bureau of Shipping, Lloyd's Registry of Shipping, the International Association of Classification Societies or FEV's criteria. Therefore, compliance with the design criteria of one or more of the above organizations is not necessary to demonstrate the crankshafts are adequate for their intended service at Shoreham. Furthermore, ABS has approved the torsional critical speed arrangement of the crankshaft.

The crankshafts are required to comply only with the recommendations of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA). Conventional analytical techniques typically utilized

by the diesel engine industry show that the 13-inch by 12-inch replacement crankshafts comply with DEMA recommendations. Angular displacements of the free end of the crankshaft, stress ranges in the most highly stressed crankpin fillets, and the range of output torque at the flywheel were measured at and above full-rated load. The torsiongraph measurements of twist confirm the analyses and show that the crankshafts meet the DEMA recommendations.

In addition, strain gage measurements of maximum bending and torsional stress and calculations of maximum stress by a modal superposition analysis show that the crankshafts have a factor of safety in fatigue of 1.48, without taking into account any benefit of shot peening the crankpin fillets. This factor of safety is more than adequate to assure that the crankshafts will not fail in fatigue during operation. The factor of safety was determined from the measured endurance limit of the original 13-inch by 11-inch crankshafts that cracked in high cycle fatigue. The measured crankshaft response was in close agreement with that predicted by the modal superposition analysis. There is, therefore, more than adequate assurance that the crankshafts are suitable for their intended service.

II. BACKGROUND

4. Please briefly describe the function of the crankshaft in the diesel generators at Shoreham.

A. (All) The crankshaft converts the reciprocating (up and down) motion of the pistons and connecting rods into rotary motion. In this process, the crankshaft converts the inertial and gas pressure firing forces into torque, i.e., twisting force. The output torque from the crankshaft drives the electrical generator to provide emergency power.

5. Please briefly describe the failure of the original 13-inch by 11-inch crankshafts at Shoreham.

A. (Montgomery) On August 12, 1983, the original 13-inch by 11-inch crankshaft on EDG 102 fractured through the crankpin and rear (generator end) web under cylinder No. 7. Subsequent investigation revealed that the crankshaft on EDG 101 was significantly cracked at the No. 5 and No. 7 crankpins and the crankshaft on EDG 103 was cracked at the No. 6 crankpin.

6. What was the cause of the crankshaft failure?

A. (Johnston, McCarthy) Based upon extensive metallurgical examinations of the fracture surfaces, the cause of the crankshaft failure was determined to be high cycle vibratory fatigue.

7. What caused the crankshafts to fail in high cycle fatigue?

A. (Johnston, McCarthy) The crankshafts failed in high cycle fatigue due to the torsional (or twisting) stresses imposed upon them during operation. Testing and analysis revealed that the crankshafts experienced torsional excursions beyond their fatigue endurance limit, which ultimately led to their failure.

8. What action did LILCO take after the failure of the original crankshafts?

A. (Montgomery) LILCO did a number of things. First, Failure Analysis Associates (FaAA) was hired to determine the cause of the original crankshaft failure. FaAA's evaluation of the original crankshafts included: (1) a metallurgical failure analysis; (2) dynamic tests performed on the crankshaft from EDG 101; (3) a review of Transamerica DeLaval Inc.'s (TDI) torsional analysis of the Shoreham crankshafts; (4) a modal superposition analysis of the torsional system; and, (5) the development of a model employing finite element analysis to predict stresses imposed on the crankshafts during operation.

Second, after consulting with FaAA and TDI, LILCO ordered replacement crankshafts from TDI of a different design than the original crankshafts. The original crankshafts had a 13-inch main journal and an 11-inch crankpin. The replacement crankshafts have a 13-inch main journal and an 12-inch crankpin. The crankpin-to-web fillet radii of the replacement crankshafts

have a larger radius of curvature than the fillet radii of the original crankshafts. Typical structural dimensions of one throw and fillet details are shown in Exhibit C-1. In addition, the fillet regions of the replacement crankshafts have been shot peened. The average ultimate tensile strength of the original crankshafts was approximately 93,500 psi. The minimum ultimate tensile strength of the new crankshafts is over 100,000 psi. The replacement crankshafts have greater section properties, greater material strength and a more enhanced surface treatment (shot peening) than the original crankshafts.

Third, LILCO embarked on an unprecedented program to test and analyze the replacement crankshafts. This program was designed to ensure that the replacement crankshafts are adequately designed to withstand the stresses they will experience during operation in the Shoreham EDGs. This program included:

- (1) a detailed multi-modal, multi-frequency torsional dynamic analysis of the crankshaft;
- (2) finite element structural modeling and stress analysis of a single quarter crank throw geometry;
- (3) field tests on the EDG 103 replacement crankshaft at various power levels to measure the principal stresses in the fillet region of the crankshafts, torsional vibrations (torsigraph tests), cylinder pressure time diagrams, electrical generator output, and transient conditions due to engine start-up and generator load changes;
- (4) non-destructive

examination (eddy current tests) of the crankpin fillets on all three crankshafts at cylinder Nos. 5 - 8 after 100 hours of operation at 100% load or greater; and (5) review of the TDI torsional analysis using conventional Holzer and equivalent static equilibrium amplitude techniques.

III. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

A. The Crankshafts Must Comply with DEMA

9. What were the design requirements for the replacement crankshafts?

A. (Montgomery) The replacement crankshafts were required to meet the recommendations of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA). Stone & Webster's Specification for Diesel Generator Sets, -Spec. No. SH1-89, Revision 2, January 26, 1983 (Spec. SH1-89) required that:

The diesel engines and auxiliaries shall be designed, engineered, manufactured, and tested in accordance with the latest published applicable sections of the Standards of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA), at least, but not limited to DEMA "Standard Practices for Low and Medium Speed Stationary Diesel Engines."

The relevant portion of Spec. SH1-89 is attached as Exhibit C-2.

10. Do the replacement crankshafts meet the DEMA recommendations?

A. (All) Yes. As will be discussed in detail later, the crankshafts meet the recommendations of DEMA, both for operation at full load (3500 KW) and at overload (3900 KW).

11. The County contends the replacement crankshafts are inadequately designed for operation at full load (3500 KW) or overload (3900 KW) because they do not meet the requirements of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Lloyd's Registry of Shipping (Lloyd's), or the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). In addition, under the German criteria used by FEV, the crankshafts are marginal at full load and inadequate at overload. Is there any basis for this contention?

A. (Montgomery) No. There is no licensing requirement, either in the Shoreham FSAR or in any applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation or guideline, that the replacement crankshafts meet any of these criteria. In fact, the only standby diesel generator design criteria currently referred to in an NRC Regulatory Guide is DEMA.

12. Please explain.

A. (Montgomery) NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2 (December 1979) (Exhibit C-3), addresses the design of standby diesel generator units at nuclear power plants. The Regulatory Guide provides:

Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std 387-1977, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," dated June 17, 1977, is acceptable for meeting the requirements of the principal design criteria and qualification testing of diesel-generator units used as onsite electric power systems for nuclear power plants. . . .

IEEE Std 387-1977 (Exhibit C-4), provides:

4.1 Standards. The equipment and accessories of the diesel-generator unit shall conform to the applicable portion of the following standards and the latest revisions thereof, as of the date of approval of this document.

* * *

[5] DEMA, Standard Practices for Low and Medium Speed Stationary Diesel and Gas Engines.

Nowhere is there any requirement that the crankshafts meet the criteria established by ABS, Lloyd's, IACS or FEV. As Dr. Carl Berlinger, NRC Lead Engineer for the Assessment of Diesel Engine Reliability/Operability, stated at the July 11, 1984 meeting of the TDI Owners Group:

NRC does not require the use of Lloyd's and specifically references DEMA, and we would not propose to require that this design be compared to Lloyd's. I don't know whether we really need any additional discussion relative to what standard to use as a basis for licensing or approval of these crankshafts.

The relevant portion of the transcript is attached as Exhibit C-5.

Furthermore, the determination of the fatigue endurance limit of the crankshafts, independent of any code or design requirements, establishes that the replacement crankshafts are adequate for their intended service.

B. The Crankshafts Do Not Have to Comply with ABS, Lloyd's, IACS or the Criteria Used by F.E.V.

13. Notwithstanding that there is no licensing requirement that the crankshafts meet any of these design criteria, is it necessary for the crankshafts to meet the standards of ABS, Lloyd's, IACS or the criteria used by FEV to be considered adequate and reliable for their intended use in the Shoreham EDGs?

A. (Montgomery, Chen) No. The replacement crankshafts have been demonstrated to be adequate and reliable by an extensive program of testing and analysis. This program clearly establishes, apart from any code, that the crankshafts will perform their intended function.

In addition, there is extensive experience with 13-inch by 12-inch crankshafts in DSR-48 engines that establishes the crankshafts are reliable. A table showing the operating history of DSR-48 engines with 13-inch by 12-inch crankshafts is attached as Exhibit C-6. An additional table showing the operating history of each of the Shoreham engines is attached as Exhibit C-7. The crankshafts were all inspected after 100 hours of operation at full load or greater by eddy current inspection. This inspection revealed no relevant indications or crack formations on the crankshafts after more than one million torsional peak stress reversals. The results of the eddy current inspection are attached as Exhibit C-8. Finally, the crankshafts comply with the DEMA recommendations for torsional vibratory stresses.

14. The County contends DEMA is not a design code and that it should not be used to determine the adequacy of the crankshafts. Do you agree?

A. (Chen) I agree that DEMA is not a design code. That is to say, DEMA does not tell an engine manufacturer how to design a crankshaft. However, I do not agree that DEMA does not

provide standards to measure the adequacy of a crankshaft. DEMA provides specific stress limits for crankshafts: 5,000 psi for a single order of vibration and 7,000 psi for the summation of the major orders. Engine manufacturers have used DEMA for years on stationary diesel generator installations to determine whether a crankshaft is adequate for its intended service. In addition, in over thirty (30) years of experience with diesel engines, I have never seen a crankshaft that complied with DEMA fail primarily from torsional fatigue.

15. The County states at page 114 of its testimony that "at a minimum, the crankshafts should be compatible with the rules of all the major classification societies." Do you agree with this statement?

A. (Cher.) No. In fact, this statement is absurd. No reasonable person would say that a crankshaft had to comply with the rules of all major societies to be considered adequate. The rules, standards and design methodologies of design societies vary widely and, in fact, provide differing acceptance criteria for the same crankshaft design parameters (e.g., journal/pin sizing, allowable horsepower, allowable torsional stress levels, etc.). A crankshaft may not meet the criteria of certain codes and be perfectly adequate under other codes. Furthermore, certain of the codes explicitly recognize that special consideration should be given to detailed stress analyses and test data if a crankshaft does not comply with literal

code requirements. For example, Section 37.17.1 of the 1983 ABS rules on the diameter of pins and journals (Exhibit C-9) provides:

Where critical dimensions are proposed which are less than those determined by the above equation, complete supporting data, including detailed stress analysis, are to be submitted for special consideration.

In addition, note 3 to Table 34.3 of the 1983 ABS rules concerning Allowable Stress Values for Crankshafts and Tail Shafts Due to a Single Harmonic (Grade 2 Steel) (Exhibit C-10) provides:

If torsional critical speed arrangements are similar to previous installations proven by service experience, consideration will be given to higher stresses upon submittal of full details.

In sum, the best way to evaluate a crankshaft is through engineering analysis. The County's suggestion that the crankshafts should comply with selected aspects of various codes (i.e., the most conservative part of each code) has no foundation.

16. Is a crankshaft inadequate if it does not comply with ABS, Lloyd's, IACS or the criteria used by FEV?

A. (Chen) No. A crankshaft may be structurally adequate for its intended service and not comply with ABS, Lloyd's, IACS or the FEV criteria. While compliance with one of the codes generally provides assurance that a crankshaft is adequate, noncompliance does not necessarily mean a crankshaft is

inadequate. Rather, noncompliance merely means a crankshaft does not meet the design requirements of a particular code. If a crankshaft is not required to meet that code by specification or other requirement (e.g., insurance purposes, licensing requirements, etc.), and there is assurance from other sources (such as testing or detailed engineering analysis) that the crankshaft is adequate, noncompliance is not significant.

Furthermore, the critical surface temperature and various stress levels of an operating marine engine vary considerably depending upon ship hull design, swells, wind and other sea-ship interactions, as well as the type of fuel used. That is why the marine engine classification rules are more stringent than the rules for stationary land-based engines. A stationary engine, which is perfectly adequate, might or might not pass one or more of the marine codes.

17. What is the most accurate way to assess the adequacy of a crankshaft?

(A) (All) The most accurate way to assess crankshaft adequacy is not to rely upon the design criteria of any code. Rather, the most accurate way to assess crankshaft reliability is to perform the type of tests and analyses that were performed on the Shoreham crankshafts. This information permits the calculation of actual operating stress states, separate and apart from compliance with the standards of any code.

18. You have just described the most accurate way to

assess the adequacy of a crankshaft. Why are not all crankshafts assessed in this manner?

A. (All) Most crankshafts are not assessed in this manner because the design review normally occurs before the crankshaft is manufactured. This is where design codes are used. It is normally impossible to measure the actual stresses from tests on the crankshaft because the crankshaft does not exist when it is being designed. Because of the uncertainty in predicted loads and response, these design codes are very conservative.

Unfortunately, LILCO had the luxury of having data available from a smaller crankshaft that failed in the same engines. This allowed calculation of the fatigue endurance limit for the replacement crankshafts. This type of data is extremely useful, but it is normally unavailable. In the absence of this detailed information, design codes are relied upon to provide assurance of crankshaft adequacy.

19. Notwithstanding that the crankshaft is not required to meet any of these codes, has the crankshaft been approved by any of these ship classification societies?

A. (Montgomery) Yes. ABS has approved the crankshaft dimensional sizing for diameter of pins and journals and proportions of the crankshaft webs. A copy of the crankshaft drawing certified by ABS is Exhibit C-11. ABS has certified that the material properties of the replacement crankshafts conform to the requirements of ABS grade 4 specifications. A copy

of the material properties certification is Exhibit C-12. Finally, ABS has stated that it would approve the torsional critical speed arrangement of the crankshaft, flywheel and generator at Shoreham for use on an ocean going vessel. A copy of ABS's letter of approval is Exhibit C-13.

20. The County contends ABS's approval is suspect because the information submitted to ABS was deficient in four specific areas: (1) shot peening; (2) maximum firing pressures; (3) strain gage measurement; and (4) operating experience. Please respond to each of these areas.

A. (Montgomery) The County claims the information on shot peening was inaccurate because TDI took credit for a 20% increase in the fatigue limit and there was no discussion of the first shot peening by TDI. As the separate testimony of Messrs. Wells, D. Johnson, Wachob, Seaman, Cimino and Burrell clearly demonstrates, the shot peening does increase the fatigue limit by up to 20%.

21. The County contends that maximum firing pressures as high as 1750 psi have been measured at full load. ABS was informed that the maximum firing pressure at full load was 1700 psi. Please discuss.

A. (Montgomery) The County is simply wrong. The documents relied upon by the County to show that peak firing pressures of 1750 psi have been measured at full load (TDI test logs attached to Suffolk County Exhibit 46) clearly show that the pressures above 1700 psi were measured at 110% of full load. The maximum firing pressure of 1700 psi relied upon by

ABS is correct. A fuller discussion of the inaccuracy of the County's contention concerning maximum firing pressure is contained in the testimony of Messrs. Harris, et al., on pistons.

22. The County contends TDI did not inform ABS that the strain gage test results were only accurate to within $\pm 5\%$. Is this significant?

A. (All) There is no significance to the fact that ABS was not informed that the strain gage test results were only accurate to within $\pm 5\%$. This is the expected degree of accuracy for field test results of this type.

23. Finally, the County contends TDI did not submit accurate information on the operating experience of the DSR-48 engines. Please discuss.

A. (Montgomery) The operating history submitted for the Shoreham engines was complete and accurate. The information submitted is attached as Exhibit C-6. This clearly shows the number of hours the Shoreham engines have operated at and above 3500 KW. In addition, there was no reason to submit information concerning block cracking since block data is not used in ABS's design rules for crankshafts. ABS was only asked to review the torsional critical speed arrangement. ABS was provided complete and accurate information for the Shoreham engines and approved the crankshafts on that basis.

IV. THE CRANKSHAFTS COMPLY WITH DEMA

24. Do the replacement crankshafts meet the recommendations of DEMA?

A. (Johnston, Chen) Yes, conventional analytical techniques typically utilized by the diesel engine industry show that the replacement crankshafts comply with the recommendations of DEMA.

25. What are the DEMA recommendations for crankshafts?

A. (Johnston, Chen) The DEMA recommendations for allowable crankshaft vibratory stress (Exhibit C-14) state:

In the case of constant speed units, such as generator sets, the objective is to insure that no harmful torsional vibratory stresses occur within five percent above and below rated speed.

For crankshafts, connecting shafts, flange or coupling components, etc., made of conventional materials, torsional vibratory conditions shall generally be considered safe when they induce a superimposed stress of less than 5000 psi, created by a single order of vibration, or a superimposed stress of less than 7000 psi, created by the summation of the major orders of vibration which might come into phase periodically.

26. How did you determine that the crankshafts complied with DEMA?

A. (Johnston) In August, 1983, TDI performed a torsional critical speed analysis of the replacement crankshafts. (Exhibit C-15). FaAA reviewed this analysis for compliance with the DEMA allowable stresses. In addition, in January, 1984, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, conducted

torsiograph tests on a replacement crankshaft at Shoreham. (Exhibit C-16). FaAA compared the test results with the DEMA allowable stresses. Based upon the review of TDI's torsional analysis and Stone & Webster's torsiograph tests, FaAA concluded the crankshafts complied with DEMA at full load (3500 KW) and overload (3900 KW). FaAA's conclusions are contained in the TDI Owners Group Crankshaft Report. (Exhibit C-17).

(Chen) In addition, I performed independent calculations (Exhibit C-18) to determine whether the crankshafts met the recommendations of DEMA. These calculations employed an internationally known computer program (TORVAP), which is widely used by the diesel engine manufacturers industry to measure nominal crankshaft torsional stresses. On the basis of these independent calculations, I determined that the replacement crankshafts complied with DEMA at full load (3500 KW) and overload (3900 KW).

27. What is a torsional critical speed analysis?

A. (Johnston, Chen) A torsional critical speed analysis is a method of calculating the torque being transmitted through a crankshaft in a diesel engine at a particular speed and power level. When operating at a particular speed and power level, the torque being transmitted through a crankshaft in a diesel engine varies with time and location. For a four-stroke engine, the torsional stress relationship over time repeats

itself every two revolutions of the crankshaft. The maximum torque on the crankshaft at any instant may be much larger than the mean torque required to run the engine at a given speed and power level. This additional torque is caused by a number of factors, including the cylinder firing order (excitation) and the presence of natural torsional modes of vibration of the crankshaft. To determine the maximum torque applied to the crankshaft, it is necessary to conduct a torsional critical speed analysis. Once the maximum torque has been calculated, it is simple to calculate the nominal torsional stresses for comparison to DEMA allowable stresses.

28. How was TDI's torsional critical speed analysis conducted?

A. (Johnston, Chen) TDI calculated the response of the crankshaft at 100% of rated load (3500 KW). The torsional analysis conducted by TDI was of two parts. First, TDI used an analytical technique, known as the Holzer method, to compute the natural frequencies and modes of vibration of the crankshaft system. If you strike a tuning fork, it will tend to vibrate at a particular frequency that is called its natural frequency. Similarly, a twisting force exerted on a crankshaft will induce the shaft to vibrate at certain discrete natural frequencies. The shape or angle of twist as a function of position along the shaft is unique for each natural frequency,

and this is often referred to as a mode shape. The Holzer method permits the manufacturer to calculate the predicted natural frequencies of the various modes of vibration that will result from torsional forces exerted on the crankshaft during operation.

TDI used the Holzer method to calculate the system's first three natural frequencies, which are shown in Exhibit C-19. In a four stroke engine such as the Shoreham diesel generators, operation at the fourth order critical speed produces the maximum stresses. The fourth order critical speed calculated by TDI is 581 rpm. The Shoreham engines operate at 450 rpm, which is significantly below the fourth order critical speed.

29. What is the second step of the analysis?

A. (Johnston, Chen) The second step in a torsional critical speed analysis is to determine the dynamic torsional response of the crankshaft due to gas pressure and reciprocating inertia loading for each order. The first order is a harmonic which repeats once per revolution of the crankshaft. For a four-stroke engine, harmonics of the order 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 . . . exist. TDI performs this calculation separately for each order of vibration up to 12. For each order, the applied torque and nominal torsional stress at a cylinder due to gas pressure and reciprocating inertia is calculated.

30. What was the result of TDI's analysis and how did the result compare to DEMA allowables?

A. (Johnston) TDI calculated the response for the first three modes and plotted the results for only the first mode, since higher modes produce much smaller stresses. The nominal shear stresses for the significant orders are shown in Exhibit C-20. The largest single order stress at rated load and speed is for the fourth order. This stress, 2980 psi, is well below the 5000 psi allowed by DEMA. Due to the analytical technique TDI employed, TDI did not calculate the torsional stresses created by the summation of the major orders of vibration for purposes of comparison with the DEMA allowable of 7000 psi.

31. Given that TDI only calculated single order stresses, what further action was taken to assure that the crankshafts complied with DEMA?

A. (Johnston) Stone & Webster performed torsigraph tests on the replacement crankshaft in EDG 103 in January, 1984 at various power levels. (Exhibit C-16). The torsigraph tests measured the total torsional vibrations resulting from all orders. These torsional vibrations were converted into stresses for comparison with DEMA.

32. How is a torsigraph test performed?

A. (Johnston, Chen) A torsigraph test is performed by placing a seismic instrument (a device for measuring angular displacement due to vibration) on the end of a crankshaft and recording the angular displacement due to vibration under different engine operating conditions.

The test is usually performed in two stages. The first stage is without load and is used to determine the location of critical speeds, or natural frequencies, of the crankshaft. This is done by varying the speed of the engine and recording the vibratory response. As the frequency of vibration for any order approaches a natural frequency of the shaft, the amplitude of vibrations will increase and reach a peak at the natural frequency. If you know the engine speed where this peak vibration occurs, it is simple to calculate the natural frequency. Critical speeds may also be determined while operating at a fixed speed and observing the frequency content of the response.

33. How did the natural frequency measured by Stone & Webster compare to the natural frequency computed by TDI?

A. (Johnston) The frequency content of the torsional vibration signal at 450 rpm showed a resonance at 38.6 Hz. This value is in excellent agreement with TDI's computed value of 38.7 Hz. This comparison demonstrates that the mass elastic properties used in TDI's analysis for representation of the crankshaft are correct.

34. What is the second stage of the torsionograph test?

A. (Johnston, Chen) The second stage is to determine nominal stresses in the crankshaft under various load conditions. This test is performed at rated speed of 450 rpm with

variable load. The purpose of this test is to confirm the forced vibration calculations.

The torsigraph provides the angular displacement response (the angle of twist) of the free end of the crankshaft as a function of time. This displacement may be decomposed into components corresponding to each order. The torsigraph also provides the peak-to-peak response. These responses are used to calculate the nominal stresses.

35. How were the nominal stresses determined from the torsional vibrations measured by Stone & Webster?

A. (Johnston) Stone & Webster tabulated the single order and peak-to-peak torsional vibration response for both 3500 KW (100% of rated load) and for 3800 KW (109% of rated load). FaAA factored these values to obtain nominal shear stresses, which are shown in Exhibit C-21. The results at 100% load show that the largest single order (the fourth order) has a stress of 3108 psi, which is well below the DEMA allowable of 5000 psi. The total stress of 6626 psi is also below the DEMA allowable of 7000 psi.

At 3800 KW the stresses of 3242 psi for a single order and 6875 psi for combined response are also lower than 5000 psi and 7000 psi respectively. At 3900 KW the corresponding stresses are 3287 psi and 6958 psi, by linear extrapolation. The measured response at 3500 KW is in close agreement with that calculated by TDI.

36. Did FaAA calculate the stresses at 95% and 105% of rated speed?

A. (Johnston) Yes, we calculated the fourth order and total stresses at 95% and 105% of rated speed. On the basis of our calculations, we conclude that the stresses at those speeds satisfy the DEMA allowables.

37. What conclusions did FaAA draw from the stresses calculated from the torsionograph test data and the stresses calculated analytically by TDI?

A. (McCarthy, Johnston) The design calculations on the 13-inch by 12-inch crankshafts performed by TDI are appropriate and show that the crankshaft stresses are below DEMA recommendations for a single order. Combined stress was not calculated by this method, but was determined by torsionograph testing. The Stone & Webster torsionograph test results show that the 13-inch by 12-inch crankshaft stresses are below the DEMA recommended levels for both single order and combined orders for both 3500 KW (100% rated load) and 3800 KW. A linear extrapolation to 3900 KW also shows compliance. In addition, no harmful torsional vibratory stresses occur within 5% above and 5% below rated speed.

38. Dr. Chen, do your calculations also show that the replacement crankshafts comply with DEMA?

A. (Chen) Yes.

39. Please describe your calculations.

A. (Chen) I calculated the natural frequencies, as well as the torsional stresses of the engine generator system using the TORVAP R and TORVAP C computer programs. I calculated the response for single orders and combined orders. I also calculated the torsional vibration at the free end of the crankshaft. The calculations I performed are typical of the calculations performed by the diesel engine industry to check the adequacy of a crankshaft to withstand torsional stress.

40. What were the results of your natural frequency calculations?

A. (Chen) The natural frequency calculations are essentially identical to the natural frequency calculations of TDI and FaAA. The results are shown in the following table:

<u>Mode</u>	<u>TDI</u>	<u>FaAA</u>	<u>PEI</u>
1st	2323.2	2323.8	2323.3
2nd	5575.5	5576.4	5575.2
3rd	7000.3	7002.0	7000.4

41. What were the results of your free end amplitude calculations?

A. (Chen) The results of the free end amplitude calculations are in close agreement to the values calculated by FaAA and measured by Stone & Webster. The results for the fourth order and the combined response are shown in Exhibit C-22.

42. What were the results of your single order nominal stress calculations?

A. (Chen) The maximum torsional stresses are caused by the fourth order. I calculated the fourth order stresses for all modes. This contrasts to TDI's calculation, which only allows the calculation of fourth order stresses for single modes. I calculated these stresses at full load, overload, 95% of rated load and 105% of rated load. The fourth order stresses are as follows:

Fourth Order Stresses

<u>RPM</u>	<u>KW</u>	<u>PSI</u>
450	3500	3455
450	3900	3740
427.5	3500	3071
472.5	3500	4010

43. What was the result of your sum of orders response and nominal stress calculation?

A. (Chen) The sum of orders stresses at full load, overload, 95% and 105% of rated load are as follows:

Sum of Orders Stresses

<u>RPM</u>	<u>KW</u>	<u>PSI</u>
450	3500	5101
450	3900	5401
427.5	3500	6232

472.5

3500

5673

44. Do the crankshafts comply with DEMA at overload conditions?

A. (Chen) Yes. At 3900 Kw the fourth order stress is 3740 psi and the sum of orders stress is 5401 psi. These figure are well within the DEMA allowables. It should be noted that DEMA does not require stress calculations at overload conditions. Nonetheless, the replacement crankshafts are within the DEMA stress limits at overload.

45. Dr. Chen, have you ever seen crankshafts that have failed from torsional stress?

A. (Chen) Yes. I have seen quite a few crankshafts that have failed from torsional stress.

46. Are you aware of any crankshafts that comply with DEMA that have failed primarily due to torsional stress.

A. (Chen) No. In more than thirty (30) years of experience in the diesel engine industry, I do not know of any situations in which a crankshaft that met DEMA recommendations has failed primarily from torsional fatigue. I was chairman of the DEMA Technical Committee from 1971 through 1973 and I can state with confidence that a crankshaft that complies with DEMA is reliable for its intended service.

V. THE FATIGUE ANALYSIS AND FIELD TESTING OF THE CRANKSHAFTS SHOW THAT THE CRANKSHAFTS WILL NOT FAIL DURING OPERATION

47. What is the purpose of a fatigue analysis?

A. (McCarthy, Johnston) The purpose of a fatigue analysis is to determine the useful life of a given component (in this case a crankshaft) for its specified service loads. FaAA performed a fatigue analysis which enabled us to conclude that the crankshafts have unlimited life for their intended service.

48. Why did FaAA perform a fatigue analysis of the crankshafts?

A. (McCarthy, Johnston) Although the crankshafts meet the nominal stress recommendations of DEMA for operation at 3500 KW and 3900 KW, the stresses for combined orders calculated from the torsionograph measurements are close to the recommended allowable of 7000 psi. (The stresses for single orders are considerably lower than the recommended allowable of 5000 psi.) While the DEMA limits are believed to contain an intrinsic safety margin, a fatigue analysis was performed to determine the true safety margin of the crankshafts and to provide an additional measure of assurance, independent of design criteria specified by any code, that the crankshafts are adequately designed to perform their intended function in the Shoreham EDGs.

49. How was the fatigue analysis conducted?

A. (Johnston, McCarthy) To conduct a fatigue analysis FaAA had to determine the maximum stresses the crankshafts would see in service, as well as the endurance limit for the crankshaft material. FaAA performed a two part analysis to determine the maximum stresses. First, a dynamic torsional analysis of the crankshaft was performed to determine the true range of torque at each crank throw. Second, using the results of the dynamic torsional analysis, a finite element model of a one quarter crank throw was used to compute the magnitude and location of peak stresses in the fillet region. Torsional and gas pressure loading cases were considered in the finite element model to evaluate the effects of twisting and bending loads. These analyses permitted FaAA to determine the maximum stresses. These stresses were also obtained from a dynamic strain gage test on the replacement crankshaft.

The fatigue endurance limit was established for the replacement crankshaft by first obtaining the endurance limit for the failed crankshafts, and then increasing that limit to reflect the difference in ultimate tensile strength between the failed and replacement crankshafts. The endurance limit was compared with values provided in the literature and found to be acceptable. The factor of safety against fatigue failure was computed from the test data gathered from the original and

replacement crankshafts. The factor of safety is large enough to provide confidence in the reliability of the crankshafts.

50. Let us discuss separately each part of the fatigue analysis. What is the purpose of a dynamic torsional analysis?

A. (Johnston) FaAA developed a dynamic torsional model of the crankshaft to determine the total torque at each crank throw. The total torque is calculated by a summation of the torque produced by each order and mode. The analytical method used by FaAA computes the phase relationship between the various orders and modes, which permits this summation. The dynamic torsional analysis represents a more accurate calculation of the stresses actually experienced by the crankshaft during operation than conventional analytical techniques. (Technical details of the dynamic torsional model are contained in Section 3.1 of Exhibit C-17).

51. What did you do with the total torque calculated from the dynamic torsional analysis?

A. (Johnston) The total torque was used as input data to the finite element model to determine the actual maximum state of stress in the crankshaft.

52. What was the purpose of constructing a finite element model of a one quarter crank throw?

A. (Johnston) The nominal crankshaft stress values calculated from the dynamic model (i.e. total torque) are

considerably less than the actual maximum stresses in the crankshaft. Those nominal values would prevail if the crankshaft were a long circular cylinder. Stresses in the real crankshaft are greatly influenced by its complex geometry and by stress concentrations, especially at the fillet radii between the main journal and web and the crankpin and web. In addition, a crankshaft throw is subjected to loads of two basic types: (1) torque transmitted through the throw, which is influenced by the output power level and by the torsional vibration response of the crankshaft; and, (2) connecting rod forces applied to the crankpin and reacted at bearing supports. A finite element model of a one quarter crank throw, considering stresses due to torsional loading and stresses due to gas pressure loading, was used to compute the actual maximum value and location of stresses in the crankpin fillet area. The strain gages used during dynamic testing were placed at the location of maximum stress calculated by the finite element model. (Technical details concerning the finite element model are contained in Section 3.2 of Exhibit C-17).

53. Please describe the dynamic testing.

A. (Johnston) Stone & Webster conducted dynamic tests on the replacement crankshaft on EDG 103 in January, 1984. Instrumentation for the measurement and recording of significant dynamic data included the following:

1. Cylinder firing pressure of cylinder Nos. 5 and 7 was measured;
2. Dynamic torque in the crankshaft between the engine casing and the flywheel was measured by a strain gage torque bridge;
3. Crankpins Nos. 5 and 7 were instrumented with three element strain rosettes to measure crankpin fillet dynamic strains.

These tests were performed under a variety of loads and transient conditions to investigate the dynamic response of the crankshaft.

54. How were the results of these tests used in FaAA's analysis?

A. (Johnston) First, the cylinder firing pressure measured by Stone & Webster was utilized to obtain the gas pressure loading for input to the dynamic torsional analysis. The total torque produced by this loading was calculated and corresponds closely to the torque measured by Stone & Webster near the flywheel. (Exhibit C-23). Second, the dynamic strains measured by Stone & Webster in the crankpin fillets of crankpin Nos. 5 and 7 were used to compute the maximum stresses, which were used to calculate the factor of safety. These stresses are within the range predicted by FaAA's finite element analyses. (Exhibit C-24).

55. Are the results of Stone & Webster's dynamic torsional testing confirmed by the analytical models used by FaAA?

A. (Johnston, McCarthy) Yes. The results of FaAA's

analytical models agree with the dynamic strain gage tests. Dynamic testing of the crankshaft, in this regard, is considered to be an essential element of the design review program because it is only through carefully conducted measurement that the actual engine dynamics and local component stresses are confirmed.

56. After measuring the maximum stresses in the fillet area, what was the next step in your analysis.

A. (Johnston) The next step in the analysis was to compare the measured stresses with the fatigue endurance limit of the replacement crankshafts. The results of the finite element analysis were used to determine the maximum principal stress range in the fillet area, which was then compared to the fatigue endurance limit of the replacement crankshaft.

57. How was the fatigue endurance limit of the replacement crankshaft established?

A. (Johnston) The fatigue endurance limit of the replacement crankshaft was established by first obtaining the endurance limit of the failed crankshaft. Since the endurance limit scales linearly with ultimate tensile strength, the endurance limit of the replacement crankshaft was increased to reflect the difference in ultimate tensile strength between the failed and replacement crankshaft.

58. How was the endurance limit established for the original crankshafts?

A. (Johnston) The original 13-inch by 11-inch crankshaft on EDG 101 was instrumented with strain gages in the fillet location of Crankpin No. 5. This fillet had previously experienced a fatigue crack during performance testing. After the test, the three-dimensional finite element model of a quarter section of a crank throw showed that the strain gages were placed close to the location of maximum stress. The measured stress range was used to establish the endurance limit in this analysis as a conservative assumption, although the actual maximum stress range was revealed by the finite element model to be about 15% higher at a nearby location. The original crankshaft on EDG 102 had experienced 273 hours at equal to or greater than 100% load, or about 4,000,000 cycles. By using linear cumulative damage techniques, it was determined that the endurance limit for the original crankshafts was 36.5 ksi.

59. What is the fatigue endurance limit for the replacement crankshafts?

A. (Johnston) The fatigue endurance limit for the replacement crankshafts is 39.2 ksi. This is higher than the fatigue endurance limit for the original crankshafts because the ultimate tensile strength of the replacement crankshafts exceeds the ultimate tensile strength of the original crankshafts.

60. Having obtained the fatigue endurance limit for the replacement crankshafts, were you able to calculate the factor of safety against fatigue failure?

A. (Johnston) Yes. The factor of safety against fatigue failure was calculated by plotting the maximum principal stress range measured in the crankpin fillet area on a Goodman diagram, constructed using the fatigue endurance limit and the ultimate tensile strength values for the replacement crankshafts. (Exhibit C-25). The factor of safety against fatigue failure is 1.48, without taking into account any beneficial effect of shot peening the fillet regions.

61. Does a factor of safety of 1.48 provide sufficient assurance that the replacement crankshafts are adequate for their intended service in the Shoreham EDGs?

A. (McCarthy) Yes.

62. What is the basis for your opinion that a factor of safety of 1.48 is sufficient for the replacement crankshafts?

A. (McCarthy) To explain that I must first explain what a factor of safety is. With that understanding, the acceptability of a factor of 1.48 will become apparent.

63. What is a factor of safety?

A. (McCarthy) A factor of safety is an additional margin of strength, in either the fatigue strength (endurance limit), yield strength, or ultimate strength, that is added to a mechanical design to compensate for uncertainties, i.e. effects or things we don't know. There is significant confusion often

generated by a failure to identify whether a stated factor of safety is with regard to fatigue or endurance limit, yield, or ultimate strength. The factor of safety with regard to these three different failure modes will generally be different for the same design or part.

64. What is the difference between a factor of safety in endurance limit, yield strength, and in ultimate strength?

A. (McCarthy) A factor of safety in endurance limit is the factor of strength the part or design has over that required for the part to be expected to exhibit infinite life, or a life of some specified number of cycles in repeated or cyclic loading. A factor of safety in yield is the factor the yield strength of the part is greater than the expected service load. Similarly the factor of safety in ultimate strength or overload failure is the factor the breaking strength of the part is greater than the expected service load. In older design references it is not uncommon to see a very large factor of safety in overload recommended, and no mention of a factor of safety in endurance limit or fatigue strength, for parts that were cyclically loaded and could fail in fatigue. This was before fatigue and stress concentration effects were as well understood as they are now.

65. What types of uncertainties is the factor an allowance or compensation for?

A. (McCarthy) Uncertainties as to service load, material properties, stress concentration factors, lifetime, etc., which obviously are directly related to the amount of testing, analysis, and understanding a designer has of a particular part and its service environment.

66. What is an acceptable allowance for this uncertainty, or, in other words, what is an acceptable factor of safety?

A. (McCarthy) This is totally determined by the degree of uncertainty and the difficulty or penalties of adding additional strength to the design. Where the design envelope and the nature of the fabricated part are reasonably understood, a factor of safety in fatigue or cyclic loading of 1.3 to 2.0 is generally recommended. When the uncertainty of design factors is greater, higher values will be recommended. Some design texts will recommend that, if the designer is seriously considering a factor of safety of greater than two, he should devote additional time to analyzing the design, rather than accepting the ignorance which is causing him to select a higher factor of safety. Portions from several of the most widely used Mechanical Engineering design references are attached as Exhibit C-26. A factor of safety of 1.48 in fatigue or endurance limit will produce a much higher factor of safety with regard to yielding or overload failure.

67. How well is the design of the replacement crankshafts understood?

A. (McCarthy) To put it simply, extremely well. We have the benefit of the information gained from the failure of the original crankshafts, full scale instrumented tests of the actual service loading, material strength tests for the individual parts, torsionograph testing, and extensive three dimensional analytical modeling of the structure. The crankshaft is being run in a temperature controlled, oil filled environment. It is completely guarded from accidental and unanticipated impact by foreign objects by the engine block. Usually a designer has far, far less information to work with when assessing a design. This results in uncertainties in the design being reduced substantially.

68. What does this understanding of the crankshaft design mean in terms of an acceptable factor of safety.

A. (McCarthy) For well understood designs operating in environments that are not severe, a factor of safety in fatigue or endurance limit of 1.3 to 1.5 is generally accepted. For this particular part, it would^{be} my opinion that our degree of understanding would certainly permit the use of a safety factor at the lower end of this range, when in fact the actual safety factor is at the high end. Therefore the factor of 1.48 is quite acceptable.

Attachment 1

Failure Analysis Associates

ROGER L. McCARTHY

Specialized Professional Competence

Mechanical, machine, and mechanism design. Dynamic mechanical system design, analysis modeling, control (including dedicated computer control), and failure analysis. Custom product design. Human factors engineering and testing; design analysis of man/machine interface. Design analysis research. Risk analysis; quantification of hazards posed by design and construction of mechanical components, products, or system failure in the industrial and transportation environments. Design analysis through large scale accident data analysis and evaluation, including vehicle design and collision performance. Evaluation of mechanical/electrical design-related explosion hazard; heat transfer design. Reinforced polymer composite design analysis, including tires. Patent analysis relating to mechanical design.

Background and Professional Honors

A.B. (Philosophy), University of Michigan, with High Distinction
B.S.E. (Mechanical Engineering), University of Michigan, summa cum laude
S.M. (Mechanical Engineering), Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mech.E. (Mechanical Engineering), Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ph.D. (Mechanical Engineering), Massachusetts Institute of Technology

President,

Failure Analysis Associates
Principal Design Engineer
Failure Analysis Associates
Program Manager, Special Machinery Group,
Foster-Miller Associates, Inc.
Project Engineer, Machine Design and Development Engineering, Engineering Development Division,
Proctor & Gamble Company, Inc.

Registered Professional Mechanical Engineer, California, #M20040

Registered Professional Mechanical Engineer, Arizona, #13684

Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, James B. Angell Scholar

National Science Foundation Fellow

Outstanding Undergraduate in Mechanical Engineering, University of Michigan

Member, American Society of Metals, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Society of Automotive Engineers, American Welding Society, National Safety Council, American Society for Testing and Materials

Member, American Society of Safety Engineers

Member, Human Factors Society, System Safety Society, National Society of Professional Engineers

Member, American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers

Member, National Fire Prevention Association

Selected Publications

"School Bus Wheel Rim Safety - Multipiece vs. Single Piece," National School Bus Report, Springfield, Virginia (December 1982) (with G. E. McCarthy).

"Warnings on Consumer Products: Objective Criteria For Their Use," 26th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society, Seattle, Washington (October 25-29, 1982) (with J. N. Robinson, J. P. Finnegan and R. K. Taylor).

"Average Operator Inaction Characteristics with Lever Controls - Study of the Column Mounted Gear Selector Lever," 26th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society, Seattle, Washington (October 25-29, 1982) (with J. P. Finnegan, G. F. Fowler and S. B. Brown).

"Catastrophic Events: Actual Risk versus Societal Impact," 1982 Proceedings, Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, Los Angeles, California (January 26-28, 1982) (with J. P. Finnegan and R. K. Taylor).

- "Product Recall Decision Making: Valid Product Safety Indicators." Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference, San Francisco, California (July 9-13, 1979). Published by Professional Engineer Magazine (March 1981).
- "Large Vehicle Wheel Servicing: Reduction of Risk Through Implementation of An OSHA Standard Governing Multipiece and Single Piece Rims: Phase IV." Published by the National Wheel and Rim Association (March 1981) (with J. P. Finnegan).
- "Program to Improve Down Hole Drilling Motors: Task 2, Lip Seal Design." Failure Analysis Associates Report FAA-81-7-6 to Sandia National Laboratories (October 1980) (with V. Pedotto).
- "A Safety and Fracture Mechanics Analysis of the Pneumatic Tire: A Perspective on the Firestone 500 Radial Tire." Presented at the International Conference on Reliability, Stress Analysis and Failure Prevention, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, San Francisco, California (August 18-21, 1980) (with W. G. Knauss).
- "Multipiece and Single Piece Rims: The Risk Associated with Their Unique Design Characteristics: Phase III." Published by the National Wheel and Rim Association (June 1980) (with J. P. Finnegan).
- "An Engineering Safety Analysis of the Steel Belted Radial Tire." Society of Automotive Engineers Paper #800840 (June 9-13, 1980).
- "A Simple Technique to Improve the Allocation of Safety Inspection Resources." Proceedings of the Fourth International System Safety Conference, San Francisco, California (July 9-13, 1979) (with P. M. Besuner).
- "An Engineering Analysis of the Risk Associated with Multipiece Wheels." National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, ANPR Docket No. 71-19, Number 7 (June 1979) (with J. P. Finnegan).
- "Planar Thermic Elements for Thermal Control Systems." Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement and Control, Vol. 99, Series G, No. 1 (March 1977) (with B. S. Buckley).

Attachment 2

EUGENE F. MONTGOMERY
18 Fourth Place
Syosset, New York 11791

Telephone - Home: 516/921-0866
- Office: 516/929-8300,
Ext. 3637

EXPERIENCE SUMMARY:

Over eight years of progressively increasing responsibility in the performance and management of engineering mechanics activities on nuclear power plant piping systems and equipment for electric utility and consulting engineering firms.

EDUCATION:

Columbia University School of Engineering and Applied Sciences,
New York, New York

Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering - May 1973
Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering - October 1974
Mechanical Engineer (Professional Degree) - January 1981

Queens College, City University of New York, Queens, New York

Bachelor of Arts, Physics - May 1973

EXPERIENCE: (See Attachment for Details)

1981 to Present

Stress Analyst, Nuclear Engineering Department
Long Island Lighting Company
175 East Old Country Road
Hicksville, NY 11801

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit No. 1
Mark II BWR/4 Capacity 819 Mw Net

Responsible Owner's representative for the engineering, coordination, review and approval of stress related activities performed in support of Shoreham licensing, start-up and system turnover.

1980 to 1981

Senior Engineer, Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Burns and Roe, Incorporated
185 Crossways Park Drive
Woodbury, NY 11797

Washington Nuclear Project (Hanford) Unit No. 2
Mark II BWR/5 Capacity 1100 Mw Net

Lead Engineer for various engineering evaluations related to fatigue analysis and high frequency effects of Mark II Suppression Pool loads on containment piping, equipment and support structures.

EUGENE F. MONTGOMERY
Page Two

EXPERIENCE (Cont'd.)

1978 to 1980

Senior Engineer, Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Ebasco Services, Incorporated
2 World Trade Center
New York, NY 10048

Laguna Verde Units No. 1 and 2
Mark II BWR/6 Capacity 600 Mw Net

Stress Engineer responsible for the design, analysis and checking of major ASME III Code Class 2, 3 and USAS B31.1 nuclear power piping systems.

1977 to 1978

Engineer 'A', Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Burns and Roe, Incorporated
185 Crossways Park Drive
Woodbury, NY 11797

Washington Nuclear Project (Hanford) Unit No. 2
Mark II BWR/5 Capacity 1100 Mw Net

Stress Engineer responsible for the combined application of finite element methods (ANSYS), piping flexibility analysis (ADLPIPE) and Fortran IV computer programming to achieve the optimum design of nuclear power piping systems and their supports (normal/pipe-rupture) according to project specifications.

PROFESSIONAL
SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP:

Associate Member - American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Associate Member - New York State Society of Professional Engineers

Member - Tau Beta Pi (National Engineering Honor Society)

REFERENCES:

Will be furnished on request.

DETAILS OF EXPERIENCE LISTING

From Stress Analyst, Nuclear Engineering Department
3/81 Long Island Lighting Company
to 175 East Old Country Road
Present Hicksville, NY 11801

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1
Mark II BWR/4 Capacity 819 Mw Net

Responsible Owner's representative for the engineering, coordination, review and approval of stress-related activities performed in support of Shoreham licensing, start-up and system turnover. Major assignments included the following:

- o In responsible charge of engineering review and approval of calculations performed by project consultants (Stone & Webster, Inc., General Electric) for seismic qualification and hydrodynamic re-evaluation of all safety-related equipment subject to IEEE-344, 1975 and the latest NRC criteria. Represented client interests at NRC-Equipment Qualification Branch technical audits of detailed dynamics analyses and test reports. Interfaced and coordinated between NRC and consultants to obtain acceptable resolutions on outstanding technical concerns.
- o Member of Motor Operator Test Group addressing issues on vibration aging and mechanical fatigue of Limitorque motor operators. Participated in formulation of procedures and test specifications used to qualify the equipment to long-duration, high frequency loads.
- o Initiated and coordinated stress-engineering software development for the Nuclear Engineering Department. Conducted evaluations to assemble an applications package consisting of essential structural and piping codes.
- o Lead Engineer for the Independent Design Review of the safety-related portions of the ECCS Core Spray System piping, supports, equipment and structures. Developed program plan and description, reviewed technical proposals. Coordinated audit open items/findings resolutions between Independent Design Reviewer (Teledyne Engineering Services) and project consultants.
- o Project Engineer for the As-Built Piping Reconciliation Program responsible for monitoring and minimizing the impact of field modifications due to calculation close-out and reviews.
- o LILCO Engineering Specialist for the Transamerica Delaval (TDI) Recovery Program. Reviewed diagnostic calculations on failure of engine crankshaft and analyses of replacement crankshaft design. Developed "tracking System" for nuclear/non-nuclear diesel engine failure experience for use in the TDI Owner's Design Review/Quality Revalidation effort.

Special Training

LILCO sponsored departmental training lectures. Covered topics included:

- o 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Assurance Requirements
- o BWR Systems Familiarization Course
- o General Employee Training (GET) (for access to vital plant areas)
- o Shoreham Emergency Preparedness Training
- o English Language Institute Study Course
- o Technical Specialist QA Auditor Training

From
4/80
to
3/81

Senior Engineer, Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Burns and Roe, Incorporated
185 Crossways Park Drive
Woodbury, N.Y. 11797

Washington Public Power Supply System

Washington Nuclear Project (Hanford) Unit No. 2
Mark II BWR/5 Capacity: 1100 Mw Net

In responsible charge of engineering evaluations in the following areas:

- o Lead Engineer for the fatigue analysis of MSR/V lines and downcomers subjected to extended duration LOCA-related hydrodynamic loads. Supervised engineering personnel in lower classifications.
- o Member of Mark II SRSS/LCAC (Square-Root-Sum-Square and Load Combination Acceptance Criteria) Subcommittee addressing issues on MSR/V and downcomer fatigue analysis, essential piping functional capability, SRSS Newmark-Kennedy Criteria and high frequency content of Mark II loads.
- o Lead Engineer for analysis of drywell ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) for Annulus Pressurization faulted loading conditions. Assisted and trained other stress analysts in performing calculations on conformance with project design specifications and ASME code.

Conceptual Engineering

- o Developed an analytical approach for determining the optimum support configuration restraining large, eccentric motor-operator valves. Guidelines in the form of simplified computational procedures and tables were prepared. (Published paper titled, "Optimum Rigid Support Spacing for Eccentric Operator Valves," June 1981.)

From
5/78
to
4/80

Senior Engineer, Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Ebasco Services Incorporated
2 World Trade Center
New York, N.Y. 10048

Stress Engineer responsible for the design, analysis, and checking of major ASME Code Class 2, 3 and USAS B31.1 nuclear power piping systems.

Comision Federal de Electricidad

Laguna Verde Units No. 1 and 2
Mark II BWR/6 Capacity 600 Mw Net

- o Responsible for thermal, pressure, deadweight and seismic design, analysis and checking of safety-related systems according to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III and USAS B31.1 using the proprietary pipe flexibility code PIPESTRESS 2010.
- o Developed initial support location, selection and sizing (or modified line routing, when necessary) on the following BWR systems: reactor water cleanup (RWCU), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), high pressure core spray (HPCS), low pressure core spray (LPCS), residual heat removal (RHR), standby liquid control (SLC), and numerous other Reactor and Control Building systems.
- o Prepared, checked and reviewed system stress analysis reports. Interfaced equipment allowable nozzle loads, pipe support loads, and postulated pipe stress break locations with other disciplines.

Houston Lighting and Power Company

Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Mark III BWR Capacity 1200 Mw Net

- o Performed investigative study to determine the structural response of proposed Main Steam and Reactor Feedwater seismic interface/ pipe rupture restraint system outside primary containment. An in-house dynamic-plastic finite element code, PLAST 2267, used for analysis.

Conceptual Engineering

- o Responsible for deriving maximum seismic support spans based upon a frequency design criteria. Nondimensional charts and tables developed for supports around right angle elbows, large radius bends, and parallel offset configurations. Prepared summary report for inclusion in project Pipe Stress Analysis Guidelines.

Special Training

Ebasco Services, Inc. sponsored departmental training lecture series. Covered topics included:

- o Code Stress Basis
- o Quality Assurance
- o Stress Analysis of Fossil Plant Piping
- o Pipe Rupture Interface with Stress Analysis
- o Thermal Stress Analysis According to B31.1
- o Seismic Charts Analysis
- o Vibration Theory and Problems in Piping

From
2/77
to
4/78

Engineer 'A', Stress Analysis Engineering Department
Burns and Roe, Incorporated
185 Crossways Park Drive
Woodbury, N.Y. 11797

Stress Engineer responsible for the combined application of finite element methods (ANSYS), piping flexibility analysis (ADLPIPE) and Fortran computer programming to achieve the optimum design of nuclear power piping systems and their component supports according to the applicable portions of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III.

Washington Public Power Supply System

Washington Nuclear Project (Hanford) Unit No. 2
Mark II BWR/5 Capacity 1100 Mw Net

- o Responsible for the pipe rupture analysis of Main Steam high energy line breaks outside primary containment. Non-linear, elasto-plastic, dynamic finite element analysis (ANSYS) used to determine whip restraint gap size, maximum support member forces/moments, plastic piping response, penetration nozzle reactions. MSIV end loads and deformations. Prepared and reviewed final stress analysis report.
- o Responsible for the engineering, design and analysis of major wetwell piping and components subjected to direct hydrodynamic Mark II submerged structure loads. Time history and response spectra techniques (ADLPIPE) used to locate supports and evaluate piping response on MSRV lines, downcomers and miscellaneous wetwell penetrations under normal/upset/emergency/faulted hydrodynamic loading conditions.

- o Coordinated application of DFFR (CE Dynamic Forcing Function Report) and DAR (Design Assessment Report) for developing force vs. time curves due to SRV discharge, Chugging, Condensation Oscillation, Pool Swell and Fallback input to pipe stress analysis. Developed Fortran programs for data file manipulation.
- o Performed detailed analysis of MSRV X-Quencher device and its associated support structure under direct and indirect structural loads. Verified member sizes and anchor bolt-down adequacy. Prepared final stress report.

Jersey Central Power and Light

Three Mile Island Unit No. 2
PWR Capacity 880 Mw Net

- o Responsible for verifying the design adequacy of Reactor Pressure Vessel and Main Steam Generator base plate shear pin bolt design under longitudinal and circumferential hot/cold leg coolant line breaks. The dynamic finite element codes STARDYNE and ANSYS were used in conjunction with an empirically developed collapse moment equation. Prepared final stress report.

Conceptual Engineering

Prepared Fortran software necessary to interface company developed piping graphics package with ADLPIPE, a conventional pipe flexibility code. Linkage permitted free thermal execution of designers' proposed routing while simultaneously plotting the layout on orthographic or isometric view.

Special Training

- o "Practical Seismic Design of Structures" administered by Structures Group, Metropolitan Section ASCE.
- o "Advanced Topics and New Developments in Finite Element Methods" administered by MARC Analysis Research Corporation.

Attachment 4

PEI

CONSULTANTS

Biographical Data On
Dr. Simon K. Chen, PE

March 16, 1983

Position PresidentHome 325 Racine Street, Delavan, WI 53115
Home Phone: 414-728-6994Education

B.S., M.E.	1947	National Chiao-Tung University
M.S., M.E.	1959	University of Michigan
Ph.D., M.E.	1952	University of Wisconsin
M.B.A.	1964	University of Chicago, Executive Program

Work Experience

President, Power and Energy International, Inc. Technical consulting and product development	1979 - present
President, Beloit Power Systems, Inc. Manufacturers of engine and turbine driven alternators, up to 15,000KW, rotary positive screw gas compressor, power plant controls, and gen-sets.	1973 - 1979
V.P., Engineering and Application, Fairbanks-Morse Power Systems Colt Industries Developer of O.P. Blower series line with increased rating, O.P. sparked gas engine, manufacturer of SEMT-PC-2 for marines, stationary and nuclear standby applications, developer of 38A-20 engine, producer of large irrigation pump, rotary compressor, alternators and motors.	1969 - 1973
Divisional Chief Engineer, Diesel Engine R&D, International Harvester Company Developer and manufacturers of vehicular diesels and spark- gas engines for construction equipment, farm equipment, medium-duty truck, and industrial applications.	1965 - 1969
Chief Project Research Engineer, Engineering Research, IH Corporate research on alternate power plant, engine combus- tion, advanced power train concept, advanced vehicle analysis, and corporate product planning.	1956 - 1965
Project Engineer, IH, Melrose Park In charge of combustion research on diesel and stratified charge engine.	1952 - 1956

Technical Society Membership List and Honors

SAE, ASME, SNAME, EGSMA, CIE, Who's Who in the World, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, Engineers of Distinction by Engineers Joint Council in 1973, SAE Arch T. Colwell Merit Award in 1966, University of Wisconsin Alumni Distinguished Service Award, 1973, Chinese Institute of Engineer's Achievement Award in 1976, Director and Technical Chairman of Diesel Engine Manufacturing Association, 1971-73, Member Compressed Air and Gas Institute, 1973-79, SAE Fellow-1983, Registered Professional Engineer - State of Wisconsin.

PEI**CONSULTANTS**Publications
Dr. Simon K. Chen

January 16, 1984

- "Compression and End Gas Temperatures from Iodine Absorption Spectra," Co-author, SAE, 1954.
- "Development of a Single Cylinder Compression Ignition Research Engine," Co-author, SAE 650733, 1965.
- "Development and Evaluation of the Simulation of the Compression-Ignition Engine," Co-author, SAE 650451, 1965.
- "Engine Development Criteria and Techniques," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Taiwan, Republic of China, July 1974.
- "Engine Cycle Analysis and Combustion Problems," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Taiwan, Republic of China, July 1974.
- "Diesel Application," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Taiwan, Republic of China, July 1974.
- "Highlights of the Energy Session," Energy Quarterly, Republic of China, January 1975.
- "A Collection of Abridged Management Papers," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Taiwan, Republic of China, July 1976.
- "Marketing in a Competitive Market," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Taiwan, Republic of China, July 1976.
- "Management Philosophy and High Technology Development," Energy Quarterly, Taiwan, Republic of China, January 1978.
- "Vibration Analysis for a Sound Generator-Set Design," Electrical Generating Systems Marketing Association, Chicago, IL, September 26-27, 1978.
- "Waste Heat Recovery Cycle Analysis and Systems for Diesel and Gas Turbine Engines," 13th CIMAC Conference, Vienna, Austria, May 7-10, 1979.
- "Small Industrial Diesel Planning," September 16, 1980.
- "An International Perspective of Taiwan's Automotive Industry," Society of Automotive Engineers, SAE-ROC Technical Meeting, Taiwan, Republic of China, November 23-25, 1981.
- "The Development of ROC Machine Tool Industry and the Impact of Automation," Industrial Technology Research Institute, Taiwan, Republic of China, September 1981.
- "Japan's Robot and Robotics Development," March 11, 1982.
- "Techno-Economic Recommendations to Fight Recession Accelerated by Energy Shock," May 5, 1982.
- "US Robots and Robotics," August 1983.
- "A Review of Engine Advanced Cycle and Rankine Bottoming Cycle and Their Loss Evaluations," Co-authored, SAE 830124, 1983.
- "Flexible Manufacturing Systems Applications," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Singapore, November 1983.
- "The Impact of Automation on Newly Industrialized Countries," Modern Engineering and Technology Seminar, Singapore, November 1983.

LILCO, August 14, 1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

In the Matter of)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power)
Station, Unit 1))

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. YOUNGLING, AND
FRANZ F. PISCHINGER ON BEHALF OF
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON
SUFFOLK COUNTY'S CONTENTION REGARDING
REPLACEMENT CRANKSHAFTS ON DIESEL GENERATORS AT SHOREHAM

1. Please state your names, business affiliations and addresses.

A. (Pischinger) My name is Dr. Franz F. Pischinger. I am president of FEV (Research Society for Energy, Technology and Internal Combustion Engines) and a professor at the University of Aachen, Institute of Applied Thermodynamics. My business address is Erckfeld 4, Aachen, West Germany.

(Youngling) My name is Edward J. Youngling. I am employed by Long Island Lighting Company, North Country Road, Wading River, New York 11792.

2. Please summarize your professional qualifications and your role in the investigation of the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham.

A. (Pischinger) I obtained my diploma (or master's) in 1952 and my doctorate in 1954 from the Technical University in Graz, Austria. I am currently and have been since 1971 a professor at the University of Aachen at the Institute of Applied Thermodynamics. I am also the owner and president of the Research Society for Energy, Technology and Internal Combustion Engines (FEV), a private consulting firm in Aachen, which I formed in 1979. From 1958 until 1962 I was employed as head of the research department by AVL Research and Development in Graz, Austria, and from 1962 until 1971, I worked as a department manager and later as the head of diesel engine development at KHD. My resume is Attachment 1.

My role in evaluating the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham has been to critically review the work performed by

Failure Analysis Associates (FaAA) and determine whether the crankshafts are adequate for their intended service.

(Youngling) I am Manager of the Nuclear Engineering Department for LILCO. Prior to May, 1984, I was Startup Manager for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and was responsible for all pre-operational test activities. In this capacity, I was directly involved in the testing of Shoreham's diesel generators and supervised the operation of Shoreham's diesels for over 3350 hours. I am familiar with the testing requirements for the diesels over the 40 year life of the plant. Prior to being Startup Manager, I held a number of positions at Shoreham including that of Chief Technical Engineer for four years. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Lehigh University. My resume is Attachment 2.

3. What is the purpose of this testimony?

A. (Youngling, Pischinger) The purpose of this testimony is to address Emergency Diesel Generator Contention 1(a), admitted by the Board in its July 17, 1984 Memorandum and Order, which is whether:

The replacement crankshafts at Shoreham are not adequately designed for operating at full load (3500 KW) or overload (3900 KW), as required by FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.5, because they do not meet the standards of the American Bureau of Shipping, Lloyd's Registry of Shipping, or the International Association of Classification Societies. In addition, the replacement crankshafts are not adequately designed for operating at overload, and their design is marginal for operating at full load, under the German criteria used by FEV.

4. Dr. Pischinger, please describe the scope of your work on the replacement crankshafts at Shoreham.

A. (Pischinger) I have visited the Shoreham plant on several occasions and inspected the diesel engines. I have thoroughly reviewed the work performed by FaAA on the replacement crankshafts and I have compared the design of the crankshafts against a very conservative German design criteria.

5. Please describe the design criteria FEV used to review the replacement crankshafts.

A. (Pischinger) FEV reviewed the replacement crankshafts under the Kritzer-Stahl design criteria. These are conservative guidelines that are used in the German diesel engine industry as initial dimensional recommendations.

6. What conclusions did you draw from your comparison of the replacement crankshafts with the Kritzer-Stahl design criteria?

A. (Pischinger) Under the Kritzer-Stahl design criteria, the crankshafts should have unlimited life for operation at 3500 KW. In addition, FEV estimates that the crankshafts should be able to operate at 3900 KW for a minimum of ~~200~~¹²⁰⁰ hours. This is far in excess of the number of hours the crankshafts will ever operate at 3900 KW over the 40 year life of the plant.

7. Did your comparison with the Kritzer-Stahl criteria take into account any beneficial effects from shot peening the replacement crankshafts?

A. (Pischinger) No. However, if we assume a ~~2%~~^{6%} increase in the fatigue endurance limit from the shot peening, the crankshafts should have unlimited life for operation at 3900 KW, as well as 3500 KW.

8. Is compliance with the Kritzer-Stahl design criteria, or any other code, necessary to assure that the replacement crankshafts are adequate?

A. (Pischinger) No. With most design codes, and particularly with the Kritzer-Stahl criteria, conservatism has been included in the criteria to estimate the crankshaft design requirements without the benefit of actual engine construction and development testing. However, it is common and normal practice in the diesel engine industry to rely upon field testing and failure analyses to develop a crankshaft that satisfactorily performs its intended service. Therefore, it is my opinion that the design analysis and field testing of the instrumented crankshaft conducted by FaAA is an appropriate and accurate method of assessing the adequacy of the replacement crankshafts.

9. Do you have an opinion about the adequacy of the replacement crankshafts to perform their intended functions in the Shoreham engines?

A. (Pischinger) Yes. In my opinion the replacement crankshafts are adequate for their intended service at Shoreham and have a sufficient safety margin. My opinion is based upon the evaluation of the crankshafts by FaAA, the results of the FaAA tests and the fact that the conservative Kritzer-Stahl design criteria predicts unlimited life at 3500 KW and a minimum of ¹²⁰⁰~~500~~ hours at 3900 KW, without taking into account shot peening.

10. Do you support and concur with FaAA's conclusions regarding the adequacy of the replacement crankshafts?

A. (Pischinger) I agree completely with FaAA's conclusion that the replacement crankshafts are totally adequate for their intended service.

11. Dr. Pischinger has indicated that the crankshafts can operate at 3900 KW for at least ~~600~~¹²⁰⁰ hours. What is the maximum number of hours the EDG's would possibly operate at 3900 KW over the 40 year life of the plant?

A. (Youngling) The engines never attain a loading level of 3900 KW in support of an accident sequence at the plant. The maximum postulated load stated in the FSAR is 3881 KW for EDG 103. The maximum postulated loads for EDG's 101 and 102 are 3409 KW and 3383 KW. These peak loads occur during the first ten minutes of the accident sequence and significant load reductions occur thereafter. For example, after the first ten minutes the load on EDG 103 is reduced 2641 KW.

The engines operate at 3900 KW only during surveillance testing. This testing is performed on an 18-month interval in accordance with plant technical specifications. Each engine is expected to operate at 3900 KW for no more than 60 hours during testing over the 40-year life of the plant. Therefore, it is obvious that the crankshafts are completely adequate for their intended service at Shoreham.

12. Has LILCO performed any tests to measure actual peak loads on the diesel generators during a LOCA event?

A. (Youngling) Yes. During the preoperational test program LOCA conditions were simulated and plant response resulted in a peak diesel generator load that was even less than the FSAR peak loads.

CONCLUSION

13. Please summarize your conclusions.

A. (Pischinger) The crankshafts comply with the conservative Kritzer-Stahl design criteria for operation at full

load. Compliance with the Kritzer-Stahl design criteria at overload is not required to determine that the crankshafts are adequate. The replacement crankshafts are completely adequate for their intended service at Shoreham. This has been demonstrated by analysis and testing of the crankshafts.

Attachment 1

CURRICULUM VITAE

Professor Dr.techn. Franz F. Pischinger

Date of Birth: 18.07.1930, Waidhofen/Thaya, Austria

1948 to 1952 studies and graduation in mechanical engineering at Graz Technical University. From 1953 to 1958 (1954 doctors degree) technical assistant at Graz Technical University. Then Head of Research Department of AVL (Institute for Internal Combustion Engines, Professor List, Graz). 1958 habilitation. 1962 to 1970 leading positions in research and development at Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz AG, Köln (last position: Director of Research and Development Department). Since 1970 Director of the Institute for Applied Thermodynamics at Aachen Technical University. Supervising research and teaching in the field of internal combustion engines and thermodynamics of combustion. Also (since 1978) president of the FEV Forschungsgesellschaft für Energietechnik und Verbrennungsmotoren mbH, Aachen.

Attachment 2

Edward J. Youngling
Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department

Assigned as Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department in May 1984. Report to the Vice President, Nuclear. Responsible for the overall operation of the Nuclear Engineering Department. The Nuclear Engineering Department is charged with providing the technical direction for engineering, fuel management, and radiation protection for the purpose of maintaining the design basis of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Responsible for the organizational development of the Nuclear Engineering Department and the definition of functions and responsibilities of the Nuclear Systems Engineering, Nuclear Fuel, Nuclear Project Engineering, Engineering Assurance and Radiation Protection Divisions.

Provide timely technical support to Shoreham plant operating staff for routine and abnormal operations in areas of nuclear engineering, core analysis, radiation protection, health physics, chemistry and radiochemistry. Administer programs and approve procedures to provide engineering and engineering management for plant modifications and engineering studies. Establish reliability and risk assessment capability aimed at improving plant safety and availability. Provide engineering support to Shoreham in the disciplines of thermal-hydraulics, heat transfer, stress analysis, systems engineering, instrumentation and controls, materials engineering, nuclear fuel design, core physics, safety and reliability analysis, risk assessment, radiation protection, shielding, health physics, radiation chemistry, non-destructive examination, corrosion analysis, and nuclear waste technology. Direct engineering work to the Office of Engineering on matters encompassing the disciplines of electrical, civil, power and environmental engineering for projects related to Shoreham. Direct activities related to nuclear fuel cycle management and establish nuclear material accountability. Establish core analysis systems to provide core follow support and advice on control rod withdrawal patterns. Provide technical direction for the Company's Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. Provide radiation protection engineering and health physics technology assessments for incorporation in the Company's ALARA radiation dose reduction program. Responsible for the Company's ALARA radiation dose reduction program. Participate with Nuclear Operations Support and Plant Operating Staff in the development and implementation of the Corporate Licensing Policy.

Prepare and approve all budgets related to departmental activities necessary to comply with Corporate requirements. Prepare testimony and participate in appearances before federal, state and local hearing boards as required (PSC Prudency, PSC Rate Case, NRC Hearings, etc.). Administer R&D efforts within the Department in support of the Corporate R&D program.

Edward J. Youngling

Responsible for the finalization of the Shoreham Delaval Diesel Generator Design Review/Quality Revalidation Program.

Graduated from Lehigh University in 1966 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering. From June 1966 to March 1968 attended Union College and achieved credits towards a Masters of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering. Successfully completed the following training courses:

- "Introduction to Nuclear Power" by NUS Corp., July 1970
- "Boiler Control Fundamentals" by General Electric Co., January 1972
- "Fundamentals of BWR Operation" by General Electric Co. at the GE Dresden Simulator, August 1972
- "Process Computer Concepts and Practices" by General Electric Co., February 1973
- "Shoreham Research Reactor Training Program" at Brookhaven National Laboratory Medical Research Reactor (NRC SROC License candidate research reactor training requirement), May 1975
- "Planning for Nuclear Emergencies" by Harvard School of Public Health, May 1976
- "Interagency Course in Radiological Emergency Response Planning in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities" by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1978
- "Customer Engineer Training Program in the Methods Used to conduct Maximum Turbine Capacity Tests and Analyze Results to Detect and Correct Cycle Losses" by the General Electric Co., Large Steam Turbine Division, September 1979
- "Shoreham Nuclear Power Station On-Sit Training Program" (NRC SROC license candidate plant systems training requirement), January - April 1979
- "LILCO Advanced Supervisory Workshop", April 1979
- "Assertiveness Training Workshop", November 1980
- "LILCO Management Workshop", December 1980
- "Shoreham General Employee Training", 1983

Achieved a Senior Operator Certification from the General Electric Company on the Duane Arnold Energy Center Boiling Water Reactor.

March 1981 - May 1984

Assigned as Startup Manager in March 1981. Responsible for the Preoperational test activities for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Report to the Vice President-Nuclear. Responsible for coordinating all Checkout and Initial Operations and Preoperational Testing. Set initial construction priorities by system/subsystem and monitor construction progress as it relates to the startup schedule. Had the authority to modify construction schedule as conditions demand. Chaired construction release meetings at which status of construction, as it relates to systems scheduled to be released, was discussed. Member of the Joint Test Group. Ensured that the established procedures of documentation control were followed. Responsible for the review, monitoring, supervision and approval

Edward J. Youngling

of Checkout and Initial Operations Tests, Preoperational Tests, and Acceptance Tests, review of all test results summaries and recommend acceptance, rejection or modification by the JTG according to results. Responsible for the production of all the software required for testing of Shoreham. Certified Level III per ANEI N45.2.6 - 1978.

In August 1983 named as Manager for the Shoreham Delaval Emergency Diesel Generator Crankshaft Failure Recovery Program. Responsible for coordinating the failure analysis, rebuilding, retesting and requalification of the three diesel generator units.

Prepared testimony, was deposed and testified before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding Shoreham contentions dealing with quality assurance, startup testing and emergency diesel generators. Prepared testimony and testified before the New York State Public Service Commission. Responsible for direct interface with NRC Resident, Regional and Staff personnel for matters related to the preoperational test program and emergency diesel generators recovery effort.

May 1979 - March 1981

Assigned as Nuclear Services Supervisor in May 1979, reporting to the Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Division. Responsible for the management and coordination of those support services required by LILCO Nuclear Power Stations. These support services included coordination of major station modifications, performance of operational design reviews, coordinating the resources of other LILCO Departments and outside consultants to achieve a desired result assigned to the Division, coordinating long-range planning activities associated with plant maintenance, fuel cycle strategy and budget and cost control, monitoring overall plant and individual equipment performance, maintaining a current knowledge of federal regulations, industry codes and standards, and changes thereto applicable to the facility.

Participated on the LILCO Corporate Task Forces assessing Shoreham design and operations, corporate communications, crisis management and overall company emergency preparedness following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. Chairman of the Shoreham Review Task Group, responsible for developing action plans for implementing post TMI recommendations. Responsible for the Shoreham Control Room human factors design review.

Developed the corporate policy manual defining interdepartmental responsibilities for the LILCO Nuclear Program.

Edward J. Youngling

February 1975 - May 1979

Assigned as Chief Technical Engineer of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 in January 1975. Responsible for the activities of the Instrumentation and Control, Health Physics, Radiochemistry and Reactor Engineering Sections of the plant staff, including the development of administrative and technical programs and procedures to meet regulatory, company and industry requirements; and the training of professional personnel and technicians to satisfy qualification standards. Served on the plant Review of Operations Committee (ROC) and when designated acted as Chairman of the ROC in the Plant Manager's absence. Served as a member of the plant Licensed Source User's Committee as stipulated in NRC Nuclear Material License No. 31-17432-01, February 1977.

August 1974 - January 1975

Reassigned to the plant staff as the Instrumentation and Control Engineer, then Acting Chief Engineer-Technical. Responsible for manpower planning and the development of the technical training programs for subordinate personnel. Participated in generating portions of the Shoreham Safety Analysis Report, and in the review and approval of plant operating procedures, lesson plans and system descriptions.

July 1973 - July 1974

Named the Instrumentation and Control Engineer for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and assigned to the General Electric Company Startup, Test and Operations (STO) organization at the Duane Arnold Energy Center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Participated in the preoperational test program in the areas of in-core nuclear process radiation and reactor vessel (pressure, level and temperature) instrumentation. Acted as G.E. shift engineer during fuel loading operations and as assistant to G.E. shift engineer during startup testing and power ascension program. Participated in the G.E. shift engineer training program and sat for the G.E. Certification Examination for DAEC.

August 1972 - June 1973

Reassigned to Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Project as the Assistant Project Engineer, then Project Engineer. Responsible for overall plant design control. Coordinated design effort between LILCO, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, General Electric Co. Nuclear Energy Division, various major equipment suppliers and regulatory agencies.

November 1971 - July 1972

Reassigned to the Northport Power Station to participate in the startup of Northport Unit No. 3. Directly responsible for the startup of the boiler for this 380MW unit including the fuel safety system, the combustion and

Edward J. Youngling

feedwater control systems and associated mechanical equipment. Assumed overall plant shift operations responsibility during the latter stages of startup. Was an instructor in the Unit No. 3 systems training program given to plant supervisors, operators, technicians, and mechanics.

November 1969 - October 1971

Assigned to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Project in the Nuclear Engineering Department. Participated in the engineering review of the Shoreham plant design in the following areas: plant equipment layout, equipment specifications, equipment selection, main control board design, plant operations logic, plant instrumentation, plant computers. Review included contacts with the A-E, Stone and Webster, NSSS supplier, General Electric Company, various vendors and visits to several nuclear stations.

April 1968 - October 1969

Employed by the Long Island Lighting Company and assigned to the Northport Power Station. During the period, assisted in the startup of Northport Unit 2, assisted in the station maintenance section supervising route and shutdown maintenance activities and acted as the station Results Engineer responsible for the repair and calibration of the station instrument and control systems and for monitoring station performance.

June 1966 - March 1968

Employed by the General Electric Company at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. Stationed at the West Milton Site as a Mechanical Test Engineer on the S3G Prototype "USS Triton" submarine. While at the S3G plant my responsibilities were to prepare procedures for tests and operations which were not in accordance with normal plant operations; supervise the actual tests, analyze the results and issue reports to the AEC. The following specific activities were engaged in: completed selected sessions of the Engineering Officer of the Watch Training Course, participated in numerous plant tests including routing low power physics testing including directing reactor control rod movements through Navy reactor operators, maneuvering transients, main coolant pump tests, power runs, various engine room tests and ultrasonic testing to trend pipeline degradation. Participated in the Advanced Reactor Control Program as Lead Shift Test Engineer, including completion of required training program, and performing preoperational tests and integrated plant acceptance testing.

Member - American Nuclear Society. Held a Guest Associate Engineer appointment in the Reactor Division at Brookhaven National Laboratory. Member - Pi Tau Sigma. Hold an Engineer in Training Certificate - State of Pennsylvania (State Registration Board for Professional Engineers).

Attachment 3

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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION

2 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

3 Q. Dr. Johnston, you aren't a diesel engine
4 expert, are you?

5 DR. JOHNSTON: My experience and
6 expertise is in the area of structural analysis of
7 structural mechanical components which would include
8 crankshafts in large diesel generators. That is the
9 area in which -- structural analysis is the area in
10 which I have both practice and experience, also is
11 the area of my education, also the area in which I
12 have lectured at Stanford University.

13 Q. So, you are not a diesel engine expert,
14 you are a structural analysis expert; is that your
15 testimony?

16 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, I am a structural
17 analyst.

18 Q. And you are not a diesel engine expert?

19 DR. JOHNSTON: I am an expert in diesel
20 generators to the extent that it relates to the
21 analysis of diesel engine components by techniques
22 such as dynamic analysis, modal analysis, finite
23 element analysis.

24 Q. And prior to performing any of your work
25 for the TDI Owners' Group, did you ever have any

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1 experience in the actual design of diesel generators?
2 DR. JOHNSTON: My experience prior to and
3 subsequent to the Shoreham project has not been in
4 the design of diesel generators. It has been in the
5 analysis of components, structural components such
6 as crankshafts.

7 Q. And you had no experience in the
8 manufacture of diesel generators or diesel engine
9 components; isn't that true?

10 DR. JOHNSTON: I have no experience in
11 manufacturing processes.

12 Q. And other than, perhaps, driving diesel
13 engine vehicles, you never had any experience in
14 operating diesel generators; isn't that true?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: I am not a diesel engine
16 operator.

17 Q. And, in fact, your familiarity with
18 diesel generators prior to your work with the TDI
19 Owners' Group was limited to general knowledge that
20 an engineer might have from reading papers and
21 discussing matters with your colleagues, isn't that
22 true?

23 DR. JOHNSTON: My experience with diesel
24 generators would only be that which is related to my
25 capabilities and experience in the analysis of

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1 structural components. It wouldn't be included in
2 diesel generators or other machinery or other
3 structures.

4 Q. Thank you, Dr. Johnston.

5 Prior to your performing any work for the
6 TDI Owners' Group you had never before analyzed the
7 crankshaft structure, isn't that true?

8 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to the
9 form of that question. If he wants to ask him a yes
10 or no question that's fine, but I think these
11 continual leading questions, and the witnesses
12 exhibit no hostility, are improper.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: It's cross-examination,
14 he's allowed to ask leading questions.

15 MR. STROUPE: I understand that. But I
16 still believe the way the questions are being asked
17 that they are improper.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: The objection is
19 overruled. I think they're proper.

20 DR. JOHNSTON: I think my experience and
21 education is quite clear. It is in the area of
22 structural analysis, both statically and dynamically.
23 It is applicable to the analysis of many components
24 including crankshafts, and I -- that is the area
25 that I specialize in. I am not an operator or

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1 manufacturer of generators and I have not in the
2 past specifically been involved in the design of
3 engine components but I have been involved in the
4 analysis of such components.

5 Q. My question, Dr. Johnston, was isn't it
6 true that you haven't structurally analyzed the
7 crankshaft for diesel engines before?

8 DR. JOHNSTON: Specifically, I have not
9 analyzed a crankshaft for a diesel engine prior to
10 this project.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 DR. JOHNSTON: Although the same
13 techniques are used to analyze many other similar
14 components.

15 Q. When you say similar, what components or
16 object do you believe is the most similar to the
17 crankshaft that you performed the structural
18 analysis on?

19 DR. JOHNSTON: The tools that I used to
20 analyze a crankshaft such as the modal super
21 position technique and finite element analyses,
22 general techniques that I use to analyze many
23 components that range from crankshafts to piping
24 supports to off shore platforms to buildings,
25 they are used for calculating stresses in components.

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1 Those are the tools that I'm familiar
2 with.

3 Q. Well, aren't pipes different from
4 crankshafts in terms of structural analysis, aren't
5 they subjected to different stresses?

6 DR. JOHNSTON: From the standpoint of
7 structural analysis, they are not different. The
8 techniques used to analyze them are the same. Yes,
9 they are subjected to different stresses, but,
10 however, the techniques used to analyze such
11 components are the same. They take into account the
12 different loading and use the same method to compute
13 the stresses.

14 Q. And is the structure of a crankshaft such
15 as that used in the EDG's at Shoreham significantly
16 more complex than that of pipes used in nuclear
17 power plants?

18 DR. JOHNSTON: Not necessarily.

19 Q. Well, can you explain —

20 DR. JOHNSTON: Well, for example, the
21 intersection between a pipe and a vessel is an
22 extremely complex stress analysis problem as indeed
23 is a crankshaft a complex stress analysis problem.
24 There are some problems that are easy, there are
25 some problems that are more difficult. Crankshafts

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1 would not be representative, necessarily, of the
2 most difficult component to analyze or necessarily
3 the most difficult component that I have analyzed.

4 Q. I will ask my question again, because I
5 do not believe that you answered it.

6 What component that you have analyzed
7 before is most similar to that of a crankshaft in
8 terms of structural analysis?

9 DR. JOHNSTON: I don't feel that there's
10 any one particular component that I would regard as
11 similar to a crankshaft that I have analyzed in the
12 standpoint of what you see it doing or what it looks
13 like. But as I outlined, the kind of components
14 that I have analyzed are analyzed by the same
15 techniques as those of a crankshaft. I'm not sure
16 whether you would consider a shaft that didn't have
17 cranks and webs as similar to a crankshaft. I'm not
18 sure whether — what you would consider similar to a
19 crankshaft.

20 What I have testified to and what I will
21 state again is that the components that I have
22 analyzed in the past are similar to those of a
23 crankshaft because the methods used to analyze them
24 are similar.

25 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, I'd just

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1 like the record to reflect that counsel from New
2 York State has now arrived in the courtroom.

3 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, you have noted that
4 and I'm sure you intend to be courteous. I have
5 refrained from noting that last week and this week
6 so it should not be taken as opposite of being
7 courteous but ramifications may flow from the
8 periodic attendance from New York State. You may
9 proceed. You may proceed.

10 Q. Mr. Montgomery, do you consider yourself
11 a diesel engine expert?

12 MR. MONTGOMERY: My experience has been
13 in the area of stress analysis applying the
14 disciplines of vibration mechanics and fatigue
15 analysis that were employed in the design review for
16 the replacement crankshaft at Shoreham.

17 The techniques that were employed for the
18 design review on this component as Dr. Johnston has
19 already stated is generic and applicable to a wide
20 variety of components undergoing structural review
21 and analysis.

22 Q. So you are not a diesel engine expert, is
23 that what you're saying, but you are a stress
24 analyst expert?

25 MR. MONTGOMERY: I am a stress analyst.

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1 Q. Are you not a diesel engine expert?

2 MR. MONTGOMERY: Insofar as the question
3 you're asking relates to diesels, no; however, the
4 analytical techniques generically apply to a wide
5 range of components including the crankshaft on the
6 diesel generator.

7 Q. So that, Mr. Montgomery, have you ever
8 either designed or manufactured diesel engine
9 components?

10 MR. MONTGOMERY: I have not been involved
11 in the manufacturing of diesel engine components.

12 Q. And have you been involved in the actual
13 design of diesel engine components?

14 MR. MONTGOMERY: Your question, of course,
15 relates to crankshafts.

16 Q. Have you been involved in the actual
17 design of the crankshaft for a diesel engine?

18 MR. MONTGOMERY: I state that because
19 diesel engine components would include a wide
20 variety of engine elements which would include its
21 various manifolds, piping supports, tubing. In
22 these areas I've had direct relevant experience.

23 Q. Design experience.

24 MR. MONTGOMERY: In the general sense,
25 yes.

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1 Q. What do you mean by the general sense?

2 MR. MONTGOMERY: As my summary of
3 experience will bear out, I have had direct design
4 and analysis experience on nuclear safety related
5 piping and pipe supports at various installations
6 throughout the country.

7 Insofar as safety related piping in
8 applications other than -- other than diesel generator
9 applications, I have had direct experience.

10 Q. So you haven't had direct experience with
11 respect to piping on diesel generators; is that true?

12 MR. MONTGOMERY: There's nothing
13 significantly different about the piping
14 configurations.

15 Q. That wasn't my question, Mr. Montgomery.

16 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to his
17 interrupting the witness, Judge Brenner. I think
18 the witness is entitled to give an answer. If he
19 doesn't get his answer, then he's certainly entitled
20 to request assistance or to ask it again.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Mr.
22 Montgomery, you should try to answer the question
23 asked first and then to the extent that you want to
24 offer an explanation, you can do that. I infer that
25 what you had started out with was the explanation.

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1 and the problem is when a witness does that,
2 sometimes he forgets to include the direct answer to
3 the question by the end of that. Start out with the
4 answer, and then we will assure that you'll have
5 sufficient opportunity to provide an explanation as
6 long as it's pertinent to the particular question
7 and answer.

8 Do you recall the question at this time?

9 MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Please answer
11 it.

12 MR. MONTGOMERY: I have not had direct
13 responsibility for design and analysis of piping in
14 a diesel engine application; however, as I had
15 started to explain, the application of the piping
16 and pipe support design analysis tools for this type
17 of configuration is generic, and can be utilized on
18 a diesel engine as well as on any other piping
19 application in the plant; so that for the case of
20 the piping configurations supporting the diesel
21 generator, there is nothing specifically or uniquely
22 different about it.

23 Q. Mr. Montgomery, prior to working for
24 LILCO, did you ever perform a stress analysis on a
25 diesel engine crankshaft?

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1 MR. MONTGOMERY: I have not performed a
2 detail stress analysis on a crankshaft prior to
3 joining LILCO; however, as was already stated in the
4 testimony of Dr. Johnston, the analytical techniques
5 that are utilized in the design and analysis of the
6 replacement crankshaft such as forced vibration
7 solutions to dynamic vibratory problems, fatigue
8 analysis, modal superposition, all of these are
9 standardized techniques that are well-known to
10 people in my field.

11 Q. After the failure of the original
12 crankshafts at Shoreham, did you perform any stress
13 analyses of those crankshafts — I'm sorry, prior to
14 the failure of the original crankshafts, have you
15 performed any stress analyses of those crankshafts?

16 MR. MONTGOMERY: Your question is to me
17 personally?

18 Q. That's a start.

19 MR. MONTGOMERY: Prior to the failure of
20 the original crankshafts, we're speaking now of the
21 11 by 13 configuration, I was not directly involved
22 in the review of the diesel generator sets or any of its
23 design bases.

24 Q. You say that you were not directly
25 involved.

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1 Q. And were those individuals Stone &
2 Webster employees or were they LILCO employees?

3 MR. MONTGOMERY: My firsthand knowledge
4 was of LILCO employees.

5 MR. SCHEIDT: I don't want to go into
6 this area too deeply, but I'd just like to know
7 which individuals at LILCO were responsible for the
8 analysis of the original crankshaft prior to its
9 failure.

10 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to that
11 question on the basis there's no foundation or
12 evidence that there was any such analysis.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, we will find that
14 out in a hurry. I thought you were going to object
15 on some other basis, but that objection is overruled.

16 MR. STROUPE: I would also add to that
17 objection that I believe this would appear to me to
18 be outside the scope of the contentions as they are
19 admitted in this proceeding.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: Can you explain the
21 materiality of the question, Mr. Scheidt?

22 MR. SCHEIDT: One second, Judge Brenner.

23 Judge Brenner, the question is related to
24 the expertise of the witness in the area of stress
25 analysis.

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1 I admit it's not directly related, but it
2 would be relevant and material to know the extent of
3 this witness's involvement in the analysis, if there
4 was an analysis, Mr. Stroupe, and the extent of
5 supervision, if he had any supervision, and the
6 extent of the analysis as a comparative factor with
7 what went on afterwards.

8 JUDGE BRENNER: I'm smiling only because
9 I predicted the correct answer. If you wanted to
10 ask the question, we'll allow it on that basis, but
11 as you said, not too deeply.

12 MR. SCHEIDT: As I indicated --

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Because given that reason,
14 it shouldn't be necessary.

15 Do you recall the question after all that,
16 Mr. Montgomery? He wants to know the names of people
17 at LILCO, if any, who performed the analyses, stress
18 analyses of the original crankshafts prior to
19 failure.

20 MR. MONTGOMERY: The stress analyses
21 performed on the original 11 by 13-inch crankshaft
22 configuration was done by Trans-America DeLaval. A
23 review of that analysis was performed by our Stone &
24 Webster engineering consultants.

25 LILCO did not directly perform a stress

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1 analysis review on the original crankshafts.

2 Q. Mr. Montgomery, you testified that you
3 were peripherally involved in this review.

4 What was the extent of your involvement,
5 what did you do?

6 MR. MONTGOMERY: I believe that I stated
7 that I was peripherally involved in matters related
8 to the emergency diesel generators at Shoreham.

9 Q. And I would like to know what your
10 peripheral involvement was.

11 MR. STROUPE: With regard to the stress
12 analysis of crankshaft.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Is that right, Mr.
14 Scheidt?

15 MR. SCHEIDT: Yes.

16 MR. MONTGOMERY: In response to your
17 direct question, no.

18 If I can -- to restate it, you asked for
19 what my direct involvement was in the -- or
20 peripheral involvement was in the stress analysis
21 review that was being performed prior to the failure
22 of the original 13 by 11 crankshaft; however, I may
23 want to point out that subsequent to the failure of
24 the 11 by 13, I was directly involved in the review
25 of the TDI calculations as well as the developing

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1 FaAA evaluations.

2 Q. Just so that I have an understanding of
3 what you just testified to, did you state that you
4 had no involvement in the review of the stress
5 analysis prior to the failure?

6 MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes.

7 Q. And your involvement only came about
8 after the failure of the original crank shafts;
9 isn't that right?

10 MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. And you were involved in the review of
12 the analysis of the replacement crankshafts; isn't
13 that true?

14 MR. MONTGOMERY: I was involved in the
15 capacity of engineering specialist within the DRQR
16 program which developed out of or out of a
17 consequence of the failure of the 13 by 11
18 crankshaft, and in that capacity, I provided
19 technical review and direction to LILCO consultants
20 which includes Failure Analysis Associates, Power
21 and Energy International and Stone & Webster
22 Corporation in their assessments of the original and
23 replacement crankshaft.

24 Q. What technical review did you perform?

25 MR. MONTGOMERY: I performed reviews of

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1 the Phase 1 and Phase 2 replacement crankshaft
2 reports as well as their supporting calculations as
3 performed by FaAA.

4 I also performed a review of the failure
5 report on the 13 by .11 crank shaft and its
6 supporting calculations.

7 Q. Did you perform any independent review or
8 independent analysis of the replacement crankshafts?

9 MR. MONTGOMERY: The review of the
10 original crankshaft failure as well as the
11 replacement crankshaft, as this panel would testify
12 to, was directly performed by FaAA, and to some
13 extent PEI.

14 In my review of their work, other than
15 simple checks on the overall analysis, I performed
16 no in-depth review or parallel review to their -- to
17 replicate their work effort.

18 Q. And you've testified that you also
19 provided direction to the work performed by LILCO
20 consultants.

21 Could you elaborate what you mean by
22 direction of that work?

23 MR. MONTGOMERY: I provided guidance in
24 the area of the specific design requirements as
25 specified in our purchase specification and our

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1 licensing requirements under LILCO interpretation of
2 our commitments to our specialists for their
3 implementation into the design review.

4 Q. What do you mean by LILCO interpretations
5 of your FSAR requirements?

6 MR. MONTGOMERY: Let me state flatly then
7 the FSAR requirements.

8 Q. When you say design requirements, do you mean
9 the DEMA standards?

10 MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes, that is correct.
11 Our purchase specification clearly states that the
12 Diesel Engine Manufacture Association, DEMA
13 standards are in effect for the replacement
14 crankshaft.

15 Q. And what sort of guidance did you provide
16 LILCO consultants concerning DEMA?

17 MR. MONTGOMERY: It is our testimony that
18 the DEMA recommendations be implemented using
19 conservative conventional analytical techniques, and
20 in conjunction with our consultants, we interpreted
21 the DEMA recommendations as specified by
22 methodologies that are developed in the diesel
23 engine industry over many years and these are
24 reflected in our various reports.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I wonder if

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1 I might interrupt on what I hope is not a lengthy
2 digression. I did not ask the parties whether
3 anything had been worked out as to particular
4 sequences within this sequence of the testimony and
5 if any party raised anything so I assume everything
6 has been worked out satisfactorily.

7 I had assumed in my own mind that after
8 you finished the qualifications of the witnesses,
9 and I sense that you're now overlapping into Part B
10 on page 64 of the cross plan --

11 MR. SCHEIDT: Excuse me, Judge Brenner,
12 by the witness's testimony, that wasn't my intent,
13 but we're here --

14 JUDGE BRENNER: It's perfectly okay. I'm
15 not criticizing it.

16 I had thought that maybe you would go to
17 your primary questions to Mr. Youngling and Dr.
18 Pischinger before focusing on this part of the panel,
19 not that it was required, but just in case our time
20 estimates turned out to be incorrect, but I don't
21 know if that was discussed among the parties.

22 One reason I raised it is that I have
23 something else in mind further down the line that we
24 said we would try to the extent feasible to make
25 some productive push forward for shot peening at

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1 least. I don't know if I'll be able to do any of
2 that. But does Dr. Pischinger still have a
3 scheduling problem?

4 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, Dr.
5 Pischinger is available for the remainder of this
6 week.

7 My understanding is he will be going back
8 to Germany at the end of this week. He has some
9 obligations which are undeferable, so to speak. He
10 will — we have asked him to make an attempt to
11 accommodate his schedule to come back to this
12 proceeding, perhaps the week following, a week to
13 ten days, something like that.

14 JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

15 MR. STROUPE: We would obviously like to
16 discuss later in the week, depending on how this
17 goes.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: I didn't mean to get too
19 far ahead, but if he will not be here next week, it
20 may not make a difference, but would it affect your
21 plan, Mr. Scheidt, to ask the questions you have on
22 approximately page 69 of your cross plan before the
23 questions starting at part B on page 64?

24 MR. SCHEIDT: It would affect my plans,
25 Judge Brenner. I can accommodate Dr. Pischinger. I

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1 prefer to do it after I've established some points
2 on cross-examination and preferably not today.

3 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. I recognize
4 that the subjects overlap. All right. Well, I hope
5 the cross won't go too far beyond today, but we'll
6 see where it goes. Go ahead. I'm sorry for the
7 interruption.

8 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

9 Q. Mr. Montgomery, you testified that you
10 interpreted the DEMA recommendations as specifying
11 methodologies that were specified in the diesel
12 engine industry over a number of years; isn't that
13 right?

14 MR. MONTGOMERY: I did not testify that I
15 interpreted the diesel engine manufacturers
16 associations recommendations.

17 The various consultants specifically are
18 Dr. Simon Chen of Power and Energy International,
19 who was a former chairman with the technical
20 committee for DEMA, provided us with excellent
21 insights into the application of DEMA for our
22 situation.

23 Q. Was he the only source of your knowledge --
24 when I say your, I mean LILCO, FaAA, was he the only
25 source for this interpretation?

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1 MR. MONTGOMERY: We reached these
2 conclusions or interpretations based upon a number
3 of consultants' input, which includes Trans-America
4 DeLaval, Failure Analysis Associates and PEI, all of
5 which concur with the appropriate aspects of the
6 DEMA calculations attributed to them.

7 Q. Mr. Montgomery, you spent a significant
8 amount of time developing the tracking system for
9 the TDI diesel engine failure experience for use in
10 the DRQR, isn't that true?

11 MR. MONTGOMERY: One of my
12 responsibilities within the DRQR program was to
13 develop and assemble all relevant diesel engine
14 experience including Shoreham, TDI experience,
15 nuclear experience, which includes both TDI and
16 non-TDI generators, and non-nuclear engines in the
17 area of TDI's marine applications.

18 Q.. How did you determine which of this
19 experience was relevant?

20 MR. STROUPE: At this point in time I am
21 going to register an objection to this line of
22 questions. I don't see how it's relevant to the
23 admitted contentions.

24 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, I'll let Mr.
25 Scheidt respond.

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1 MR. SCHEIDT: The area is an area that he
2 performed what, I believe, was a substantial amount
3 of work and time on. I'm trying to develop what it
4 is that he actually did and how much time he spent
5 on it and so on.

6 MR. STROUPE: I'd like to know how that
7 relates to —

8 JUDGE BRENNER: Wait a minute.

9 You're claiming just in the area of his
10 qualifications.

11 MR. SCHEIDT: Background, what work he
12 performed.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, it's relevant to
14 that. It's also, at least he's apparently not into
15 it deeply yet, relevant to the LILCO testimony that
16 extensive experience with the new crankshaft, the 13
17 by 12 crankshaft shows how good they are. So we'll
18 allow it. Do you understand the question, do you
19 know what the question is?

20 MR. MONTGOMERY: Please repeat it.

21 Q. How did you determine what experience was
22 relevant and not in compiling this tracking system?

23 MR. MONTGOMERY: The relevancy or
24 non-relevancy of the individual experience items was
25 not determined by LILCO.

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1 As the DRQR Phase 2 final report, nine volume
2 set will show, within each diesel engine component,
3 there is an appendix summary sheet which itemizes
4 the Shoreham, nuclear and non-nuclear industry
5 experience for that particular component, and
6 determines whether or not that failure would have
7 any consequences or bearing on the design review
8 performed by the task leader of that component; so
9 in the sense of relevancy, that was a determined --
10 a value determined by the group task leader for that
11 particular component.

12 Q. What were the standards used with respect
13 to crankshafts in determining whether a failure had
14 a bearing on Shoreham?

15 MR. MONTGOMERY: As I just stated, the
16 relevancy or bearing of a particular failure on a
17 component's design review is the responsibility of
18 the assigned task leader.

19 Q. It may be his responsibility, but do you
20 know what the standards he used were?

21 MR. MONTGOMERY: I assume I would have to
22 answer this question programmatically.

23 The assessment of the individual failure
24 incidents by the responsible task leader would
25 involve taking into consideration the impact that

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1 that incident would have on the quality assurance,
2 quality control, design adequacy, operation and
3 maintenance, material selection, and any other
4 factor as it relates to Shoreham, and what was, in
5 fact, the steps taken at Shoreham to preclude the
6 occurrence of that failure.

7 Q. Who was the task leader for crankshafts?

8 MR. MONTGOMERY: Dr. Paul Johnston.

9 Q. Perhaps this question ought to be
10 directed to you, Dr. Johnston.

11 What were the standards used in
12 determining what impact these incidents had on
13 quality assurance, quality control, operation and
14 maintenance, design adequacy and material selection?

15 MR. SCHEIDT: Doctor, I would like your
16 answer and not Mr. Youngling's, if I may.

17 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, you have eyes
18 as well as I do. I assumed you had no objection to
19 other members of the panel conferring on some of
20 your questions. If you do have that problem, say so
21 sooner rather than later.

22 MR. SCHEIDT: A certain amount of leeway
23 can be given but it can be excessive, too.

24 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Youngling, if you
25 have something to say on this, you can tell us

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1 directly. It's a matter of the witness's part, too.
2 If it's just a check, I understand why you might
3 want to confer and have the witness answer providing
4 the question is not limited to one witness but we
5 have a lot, but if there's a lot to say, its more
6 efficient to get it directly.

7 DR. JOHNSTON: As task leader of the
8 crankshaft design review, the standards used include
9 the DEMA standards for the stress analysis of the
10 crankshaft includes material specifications and
11 material test reports for the materials, includes
12 the inspection reports for the quality assurance
13 work that covers inspections on the particular
14 generators, and Mr. Youngling, I think, perhaps,
15 would address the area of operations and maintenance.

16 MR. YOUNGLING: Mr. Scheidt, as far as
17 the operation and maintenance was concerned, the
18 initial base line documents that we used were the
19 TDI operations manuals, which specified how to
20 operate and maintain the manual — the engine generator
21 sets.

22 From there, as we went into the operating
23 experience, and the design reviews, we expanded into
24 other recommendations that have been put forth by
25 the Owners' Group.

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1 As far as the testing is required, that
2 mainly relates to the regulatory requirements by the
3 NRC and our commitments to those requirements in the
4 Shoreham FSAR.

5 MR. SCHEIDT: I think we're moving away
6 from the original question that was asked and that
7 was experience of other TDI generators in other
8 installations and in determining the impact of that
9 experience on Shoreham. The standards that were
10 used in determining the impact of that experience on
11 Shoreham.

12 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, I will again
13 make my objection. What has obviously started out
14 as I think qualification questioning is now into the --
15 I believe the meat of the DRQR. It was my
16 understanding that was not an issue in this
17 litigation. The experience that, I believe, LILCO
18 used was, perhaps, not experience gained as a result
19 of the DRQR.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, you know, I
21 understood that is an objection by LILCO and we make
22 certain rulings on the admission of the contentions
23 that bear on that. I don't want to repeat the whole
24 discussion, but in not ruling out -- in ruling out
25 certain parts of the contentions, we emphasized that

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1 just because we were ruling it out did not mean that
2 other experience was immaterial as applied to
3 particular context, and apparently not only the
4 County is taking us up on that, but I suggest to you
5 that LILCO in its Exhibit C-6, among other places,
6 has put that experience into issue, and you then
7 relied on that Exhibit C-6 on your testimony, I
8 believe, on page 13. And I don't know if Mr.
9 Scheidt has planned on being there substantively,
10 but there is no requirement for a bright line
11 between qualifications and the substance, and he's
12 going to get there sooner or later, I suspect. It
13 might as well be now, and you can respond, Mr.
14 Stroupe- but if you think I'm misunderstanding
15 something about your testimony in Exhibit C-6 —

16 Let me the state my impression, Exhibit
17 C-6 lists experience at other diesel generators, and
18 the testimony — I shouldn't try to paraphrase from
19 memory, but it says this experience shows that the
20 other conclusions about the reliability of the
21 crankshafts are correct. Let me find it precisely.

22 Page 13 of the LILCO testimony, McCarthy
23 et al., on this particular — for which this
24 particular panel — some members of this particular
25 panel are present, states in the second paragraph of

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1 the answer in this edition there is extensive
2 experience with 13 inch by 12 inch crankshafts in
3 DSR-48 generators that establishes the crankshafts
4 are reliable.

5 It goes on to cite the table on Exhibit
6 C-6 that it refers to.

7 MR. STROUPE: I understand what you're
8 saying, Judge Brenner.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Questions are at least
10 relevant to that, even if you disagree its relevance
11 to other things. It may also be relevant to other
12 things.

13 Q. The question is what are the standards
14 that were used in determining whether incidents with
15 other TDI generators other than the Shoreham EDG's
16 had an impact on Shoreham?

17 DR. JOHNSTON: The standard is based on
18 judgment.

19 Perhaps I could just give you an example.

20 One of the items that is entered as
21 experience that should be accounted for in the
22 design review of the replacement crankshafts is the
23 failure of the original crankshafts, and the
24 original crankshafts were analyzed so that we
25 understood why it was that they failed, and why it
26 is that we believe that the replacement crankshafts

waga 1 are adequate.

2 Having assessed the differences between
3 those, we can then reach a judgment that that
4 particular piece of experience does not present any
5 problem to the adequacy of the replacement
6 crankshafts.

7 Q. My question, though, goes to non-Shoreham
8 EDGs and how that experience was determined to be
9 relevant or not to Shoreham generators. I
10 understand your point on the original crankshafts.

11 MR. MONTGOMERY: In a very similar matter
12 the problems —

13 DR. JOHNSTON: The problems we
14 experienced with V-16 engines, we had analyzed
15 crankshafts on V-16 engines, we assessed where their
16 criticals lie, we assessed what the stresses were in
17 the crankshafts, both in V-16's now and in some
18 V-16's that experienced difficulties because of
19 different counter-weighting. We used those to
20 assess what it is that's different about crankshafts
21 that had problems from the crankshafts in the EDG's
22 at Shoreham.

23 By doing that, and comparing the stresses
24 that existed in crankshafts that had problems with
25 those that exist in the replacement crankshafts at

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1 Shoreham, we can assess the relevance of that
2 experience.

3 Q. So it's your testimony that some of the
4 standards that you used are the stresses that are
5 present in other TDI generators; is that correct,
6 and how they might differ from the EDG's at Shoreham?

7 DR. JOHNSTON: That is correct.

8 Q. What other standards do you use?

9 DR. JOHNSTON: Other standards include
10 the material specs; for example, the EDG's at
11 Shoreham have -- maybe have certified materials that
12 is compared to the allowables.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Johnston, in your
14 last answer, were you restricting it to the
15 crankshafts even though you did not expressly so
16 state?

17 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, sir, I was.

18 Q. Are there other standards that you used
19 other than material specifications for the
20 crankshafts?

21 DR. JOHNSTON: The standards for
22 operation and maintenance typically related to the
23 TDI manual for that, so that those also represent a
24 body of standards by which operations and
25 maintenance problems at other sites may be compared

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1 with that.

2 Q. Were the TDI operation manuals different
3 from engine to engine, or were they the same? You
4 can, for example — for the DSR-48 generators, were
5 those operating manuals the same?

6 MR. STROUPE: Do I assume correctly this
7 is restricted to crankshafts?

8 MR. SCHEIDT: Yes.

9 DR. JOHNSTON: The operations manuals that
10 I have seen for the Shoreham engine is certainly
11 different than any other operations manual that I
12 have seen.

13 Q. Does that include operating manuals for
14 other nuclear power plants?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, it does.

16 Q. How does it differ? Well, certainly
17 there's one area where it differs —

18 MR. SCHEIDT: Mr. Youngling, I'm
19 following up with questions to Mr. Johnston.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: We'll let you add if you
21 want, Mr. Youngling, but this is direct follow-up to
22 the difference that Mr. Johnston at least has seen.

23 MR. YOUNGLING: I'm sorry, Judge.

24 DR. JOHNSTON: For example, the numbers
25 of cylinders in an engine at Shoreham would be

waga

1 different than a number of cylinders at Catawba,
2 that would be included in the operations manual for
3 the two generators.

4 Q. My question was as between DSR-48
5 generators, do the operating manuals differ?

6 DR. JOHNSTON: I have not inspected the
7 operations manuals for other nuclear service DSR-48
8 generators.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Let's let Mr. Youngling
10 add at this point if he wants to answer the question
11 as to what differences there are in the operating
12 manuals for, I guess the question ended up being
13 focused on other DSR-48 engines, and if you then
14 want to go beyond that, we'll accept that also.

15 MR. YOUNGLING: Depending upon the
16 arrangement and the configuration, there could be
17 differences in critical speed components in the
18 engine which would require different precautions as
19 to where the engine should or should not be operated.

20 That certainly could relate to the
21 straight eights and certainly to the V engines which
22 would make them different. That was the major point
23 that I wanted to make.

24 Yes. There could be differences between
25 the manuals.

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1 Q. Dr. Johnston, did you ever examine the
2 operating manuals for TDI DSR-48 engines in
3 non-nuclear power plants -- in non-nuclear
4 applications?

5 DR. JOHNSTON: No, I did not.

6 Q. Now, were there any other standards that
7 you used in determining whether experience with TDI
8 diesel engines at plants -- installations other than
9 Shoreham had an impact on Shoreham?

10 MR. MONTGOMERY: In addition to the
11 standards already mentioned, there are a number of
12 other general engineering standards for assessing
13 both the adequacy of particular components and the
14 reasons for problems in other components. These
15 would include the endurance limits, for example, of
16 parts that may have failed and other material
17 parameters.

18 Q. Such as?

19 DR. JOHNSTON: Such as yield strength,
20 elongation.

21 Q. Did the DRQR analyze any of the
22 crankshafts on TDI engines that did not fail to
23 determine whether they were relevant to the Shoreham
24 crankshafts?

25 DR. JOHNSTON: Part of the design review

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1 process, we have analyzed a number of crankshafts in
2 DSR-48 engines, and including those at River Bend,
3 Rancho Seco, also some engines in Saudi Arabia, so
4 that we have, indeed, compared stress levels in
5 engines that have operated satisfactorily with those
6 at Shoreham, and we have included this experience in
7 a number of reports, including the report on the
8 failure investigation of the original 13 by J1
9 crankshaft at Shoreham.

10 Q. Which engines in Saudi Arabia did you
11 compare stress levels for?

12 DR. JOHNSTON: We have compared the
13 stress levels in the engines at Rahfa in Saudi
14 Arabia.

15 Q. Where is this information reported?

16 DR. JOHNSTON: The stress levels for the
17 engine at Rahfa, those calculations have not been
18 specifically reported in the failure analysis
19 reports, although the torsional systems for them
20 have been reported in the TDI submittal to the
21 American Bureau of Shipping.

22 Q. You mentioned that some of this
23 information was contained in the FAA reports.

24 Is it contained in the DRQR reports?

25 DR. JOHNSTON: Explicit stress analyses

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1 or the results from the stress analyses are not
2 included in the DRQR reports for the Rahfa engines;
3 however, that experience base has been included.

4 Q. Has been included where?

5 DR. JOHNSTON: It is included in part of
6 our assessment of the adequacy of the 13 by 12
7 crankshafts.

8 Q. And that's in the FaAA report on the
9 original crankshaft; right?

10 DR. JOHNSTON: It is also in the FaAA
11 report on the replacement crankshaft dated May 22,
12 1984.

13 Q. Is it included in the DRQR Phase 2 report
14 on crankshafts?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: The DRQR report is a
16 summary report that referenced the May 22nd, 1984
17 Failure Analysis report on the EDG's. The Failure
18 Analysis report does include that experience.

19 Q. Mr. Montgomery, is it true that the
20 component tracking system does not track experience
21 with crankshafts and DSR-48's that haven't failed?

22 MR. MONTGOMERY: You're talking about the
23 experience in the computer tracking system for the
24 component crankshaft?

25 MR. SCHEIDT: Yes.

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1 MR. MONTGOMERY: Only?

2 MR. SCHEIDT: Yes.

3 MR. MONTGOMERY: To the best of my
4 knowledge, the computer tracking system generically
5 contains information which encompasses known
6 failures or problems that have been incurred on a
7 particular component. It ordinarily does not
8 reflect positive or service experience on a
9 particular component.

10 Q. In fact, it doesn't indicate any analysis
11 of non-failures; does it?

12 MR. MONTGOMERY: For the purposes of the
13 DRQR review program, a listing of service experience
14 serves no immediate function. A listing of known
15 flaws or failures, maintenance oversights, material
16 inferiority, these are the aspects that require
17 further investigation and review.

18 MR. YOUNGLING: I'd like to add to that,
19 if I could.

20 I think Mr. Johnston pointed out earlier
21 that the DRQR and the FaAA people have looked and
22 analyzed other engines that have operated
23 satisfactorily and looked at their crankshaft
24 designs, and, perhaps, Dr. Johnston can comment on
25 that again.

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1 MR. SCHEIDT: I don't think there's any
2 need to go over the same testimony.

3 Q. Dr. Johnston, is it your testimony that
4 the DRQR program only looked at the alleged
5 satisfactory experience at three locations of DSR-48
6 engines in addition to Shoreham, Rancho Seco, River
7 Bend and Saudi Arabia, Rahfa?

8 DR. JOHNSTON: No. That's not correct.

9 We have looked at engines at a number of
10 locations which are listed in Table 4.1 of the May
11 22nd Failure Analysis report.

12 I indicated the other three engines as
13 specific examples of engines which we have analyzed.

14 The stresses in DSR-48 engines vary a
15 little bit from engine to engine due to minor
16 differences in configurations such as a slightly
17 different fly wheel, and so the stresses may vary a
18 small amount from one to another.

19 We have looked at three other sites to
20 compare the stress levels, but we have included the
21 experience of eight sites in that Table 4.1.

22 MR. STROUPE: Mr. Scheidt, you might want
23 to note that Table 4.1 is contained in LILCO exhibit
24 C-17.

25 MR. SCHEIDT: I picked up on that, Mr.

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1 Stroupe.

2 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, it helps the record
3 when he does that, too, Mr. Scheidt.

4 MR. SCHEIDT: I understand.

5 DR. JOHNSTON: I'd just like to add that,
6 it is our understanding that these eight sites
7 represent all of the DSR-48's that are in service,
8 and includes 26 engines.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: That's the same table as
10 we have as C-6; isn't it? I guess I can compare it,
11 too, but I thought you knew offhand.

12 MR. STROUPE: That's correct, Judge.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: When you interrupted to
14 give us the Exhibit No., I thought you were going to
15 give us C-6, and that's why I'm a little surprised.

16 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

17 Q. Did the DRQR program include an
18 examination of the operating manuals for each of
19 these 26 DSR-48 engines.

20 DR. JOHNSTON: Typically, the operations
21 manual would be reviewed as part of the
22 understanding of a failure event that would be
23 reported in the computer component tracking system
24 so that the operations manuals for all of these
25 sites were not reviewed because of the fact that

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1 they did not experience failures.

2 Q. You stated that all of them were not
3 examined.

4 Were any of them examined?

5 DR. JOHNSTON: Information from the
6 operations manuals of these other — of some of
7 these other engines were examined in order to
8 determine the torsional systems for other engines;
9 for example, the Rahfa engine; however, the extracts
10 of that information was performed by TDI.

11 Q. You said you relied on TDI for part of
12 your analysis with respect to these engines.

13 MR. SCHEIDT: Does answering this
14 question require a conference, Dr. Johnston?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: To answer your original
16 question, the adequacy of the crankshafts was
17 assessed without relying on information from
18 Trans-America DeLaval; however, the particular
19 exhibit that we are — have been referring to, the
20 history of other TDI engines in service was, indeed,
21 compiled by Trans-America DeLaval.

22 MR. MONTGOMERY: I would just like to add
23 to that, that the Shoreham experience, of course,
24 was provided to TDI by LILCO.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: I guess they did hear

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1 about it.

2 Mr. Scheidt, I'm looking for a convenient
3 place to stop for lunch. Also I'm going to ask you
4 whether you're ready to move on to Point 2 within
5 your subpart C.

6 MR. SCHEIDT: I would prefer that Dr.
7 Chen be present for that part of the testimony, so I
8 will pick that up when he arrives.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Let me phrase it
10 carefully. Are you finished with Point 1 of C?

11 MR. SCHEIDT: Point 1 under which point,
12 Judge Brenner?

13 JUDGE BRENNER: I think —

14 MR. SCHEIDT: Point C.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: I don't want to be
16 confusing but I just wanted to know much I revealed
17 would be solely past history which you would have no
18 objection as to giving some insight as to something
19 you might want to refer to so —

20 MR. SCHEIDT: I'm not through on C point
21 1.

22 JUDGE BRENNER: How much more do you have
23 on it? We seem to be getting bogged down on it.
24 I'm not criticizing any particular question and I
25 understand cumulatively it's important because you

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1 want to give us the picture on it, but we've got the
2 picture, so unless -- now is the time to think about
3 whether you have any particular factual points
4 within the picture you've given us

5 MR. SCHEIDT: I do have greater detail
6 fact points on this.

7 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, I understand
8 obviously Mr. Scheidt should be given and is given
9 leeway in his cross-examination, but I note at this
10 point in time, Dr. Pischinger, I do not believe, has
11 been asked a single question, and I don't think if
12 this pattern keeps developing we're not going to get
13 very far with his testimony.

14 JUDGE BRENNER: Were you here on Friday
15 or Thursday?

16 MR. STROUPE: I was here for the morning.

17 JUDGE BRENNER: He doesn't -- well, I had
18 a conversation with Mr. Scheidt this morning and he
19 indicated he would not be ready to get to Dr.
20 Pischinger today.

21 I indicated -- well, I'm indicating now
22 because I don't think I said it quite this way
23 earlier, although it was what I was thinking earlier,
24 that I would expect that the County could at least
25 get up to page 69 of their cross plan by the end of

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1 the day today, and that would get them to Dr.
2 Pischinger the first thing tomorrow.

3 Now, LILCO has all these witnesses up
4 here as a combined panel. If you had elected to put
5 Dr. Pischinger and Mr. Youngling up first, then we
6 would have permitted that and the County would have
7 had to ask those questions first. I don't mean to
8 be overly critical because I recognize they overlap
9 between subject matter and Mr. Scheidt has a little
10 bit of that overlap problem, too. There are some
11 things he'd rather establish first.

12 I did not infer that Mr. Scheidt meant he
13 necessarily had to get up to page 69 in sequence as
14 written in the cross plan. Page 69 is a reference
15 to his cross plan, so we'll see how it goes.

16 But you've heard my comment on how far I
17 think the County should be able to get.

18 What I meant essentially is that
19 information. I didn't mean you had to follow it in
20 sequence. If you had moved around and moved up to
21 page 69 earlier, I recognized because you covered
22 that, you would cover some of the earlier material
23 and would want to come back to that tomorrow, but —

24 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, I anticipate
25 certain points between pages 64 and 69 in which I

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1 could jump to page 69, question Dr. Pischinger to
2 the extent that I wish to question him, and then
3 come back to that material between those two pages.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Fine. That
5 may make sense from a subject matter content as well
6 as a witness accommodation content.

7 Overall, I thought we were pretty patient
8 last week and the length of time surprised me. I
9 did not think it would take all last week to
10 complete that panel. There were reasons on both
11 sides of the aisle for that, and I would hope that
12 through a combination of the cross-examiner as well
13 as the speedy response by the witnesses, a direct
14 question can be answered directly without taking two
15 or three minutes to confer unnecessarily at times.
16 Then we will make better progress this week. You
17 can see just by the number of pages last week how
18 many pauses there were before words were actually
19 put on the transcript.

20 In addition, I voiced my opinion at least
21 from time to time, as to when I thought it would be
22 more efficient to get to the questions that the
23 cross-examiner was leading to more directly, instead
24 of background. That doesn't necessarily apply to
25 anything that occurred today so far, I just want to

waga 1 be able to move a little further and faster.

2 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, I have
3 approximately two or three questions and we can take
4 a lunch break after that.

5 JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

6 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

7 Q. How did Trans-America DeLaval compile
8 this information contained in Exhibit C-6, I believe,
9 concerning the other DSR-48 engines?

10 DR. JOHNSTON: I think that question
11 should be asked to Trans-America DeLaval. I do not
12 know how they compiled that particular table.

13 Q. Did FaAA attempt to verify the
14 information contained in that table?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: The information on that
16 table that relates to the Shoreham experience was
17 verified independently through LILCO.

18 Information at other sites has not been
19 verified by Failure Analysis.

20 Q. And with respect to the examination of
21 the operating manuals to determine whether the
22 torsional systems of the engines were comparable or
23 not, other than looking at the Rahfa operating
24 manual, were there other operating manuals that you
25 looked at to determine comparability of torsional

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1 systems.

2 DR. JOHNSTON: Operating manuals are not
3 the only way to determine the torsional system of
4 another engine. It's done by looking at the
5 drawings in conjunction with a torsigraph test
6 which, of course, is independent of the operating
7 manual.

8 In the TDI submittal to the American
9 Bureau of Shipping, there is a list of a number of
10 other torsional systems for other DSR-48 engines.

11 Q. But my question was: Did you look at any
12 other operating manuals other than Rahfa, as I
13 believe you indicated you had with respect to Rahfa?

14 DR. JOHNSTON: I did not mean to indicate —
15 I don't believe I did indicate that I looked at the
16 operating manual for Rahfa. I used the torsional
17 system for Rahfa. I have — the only operating
18 manual that I have reviewed that contains
19 information on DSR-48's is that of Shoreham.

20 Q. And where did you obtain the torsional
21 information on Rahfa?

22 DR. JOHNSTON: It's included on page 17
23 of TDI's submittal to the American Bureau of
24 Shipping.

25 Q. And that is the natural frequency

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1 calculations for those engines?

2 DR. JOHNSTON: It's labeled Tabulation of
3 Mass Elastic Data for DSR-48 Engines.

4 Q. And what does that tell you about the
5 engine?

6 DR. JOHNSTON: It tells you the lumped
7 parameters to the lump mass model that represents
8 the crankshaft including eleven values of inertias
9 and ten values of its stiffnesses.

10 Q. Is that the Holzer analysis?

11 DR. JOHNSTON: No, it's not. It's some
12 of the data that is used for the Holzer analysis.

13 MR. SCHEIDT: Thank you. We can break
14 now, Judge Brenner.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Let's take a
16 break until 1:40.

17 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing
18 adjourned, to reconvene at 1:40 p.m.,
19 this same day.)

20 AFTERNOON SESSION

21 JUDGE BRENNER: Good afternoon. We're
22 back on the record. We're prepared to have the
23 County continue its cross-examination.

24 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, at this time
25 the County would move to strike portions of

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1 testimony on page 13 of LILCO testimony relating to
2 the extensive experience with 13 by 12 inch
3 crankshafts in DSR-48 engines that allegedly
4 establishes that the crankshafts were reliable as
5 well as the accompanying Exhibits C-6 on the grounds
6 that this information is not reliable.

7 There is no TDI witness who is sponsoring
8 this testimony. The witnesses have indicated that
9 they do not know how this information was compiled
10 and they, in fact, did not verify that information.

11 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, my response --

12 JUDGE BRENNER: I'll hear from you in a moment.
13 I didn't realize Dr. Chen was here and that should have been
14 noted among other things. We have to swear him in

15 MR. STROUPE: I was going to do that at the
16 outset.

17 JUDGE BRENNER: Let's take care of it after this
18 ruling as long as we jumped into it. Welcome, Dr. Chen.

19 DR. CHEN: Sorry.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: It's not your fault if we
21 understand the circumstances correctly. Mr. Stroupe, why
22 don't you respond.

23 MR. STROUPE: Our position, Judge Brenner, put
24 quite simply, is regardless of what Mr. Scheidt has

25

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1 indicated, to my knowledge there's been no showing
2 that the information is not reliable. On
3 cross-examination, they were free to make any points
4 that they could, in fact, make about the reliability
5 of this information.

6 To my knowledge, none of it was pointed
7 out to be inaccurate by any cross-examination
8 exhibit or information.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, have your witnesses
10 shown it is reliable, to state it the other way?

11 MR. STROUPE: I'm not sure that the
12 witnesses have been accurately -- all of them,
13 questioned about what they know about this. It may
14 be indeed that Mr. Youngling could have shed some
15 light on this had he been asked the question.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: We've given this witness
17 panel a lot of leeway to have any witness answer it,
18 and I guess I'd better note that for the record
19 given your comment, although the transcript will not
20 necessarily reflect it, these witnesses feel free to
21 confer among themselves this morning, even when a
22 question was directed by name to a particular
23 witness, there was at least one time when Mr.
24 Scheidt indicated he wanted the answer from the
25 particular witness, but even that was only after

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1 some moments of conferring had taken place, so it's
2 not true that the witness panel did not have a
3 chance for all of them to answer any questions, in
4 my opinion, based on my observation of the dynamics
5 of the panel this morning.

6 So I'm not going to accept that. Did you
7 mean to -- I guess I understand your answer.

8 Can you represent to me, Mr. Stroupe,
9 there is at least one witness on this panel who
10 could have answered those questions with more
11 information who you felt --

12 MR. STROUPE: No, I cannot represent that
13 to you, Judge Brenner.

14 I would say in passing that this
15 information has been contained in other documents,
16 it's been contained in this testimony for some
17 period of time, and we, of course, note that the
18 County filed no motion to strike prior to this
19 proceeding, and had we been noticed that this would
20 be a bone of contention, the reliability of this
21 information, I think we could have certainly done
22 something to prepare ourselves for that eventuality
23 rather than seeing it for the first time on
24 cross-examination.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: Staff, do you have a

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1 question on it?

2 MR. GODDARD: The Staff is inclined to
3 support the motion based upon what we've heard here
4 this morning.

5 In the event that Mr. Stroupe is able to
6 produce witnesses at a later point in time, having
7 claimed surprise as to this motion, the staff would
8 not oppose such a showing, realizing that it may
9 somewhat delay the proceeding, but on the basis of
10 the showing here, the staff would support the motion,
11 does not feel that there's anyone here that is
12 capable of supporting the material here.

13 I might further add that in response to
14 Mr. Stroupe's comment, the publication does not
15 improve the quality of the evidence before us.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear.

17 MR. GODDARD: The publication, the fact
18 that this has been set forth in the DRQR publication,
19 and other places does not lend support to the
20 admissibility of the testimony here. I do not feel
21 that a showing has been made.

22 MR. STROUPE: Mr. Goddard --

23 MR. GODDARD: That was my interpretation.

24 JUDGE BRENNER: Hold it. Talk to each
25 other outside if you want to.

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1 MR. JOHNSON: The state supports the
2 County on its motion to strike the testimony for the
3 same reasons that were given by Mr. Scheidt.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: If you feel it's
5 important, I'll let you respond to Mr. Goddard's
6 comments, Mr. Stroupe.

7 MR. STROUPE: I just wanted to make it
8 clear for the record and to the court that my
9 reference to this particular table and the
10 information being in other documents was for the
11 purpose of pointing out that a motion to strike
12 could have been filed well in advance of this
13 cross-examination.

14 MR. BRIGATI: If may I respond to that --

15 JUDGE BRENNER: No; not out of
16 discourtesy. I understand both sides of the
17 arguments and we try to keep it to a
18 particular lawyer on one point. Does the immediate
19 plan of attack rely on a ruling from us right now?

20 MR. SCHEIDT: I will proceed to question
21 them on detail of the actual testimony and the
22 exhibit, if you do not rule now.

23 JUDGE BRENNER: Why don't you give us a
24 few minutes, I think I'd like to go next door.

25 The geography of the bench here makes it

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1 difficult.

2 (Discussion in Judge's Chambers)

3 JUDGE BRENNER: We're back on the record.

4 We're prepared to grant the motion

5 subject to ascertaining the involvement or lack

6 therefore of Dr. Chen in the pertinent portion of

7 that answer.

8 I'm looking at page 13 of the testimony

9 of McCarthy, et al., regarding replacement

10 crankshafts, and Dr. Chen is listed as a co-author

11 of the entire answer.

12 As we understand the motion to strike,

13 Mr. Scheidt, you're asking to strike the first two

14 sentences of the second paragraph of that answer

15 along with Exhibit C-6; is that correct?

16 MR. SCHEIDT: That's correct, Judge

17 Brenner.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Since Dr.

19 Chen was not here this morning, let's find out what

20 his involvement might be and if he is not a sponsor

21 of those two sentences, we'll grant the motion and

22 I'll give the reasons, but let's swear Dr. Chen in,

23 find out what the situation is, unless you can tell

24 us as a representation that he had nothing to do

25 with those two sentences and is not here to give us

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1 any insight into Exhibit C-6.

2 MR. STROUPE: I believe he may have some
3 information that could be pertinent to those two
4 sentences.

5 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We'll find
6 out.

7 Dr. Chen, could you please stand and
8 raise your right hand.

9 Whereupon,

10 DR. SIMON CHEN

11 was called as a witness by and on behalf of the
12 Applicant, and having been first duly sworn,
13 was examined and testified as follows:

14 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, would now be
15 an appropriate time to have Dr. Chen adopt the
16 testimony?

17 JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

18 MR. STROUPE: Dr. Chen, do you have in
19 front of you testimony filed by LILCO of August 14,
20 1984 in this proceeding entitled "Testimony of Roger
21 L. McCarthy, Paul R. Johnson, Eugene F. Montgomery
22 and Simon K. Chen on behalf of Long Island Lighting
23 Company on Suffolk County's Contention Regarding
24 Replacement Crankshaft on diesel engines on the
25 Shoreham" along with three volumes of exhibits

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1 relating to the crankshaft?

2 DR. CHEN: Yes, I see them here.

3 MR. STROUPE: To the best of your
4 knowledge, is the testimony true and correct?

5 DR. CHEN: I don't think I can vouch for
6 every piece of information that's in here but on
7 those --

8 MR. STROUPE: Excuse me, go ahead.

9 DR. CHEN: On those things that I'm
10 involved, I'm sure it will be truthful to the court.

11 MR. STROUPE: And do you adopt that
12 testimony as your own?

13 DR. CHEN: Are those under my -- yes.

14 MR. STROUPE: Tender for cross.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Chen, we've been
16 discussing page 13 of the testimony, and the answer
17 to question 13 begins on that page.

18 There has been some testimony, oral
19 testimony this morning to which you were not present
20 involving the information in that answer, and I'll
21 give you a moment to look at it and you may also
22 want to look at the related Exhibit C-6.

23 DR. CHEN: Yes. I see it.

24 JUDGE BRENNER: With regard to the second
25 paragraph of that answer, the first two sentences,

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1 which begins: In addition, and ends with Exhibit
2 C-6, did you participate or do you now believe you
3 can participate as an author of those two sentences
4 vouching for the statements made in those two
5 sentences as supported by the exhibits or was that
6 something that Mr. Montgomery prepared without you?

7 DR. CHEN: Yes. I have participated in
8 investigating some of the information, certainly not
9 all the information in Exhibit 6.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: I guess you'd better ask
11 him some questions, Mr. Scheidt.

12 It's unfortunate for you, we recognize
13 that had Dr. Chen not had his transportation
14 problems, we would have been able to handle it all
15 at once but we are reluctant to strike it if Dr. Chen can
16 indeed provide some missing information.

17 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

18 Q. Dr. Chen, TDI compiled this information,
19 did it not?

20 DR. CHEN: I think so.

21 Q. Did you verify any of this information

22 DR. CHEN: I have certainly verified the
23 LILCO information.

24 Q. LILCO information?

25 DR. CHEN: LILCO information.

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1 In other words, the hours run at LILCO
2 and I have that information.

3 Q. Is there any information in Exhibit C-6
4 other than Shoreham LILCO information that you
5 verified?

6 DR. CHEN: Yes. I have personally
7 visited Kousheng plant late November, early December
8 and made trips over there and went to see those
9 engines, and also I have made telephone calls twice
10 early this month to find out, what whether those
11 engines are running reliably or not, and I have some
12 latest hours on those engines, yes.

13 Q. I'm sorry, Dr. Chen. When did you visit
14 Kousheng?

15 DR. CHEN: Late November or early
16 December, yes. There are four engines there.

17 Q. And when did you have these telephone
18 conversations that you referred to?

19 DR. CHEN: It's earlier this month, two
20 weeks ago.

21 Q. And with whom did you speak?

22 DR. CHEN: I spoke through an
23 intermediary, and he spoke to the — they call
24 station manager at Kousheng.

25 Q. And what did he — what information did

waga 1 he transmit to you on the number of hours?

2 DR. CHEN: Yes. The first question I
3 asked whether these engines have been operating
4 satisfactorily up to that point. He said yes.

5 And then he -- I said how many hours they
6 have been running, both total hours log and also
7 hours above 3300 kw, and I received that information.

8 Kousheng is a plant which is in operation
9 since 1980 running pretty much at the design load.

10 Q. What is the design load for those engines?

11 DR. CHEN: I say the plant is running at
12 design load. The engines are standby generators and
13 rated 3,500 kw, just like LILCO engines, they are
14 eight cylinder, but as far as total hours,
15 exercising hours every month to conform to their
16 nuclear standards, so they have not been putting too
17 many hours on as running satisfactory, but all four
18 engines have been running from 110 hours and
19 something less than 130 hours over 3300 kw ratings
20 to satisfy their nuclear requirements for the last
21 two to three years.

22 Q. Dr. Chen, perhaps I didn't understand you.

23 Are you testifying that they have run
24 between 110 and 130 hours above -- at or about 3300
25 kw?

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1 DR. CHEN: At or above, total hours.

2 Q. 110 to 130; is that right?

3 DR. CHEN: Yes.

4 Total hours run is more than that, but
5 above 3300, at 3300 kw are only 110, to 130, because
6 that's all that's required.

7 Q. Each engine has run 110, 130?

8 DR. CHEN: Four engines. I have numbers
9 on four individual engines, yes, all above —
10 they're all somewhat under 130, to the best of my
11 knowledge, memory today.

12 Q. Dr. Chen, you testified that these
13 engines were rated at 3,500 kw, is that correct?
14 I'll refer you to the exhibit.

15 DR. CHEN: To the best of my knowledge,
16 35.

17 Q. So it's your understanding that this
18 chart is incorrect, this exhibit, C-6, in that
19 category?

20 DR. CHEN: Well, I cannot vouch for the
21 36.

22 Q. Dr. Chen, can you verify the number of
23 total hours logged indicated in this exhibit for me?

24 DR. CHEN: Total hours logged is
25 somewhere between 600 hours and I believe something

waga 1 over 700 hours on each of those engines.

2 I don't have the numbers here, but I can
3 present it to you. I can present a telex to you of
4 exactly how many hours logged and how many hours
5 taken and how many hours above 3300 kw.

6 The main thing I was asking is — they
7 have no big approximate, they are running
8 satisfactorily and they say yes, they are running
9 satisfactorily.

10 Q. What factors did you ask him to — strike
11 that.

12 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, maybe I can
13 assist in efficiency.

14 I'll give it back to you if we don't get
15 anywhere.

16 Other than the LILCO data and the
17 Kousheng data in the table, Dr. Chen, do you have
18 knowledge to support the truth of the facts in the
19 rest of that Exhibit C-6?

20 DR. CHEN: I know as a fact that there
21 are quite a few numbers of these eight cylinder
22 engines shipped to Saudi Arabia since 1977, 1978 or
23 even before that.

24 And I know the existence of those engines,
25 but I don't have any details about how many hours

waga 1 they are run and at what load, no, sir.

2 JUDGE BRENNER: With respect to Kousheng,
3 did I hear you correctly that as of your recent
4 check, Kousheng, as of your recent check, about two
5 weeks ago, each of the four engines had about 700
6 hours of total operation?

7 DR. CHEN: The way it's stated, total
8 hours logged, started up for one reason or the other.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Was my figure correct?
10 Did I hear you right, 700 hours?

11 DR. CHEN: I would say that's about the
12 average of those four engines. They are up and down
13 a little bit, maybe some of them will have only 600
14 some hours and some of them have 700 some hours. As
15 I say, I can produce these individual hours.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: On the chart for Kousheng,
17 it gives the date log as 3-15-84, and in the total
18 hours logged column, the highest number for one of
19 the Kousheng engines is 368, and the lowest is 221.

20 DR. CHEN: Yes.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: Is that an unusual number
22 of additional hours for the engines to have logged
23 between March 15, 1984 and sometime early in
24 September of 1984?

25 DR. CHEN: I would say for an operating

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1 engine, you're correct, Judge, but I believe that
2 this total hours logged here corresponds to another
3 set of numbers I have that I got from telex, and the
4 other column was the hours taking loads and
5 generating upward.

6 That number is very, very close to what's
7 in the Exhibit 6.

8 There's three sets of numbers that I have
9 is total hours logged and total hours generating
10 power, and then I asked specifically the hours
11 generating power above 3300 kw.

12 I have three sets of data by telex.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: With respect to the
14 latter category, you testified that the number of
15 hours at over 3300 kw were somewhere at about 100 to
16 130 per engine for each of the four Kousheng engines;
17 is that right?

18 DR. CHEN: Yes, sir.

19 JUDGE BRENNER: And in Exhibit C-6, it
20 has a notation after the Kousheng date, quote,
21 mostly one hundred percent, close quote, and I took
22 that to apply to the total hours logged in the
23 figures on that same chart.

24 Can you explain the discrepancy between
25 my reading of the chart to mean that and the hours

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1 you've reported?

2 DR. CHEN: I cannot testify saying the
3 average load is 200 hours since I'm not the author
4 of that exhibit, sir.

5 JUDGE BRENNER: Give us a moment. We're
6 going to grant the motion to strike LILCO Exhibit
7 C-6, so, of course, it will stay in the record as an
8 offer of proof, and what we'd like to do is back up
9 on the index page and have a third column at least
10 for that one to indicate that we struck at this
11 transcript page. We're also striking the first two
12 sentences of the second paragraph on page 13 of the
13 testimony of McCarthy, et al., regarding crankshafts
14 that would begin with in addition and end with
15 Exhibit C-6.

16 (Thereupon, Lilco Diesel Exhibit C-6 is
17 rejected.)

18 Dr. Chen certainly had information about
19 the Kousheng diesels and the lawyers understand, but
20 he might not understand that it wasn't for lack of
21 trying by him that we are striking it.

22 Dr. Chen candidly told us what he knew
23 and what he did not know, and that assisted us in
24 our ruling.

25 There are, however, discrepancies even as

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1 to Kousheng about which Dr. Chen knew quite a bit
 2 between his knowledge and this chart here to the
 3 point where it's not precise enough to be reliable
 4 for the purposes by which — for which it was
 5 presented in the testimony.

6 And that is that the extensive experience
 7 on these other DSR-48 TDI diesels establishes that
 8 the Shoreham diesels are reliable.

9 In effect, our ruling is supportive of
 10 the same argument that LILCO has made from time to
 11 time about the crankshafts and, indeed, other
 12 components, that that the experience that other
 13 machines cannot be cited as being pertinent to
 14 Shoreham unless similarities and differences are
 15 well explained, and LILCO has failed to explain that
 16 even minimally with respect to this particular
 17 testimony to leave in evidence.

18 We did consider Mr. Stroupe's point that
 19 the County had not filed a timely motion to strike
 20 on this testimony and they could have.

21 If the County had done it, in our view,
 22 the following sequence would have occurred:

23 The motion to strike would have had to
 24 have been based on the point prior to testimony on
 25 the fact that there is an Exhibit C-6 and testimony

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1. sponsored by witnesses Montgomery and Chen, and
2 there is no connection in the testimony showing that
3 these witnesses have personal knowledge of the facts
4 in the table.

5 The answer undoubtedly would have come in
6 along these lines, although undoubtedly more
7 eloquently stated, that under federal rules of
8 evidence of several of them, particularly 703, the
9 witnesses do not have to have personal knowledge of
10 all the details so long as it's reasonable data of
11 the type that an expert witness would -- as
12 preparation for the hearing or preparation to obtain
13 knowledge as an expert about the crankshafts would
14 gather up, and we would have undoubtedly denied the
15 motion to strike on that basis.

16 However, then we get to the hearing, and
17 we are here to learn what weight we should attach to
18 his testimony, and that depends more particularly on
19 the witness's knowledge of the underlying data.

20 It all depends on the use to which the
21 underlying data is being put. Certain uses require
22 less precise knowledge of underlying data than other
23 uses.

24 In this case, the knowledge required is
25 quite precise, in our view, particularly given the

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1 arguments made in the past in other context by LILCO,
2 and I've stated what that argument is.

3 In order to deem other experience
4 material either to show success or failure, you need
5 to know what the similarities and differences are.

6 The County had attempted to go into that
7 on cross-examination, and the witnesses, in effect,
8 cannot supply information, therefore, the County is
9 deprived of its right to confront through
10 cross-examination the truth and weight of this
11 testimony, and for that reason we would strike it.

12 We could have stated since we are past
13 the time for motions to strike, which could have
14 been filed earlier, that given the fact that a
15 motion to strike was not filed earlier, we would not
16 strike it now, but we would give it the weight due
17 this testimony based on the cross-examination.

18 However, I've explained why in our view
19 that it would be unfair since the motion to strike,
20 in this instance, would have been denied based on
21 the way the written information, which is all we
22 would have had at that time, would have stood.

23 We also were able to determine and
24 support that the weight we would give this
25 information is zero; so there's no sense in putting

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1 it off to a later date what we can decide today with
2 respect to this particular testimony.

3 For that reason, it is struck. I will
4 explain it at greater length if necessary. I was
5 hoping that the witnesses would understand our
6 thinking ability and know that it's not our
7 reflection of their ability to testify as to matters
8 they have as to expert knowledge, their attorneys
9 can explain it better to them some day but that's
10 our ruling.

11 JUDGE BRENNER: Go on, Mr. Scheidt.

12 One thing, we have not forgotten, we have
13 a pending motion to strike the portion of the staff's
14 testimony filed by the County and we have been
15 considering that and continue to do that and we will
16 have a timely ruling on it for you on that.

17 Certainly some of the same principles
18 I've espoused here will apply to them, I'm sure, as
19 well.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: Let me add one other
21 footnote.

22 We considered leaving the data with
23 respect to LILCO in Exhibit C-6 and decided it was
24 necessary to the extent pertinent any of the
25 operating data for the LILCO engines with the new

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1 crankshaft is contained in great abundance
2 throughout testimony and exhibits, then we'll
3 undoubtedly be hearing about it later in the hearing,
4 too.

5 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

6 Q. Dr. Chen, are you familiar with the rules —
7 are you familiar with the rules of Lloyd Register of
8 Shipping?

9 DR. CHEN: I know how to apply them, yes.

10 Q. And are you familiar with the rules of
11 the American Bureau of Shipping?

12 DR. CHEN: Yes. I know how to apply them
13 and I have checked also ABS calculations.

14 Q. Those rules are based on years of wide
15 practical experience with diesel engines; aren't
16 they?

17 DR. CHEN: They are based on traditional
18 calculations of crankshaft geometry, number one, and
19 second, the torsionals are based on in most cases
20 marine engine history, operating experience and
21 history.

22 Q. And safety and reliability is of
23 paramount concerns of these rules, aren't they, Dr.
24 Chen?

25 DR. CHEN: I think seaworthy is the word

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1 the law uses. Certainly implies that if the
2 crankshaft satisfies any of these marine rules which
3 were basically designed for insurance, they will be
4 seaworthy.

5 Q. And seaworthy encompasses reliability and
6 safety, does it not, Dr. Chen?

7 DR. CHEN: I think that it really
8 gives the owners and the people who insure some
9 sense of surety.

10 Q. Of what, Dr. Chen?

11 DR. CHEN: Surety, that these crankshafts
12 are conservative enough that they would be willing
13 to insure.

14 Q. And they are willing to insure the
15 crankshafts and the engines because they are safe
16 and reliable based upon the rules; is that right?

17 DR. CHEN: I never thought of it that way.
18 I would think there's other factors from
19 the owner's point of view that must be considered
20 beyond the Lloyd and beyond the ABS to know that
21 engine and the crankshaft is safe or not.

22 Q. Well, one measure that those shipowners
23 use to determine whether the crankshafts and engines
24 are reliable and safe is compliance with one or more
25 of those classification society rules; isn't it?

waga 1 DR. CHEN: I think I will try to answer
2 that.

3 There's a difference o. judgment and
4 opinion whether those rules are for insurance
5 purposes, or is it for operation and shipowners
6 purpose.

7 I think the shipowners and the insured
8 sometimes took a little different point of view.
9 This is my experience. Just to mention why, for
10 example, shipowners would rely more on their own
11 experience on the medium speed engines, even that
12 they look — most of these crankshafts have maybe
13 either Lloyd or ABS rules and they will go beyond
14 that to talk about reliability.

15 I don't think shipowners will just take
16 the ABS rules or the Lloyd rules and say, if they
17 have Lloyd rules I would consider these crankshaft
18 reliable, and/or on ABS, also, because a good
19 example is the U.S. Navy does not require either
20 U.S. — does not require ABS rules when they accept
21 the engine, and they certainly want reliable engines.

22 Q. Most shipowners use compliance with one
23 or more of these codes as an indicator, it may not
24 be the only indicator, but as an indicator of safety
25 and reliability; isn't that true?

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1 DR. CHEN: I think I've said it several
2 times. I think that this is one other factor they
3 might consider so that they can get the insurance.

4 If I were an owner, I would certainly
5 consider the Lloyd rules or ABS rules reliable --
6 not reliable, because as engineers especially,
7 because some of those rules are not very explicit;
8 and -- especially that as time goes on, the material
9 strengths, the processing of the crankshaft and even
10 the computation methods have advanced and affect
11 some of those arbitrary -- I shouldn't say arbitrary,
12 I'm sorry, empirical rules established, I would say,
13 quite a few years ago.

14 Q. Based on years and years of experience,
15 though, isn't it true, Dr. Chen?

16 DR. CHEN: Well, based on their
17 experience.

18 I don't think that's true for -- from an
19 engineer's point of view.

20 Engineers don't consider ABS rules and
21 Lloyd rules used for design for reliability.

22 I think that's what I'm trying to say. I
23 don't think owners would consider that either,
24 because they are different rules, so which rules is
25 more reliable.

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1 There's all over the world, you have NKK
2 rules which is different, Lloyd rules are different.
3 You have different rules and Asia goes for -- use
4 quite a bit of ABS rules.

5 Russia has their own rules. Lloyd
6 England, Lloyds of London has its own rules and
7 Lloyd of Germany has a little different rules, so as
8 an engineer, I think it's one of the parameters we
9 have to consider if we want to sell to the marine
10 owners, but it's certainly not a rule that we will
11 consider whether we design the crankshaft safely or
12 not safely. I repeat it again because many of the
13 engines used in this country when they designed the
14 one design they don't consider ABS rules.

15 They eventually will be used on auxiliary
16 generators or on the ships or used by the Navy.
17 They never received ABS rules.

18 Q. Dr. Chen, doesn't the Navy have standards
19 of its own for its crankshafts and diesel engines

20 DR. CHEN: They use engineering
21 evaluations, sir, and their own experience.

22 Q. Aren't those standards more stringent
23 than the ABS standards?

24 DR. CHEN: They are different and they're
25 based on engineering evaluation, not -- certainly

waga

1 not rules.

2 Q. Are you aware of any ships that are in
3 the Navy that do not comply with the ABS standards?

4 DR. CHEN: Yes, sir.

5 Q. Which ships are those?

6 DR. CHEN: None of the military ships
7 require ABS rules.

8 Q. That wasn't my question, Dr. Chen.

9 I'm asking do you know of any ships in
10 the Navy that do not comply with the ABS rules?

11 DR. CHEN: Yes.

12 Q. Which of those ships --

13 DR. CHEN: Recently LDS-41 does not cite
14 ABS rules.

15 Q. That's not my question, Dr. Chen. It's
16 not a matter of citing ABS rules. It's a matter of
17 complying with any ABS, do you know any ships?

18 DR. CHEN: What do you mean by -- I do
19 not understand, sir, what you mean by comply.

20 Does it mean that they get the papers --
21 piece of letters from ABS certificate and say this
22 ship arrangement conforms to ABS rules?

23 Q. Do you know of any ships --

24 DR. CHEN: I just mentioned LDS-41 that
25 I'm also a consultant on.

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1 JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Chen, you have to let
2 him finish the question. He's going to have to let
3 you finish the answer. Otherwise, we will have to
4 get a court reporter for each of you to take this
5 down.

6 DR. CHEN: I'll slow down. I do --

7 JUDGE BRENNER: Why don't you add the
8 words "in fact" to one of your next questions and
9 we'll get the distinction.

10 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

11 Q. In fact, Dr. Chen, don't the Navy ships
12 meet the ABS standards whether or not they are
13 required to comply with those standards or whether
14 or not they have gone to ABS to determine whether
15 ABS will give their approval?

16 DR. CHEN: Again, when you say -- maybe
17 it's my English, when you say, in fact, whether I
18 have performed some calculations or the Navy has
19 performed some calculations to see whether that
20 crankshaft satisfies ABS rules? That's my question.

21 Q. Dr. Chen, do you know of any ships for
22 which calculations have been made under the ABS
23 rules that show that those ships do not meet the ABS
24 rules?

25 DR. CHEN: As I say, I don't know. I

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1 don't know that the LDS-41 or the TAO diesel, these
2 are the two major ship programs which are using
3 medium speed engines. Whether they pass -- has
4 anybody made calculation whether they pass ABS rules
5 or not?

6 DR. CHEN: I think they certainly make a
7 lot of calculations by the suppliers.

8 But I personally don't know whether those
9 calculations and stress levels, torsional levels
10 conform to ABS or not.

11 This is the truth.

12 Q. Dr. Chen, isn't it true that certain
13 classification society rules are more conservative
14 than others?

15 DR. CHEN: Well, some of the society
16 rules are pretty old, and may be old fashioned, also,
17 archaic.

18 There are rules that are handbook type of
19 rules and the numbers are based on maybe lesser
20 materials and based on less sophisticated
21 calculations and their numbers appear to be lower,
22 yes, sir.

23 Whether you consider lower limits as less
24 safer or safer than the others, this is something I
25 do not agree. I don't think that you can consider

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1 the lower numbers as safer.

2 Q. When you refer to lower numbers —

3 DR. CHEN: Limits.

4 Q. What are you referring to?

5 DR. CHEN: Lower allowable limits.

6 Q. Well, Dr. Chen, is it your testimony that
7 some classification society rules are more
8 conservative than others?

9 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object at this
10 point, Judge Brenner, unless Mr. Scheidt specifies
11 one of the classification societies that I
12 understand has been admitted as an issue or
13 contention in this proceeding rather than just
14 asking the general broad question about any
15 classification societies.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: We'll sustain that
17 objection.

18 You can get similar points to the extent
19 material to the contention by being more precise,
20 Mr. Scheidt, I think it would be more efficient;
21 also. At the same time, I don't think it will
22 deprive you of any substance to ask questions in
23 context to the extent you still want to.

24 Q. Dr. Chen, isn't it true that with Lloyd's
25 rules that an engine manufacturer can submit his

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1 design plans and seek approval of his engine?

2 DR. CHEN: I think in addition to design
3 points, I think they also have to submit some other
4 calculations, drawings, calculations and plans for
5 his engines; isn't that right, what he submits to
6 Lloyds?

7 DR. CHEN: Yes.

8 Q. And doesn't Lloyds have in-house staff of
9 engineers and surveyors that review those plans and
10 actually go out and look at the crankshaft in an
11 engine; isn't that true?

12 DR. CHEN: In my deposition, I think
13 before I have told Mr. Dynner that I don't know that
14 much detail about Lloyds of London.

15 In this country, we use ABS and ABS is
16 recognized all over the world as field surveyors all
17 over the world, so I'm not familiar with what Lloyd
18 does, and I have never had occasion to use Lloyd,
19 sir.

20 Q. Then doesn't ABS have an in-house staff
21 of engineers and surveyors who will review plans,
22 drawings and send surveyors out to inspect the
23 crankshafts in marine applications?

24 DR. CHEN: Yes. I believe what you
25 describe is accurate.

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1 Q. And DEMA does not have an in-house staff
2 of surveyors and engineers who will review plans and
3 inspect crankshafts; isn't that true?

4 DR. CHEN: DEMA is not a standard as such.

5 I think it's referred to as a guideline.
6 They certainly -- certainly it's different from the
7 ABS, and it does not have surveyors, it does not
8 have inside technical staff to check calculations.

9 Q. And DEMA does not give its approval or
10 disapproval to a particular crankshaft; does
11 it?

12 DR. CHEN: All DEMA does is come up with,
13 was a reference and a certain allowable limits to
14 their member company and as more or less a self
15 policing type of guidelines and it has no value to --
16 as far as -- has no certificate about -- or approval
17 or not approval.

18 I think what you described is correct.

19 Q. And DEMA last revised its recommendations
20 for stationary engines in 1972; isn't that true?

21 DR. CHEN: I believe it's 1972, yes.

22 I remember that, yes.

23 Q. And doesn't Lloyds rule -- Lloyds
24 register and the ABS revise their rules almost every
25 year?

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1 DR. CHEN: ABS's last revision is 1984,
2 so they have current rules.

3 Q. Do you know whether Lloyds revised its
4 rules in 1984?

5 DR. CHEN: They actually sent out
6 revision sheets every year, if it's revised.

7 They have a very thick volume, and they
8 will send out revision sheets every year.

9 I have not — I do not whether in 1984
10 rules on crankshaft is revised or not. I don't
11 believe the 1984 revisions changed the torsional
12 calculations.

13 Q. Dr. Chen, do you know whether the DEMA
14 rules are currently considered to be up-to-date and
15 current?

16 MR. STROUPE: Objection. Unless he
17 specifies by whom.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: We'll allow the question
19 as asked and an expert witness can take care of that,
20 if there is such a possible distinction.

21 DR. CHEN: I am not on the DEMA technical
22 committee today, so I cannot speak for DEMA. It
23 would not be wise for me to speak for DEMA, but I
24 did talk to the chairman, technical committee
25 chairman, and co-chairman, and several other DEMA

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1 members, to question them about this, because it's
2 my feeling that their quote unquote rules are not
3 explicit enough to be used as a crankshaft criteria.

4 As time goes by, there's a lot of things
5 which happens in the 1970's that are different than
6 today, so I cannot consider them as up-to-date, in
7 both the material area, especially the material
8 areas, ABS, strength area, the calculation areas are
9 different, and DEMA's rules are not that explicit.

10 But I do think that the members when they
11 use it, they will use it because of some of these.
12 Either way you can do, they will use it to design
13 their crankshaft according to the -- to the spirit
14 of DEMA, but, perhaps, maybe not the exact -- in
15 exact formula, or -- what I'm trying to say is the
16 BEMA members, they do try to design the crankshaft,
17 that will be satisfactory for the owners to use.

18 Believe me, no engine builders wants to
19 build -- wants to produce a crankshaft that would
20 not be reliable.

21 Q. Dr. Chen, are you through with your
22 answer?

23 DR. CHEN: I'm just trying to tell you
24 that -- you asked me the reliability of whether they
25 are archaic or not, I'm trying to relate this

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1 obsolete formula, what engine manufacturers what
2 they do in-house, how they use the DEMA standards.

3 Q. So, Dr. Chen, you don't know whether the
4 DEMA rules are -- the recommendations are still in
5 effect; isn't that --

6 DR. CHEN: That's not true. That's not
7 what I said.

8 I said that I talked to several DEMA
9 members. They don't -- they do not consider the
10 DEMA rules are obsolete at this point, although
11 there's some various discrepancies about the methods
12 and interpretations of several -- by their member
13 firm.

14 The reason is like this. The way they
15 explained it is the technical committee, because of
16 the other more important standards they have to work
17 out such as exhaust, emission, smoke, noise,
18 particulates, that they do not -- they have not
19 found it necessary to revise some of the rules and
20 some of the suggestions that have that I have
21 submitted to them.

22 Q. Dr. Chen, you mentioned that -- you
23 mentioned the words "archaic" and "obsolete" in
24 discussing DEMA generally.

25 Do you believe that any portions of those

waga 1 recommendations are obsolete or archaic?

2 DR. CHEN: I don't — maybe I didn't use
3 the words right.

4 What I'm saying is they are — they came
5 out with the latest revision in 1971, 1972 like you
6 informed me just a while ago, and actually there's
7 very little changes between that version and the
8 earlier versions, I believe, is maybe like 1950's,
9 and so it is an older rules.

10 And, as I say, it is not the rules
11 because they didn't specify how do you date -- they
12 are based on old sets of criteria that they have
13 accumulated throughout the years.

14 And that set of criteria goes back to the
15 days of much weaker — much poorer was used.

16 And they find it satisfactory and the
17 Navy found it satisfactory that some of those
18 criteria are sufficient, adequate for the purpose of
19 evaluating torsional vibration of the crankshaft.

20 Q. Do you know whether DEMA itself considers
21 its rules to be outdated at the present time?

22 DR. CHEN: I think I just mentioned that
23 I cannot speak for them.

24 I just — I talked to their members and
25 that's what they told me, exactly. They said they

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1 have urgent things to do that they cannot respond to
2 my questions.

3 Q. Dr. Chen, do you know -- Dr. Chen, isn't
4 it true that the DEMA recommendations are no longer
5 in print?

6 DR. CHEN: Well, I really believe that
7 whatever reason that they say is adequate is the
8 figures are conservative, so they don't think that
9 the rules has misled their member firm, so that
10 their different firm of suppliers will supply or
11 furnish crankshaft which is not adequate.

12 I think that is one of also their
13 thinking that when the member firm uses these
14 formulas that the crankshaft will be satisfactory.

15 If the members uses these figures
16 correctly, and if they do not use these guideline
17 correctly and they will not be satisfactory, they
18 don't have any other experience than that.

19 Q. Dr. Chen --

20 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I wonder if
21 I might interject, obviously he was supplementing
22 his answer to a prior question so you're undoubtedly
23 warming up to restate your last question.

24 Let me suggest it for you differently
25 because I don't know what you mean by no longer

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1 in print and I think there's a potential for
2 miscommunication, unless you precisely state what
3 you are asking.

4 Q. Dr. Chen, isn't it true that DEMA -- that
5 the DEMA rules are no longer published and
6 circulated by DEMA?

7 DR. CHEN: Well, I think -- what do you
8 mean by that? Please, the menus are still used --
9 the standards are still used and from time to time
10 they come out with revision sheets to update their
11 standards or -- their so-called stationary standards
12 and marine standards.

13 Q. Is it true, Dr. Chen, they haven't
14 reissued any revisions to those rules since they
15 were published in 1972?

16 DR. CHEN: You might know something I
17 don't know.

18 I know that they have put supplementary
19 sheets to their members about, I think I was
20 personally involved, such as exhaust emission and
21 acoustic measurement.

22 They sent the supplementary sheets to the
23 manuals.

24 Q. Have they sent any supplementary
25 organizations on the torsional aspects of the rules?

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1 DR. CHEN: You'd better ask DEMA but I
2 don't think so. I have not received any revisions
3 on the crankshaft. I think the crankshaft standards
4 have not changed since -- quote, unquote standards
5 have not been changed since the last publication.

6 Q. Dr. Chen, do you know whether -- do you
7 know that the DEMA rules are no longer available
8 from DEMA?

9 DR. CHEN: I don't know that.

10 As I say, you'd better ask DEMA.

11 JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Chen, when you talk
12 about DEMA members, would those be limited to diesel
13 engine manufacturers?

14 DR. CHEN: The DEMA members are only
15 those builders, manufacturers of large reciprocating
16 engines.

17 In this case, it would be -- maybe you
18 can just refresh my memory, they are Cooper Bessemer,
19 Waukesha Engine Company, Colt Fairbanks-Morse, and I
20 believe White Superior, Dresser Industry. Dresser
21 has two divisions and -- who are interested in DEMA,
22 so Waukesha is one of the divisions. There's
23 another division and Ingersoll-Rand I think adhered
24 to DEMA. These are large diesel manufacturers. I
25 might have missed some but these are the ones that --

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1 certainly my colleagues just reminded me that
2 Enterprise Division, DeLaval Enterprise Division,
3 TDI.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: Although you state you
5 may have missed some, the sense that I'm getting
6 from your answer is the number of members of DEMA
7 are approximately five, perhaps some more, but not
8 more than ten.

9 DR. CHEN: Not more than ten.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: Are they all American
11 companies?

12 DR. CHEN: Well, these were organized
13 only for -- interchange for technical information
14 and set up some industry standards, practice, to
15 upgrade the industry as a whole, so it's -- it's
16 only for American companies.

17 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, may I have a
18 moment to confer with my colleagues.

19 (There is a discussion off the record.)

20 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

21 Q. Dr. Chen, you testified that you talked
22 to some of the DEMA committee members.

23 What was the purpose of your
24 conversations with those persons?

25 DR. CHEN: I have left the DEMA

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1 organization since 1972, so I want to be sure that
2 they don't have any concerning torsional
3 calculations and crankshaft, and I did ask them
4 whether they have -- their methods that they are
5 using are about the same as what I used before or
6 any revisions in that area, so I asked for an
7 interchange of information about torsional
8 calculations, the methods, and certainly the limits.

9 Q. Are those the two -- the only two general
10 areas that you requested information from them on,
11 and those areas being whether there were current
12 revisions and to the methods used for torsional
13 calculations and the limits?

14 DR. CHEN: Yes. Calculations, when you
15 talk about calculations, there's a lot of details
16 about calculations, yes, those are the areas that
17 we're talking about.

18 Q. Who are the individuals that you spoke
19 with?

20 DR. CHEN: I talked to Lee Evans who is
21 the chairman of the technical committee.

22 Q. I'm sorry, what was the name?

23 DR. CHEN: LEE, L E E, E-V-A-N-S.

24 Q. Who else did you speak with?

25 DR. CHEN: Pardon?

waga 1 Q. Who else did you speak with?

2 DR. CHEN: I talk talked to Richard
3 Smally, S-m-a-l-l-y. I just remembered that I
4 failed to mention Alco Engine Company is also a
5 member. He's the chief engineer of Alco Engineering
6 Company, and I talked to a staff member on the Colt
7 Industries Fairbanks-Morse, he has
8 been making crankshaft calculations since the 1940's,
9 and I touched based with him and asked him about
10 what is the latest DEMA practice, and — industrial
11 practice as well.

12 And I believe I also talked to someone at
13 Cooper Bessemer about their calculations. They
14 moved to Grove City, Mount Vernon.

15 Q. Approximately when did you speak with
16 these individuals?

17 DR. CHEN: I talked to most of them
18 earlier this year. When I was making some
19 calculation for LILCO, I wanted to be sure that my
20 calculations are still what's considered to be
21 up-to-date calculations based on industrial
22 experience.

23 And since I wanted to see whether those
24 crankshafts were conforming to the DEMA guidelines,

25

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1 so I did check with the technical committee of the
2 DEMA organization.

3 Q. And when you say earlier this year, can
4 you give me an approximate month that you're
5 referring to?

6 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I was trying
7 to restrain myself for the last few questions, and
8 I'm sure you're maybe seeing something that I'm not,
9 but I fail to see how some of the detail you're
10 inquiring into unless your questions will help us to
11 determine the merits of the contention, particularly
12 the names and precisely when he spoke to them, I can
13 see why the general time frame might be relevant,
14 depending on what the answer was, but I think we're
15 getting more details than are necessary, yes.

16 MR. SCHEIDT: I think two more questions
17 may establish or show to you the relevance and
18 materiality of this line of questioning and I don't
19 intend to pursue it in any more depth, much more
20 depth.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: I don't recall anything
22 in the cross plan that would have answered my
23 question either, that's why I interjected, but go
24 ahead.

25 He wants to know if you can tell him

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1 approximately what month it was that you had these
2 conversations, and then he's going to show me why
3 the particular month has some materiality.

4 DR. CHEN: I think it's March or April
5 that I have talked to several of them at that time,
6 before I made the so-called DEMA calculations, and I
7 also talked to them recently.

8 I talked to Lee Evans twice recently, and
9 I talked to Bob Maddox which is a Fairbanks-Morse
10 engineer, staff engineer, also recently. Recently
11 means last three or four weeks, within the last
12 three or four weeks.

13 Q. Did any of those individuals tell you at
14 that time that DEMA is planning to revise its
15 recommendations?

16 DR. CHEN: They say that it's not top
17 priority, but they will consider to review it.

18 I don't think they say revise it, because
19 I have asked some very direct and pointed questions.

20 Q. Isn't it true that DEMA — DEMA committee
21 is planning on meeting in November of this year, Dr.
22 Chen?

23 DR. CHEN: They meet twice a year.

24 I don't know exactly when they meet,
25 but regularly they meet twice a year.

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1 I might want to add that the DEMA group
2 is a very conservative group. They don't want to
3 change anything if they find the calculations quite
4 adequate; so I don't know whether they're going to
5 revise or not.

6 I hope they will, because they are not
7 that explicit.

8 Their first answer is, well, they have no
9 problem with the rules, why would they want to —
10 they more or less blame me to rocking the boat
11 asking personal questions and pointed questions, and
12 they think they are conservative — sufficiently
13 conservative, but, yet, I have to say that it's my
14 association with DEMA that they are very
15 conservative, and also, I might add that large
16 engines that I have designed that I have put in
17 productions they all conform to the DEMA, and I have
18 no problem at all with them, and also with my
19 association with the DEMA members and other
20 technical committee, I don't know of any case that
21 they have problems with the crankshaft that they
22 have passed the DEMA rules and have torsional
23 problems.

24 I don't know of any, so the question is
25 why do you want to change. I don't know whether

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1 they want to revise or not. That's the answer. I
2 don't know whether they want to revise or not.

3 They are very defensive of their records.

4 Q. Dr. Chen, do you know that DEMA will not
5 give out advisory opinions concerning their rules
6 because DEMA considers those rules to be out of date?

7 DR. CHEN: They are very defensive about
8 it. That's my impression. And they all seem to
9 know what they are doing and they are a little bit
10 resentful that I questioned what they are doing,
11 frankly.

12 That's a true statement. And I don't
13 know whether that they would consider it out of date
14 or not. I think you have to ask them.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I don't know
16 what you mean by advisory opinions. That's a broad
17 label. If you meant whether or not DEMA would
18 refuse to state whether a crankshaft met its
19 standards or not, then you'd better ask that
20 question. You did not mean that --

21 MR. SCHEIDT: No. That was not the
22 meaning of my question.

23 Go ahead.

24 BY MR. SCHEIDT: Isn't it true, Dr. Chen,
25 that DEMA has a procedure where you can request an

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1 interpretation from DEMA of its rules regarding
2 crankshafts and torsional vibrations?

3 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to lodge an
4 objection at this point. I just fail to see the
5 relevance of this line of questioning, Judge Brenner.

6 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, I see the relevance.
7 I don't know if it will go anywhere, but it's
8 certainly relevant as an opening question.

9 Objection is overruled.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: Do you need the question
11 repeated?

12 DR. CHEN: Please.

13 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Chen, that DEMA has a
14 formal procedure where you can request a formal
15 interpretation of DEMA rules concerning torsional
16 vibrations and crankshafts?

17 DR. CHEN: When I was at DEMA on the
18 technical committee or on the Board I didn't know
19 such a rule. Maybe there's a rule, but it was never
20 used when I was there.

21 Q. Well, I'm not talking about a rule. I'm
22 talking about a procedure by which any manufacturer
23 can request an interpretation of the DEMA
24 recommendations.

25 DR. CHEN: I don't know whether there's

waga 1 so-called set procedures. When the technical
2 committee get together, they talk about different
3 issues, and they can bring it up any time in the
4 meetings.

5 As you know yourself, they meet twice a
6 year.

7 Q. When you were a committee member for DEMA,
8 did you ever receive a request for an interpretation
9 of a DEMA rule?

10 DR. CHEN: I was associated with DEMA in
11 19 -- from 19 -- I resigned, I think, 1973, as a
12 board member, and when I was at the head of the
13 chairman of the technical committee, had not
14 received any -- the way you described it, whatever
15 that is, questions about how to interpret
16 calculations, whatever you said.

17 I have not received it. I don't remember
18 if I received it as a chairman of the technical
19 committee.

20 Q. Dr. Chen, you testified that marine
21 engine classification rules are more stringent than
22 the rules for stationary land based engines.

23 Are you familiar with DEMA's rules
24 concerning marine engines, and, Dr. Chen, I don't
25 think you need Mr. Youngling to prep you on this.

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1 If you know, you know, if you don't know,
2 you can tell me. Mr. Youngling can chime in with
3 whatever he wants to chime in after I get your
4 answer.

5 DR. CHEN: I can answer the second part
6 of it.

7 I don't think I can answer the first part
8 of it.

9 Q. Well, try to answer the question, Dr.
10 Chen, please.

11 DR. CHEN: Repeat the question again.

12 Q. I'll ask the question again.

13 Are you familiar with DEMA's
14 recommendations concerning marine diesel engines?

15 DR. CHEN: Yes.

16 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Chen, that the marine
17 diesel recommendations for DEMA had the exact same
18 limits for torsional vibrations as the stationary
19 land based engine rules do?

20 DR. CHEN: Yes, sir.

21 Q. So, Dr. Chen, isn't it true that DEMA
22 then does not consider the -- does not impose a more
23 stringent rule concerning torsional vibrations for
24 marine engines than it does for stationery engines;
25 isn't that true, Dr. Chen?

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1 DR. CHEN: First of all, when you talk
2 about --

3 Q. Can I first have a yes or no answer and
4 then the next question.

5 DR. CHEN: I can't answer it yes or no.
6 May I explain this a little bit? This is not a yes
7 or no answer. May I speak just two words?

8 JUDGE BRENNER: If you can't answer yes
9 or no, then you can explain what your answer is.

10 DR. CHEN: The limits are the same but
11 the rules are different, the calculations are
12 different.

13 Q. Are those calculation formulas stated in
14 the rules, Dr. Chen?

15 DR. CHEN: Yes, it says in the rules when
16 you're marine you have to consider not constant
17 speed, you have to consider variable speed
18 operations, so the rules are -- the limits are not
19 the same at design point, but you have to consider
20 much more in the marine engine -- than you do in the
21 stationary engines. In the stationary you only have
22 to worry about synchronized speed.

23 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Chen, even for
24 stationary land-based engines DEMA have
25 recommendations for underspeed and overspeed?

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1 DR. CHEN: Yes.

2 Q. And does DEMA also have the same
3 recommendations for marine engines?

4 DR. CHEN: If I read it, it would be
5 different in this respect, that in the — in the
6 stationary engines for the — especially modal
7 engines, constant speed engines, you only have to
8 worry about plus or minus of the design speed, but
9 for the marine engines, you have to consider the
10 whole speed range from idling to the design speed.

11 Q. Isn't that plus or minus ten percent rate
12 of speed?

13 DR. CHEN: No. The marine engines you
14 have to consider the whole speed range.

15 DR. PISCHINGER: May I —

16 Q. But the limits, Dr. Chen, are the same
17 for torsional vibrations.

18 DR. CHEN: I think I mentioned that
19 before. The limits and the design speeds are the
20 same.

21 Q. Thank you, Dr. Chen

22 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I think Dr.
23 Pischinger wanted to add something in answer to your
24 last question. So I'll allow him to make his
25 statement.

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1 DR. PISCHINGER: I just wanted to add
2 that most marine engines operate in a really wide
3 range of speeds and even loads and it depends very
4 much on their -- on the way of how they operate,
5 what gearing, for instance, they have, if they use
6 gears, and though the speed question is very, very
7 complex and you have really to be concerned with the
8 very wide range of these speeds, and this is one of
9 the reasons why -- because -- or the reasons for the
10 ship -- rules for ship engines, the range of rules
11 for ship engines are usually very conservative
12 because you cannot even define these ranges because
13 you cannot define completely the operating range of
14 a ship.

15 A ship can come into conditions which
16 weren't even taken into account during design,
17 therefore, you have to over design.

18 I want to state -- I know it's going a
19 little beyond what I -- what your question was.

20 Q. Are you familiar with the DEMA rules, Dr.
21 Pischinger?

22 DR. PISCHINGER: Yes.

23 Q. Isn't it true that the torsional
24 vibration limits are exactly the same for the
25 stationary marine based engines?

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1 DR. PISCHINGER: Yes, as far as nominal
2 stresses are concerned.

3 Q. Thank you, Dr. Pischinger.

4 DR. CHEN: May I add one more thing,
5 since — you asked whether — I think you're trying
6 to say that the DEMA does not consider — there's a
7 difference between the stationary and marine, and
8 you do not consider the marine engines are more
9 stringent applications.

10 I want to put it a little bit different
11 way to try to convince you, yes, they do consider
12 the severity of the marine engines, but since the
13 stationary engines are sometime also used in marine,
14 and also has to satisfy the marine, so if you — if
15 the limits — same limits of thousand pounds and
16 7,000 pounds are adequate by experience for marines,
17 I think you can almost say that this is a
18 conservative type of limits for stationary.

19 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, if you pick
20 a convenient time, we can take a break. I don't
21 know if this is it or if you want to go a little bit
22 longer.

23 MR. SCHEIDT: This is a very convenient
24 time.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: Let's break until 3:30.

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1 (Recess)

2 JUDGE BRENNER: We're back on the record.

3 MR. STROUPE: Judge Brenner, I think Dr.

4 Chen would like very much to correct a statement
5 that he made on the record concerning DEMA, because
6 I believe — well, he has something he'd like to say,
7 but I think you'll find that something he said was
8 not what he thought he said.

9 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. If it's an
10 error, we'll certainly allow a correction at this
11 point.

12 MR. CHEN: I think — half an hour ago,
13 the County asked me a question about whether I have
14 said whether DEMA's rules are obsolete or archaic.
15 I need to clarify a little bit.

16 What I meant truthfully is DEMA rules and
17 the limits in the 1972 edition say something about
18 5,000 pounds for single orders and 7,000 pounds for
19 sum of orders — of major orders, and those rules
20 actually came from 1959, so it's some time ago.

21 And the material used at that time, I
22 think, when we talk about rules, we talk about
23 limits, we also have to talk about the background of
24 those calculations and the limits.

25 The background at that time in 1959 and

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1 1972 certainly are three things we have to consider,
2 one is the material values used at that time, the
3 limits is based on so-called conventional material
4 to us engineers, conventional materials are SAE 1045,
5 which is certainly not as good as the material used
6 in these shafts we're talking about today.

7 Ultimate tensile strength is somewhere
8 around 60, 70,000 pounds, not more than that, most
9 probably a little bit less, if I check the details
10 of that.

11 Number two is the calculation methods at
12 that time frame, 1958 and given even as late as 1972
13 are what we call Holzer analysis force vibration
14 which is based on the work -- previous work done by
15 the engineering board by Kerr Wilson and by British
16 organization called British Internal Combustion
17 Institution.

18 The calculation methods at that time are
19 the Holzer type of calculations, quite a
20 conservative type of calculations.

21 It's an older calculations, and also --

22 JUDGE BRENNER: What kind of calculations?
23 I just didn't hear the words.

24 MR. CHEN: It's older calculations, which
25 they have attempted to correlate with the torsigraph

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1 data, and so we have to consider the methods to use
2 and both the in the calculations and in the
3 measurements, so at that time the limits of 5,000
4 pounds and 7,000 pounds has not changed since 1958
5 or 1971 -- 1972, and not even today. They are based
6 on those calculations.

7 As far as my experience and also some of
8 the peoples that I talked to, these calculations are
9 conservative in this respect.

10 If we use better material then we will
11 have higher margin of reliabilities; however, if we
12 use different calculations, if we use more modern
13 calculations -- then those numbers could even be
14 exceeded, if we're still using the old material.

15 So there's a lot of these things involved
16 here, but if we use the old material and if we use
17 the Holzer forced vibrational calculations, and
18 conventional crankshaft to those rules of 5,000
19 pounds or 7,000 pounds, maybe old figures are
20 conservative limits and I do really believe that,
21 because, as I mentioned earlier, that I've been
22 working on engines and crankshaft since the 1950s
23 and I don't know of any crankshaft which passed
24 these rules and suffered torsional problems.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: I'd like to make two

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1 points about that answer, one minor and one greater
2 than minor one.

3 The minor one is I'd like the witnesses
4 to watch the jargon. I take it when you said 5,000
5 and 7,000 pounds I take it you meant 5,000 pounds
6 per square inch. I'd like to get —

7 MR. CHEN: Per square inch.

8 JUDGE BRENNER: When you said orders, you
9 meant orders of vibration.

10 MR. CHEN: Yes.

11 JUDGE BRENNER: Major point, Mr. Stroupe,
12 as counsel counsel to exercise better judgment to
13 distinguish correction of an error for which we
14 would give you leeway even there is no pending
15 question.

16 The main reason for that, we certainly
17 don't want questions and answers to go on for the
18 rest of the day, perhaps even into another day based
19 on an error. And then wait for redirect to turn
20 something around, perhaps, as much as 180 degrees
21 and then get a whole new round of cross-examination.

22 That's why we give leeway. What we just
23 had now does not fall into that category of
24 correction of errors. A large part of what we just
25 heard is a lot of things that are repetitious.

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1 To the extent it's not repetitious, it's
2 an elaboration removed in time at least from the
3 pending question and suitable for redirect and not
4 interruption at this point.

5 I want the cross-examiner to be within
6 reason to be able to set a pace.

7 I've worried about the time here and I've
8 already alluded here to the fact that time is not
9 solely the fault of the cross-examiner.

10 MR. STROUPE: I understand, Judge Brenner.
11 I'd just state that I frankly thought the answer was
12 going to be very short and somewhat briefer.

13 MR. SCHEIDT: One follow-up question to
14 which was testified to, Dr. Chen.

15 Q. Your testimony if you used a more
16 sophisticated analysis that you believe DEMA
17 contemplates, and if you — are you still using old
18 crankshaft material, you can safely exceed the DEMA
19 limits, is that what you testified to?

20 MR. CHEN: DEMA, when they designed the
21 spec — designed the limits, they used quote unquote
22 conventional material. My interpretation of that is
23 1045 steel. I can find the reference to that. I
24 think the question is also if we use a new
25 calculation method, whether the results would be

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1 higher than what I described, the Holzer forced
2 vibration calculation, it could be higher, so in
3 that case, the limits, the stress level, nominal
4 stress level calculated by newer methods could be
5 higher than the methods were used in the 1950's,
6 sixties, yes.

7 MR. SCHEIDT: Thank you, Dr. Chen.

8 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

9 Q. This is to anyone on the panel. Which
10 are the conventional analytical techniques typically
11 utilized by the diesel engine industry that LIUCO is
12 relying on to show compliance with DEWA?

13 MR. CHEN: In my testimony, I have
14 explained what methods I used and it's also in the
15 exhibit, the number is —

16 Q. I would just like the names or the
17 analyses that were performed that you are using to
18 show compliance with DEWA.

19 MR. CHEN: Yes. I used actually two
20 methods. The first methods is to — the traditional
21 Holzer Wilson Bicera type of calculation which is
22 widely used, even at that time, and certainly today,
23 and that program — the software I used is called
24 TORVAP vibration program, TORVAP/R or C. That is
25 available through Comshare, which is a computer

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1 software firm. I choose to use a common domain
2 software to avoid any comments what I have used,
3 whether it's right or wrong, and that TORVAP, it's
4 developed by CAD, a program -- computer program firm
5 in England, and is sponsored by the British Internal
6 Combustion Institute, and it's very close to -- or
7 basic -- it's very close to what Lloyds described in
8 their rules, and.

9 And I also used a more advanced computer
10 program called TORVAP C, C as Charles. There is
11 basically a -- recourse harmonic synthesis method,
12 basically simultaneous solution of many equations
13 depending on the number of cylinders and number of
14 mass we consider.

15 It's a complex number type of program and
16 it will give you stress level, not only at the first
17 mode -- nodal point, but also give us stress level
18 at all the mass or all the shaft section we consider.

19 So this is a more advanced, more precise
20 method which is developed, which was introduced by
21 TORVAP in the middle of the 1970's, and it's
22 available in this country through first SDRC, SDRC
23 then give it to Comshare, so SDRC is structural
24 dynamics.

25 DR. MC CARTHY: Research corporation.

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1 MR. CHEN: Research corporation which at
2 that time was a division of U.S. Steel but today is --
3 it's hooked up with General Electric, affiliated
4 with General Electric.

5 Q. You're relying on TORVAP/R and TORVAP/C
6 calculations to show compliance with DEMA; is that
7 correct?

8 MR. CHEN: For compliance, for
9 calculation, yes.

10 DR. JOHNSTON: I'd like to add to that.

11 In addition, Failure Analysis Associates
12 has reviewed the Holzer and forced vibration
13 calculations of Trans-America DeLaval to agree with
14 them that they show compliance with DEMA, and, in
15 addition, the crankshaft at Shoreham has been torsio-graphed
16 to actually experimentally measure the response of
17 the crankshaft, and from those measurements, it is
18 also shown that the crankshaft meets the
19 requirements of DEMA.

20 Both these items are explained in more
21 detail in Section 2 of the Failure Analysis report,
22 which is Exhibit C-17.

23 Q. Thank you Dr. Johnston.

24 Dr. Chen, your TORVAP calculations are
25 widely used in the diesel engine industry to measure

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1 crankshaft torsional stresses, isn't that true?

2 MR. CHEN: Please repeat your question.

3 The last part I didn't hear very well. You said

4 measured —

5 MR. SCHEIDT: I'll ask the question again,

6 Dr. Chen.

7 Q. Isn't it true that your TORVAP

8 calculations are widely used in a diesel engine

9 industry to measure nominal crankshaft torsional

10 stresses?

11 MR. CHEN: Quite commonly used in this

12 country — well, has been used in this country and

13 certainly used in the United Kingdom, not to measure

14 torsional vibration, but to calculate torsional

15 vibration.

16 Q. I'm sorry, Dr. Chen, calculate.

17 MR. CHEN: Nominal.

18 Q. Is your method a modal superposition

19 method?

20 MR. CHEN: I would say yes. Some other

21 expert might talk about the difference between

22 harmonic synthesis and modal superposition, but basically,

23 this method is a simultaneous equation solution

24 which was explained in my earlier paper.

25 Q. And although there may be certain

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1 differences in the values that you use in your
2 calculation, the method is basically the same or
3 very similar to that employed by FaAA; isn't that
4 true?

5 MR. CHEN: I think I did try to check
6 these two methods, and I have to report the answers
7 are very close, although I don't know the detail
8 program that FaAA used.

9 Q. But, Dr. Chen —

10 MR. YOUNGLING: Excuse me.

11 JUDGE BRENNER: There's been a question
12 answered.

13 Let him ask the next question then. Go
14 ahead, Mr. Scheidt.

15 Q. Did you review the calculations that were
16 performed by FaAA?

17 MR. CHEN: I reviewed the answers and the
18 description of the methods they used.

19 Q. So in addition to looking at the
20 description of the method that they used, you
21 compared your results with those of FaAA, is that
22 what you're saying?

23 MR. CHEN: Yes.

24 Q. And you don't know the detail of program
25 that they used, you aren't familiar with the

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1 detailed program that they use; isn't that true?

2 MR. CHEN: Detailed program, I have
3 talked to the author of that paper, which is Dr.
4 Johnston. We believe it's comparable.

5 It's very close, although I have not seen
6 all the equations, all the assumptions that they
7 make.

8 I believe that if we use the same input,
9 hour output, it will be within a few percent.

10 Q. Now, are you an expert in finite element
11 analysis, Dr. Chen?

12 MR. CHEN: I am not an expert of finite
13 element methods.

14 Q. Have you ever performed a finite element
15 analysis on a crankshaft on a diesel engine?

16 MR. CHEN: I'm not an expert.

17 I have not performed an
18 analysis on a crankshaft using finite element.

19 Q. Now, is modal superposition analysis a
20 conventional analytical technique that is used in
21 the diesel engine industry?

22 MR. CHEN: I would say that in the last
23 few years, whether it's 1975, 1976, they are
24 certainly more used.

25 I don't think that this method is used by

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1 all the engine manufacturers, or I don't think — I
2 don't know how you describe popular, but in this
3 country I don't think it has been used by too many
4 companies.

5 Q. Well, you testified that TORVAP is widely
6 used by the diesel engine industry — engine
7 manufacturers industry, didn't you?

8 MR. CHEN: TORVAP/R or its equivalent are
9 more or less the traditional methods and the
10 traditional industrial practice, yes.

11 TORVAP/C, I would consider that a more
12 advanced method. It does quite a bit more than
13 TORVAP/R, and I don't know how many people are using
14 it today, but certainly after I get on this job, I
15 find out as several other consultants are using
16 these methods.

17 Q. And FaAA is an organization which uses
18 the modal superposition analysis in its analysis of
19 crankshafts; isn't that true?

20 MR. CHEN: I think we talked about that
21 before, and we — I say I have even tried to compare
22 results with the two methods, and they are very
23 close, within a few percent.

24 Q. And would you say that the most modern
25 and up-to-date diesel engine manufacturers and

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1 consultants use a modal superposition analysis to
2 determine the adequacy or not of crankshafts and
3 diesel engines?

4 MR. CHEN: I didn't say that.

5 I say it's a method to calculate nominal
6 torsional stress, and a crankshaft calculation takes
7 much more than just to determine the nominal
8 torsional stress.

9 It's just one other thing you have to do.

10 Q. But the more modern up-to-date
11 manufacturers and consultants use modal super-
12 position analysis as part of their analysis of the
13 structural adequacy of crankshafts; isn't that true,
14 Dr. Chen?

15 MR. CHEN: When you say more than some of
16 the other people who don't use these methods, but
17 they might still give very good answers, I — they
18 were — they would object to what I say, but what
19 I'm saying is if I use the TORVAP/C type of
20 calculations or the modern modal superpositions or
21 the harmonic synthesis methods or the Holzer complex
22 methods that some of these consultants use, that
23 they will be able to predict the dynamic behavior of
24 the crankshaft better than the Holzer traditional
25 methods.

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1 Q. Now, did FaAA use the results of its
2 modal superposition analysis to show compliance
3 with DEMA, Dr. Chen?

4 I'd like Dr. Chen to answer this question.
5 You can follow up --

6 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to this
7 on the basis this question should be more
8 appropriately put to FaAA rather than questioning
9 one witness what another witness did.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: May I have the question
11 read back.

12 (The reporter read the record.)

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Yes. The objection is
14 sustained.

15 Why don't you direct it generally to the
16 panel, and if Dr. Chen wants to add something or if
17 you want to ask Dr. Chen, in particular, about it,
18 you can, but you've got FaAA witnesses here and they
19 would be the witnesses to ask.

20 Q. Dr. Johnston, you didn't use the results
21 of your modal superposition analysis to show
22 compliance with DEMA; did you?

23 DR. JOHNSTON: FaAA showed compliance
24 with the DEMA standards based on its review of TDI's
25 calculations for single order response, and for

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1 combined order response based on the measured
2 torsigraph method; so that our modal superposition
3 method, rather than being used to compare to the
4 DEMA allowables, was used to calculate an actual
5 stress in a concentrated fillet location by
6 following up with the finite element method, and
7 that, then, was correlated to the experimental
8 strain gauge results in order to compute the factor
9 of safety of the crankshaft.

10 Q. So FaAA did not use of the results of its
11 modal superposition analysis to show compliance or
12 not with DEMA; isn't that true?

13 DR. JOHNSTON: The compliance with DEMA
14 for offspeed conditions was, in fact, performed by
15 using a modal superposition analysis to predict the
16 free end response of the engine that would have been
17 measured by a torsigraph, had it been possible to
18 run the engine at those off-speed conditions under
19 load.

20 Then the standard torsigraph method was
21 used to reduce that front end amplitude to a nominal
22 stress.

23 So for that particular part of the
24 compliance with DEMA the modal superposition method
25 was used somewhat indirectly.

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1 The direct application of the MODAL super
2 position analysis was not used for the comparison
3 with DEMA but was used for the calculation of a
4 factor of safety.

5 Q. And, in fact, Dr. Johnston, don't the
6 results of your modal superposition analysis show a
7 stress -- show stresses higher than the DEMA
8 allowable limits for some of the orders?

9 DR. JOHNSTON: The stresses computed by
10 the modal superposition analysis we do not feel are
11 appropriate to compare with the DEMA allowables.

12 Q. Dr. Johnston, please answer yes or no
13 first.

14 JUDGE BRENNER: Let me interrupt.

15 JUDGE BRENNER: Answer his question first,
16 Dr. Johnston. Then answer the question.

17 (The record is read by the reporter.)

18 DR. JOHNSTON: Judge Brenner, I think
19 that's sort of an apples and oranges comparison
20 which is why I could not answer that question as yes
21 or no.

22 In fact, the true stress in the fillets
23 of the crankshaft are of the order of 24,000 pounds
24 per square inch as is shown in our report that
25 included as Exhibit C-17.

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1 Again, that number would not be a number
2 to compare with a DEMA allowable. Simply because it
3 is a different type of stress, so the point that I
4 was trying to make was that since the modal super-
5 position analysis technique including the 24 orders
6 that were summed was not the type of calculation as
7 Dr. Chen has testified, that would be performed to
8 compare to the DEMA limits set in 1972.

9 Q. In fact, Dr. Johnston, Dr. Chen did
10 perform those calculations and compared them against
11 the DEMA limits.

12 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to that
13 question.

14 I don't believe Dr. Chen testified he
15 used the methodology utilized by FaAA.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: That wasn't the question.

17 Objection is overruled.

18 Q. Didn't Dr. Chen, in fact, use the modal
19 superposition analysis to show compliance with DEMA?

20 I'd like your answer, Dr. Johnston.

21 Didn't he?

22 MR. STROUPE: Again, I would object,
23 Judge Brenner, on asking one witness to describe
24 what another witness did in an independent
25 calculation —

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1 JUDGE BRENNER: This is — we sustained
2 your objection before.

3 This is one is a little different.

4 This time Dr. Johnston relied for support
5 on something he said Dr. Chen did or did not do, and
6 the cross-examiner is entitled to follow-up.

7 We'll certainly give Dr. Chen an
8 opportunity to add if he wants to, and that should
9 solve your problem.

10 DR. JOHNSTON: I believe Dr. Chen
11 indicated he used the TORVAP program to show
12 compliance with DEMA.

13 I have not been involved in a review of
14 Dr. Chen's work, and have not, in fact, reviewed the
15 TORVAP power program.

16 MR. CHEN: May I add, since my name is
17 mentioned here.

18 We think consultants just between
19 consultants, just like between experts, they will
20 compare methods and there are two things I should
21 mention here, there's Dr. Johnston's methods and my
22 methods.

23 Dr. Johnston's methods is using — using
24 what I call actual torsigraph data which is any
25 time where there's any doubt in any of these codes,

waga 1 you will always refer to the test data.

2 Test data take precedent, so he used the
3 torsigraph data, and using a conservative Holzer
4 force vibration type of simulation and obtain the
5 results that way.

6 Yes, I used both the TORVAP/R and
7 TORVAP/C methods to see whether the DEMA allowable
8 is exceeded or not.

9 I also looked at Dr. Johnston's
10 calculations when he used the TORVAP/C methods on
11 single order. It's okay.

12 The single order between consultants,
13 there's very little disagreement. When he used the
14 single order when compared with the 5,000 pounds
15 DEMA specified between the consultants there is very
16 little disagreement, because that calculation is
17 more straightforward, doesn't mean it's easy. More
18 straightforward.

19 It's when you talk about the sum of the
20 orders that even between the consultants there might
21 be some discussions on.

22 I want to refresh your memory that I
23 testified before, I say that DEMA code for the sum of
24 the orders they are talking about the sum of major
25 orders, so then I would -- I would be going into how

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1 major orders are defined.

2 What TORVAP/C calculations which is quite
3 recognized, consider do it this way, how do you
4 define major orders.

5 We use altogether 20 orders of input,
6 harmonic input.

7 Then from -- in the TORVAP/R calculations,
8 the TORVAP/C allows you to pick the major orders out
9 of that calculations.

10 If you see some of the industry
11 calculations, use sometimes two major orders,
12 sometimes four major orders.

13 The TORVAP/C software I used can go up to --
14 from those 20 orders we can add them together,
15 summarize together six orders, so six orders rather
16 than either two or four sometimes industry used.

17 So I based my DEMA -- the so-called DEMA
18 calculations based on six major orders, and using
19 the -- what I call modal superposition methods or
20 harmonic synthesis methods which considers all the
21 modes and all the orders -- well, 20 orders.

22 Then I pick six of them and later on I
23 pick 12 of them and see whether it conforms to DEMA
24 limits or not.

25 The industry will be happy with four or

waga

1 six. I believe ABS only used two, so I think that
2 we both have just different terms what is the DEMA
3 rules. That's the difference.

4 Q. Dr. Chen, for purposes of Dr. Johnston's
5 answer can you tell him whether your calculations
6 were in compliance with DEMA?

7 MR. CHEN: I believe I mentioned before
8 if we use the same input, same assumptions and same
9 orders, our answer will be within a few percent.

10 Q. Dr. Chen, I am sorry.

11 I am not asking you how your calculations --

12 MR. CHEN: It will conform. If you use
13 the same inputs, same assumptions and same major
14 orders that I considered, I consider up to twelve.
15 If he used those twelve orders and -- they will
16 conform.

17 Q. Okay. I'm asking you your calculations
18 by themselves supposedly show compliance with DEMA;
19 isn't that true?

20 MR. CHEN: Yes.

21 Q. Okay.

22 Dr. Johnston, now, Dr. Chen has used his
23 modal superposition analysis to show compliance
24 with DEMA.

25 You had testified earlier that you didn't

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1 know what he had concluded.

2 Now, isn't it true — is that not true,
3 that you did not testify to that?

4 DR. JOHNSTON: I don't believe I did
5 testify that I didn't know whether he had reached a
6 conclusion that the crankshaft satisfied DEMA. I
7 indicated that I had not reviewed his calculation
8 and could not tell you what the TORVAP/R program
9 specifically did.

10 Q. Okay. Then I misunderstood your
11 testimony.

12 Isn't it true that he used modal super-
13 position analysis to show compliance with DEMA?

14 DR. JOHNSTON: Dynamic analysis
15 techniques, if you go back far enough will find the
16 same root.

17 Whether you say, for example, the
18 . TORVAP/R uses modal superposition and so does the
19 method used by Failure Analysis Associates, and they
20 both are modal superposition are not the
21 calculations the same is really not the point.

22 If you go back far enough in dynamics,
23 all equations — all methods used Newton's equation
24 of F equals MA .

25 Basically, the distinction, as I think

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1 Dr. Chen has explained, is that in his technique he
2 specifically uses what DEMA states as major orders.

3 And in his capacity of being an
4 ex-chairman of the technical committee of DEMA is
5 able to interpret what those major orders should be
6 and has used them in his analysis to show compliance
7 with DEMA.

8 DR. PISCHINGER: May I?

9 JUDGE BRENNER: Wait. Dr. Johnston, I
10 think you went beyond the question.

11 Perhaps, the questioner disagrees with me.

12 I think you were trying to guess where he
13 might be going with his follow-up questions.

14 Why don't you ask your question again,
15 Mr. Scheidt.

16 JUDGE BRENNER: Ask the question again.

17 Q. Didn't Dr. Chen use a modal super
18 position analysis to show compliance with DEMA?

19 DR. JOHNSTON: As I indicated before, I
20 don't know the method he used except to the extent
21 that he used the TORVAP program.

22 I do know that his calculations show
23 compliance with DEMA.

24 Q. Do you know whether the TORVAP program is
25 a modal superposition analysis?

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1 DR. JOHNSTON: I don't.

2 Q. Did you hear Dr. Chen testify to that
3 effect minutes ago?

4 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, I did.

5 Q. Don't you believe him, Dr. Johnston?

6 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to that
7 question.

8 JUDGE BRENNER: That's unnecessary, given
9 the explanation by Dr. Johnston.

10 The last question was mostly answered
11 although not totally completed, it was also an
12 implied mischaracterization, in any event.

13 Why don't you get to where you want to go
14 with Dr. Johnston by asking him to assume certain
15 things and you can then tell us — in your findings
16 you established an assumption through another
17 witness; if you, in fact, feel you need to follow up
18 with further question and answer.

19 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Johnston, that your
20 calculations under the modal superposition analysis
21 that you performed results in stresses that exceed
22 the limits of DEMA of 7,000 psi?

23 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to this
24 question.

25 I think it has been asked and I believe

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1 he got a full explanation of the answer some time
2 ago.

3 JUDGE BRENNER: It had been asked, but I
4 disagree with your last point, so the objection is
5 overruled.

6 DR. JOHNSTON: Could I have the question
7 repeated please.

8 (The record is read).

9 DR. JOHNSTON: No. That's not true,
10 because the limits that are set in DEMA specifically
11 refer to the summation of major orders, and that is
12 not what was performed in my analysis.

13 That was what was performed in Dr. Chen's
14 analysis; thus, the stresses calculated in Dr. Chen's
15 analysis should be compared with the allowables in
16 DEMA, and those calculated in my analysis since I
17 summed many more orders than are included in the
18 term major orders should not be compared with the
19 DEMA limits.

20 JUDGE BRENNER: You summed 24 orders of
21 vibration?

22 DR. JOHNSTON: That's correct.

23 JUDGE BRENNER: What was the result?

24 DR. JOHNSTON: Depending — at what
25 location? It varies along the shaft.

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1 I think we could refer you to the report.

2 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Refer me to
3 the report.

4 DR. JOHNSTON: Exhibit C-17, Table 3.4 on
5 Page 3-15 shows the amplitude of nominal shear
6 stresses at various locations along the crankshaft
7 as summation of the 24 orders.

8 JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Thank you.

9 MR. SCHEIDT: One second, Judge Brenner.

10 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

11 Q. Dr. Johnston, when did you perform your --
12 let me start it over again.

13 Did you perform your modal superposition
14 analysis after you knew the results of the Stone and
15 Webster torsionograph test?

16 DR. JOHNSTON: I really don't recall.

17 It was approximately the same time.

18 These analyses were conducted after the
19 test program of January 1984 because of the fact
20 that these particular analyses use the pressure
21 loading that was measured during that same test; so
22 we were using the pressure from that test, the
23 torsionograph measures were made up during that same
24 test.

25 I can't be sure which data I got first

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1 and which analyses I did first.

2 It all happened approximately the same
3 time.

4 Q. Well, if I can refer you to Exhibit C-17,
5 wherein on page 3-1, the third sentence at the top
6 of the first paragraph —

7 JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Scheidt, I'm sorry, I
8 missed your page reference.

9 Q. Page 3-1 of Exhibit C-17. It is stated
10 that, however, the stresses for combined orders were
11 quite close to the 7,000 psi that is recommended as
12 an allowable, and that refers to the calculation of
13 nominal shear stress from the torsionograph test;
14 isn't that true?

15 DR. JOHNSTON: That is correct.

16 Q. Now, did you have the results of those
17 calculations prior to performing your modal super-
18 position analysis?

19 DR. JOHNSTON: I think I just explained
20 that it happened at about the same time.

21 I don't remember on which day I did which
22 calculation.

23 Basically, obviously both calculations
24 were performed prior to the writing of this report.

25 But within the month or so that the work

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1 was being done, I don't recall which happened first.

2 Q. Now, Dr. Johnston, how do you know which
3 are the major orders under the DEMA rules?

4 DR. JOHNSTON: In my analysis, I have not
5 chosen major orders.

6 The analysis that I have conducted
7 includes the 24 orders and was specifically done
8 because of the -- of this statement that you just
9 referred to, because of the fact that the
10 torsigraph showed numbers that complied with DEMA
11 but were still slightly below.

12 We felt it prudent to follow up that with
13 a more complete analysis, both of testing and of
14 modal superposition analysis followed by a finite
15 element analysis combined showed the true margin of
16 safety of this particular crankshaft.

17 That is the reason for performing the
18 finite element analysis.

19 If I had just wanted to do a calculation
20 showing the comparison with DEMA and using the major
21 orders, I would have referred to Dr. Chen's analysis
22 who has had much more experience with using the DEMA
23 code and thus would be able to select the major
24 orders.

25 Q. So, Dr. Johnston, you don't know what the

waga 1 major orders are?

2 I'd like your answer, not Dr. McCarthy's.

3 DR. JOHNSTON: In writing the report, I
4 did not have to select the major orders. I could
5 give my interpretation of the major orders, but that
6 would be similar to Dr. Chen's.

7 The major orders are obviously the orders
8 which lead to the highest stresses, and the number
9 of those that should be used.

10 According to Dr. Chen, it is customary to
11 choose four or six.

12 I have reviewed; however, the American
13 Bureau of Shipping calculations where they showed
14 they just used two.

15 Q. So you don't know what the major orders
16 are, do you?

17 DR. JOHNSTON: No.

18 I think I have an opinion as to what the
19 major orders — some of the major orders are;
20 however, I did not use that in my analysis.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: That was **some, s-o-m-e.**

22 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

23 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

24 Q. Can you **give** us your opinion now as to
25 which those major orders are?

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1 DR. JOHNSTON: For example, for this
2 particular crankshaft, the fourth order is probably
3 the major order.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: I want to ask you about
5 these particular crankshafts.

6 Now, if it varies among the three
7 Shoreham diesels, you can tell me that also.

8 DR. JOHNSTON: No, it does not vary among
9 the three Shoreham diesels.

10 The fourth order would be the most major
11 order.

12 In addition to that, the five and a half
13 order would be considered a major order.

14 Then those would be the two, for example,
15 that the American Bureau of Shipping used.

16 If one wanted to go beyond that, one
17 might choose the four and a half order or the two
18 and a half order, but there is obviously a subset of
19 all possible orders which do represent major orders,
20 and which do lead to higher stresses than other
21 orders.

22 For example, the twelvth order or the
23 first order do not lead to significant stresses.

24 Q. Dr. Chen, perhaps you can answer this
25 question.

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1 DEMA doesn't specify how to determine
2 which orders are major and which orders are not;
3 does it?

4 MR. CHEN: All these calculations, you
5 can't specify because there's so many different
6 crankshafts and so many different mass elasticity,
7 each crankshaft will give you for specific design,
8 will give you different major orders.

9 But all the engineers know how to pick
10 them. I know how to pick them.

11 Q. Dr. Chen, the question is what does DEMA
12 consider appropriate to use as the major orders?

13 MR. CHEN: I would answer it this way,
14 that if you use a TORVAP/R calculation, you simply
15 find four or six large free end -- larger torsional
16 amplitudes.

17 This can be confirmed also by using
18 torsigraph, up to date torsigraph and then using
19 harmonic analysis, and find out what are the few
20 largest torsional amplitudes, and in the case of the
21 crankshaft we're talking about, you will find that
22 the fourth, or certainly the largest, like Dr.
23 Johnston said, then there is other orders close to
24 that.

25 Usually depending the rate of what the

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1 rate of speed is.

2 If you have 450 RPM, and usually fourth
3 order, five-and-a-half, four and a half,
4 two-and-a-half, those orders are major, and ten,
5 twelve orders or ten-and-a-half, eleven-and-a-half,
6 eight-and-a-half, those are farther away, and we
7 know engineers would not consider them as major orders.

8 But if you talk about same crankshaft
9 running at 3,000 RPM, which is impossible, let's say
10 that, then the other orders would be major orders,
11 so it's not — it takes a professional to design a
12 crankshaft and interpret the data; and it's not that
13 black and white, who are major orders.

14 You have to know how to design a
15 crankshaft.

16 Q. Dr. Chen, so DEMA itself does not provide
17 any guidelines as to choosing which are the major
18 orders and which are not; does it?

19 MR. CHEN: The guideline is the
20 engineering judgment.

21 If you have torsionograph data to break it
22 down and see what are the — those orders which give
23 you the largest amplitudes are the major orders.

24 Then it depends how prudent — how
25 conservative an engineer is to select the most major

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1 ones.

2 The major one is fourth order and the
3 others are significant orders.

4 Then the other orders are insignificant
5 orders. There's three distinguished -- it's fourth
6 order in this case.

7 Then you have moderate major which is
8 three or four of them.

9 Then you have insignificant orders, and
10 the time when we decide the code, nobody knew how to
11 add two different modes together, vectorially or
12 geometrically.

13 Now we know so here is your problem. May
14 I try to explain this problem with --

15 DR. PISCHINGER: It dates back to the
16 time when the possibilities of computers hadn't been
17 so far.

18 I myself have even worked in this time,
19 and each calculation of each of these orders was a
20 lot of effort, and so the engineers got knowledge
21 how to restrict on the most important orders, and
22 the rules which have been made are -- have been set
23 so that this was taken into account that you really
24 hadn't -- you need not get to the last trifle of the
25 orders.

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1 But today with the computer program, it's
2 really easy to sum up all orders, though one should
3 have really updated the limits in order to
4 accomplish with today's modern computer programs.

5 Q. Dr. Pischinger, prior to performing the
6 work on this case for Shoreham, had you ever
7 performed a calculation using the DEMA limits?

8 DR. PISCHINGER: Calculations using the
9 DEMA limits means —

10 Q. Perhaps I should ask a more precise
11 question.

12 Had you ever before this case used the
13 DEMA recommendations in determining the adequacy of
14 a crankshaft?

15 DR. PISCHINGER: No. I did not.

16 In Europe, DEMA has no meaning.

17 What I explained holds true to all sorts
18 of — what I previously explained, holds true for
19 all sorts of codes where stress limits are given.

20 MR. SCHEIDT: Judge Brenner, I would move
21 at this time to strike his prior answer to the
22 extent that it purports to explain what the DEMA
23 code or the calculations and recommendations
24 involved.

25 JUDGE BRENNER: You're going to be one

.waga 1 for two today, Mr. Scheidt, because --

2 MR. SCHEIDT: Fifty percent is never too
3 bad.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: Your argument is a non
5 sequitur, and the way you phrased the question that
6 you withdrew proves the non sequitur.

7 The necessary assumption is that you need
8 to use a DEMA limit performed like a calculation,
9 and if you would have let Dr. Pischinger answer
10 that one he would have explained it.

11 Perform the calculation and then you see
12 if it meets some benchmark, and he's used it against
13 other benchmarks in Europe, not the DEMA code, but,
14 nevertheless, what he told you about calculating
15 orders holds true, and then you take the result of
16 the calculation and do what you want with it.

17 Some people agree with DEMA. Dr.
18 Pischinger does not.

19 Q. Dr. Chen, how many major orders are in
20 the replacement crankshaft at Shoreham?

21 MR. CHEN: Are you saying that how many
22 major orders or how many orders?

23 Q. I'm asking you how many major orders are
24 there on the -- with respect to the crankshafts at
25 Shoreham, replacement crank shafts.

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1 MR. CHEN: I believe I answered that
2 major order at 450 RPM is the fourth order. That's
3 the — the major order.

4 Q. Let me in asking the question, Dr. Chen,
5 I'm referring to the term orders, major orders as it
6 is used in DEMA.

7 MR. CHEN: I think I also testified a
8 little bit earlier that DEMA does not specify
9 exactly how many orders you have to use, simply
10 because in one calculation, if you happen to be
11 between high speed engines, between, let's say, four,
12 and four and a half orders, then certainly those are
13 the two — could be equally major orders.

14 Then in other crankshaft, they are — the
15 orders are — does not — not one is the major, so
16 you have to use four, six to give you the combined
17 true sum of orders.

18 Q. And your calculations, you used six
19 orders and twelve orders.

20 MR. CHEN: The software I used is the
21 TORVAP/C.

22 I mentioned that TORVAP/C in my report
23 that only allows you to put in the inputs of six
24 major orders.

25 We do consider 20 orders, but we pick by

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1 my own engineering judgment the six largest stress
2 at the free end, and we use those six major orders
3 first, and later I'll check it with -- in addition
4 to the six, I add six more to it of descending
5 orders, so I did consider twelve largest of the 20
6 orders I calculated.

7 Q. Dr. Chen, in your opinion, how many
8 orders you decided to sum depends on how
9 conservative you want to be in your analysis; isn't
10 that true?

11 MR. CHEN: I don't -- I would say that
12 the more orders you use, the more orders are used --
13 I used six orders and twelve orders of all modes, by
14 the way. There's a difference between first mode,
15 second mode, third mode, and if you really get into
16 it, sometimes the first mode will cancel the second
17 mode, so it's not that straightforward as
18 conservative or not conservative.

19 I'm just citing that if you use the
20 methods that are labeled as modal superposition or
21 harmonic synthesis, it will reproduce your free end
22 amplitude, and if you have strain gauge data, it will
23 reproduce your strain gauge data more faithfully.

24 Q. Was the TORVAP/C program designed
25 specifically for DEMA, Dr. Chen?

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1 MR. CHEN: No. It was developed really
2 for Bicera which is British Internal Combustion
3 Institute, and it was used cited in the law -- it
4 was using for many of UK engineers to satisfy law.

5 Q. So you used your own engineering
6 judgments to determine which orders you were going
7 to sum; isn't that true, Dr. Chen?

8 MR. CHEN: Certainly it takes some
9 engineering judgment in each crankshaft involved,
10 but you can see that TORVAP/C will only select --
11 only uses six orders or six orders in the industry
12 is considered certainly sufficient numbers to use.

13 I have in the past before we have
14 TORVAP/C used four orders, and --

15 DR. JOHNSTON: I'd like to add to that.

16 I think it might be helpful to turn to
17 page 3-14 of Exhibit C-17, which shows not only
18 Failure Analysis Associates' predictions for the
19 amplitudes of the first sixteen orders, but also
20 shows the amplitudes that were measured using a
21 torsigraph, and I refer to the right-hand column of
22 that particular table.

23 I think it's fairly easy, looking at that
24 table to see that there are four fairly large orders.

25 The fourth order, the five-and-a-half

waga 1 order, the one-and-a half order and the
2 two-and-a-half order.

3 In addition, one might choose to include,
4 you know, two or three more, but it's fairly
5 apparent from looking at that that one can, in fact,
6 fairly readily choose a subset of orders and term
7 them major orders, and that it would not be
8 necessary to include all of the orders shown.

9 Q. Dr. Chen, my questions to you were
10 directed as to your -- the orders that you summed.

11 These are not your orders in Table 3.3;
12 are they? These are not the orders that you
13 calculated and summed; are they?

14 MR. CHEN: I can tell you what my major
15 orders are, if you wish.

16 Q. Let's establish this first, Dr. Chen.
17 These are not your figures on Page 3-14 of LILCO
18 Exhibit C-17?

19 MR. CHEN: This is the set of
20 calculations comparing a set of measurements.

21 This table shows close correlations.

22 Q. And they are comparing FaAA's
23 calculations of the measurements against Stone and
24 Webster's measurements; isn't that correct?

25 They're not your calculations, Dr. Chen?

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1 MR. CHEN: No, it is not my calculations.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 MR. CHEN: Dr. Johnston mentioned that.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: Why don't you give us the
5 six orders you used.

6 DR. JOHNSTON: We have the report here.

7 In Exhibit C-18, on page ten, just
8 underneath the table, there is the — the orders
9 used are indicated. They are the half order, the
10 one and a half order, the two-and-a-half order, the
11 fourth order, four-and-a-half order, and the
12 five-and-a-half order.

13 I think you'll notice that set of six
14 includes the four orders that I just mentioned as
15 being evidently the most significant and major
16 orders as observed from the Stone and Webster
17 torsigraph test.

18 JUDGE BRENNER: I'm sorry. I missed the
19 page reference, Dr. Johnston, to C-18.

20 DR. JOHNSTON: Page ten.

21 JUDGE BRENNER: Thank you.

22 DR. JOHNSTON: Just beneath the table.

23 MR. CHEN: I might add that page 11 also
24 shows the same — the same exhibit, page 11 shows 16
25 of the 20 orders I used in the TORVAP/C calculations.

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1 All you have to look at is the table in
2 the middle of the page shows TDI test, Stone Webster
3 test, Failure Analysis calculations and TORVAP/C
4 calculations performed on that date.

5 It shows the sixteen largest orders that
6 are picked from the twenty.

7 The others are very insignificant.

8 Then I picked six largest from here and
9 then the six largest from here to perform my
10 calculations.

11 BY MR. SCHEIDT:

12 Q. My next questions will relate to the
13 Holzer analysis or the torsional critical speed
14 analysis that was performed by TDI and was reviewed
15 by FaAA.

16 I'm referring to page 24 of the testimony
17 as a reference point.

18 Now, the stress level mentioned in the
19 first answer on that page, 2980 for single, for the
20 fourth order is a calculated measure; isn't that --
21 it's not a measurement; is it?

22 DR. JOHNSTON: That's correct.

23 Q. And a significant factor or input used to
24 achieve that figure is the T sub N values used by
25 TDI in its analysis, isn't that true?

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1 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. Isn't it true that TDI used for the
3 fourth order T sub N value of 27.7 psi in this
4 calculation.

5 DR. JOHNSTON: That's correct.

6 Q. And that's shown on table 2.3 of Exhibit
7 C-17.

8 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

9 Q. And that T sub N value is lower than the
10 T sub N value that was used by FaAA in its dynamic
11 torsional analysis, isn't that true?

12 DR. JOHNSTON: That is correct.

13 The value used by Failure Analysis
14 Associates for the T sub N of the fourth order is
15 shown in table 3.2 of the same exhibit and is 33.0
16 psi as opposed to 27.7 psi indicating a difference
17 of — well, I'll calculate the percentage difference,
18 indicating that the TDI value of T sub N that was
19 used was approximately nineteen percent lower than
20 the value used by Failure Analysis Associates.

21 And the stress level that the T sub N
22 used by TDI results in is approximately 40 percent
23 below the allowable limit of 5,000 psi.

24 The T sub N values — I beg your pardon,
25 the computed stresses for a single order are

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1 directly proportional to the T sub N value, so that
2 the T sub N value, in fact, would have had to have
3 been increased by about 67 percent in order to show
4 non compliance with DEMA.

5 Q. What were the calculations of the single
6 order stress using the T sub N value for fourth
7 order that FaAA used?

8 DR. JOHNSTON: I'll calculate it for you,
9 if you just hold please.

10 If one uses the TDI Holzer forced
11 vibration technique to calculate the single order
12 stress for the fourth order, and one was to use the
13 FaAA T sub N value, one would compute a stress of
14 3,550 psi, which, again, is well below the
15 5,000 psi limit allowed by DEMA.

16 Q. Do you believe, Dr. Johnston, that the
17 T sub N value that was used by FaAA in its dynamic
18 torsional analysis is a more appropriate T sub N
19 value than the one applied by TDI?

20 MR. STROUPE: I'm going to object to the
21 question based on the use of the word "appropriate."

22 I don't understand what he means.

23 JUDGE BRENNER: The objection is
24 overruled.

25 DR. JOHNSTON: I think that the T sub N

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1 value used by Failure Analysis is, indeed, more
2 accurate than that used in this analysis by TDI,
3 because of the fact that it was obtained from
4 measurements on this specific engine and verified by
5 correlation between the modal superposition model
6 and the torsigraph test; however, the use of the
7 more accurate T sub N value leads to no different
8 conclusions than the T sub N values used by TDI.

9 And for that reason I do not find the TDI
10 calculations to be inappropriate.

11 Q. But TDI's calculations underestimate the
12 stresses that are present in the crankshaft; isn't
13 that true?

14 DR. JOHNSTON: As I have just indicated,
15 the stress using failure analysis T sub N would have
16 been 3,550 as opposed to 2,980, so it is true that
17 this underestimates the stress by approximately 19
18 percent, but because of the fact that there is a
19 very large margin for the single order computation,
20 I do not consider that significant.

21 Q. Isn't it true, Dr. Johnston, that TDI's
22 method of calculating the stresses in the crankshaft
23 will always predict the maximum stresses in the
24 crank pin number eight for these EDG's?

25 DR. JOHNSTON: That is correct.

waga

1 Q. And isn't it true that the maximum
2 stresses in the replacement crankshafts are not
3 located in crank pin number eight?

4 DR. JOHNSTON: The maximum stresses in
5 this particular crankshaft occur in approximately
6 crank pin number five because of the fact that there
7 is an influence of more than one mode.

8 This is the reason for conducting our
9 modal superposition analysis followed by a test
10 program to verify the margin of safety that exists
11 in these particular crankshafts.

12 Q. So TDI's method of analysis does not
13 calculate maximum stresses in the proper location;
14 isn't that true, Dr. Johnston, in the location of
15 highest stress?

16 DR. JOHNSTON: The Holzer forced vibration
17 technique that is used by TDI is not a technique
18 that is designed to calculate a peak stress, whether
19 it be at a location within the engine and certainly
20 not to calculate a peak stress in a fillet.

21 There's a conventional technique that is
22 used and may be used to compare with DEMA allowables.

23 Q. Wasn't it true, Dr. Johnston, that's
24 original crankshafts did not fail in crank pin
25 number eight?

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1 DR. JOHNSTON: That is correct.

2 The crankshaft failed in crank pin number
3 seven and had cracks in crank pins number five and
4 number six; and further more, I might point out that
5 the original 13 by 11 crankshaft did not meet DEMA.

6 Q. Wasn't the purpose of the DEMA
7 recommendations -- isn't the purpose of the analysis
8 that is used by TDI to show compliance or not with
9 DEMA recommendations a prediction of the point of
10 maximum stress in a crankshaft?

11 DR. JOHNSTON: The DEMA allowables are
12 set as a result of experience gained in many
13 crankshafts, and that experience has to be
14 correlated with the analytical techniques that we
15 use to analyze those stresses, so that if you build
16 a code based on a stress value that's calculated by
17 a certain technique, then that, indeed, is the
18 appropriate calculation to perform -- to check with
19 that particular code.

20 It is not necessarily, and certainly we
21 do not believe it to be the correct calculation
22 technique to actually compare -- to actually analyze
23 the fatigue strength of this particular -- of the
24 fatigue stress cycles that would be enforced upon
25 this crankshaft.

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1 And that's why we use other methods, too,
2 but for the purposes of comparing with a DEMA
3 allowable, this is a standard technique.

4 JUDGE BRENNER: While there's a pause,
5 Dr. Chen, do you agree with Dr. Johnston that the
6 area of the Shoreham TDI crankshaft that would have
7 a maximum stress would be in the vicinity of the
8 number five crank pin?

9 MR. CHEN: My torsional calculations show
10 number five is the highest stress, but I might add
11 that some of the other crank shaft sections also
12 show fairly high stress and use the modal super-
13 position methods, we are able to predict as far as
14 torsion is concerned which is the highest stress
15 level, but this is just nominal stress.

16 There's two more factors involved. You
17 still have to look at stress concentration factor.
18 You still have to look at other stress involved in
19 the crank shaft.

20 It's my experience that other stresses
21 involved in the crankshaft is more severe at number
22 eight, simply because you're driving a very --
23 you're driving very heavy generators and you have
24 some overhand load, and also other stress like
25 bending and other things come into play, so we are

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1 just talking about torsionals number five has the
2 highest torsional nominal stress, yes.

3 JUDGE BRENNER: Would the number five
4 crank pin be correlated to the section between
5 cylinder five and six?

6 MR. CHEN: In my calculations, it shows
7 that number five cylinder — number five crank is
8 labeled as shaft number between six and seven, but
9 that's just terminologies.

10 JUDGE BRENNER: Well, that's where I got
11 confused, because your results on page ten of
12 exhibit C-18 show the — at least when you use
13 TORVAP to sum six major orders, and then I believe
14 it was twelve although my page is slightly
15 obliterated in the copy with respect to twelve, that
16 you had the highest stress, as you say in shaft
17 section six to seven, and that's the same to you as
18 the number five crank web area.

19 MR. CHEN: That's correct. We have to
20 refer back to the terminology I used in the shaft
21 sections.

22 DR. PISCHINGER: Page six.

23 MR. CHEN: Page six.

24 JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Johnston, for your
25 terminology, if you say crank pin number five, what

waga 1 shaft section is that?

2 DR. JOHNSTON: The highest stress
3 location that I termed crank pin number five, I was
4 trying to be brief.

5 It really means from halfway along crank
6 pin number five to halfway along crank pin number
7 six; and I think that in the FaAA report Exhibit
8 C-17, if you look at page 3-15, which shows a table
9 of the stresses at different locations, it
10 explicitly says -- it shows that the highest stress
11 is between cylinder number five and cylinder number
12 six.

13 JUDGE BRENNER: Yes. I knew that much.

14 All right. It's about the time of
15 adjournment. In any event, did you have one or two
16 brief things, Mr. Scheidt that you wanted to get
17 into?

18 MR. SCHEIDT: No, we can adjourn now.

19 JUDGE BRENNER: Perhaps we've reached the
20 point of our daily fatigue stress limit. If we
21 haven't, maybe the witnesses have in any event.
22 They've been on all day or most of the day.

23 We'll adjourn now and resume at nine
24 o'clock tomorrow morning.

25 (Whereupon, at 5:05 the hearing was

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adjourned, to be convened at 9:00 on
September 18, 1984.)

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1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

2 This is to certify that the attached
3 proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
4 REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:

5 NAME OF PROCEEDING:

6 SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

7 Long Island Lighting Company

8 DOCKET NO.: 50-322-0L

9 PLACE: Hauppauge, New York

10 DATE: September 11, 1984

11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the
12 original transcript thereof for the file of the
13 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

14 (Sigt)

15 (TYPED) HELEN DOHOGNE

16 Official Reporter

17 Reporter's Affiliation

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