

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050002751 | PAGE (3) 1 OF 02 |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|

TITLE (4)
INADVERTENT START OF DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1-3

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|--|------------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| 03 | 15 | 84 | 84 | 009 | 01 | 10 | 11 | 84 | DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2 | | 05000323 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 05000 |

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|--------------------------------|---|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| OPERATING MODE (9) 5 | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11) | | | | | | | | | |
| POWER LEVEL (10) 000 | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(i)(2)(iv) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.36(e)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.36(c)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii) | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 388A) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(x) | | | | | | | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| | |
|---|---|
| NAME WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
| | AREA CODE 805 595-7351 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

| | | | | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------|-------|-----|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
| | | | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), Diesel Generator No. 1-3 automatically started because of 4 KV startup power bus undervoltage for Unit 1. The cause of this event was operator error in that a licensed operator neglected to place the Unit 2 Diesel Generator No. 1-3 selector switch in manual prior to opening the startup feeder breaker.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|--------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5 8 4 - 0 0 9 - 0 1 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | | | | 0 2 | OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 16, 1984 at 1356 PST, while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) with the 4 KV busses being supplied through the station auxiliary transformers, the opening of the Unit 1 Startup Power Feeder Breaker (52-HG-15) (BKR) by a control operator resulted in the automatic start of Diesel Generator No. 1-3 (EK) on startup bus undervoltage. To ensure a reliable power supply for vital bus loads supplied through this breaker, an undervoltage sensor is incorporated which will automatically start the in-service diesel generator.

On each station electrical panel (PL) for Units 1 and 2 (both units share a common control room), a Diesel Generator No. 1-3 selector switch is installed with two positions, "auto" or "manual". Placing the selector switch in "auto" aligns Diesel Generator No. 1-3 to automatically start upon receipt of any initiating signal from either unit. The manual position defeats this automatic actuation but allows manual starting of the Diesel Generator No. 1-3 from the Control Room.

Prior to this event, the Unit 1 Startup Power Feeder Breaker (52-HG-15) was removed from the circuit breaker cabinet for planned maintenance. A spare breaker was installed and placed in service during this maintenance period.

When the control operator prepared to open the Unit 1 Startup Power Feeder Breaker (52-HG-15) for changeout, he placed the Unit 1 Diesel Generator No. 1-3 selector switch in "manual" to prevent automatic start of the diesel. The operator failed to observe the lamacoid labeling on the Unit 1 station electric panel, directing him to likewise position the selector switch on the Unit 2 station electric panel. When the startup power feeder breaker was opened, the resulting bus undervoltage signal was directed through the Unit 2 selector switch to start Diesel Generator No. 1-3.

Diesel Generator No. 1-3 was secured from the Control Room. Upon reclosing the Unit 1 Startup Power Feeder Breaker, the operator repositioned the Unit 1 selector switch to "auto". The event was discussed between the Shift Foreman and the operator involved and the need to assure the proper position of the Unit 2 Diesel Generator No. 1-3 mode selector switch is being reinforced in operator training.

An engineering evaluation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Diesel Generator No. 1-3 mode selection circuitry was performed. This evaluation concluded that a design change was not warranted because proposed modifications would further complicate the diesel control circuitry without substantial benefit.

An inadvertent start of Diesel Generator No. 1-3 in any mode of operation would pose no possible safety consequences or decrease any safety margin as defined in the FSAR.

A similar event was reported in LER 84-005-00.

0003s/0022K

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E +

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

October 11, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-326

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-009-01
Inadvertent Start of Diesel Generator

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report revision is submitted concerning the inadvertent start of Diesel Generator No. 1-3. The revision is indicated by a change bar.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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