

**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

July 25, 1984  
3F0784-17

Mr. H. R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-302  
Operating License No. DPR-72  
Technical Specification Change Request No. 123

Dear Sir:

Enclosed are three (3) originals and forty (40) copies of Technical Specification Change Request No. 123 requesting amendment to Appendix A of Operating License No. DPR-72. As part of this request, proposed replacement pages for Appendix A are enclosed.

This submittal requests the deletion of the cable tunnel sump pump surveillance requirement in the specification concerning AC sources.

An amendment application fee of one hundred fifty dollars (\$150), as required by 10 CFR 170, has been included with this Change Request.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer  
Manager, Nuclear Operations  
Licensing and Fuel Management

PGH/feb      8407310266 840725  
PDR ADDCK 05000302  
Enclosures      P                                  PDR

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2500  
Atlanta, GA 30323

*Acc'd w/ check #150  
# 669662*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF )  
 ) DOCKET No. 50-302  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

G.R. Westafer deposes and says that the following has been served on the Designated State Representative and the Chief Executive of Citrus County, Florida, by deposit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:

Chairman,  
Board of County Commissioners  
of Citrus County  
Citrus County Courthouse  
Inverness, FL 32650

Administrator  
Radiological Health Services  
Department of Health and  
Rehabilitative Services  
1323 Winewood Blvd.  
Tallahassee, FL 32301


Three (3) copies of Technical Specification Change Request No. 123, requesting amendment to Appendix A of Operating Licensing No. DPR-72.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION



\_\_\_\_\_  
G.R. Westafer  
Manager  
Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel  
Management

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 25th day of July, 1984.


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

Notary Public, State of Florida at Large  
My Commission Expires: November 19, 1986


(NOTARIAL SEAL)

STATE OF FLORIDA  
COUNTY OF PINELLAS

G.R. Westafer states that he is the Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management for Florida Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G.R. Westafer  
Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel  
Management

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County above named, this 25th day of July, 1984.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

Notary Public, State of Florida at Large,  
My Commission Expires: November 19, 1986

## NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

**Docket No.:** 50-302

**Facility:** Crystal River Unit 3

**Licensee:** Florida Power Corporation

**Date of Application:** July 25, 1984

**Request:**

This submittal requests the deletion of the DC control feed cable tunnel sump pump operability and surveillance requirements in the "AC sources" specification.

**Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:**

- Amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.
- Amendment involves significant hazards considerations.

**Basis for Determination:**

This requirement was initially imposed because acceptable operation had not yet been demonstrated. Acceptable operation may now be demonstrated, therefore no significant hazards are involved.

The operability and surveillance requirements for these sump pumps were initially imposed due to a failure to demonstrate that single failure due to flooding of redundant circuits was not possible. Florida Power has been informed by the cable manufacturer that failure due to flooding of at least one train of cables is not possible.

**Requested Implementation Date:**

Florida Power requests an implementation date of October 1, 1984.

**FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION  
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3  
DOCKET NO. 50-302/LICENSE NO. DPR-72  
REQUEST NO. 123, REVISION 0  
CABLE TUNNEL SUMP PUMP OPERABILITY**

**LICENSE DOCUMENT INVOLVED:** Technical Specifications

**PORTION:** 3.8.1.1 A.C. Sources

**DESCRIPTION OF REQUEST:**

Delete Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a.2. which requires that the sump pumps in the tunnel containing the DC control feeds to the 230 kv switchgear be verified to be operable at least once per 7 days.

**REASON FOR REQUEST:**

To comply with Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, the sump pumps in the tunnel containing the DC control feeds to the 230 kv switchgear must be operable. Within the tunnel there are four sump pumps, two on either side of a dividing wall. Two of these pumps are considered to be backups. One set of DC control and protective circuits are located in conduit and trays. A redundant set of DC control and protective circuits, with cable manufactured by Kerite, are contained in separate conduit.

Florida Power Corporation has in its possession information from Kerite Company, that verifies that the Kerite DC control cables are not adversely effected by rain or salt water submersion. Therefore, weekly verification of pump operability and running the Emergency Diesel Generators if the pumps are inoperable are not necessary to assure plant safety. Deleting Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a.2 will save manpower and potentially run time on the diesel generators.

**EVALUATION OF REQUEST:**

Operability of the sump pumps in the cable tunnel was initially included in the Technical Specifications to assure that common mode failure due to flooding will not occur. Tests performed after the initial issuance of the Technical Specifications have indicated that neither rain or salt water submersion will adversely effect Kerite cable performance. Therefore, deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a.2 from the Technical Specifications will not effect plant safety.

**REFERENCE:**

Letter to FPC from Norma H. Dube, Kerite Company, dated March 9, 1981.

Engineering Memorandum (Kerite) No. 205, "Determining Temperature Rating of FR Insulated and HTNS Jacketed Kerite Cables For Operation in Wet and Alternate Wet and Dry Locations", April 30, 1979.

Crystal River Unit 3, Safety Evaluation (NRC), Section 7.9.4, July 5, 1974.