

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Facility Name: Braidwood Station

Examination Administered At: Production Training Center

Examination Conducted: May 21-25, 1984

Examiners: R. L. Higgins
R. L. Higgins

7/11/84
Date

T. M. Burdick
T. M. Burdick

7/11/84
Date

Roger S. Walker for
F. S. Jagger

7/11/84
Date

Approved By: Roger S. Walker for
J. I. McMillen, Chief
Operator Licensing Section

7/11/84
Date

Examination Summary

Examinations Administered during the week of May 21-25, 1984

Written, oral, and simulator examinations were administered to nine instructor certification candidates.

Results: Four candidates passed, five candidates failed.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Personnel Examined

K. G. Bartes
J. E. Browning
D. E. Cooper
G. L. Gruhn
T. D. Ireland
M. G. Olson
T. E. Petelle
D. G. Selph
J. Skoryi, Jr.

2. Examiners

*R. L. Higgins
T. M. Burdick
F. S. Jaggard

*Chief Examiner

3. Examination Review Meeting

At the conclusion of the written examination the chief examiner met with Messrs. L. Kline, T. Chasensky, and K. Gerling of the Braidwood Simulator Training Staff to review the written examination and answer key.

One facility comment was made concerning the questions. A facility representative felt that question 6.5 (a one point question concerning moisture separator reheaters) and question 6.6 (a one and one half point question concerning moisture separator shell drain tanks) together covered the same topic thus placing undue importance on this one topic. The facility's contention was rejected for two reasons. First, the total point value of the two questions combined is only two and one half points, only ten percent of the section. Examiner standards permit as much as 20 percent of a section to be devoted to a single topic. In addition, the questions did not address the same topic. Question 6.5 concerned the steam system, while question 6.6 concerned the heater drain system.

Facility comments about the answers, as well as the disposition of the facility's comments, are summarized in the following paragraphs.

- a. In the answer for question 5.2, the facility requested that fuel densification and crud buildup also be accepted as correct responses. Both phenomena do in fact impede heat transfer from the fuel rods into the coolant, thus causing average fuel temperature to increase as fuel burnup increases. Therefore the facility's request was granted and the answer key expanded to include fuel densification and crud buildup as correct responses.

- b. In the answer for question 5.3, the facility requested that the responses "allows loading of additional excess reactivity" and "minimizes the required number of control rods" be accepted as correct responses. Burnable poison rods offset some of the excess reactivity loaded into the core initially, so the first response was accepted. Burnable poison rods also increase the shutdown margin of the reactor, thereby reducing the number of control rods required to maintain the reactor shutdown, so the second response was also accepted. The answer key was expanded to reflect these additions.
- c. In the answer for question 5.4.b, the facility requested that Pu-Be be deleted as a required response, since it is not going to be used at Braidwood, though originally it had been planned to be used. The latest references were checked to verify the facility's request, and Pu-Be will not be used at Braidwood. The facility's request was granted and the answer was changed to no longer require Pu-Be in order to get full credit.
- d. In the answer for question 5.7, the facility requested that the equation $Q = UA\Delta T$ be used to solve for T_{ave} . The relationship was in fact used to generate the answer, so the facility's requested was granted.
- e. In the answer for question 5.9.c, the facility requested that samarium not be needed in order for full credit to be awarded. BOS 1.1.1.1.e-1, Byron Operating Surveillance, was given as a reference. Since the samarium contribution is small and is ignored by other facilities when calculating the shutdown margin, the facility's request was granted. Samarium was not necessary for full credit.
- f. In the answer for question 5.10.a, the facility requested that the phrase "at height Z" be required for fully credit. Because the references the examiner used did not specify "at height Z", the facility's request was denied. The answer was not changed.
- g. In the answer for question 5.12.b, the facility requested that the response of "radial xenon oscillation" be counted as a correct response. Since a radial xenon oscillation would cause power to shift from one side of the core to the other, adversely affecting the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, the answer was modified to include "radial xenon oscillation" as a correct response.
- h. In the answer for question 6.4, the facility wanted the response "high auctioneered T_{ave} " to be considered optional, since the input for this parameter is multiplied by zero. Since multiplying T_{ave} by zero effectively eliminates it as an input in the Rod Insertion Limit calculation, the facility's request was granted. The answer was modified to no longer require T_{ave} in order to be awarded full credit.
- i. In the answer for question 6.10, the facility requested that full credit be given for the response "381A and B modulate opposite of each other - as one throttles shut, the other throttles open." Since

these valves modulate in order to control the temperature exiting the letdown reheat heat exchanger, the facility's request was granted. The answer was expanded to grant full credit if an examinee stated that 381A and B are throttled.

- j. In the answer for question 6.12.b, the facility requested that the answer be modified to require the examinee to include the relief valve in the return line set to relieve at 2485 psig in order to receive full credit. Since the intent of the question was to determine the strengthened design of the thermal barrier return line, the relief valve was not considered to be a required response. The facility's request was denied.
- k. In the answer for question 6.14, the facility requested that the answer be modified to include the Centrifugal Charging starting at 10 seconds and the Control Room Refrigeration Unit starting at 25 seconds. The reference, BCA 2, page 6, was checked to verify the facility's request, and the answer was changed. In addition, the examiner decided that the response "4160V/480V transformer" was trivial and therefore was not required for full credit. The answer as revised is:

Centrifugal Charging Pump 10 sec.	(0.4)
Control Room Refrigeration Unit 25 sec.	(0.4)
Component Cooling Pumps 30 sec.	(0.4)
Essential Service Water Pumps 35 sec.	(0.4)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 45 sec.	(0.4)

Ref: Training Manual 9-31; BCA 2, p. 6

- l. In the answer for question 7.8, the facility requested that the response "prevent crud from entering the RCP seals" be given full credit. The facility's request met the intent of the question, so the request was granted.
- m. In the answer for question 8.7, the facility requested that the answer be modified so that full credit be given to examinees who did not specifically mention "telephone voice communications system" or "State and local authorities." This request was granted, since other organizations share this communications link with State and local authorities. The examiner agreed that the fact that the communications link was a telephone was not a necessary part of the answer.
- n. In the answer for question 8.14, the facility requested that the response "changes which would result in operation outside of the assumptions of FSAR accident analysis" be awarded full credit. Since this statement is a paraphrase of the answer, the request was granted.
- o. In the answer for question 8.15, the facility requested that the response "maximum allowed by ASME code" be granted full credit. Since the ASME allowance is only 400 cc per hour, which is very nearly 0 gpm, the facility's request was granted.

- p. In the answer for question 8.16.a, the facility requested that the response "250°F", as well as the response "380°F", both be counted as correct since the plant reference material contradicts itself. The references - BGP 100-5 Rev. 1, page 13, step 41, and Tech Spec 3/4 4-35 - were checked and verified so the facility's request was granted.

4. Exit Meeting

At the conclusion of the visit to the Production Training Center the chief examiner, Mr. R. L. Higgins, and one of the examiners, Mr. F. S. Jaggard, met with Mr. Louis Kline, the Braidwood Simulator Manager, and with Messrs. Tom Chasensky and Ken Gerling, Braidwood Simulator Instructors. This meeting was held to discuss the known results of the examination as well as other observations noted by the examiners during the examination. The facility was informed that seven examinees definitely passed the simulator/oral portion of the examination, while two examinees were considered marginal. The other observations made by the examiners are listed in following paragraphs.

- a. The Production Training Center personnel were complimented for the cooperation shown to the examiners during the course of the examinations.
- b. The Simulator operator, Mr. Gerling, was complimented on the expeditious response to requests made during the simulatory examinations. This greatly reduced the amount of time required to conduct the examinations.
- c. Some of the initial conditions used by the Braidwood Simulator were not compatible with steps in the Braidwood procedures. This problem manifested itself when the examinees discovered during one of the scenarios that plant components were not in the status required by the procedure. This fact caused much confusion for the examinees and made one of the examinees extremely upset, no doubt contributing to his marginal performance. The facility representatives were told to revise the Braidwood Simulator's initial conditions to accurately match steps in the procedures before any more NRC simulator examinations are administered at the Braidwood simulator.
- d. It was discovered during the examination that a conflict existed between the Byron Tech Specs and the Byron Startup Procedures. Tech Specs 3.5.3 requires that a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of one or more of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold legs is less than or equal to 350°F. Procedure BGP 100-1 Revision 3 step 37 contains a caution statement requiring that two centrifugal charging pumps be operable prior to exceeding an RCS temperature of 250°F.

The conflict between Tech Specs and procedures resulted in one of the examinees refusing to comply with the simulator operator's order to continue the startup. The examinee, when again ordered to follow the procedure, demanded to be relieved. At this time the examiners

intervened to acknowledge the examinee's concern but told him to continue the startup in order to expedite the exam. The simulator operator was told by the examiners not to require the examinees to violate Tech Specs or procedures during an NRC exam. If the examiners want the examinees to do so in order to expedite the examination, the examiners will personally make this known to the examinee.

Though the simulator has no control over the procedures or Tech Specs which are provided by the plant, the conflict between the two documents is a serious one and should be resolved as soon as possible.

- e. Several labels and meters were discovered to be inaccurate during the examination, and inappropriate chart paper was used in several recorders. The specific meters, charts, and labels were shown to the facility personnel at the conclusion of the exit meeting. The facility will correct the meters and labels, but since the proper chart paper is in short supply and the Byron and Braidwood plants are given priority over the simulator, the facility personnel made no commitment to use appropriate chart paper for the foreseeable future.
- f. It was pointed out by the examiners that an open steam generator PORV would be extremely difficult to notice. One simulator scenario contained a failed open steam generator PORV; it took an extremely long time for the examinees to notice the failure. It was also pointed out that no indication for steam generator safety valves existed in the control room.
- g. During the conduct of the exams anyone walking through the hall adjacent to the Braidwood simulator could view the simulator examinations being conducted. The examiners therefore recommended that venetian blinds be installed on the windows between the hall and the simulator so that future NRC exams could be conducted in privacy.
- h. The procedures used at the simulator had pages falling out of them, and no ruler was available to aid in reading graphs.
- i. The steam generator tube rupture emergency conducted during one of the scenarios seemed unrealistic because level in the ruptured steam generator kept dropping even though there was a 350 gallons per minute leak into the generator from the RCS. The facility promised to reevaluate the steam generator tube rupture scenario to ensure that the simulator provides a realistic simulation.

5. Generic Weaknesses

The only generic weakness noted during the simulator/oral portion of the examination was the unfamiliarity which most of the examinees evidenced when operating the simulator in cold shutdown conditions. This may have been due in part to the incompatibility between the initial conditions used for cold shutdown and the steps in the procedures.

The following generic weaknesses were exhibited on the written examination:

- a. Calculation of $OT\Delta T$
- b. Determination of Shutdown Margin
- c. Definition of $F_0(Z)$
- d. Automatic actions associated with Radiation Monitors
- e. Fire Protection Deluge System
- f. Automatic closure feature of Breaker 1592
- g. Effect of a low level in the Moisture Separator Drain Tank
- h. Interlocks between the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves and the Letdown Line Control Valves
- i. RHR Hot Leg Suction Valve interlocks
- j. CCW Pump trip on low CCW expansion tank level
- k. CCW Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger Piping Design
- l. Emergency backup method of tripping the Turbine from the Control Room
- m. Basis for placing the turbine driven Main Feed Pumps on the turning gear when filling and venting the Condensate System
- n. Verification of the deenergization of an ESF DC bus
- o. Purpose of the OSC
- p. Recovery Group and the near-site EOF
- q. Symbols used on the procedure flow charts
- r. Verification of System Lineups
- s. Definition of "change in intent" when applied to a Temporary Procedure
- t. Allowable leakage through a Pressurizer Safety Valve
- u. Methods for providing Low Temperature Overpressure Protection for the RCS

Master

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION

FACILITY: Braidwood Simulator
REACTOR TYPE: Westinghouse PWR
DATE ADMINISTERED: May 21, 1984
EXAMINER: R. L. Higgins
APPLICANT: _____

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Use separate paper for the answers. Write answers on one side only. Staple question sheet on top of the answer sheets. Points for each question are indicated in parentheses after the question. The passing grade requires at least 70% in each category and a final grade of at least 80%.

<u>Category Value</u>	<u>% Of Total</u>	<u>Applicant's Score</u>	<u>% Of Category Value</u>	<u>Category</u>
<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	_____	_____	5. Theory of Nuclear Power Plant Operation, Fluids, and Thermodynamics
<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	_____	_____	6. Plant Systems Design, Control, and Instrumentation
<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	_____	_____	7. Procedures - Normal, Abnormal, Emergency, and Radiological Control
<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	_____	_____	8. Administrative Procedures, Conditions, and Limitations
<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	_____	_____	TOTALS

Final Grade _____%

All work done on this exam is my own, I have neither given nor received aid.

Applicant's Signature

- 5.1 With the plant at 100% power, normal pressure and flux distribution, how much of an increase in RCS average temperature from the 100% power reference temperature value would cause an OTDT trip? Assume plant power remains at 100%. Show your work! (2.0)
- 5.2 What phenomenon causes the average fuel temperature at 100% power to increase as fuel burnup increases? (1.0)
- 5.3 Give two reasons for the use of burnable poison rods. (1.0)
- 5.4 a. What element is used as the absorber material in the control rod? (0.5)
- b. Explain how each type of primary neutron source produces neutrons. (1.5)
- 5.5 Explain why the moderator temperature coefficient is more negative when control banks C and D are inserted than it is when control bank D alone is inserted. Refer to Figure 5.5-1. (2.0)
- 5.6 What limitation is imposed by regulation to ensure that a zirconium-water reaction will not take place? (1.0)
- 5.7 With reactor power remaining constant at 50% power, what value of Tave would cause the steam generator safety valve with the lowest lift setting to open? Assume that the normal steam generator pressure at 50% power is 1030 psig. Show your work! (2.0)
- 5.8 The initial RT_{NDT} of the reactor vessel is 40°F. After 32 EFPY the RT_{NDT} will rise to 121°F at 1/4 T and 94°F at 3/4 T.
- a. Define RT_{NDT} . (1.0)
- b. Why will the RT_{NDT} be higher at 1/4 T than it is at 3/4 T after 32 EFPY? (2.0)
- 5.9 a. Why must the required shutdown margin be greater in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 than it is in mode 5? (1.0)
- b. How is shutdown margin determined in mode 1? (1.0)
- c. How is shutdown margin determined in mode 3? (1.0)
- d. What action must be taken if the shutdown margin is determined to be inadequate? (1.0)
- 5.10 a. What is $F_Q(Z)$? (1.0)
- b. Why must $F_Q(Z)$ be modified by $K(Z)$? (1.5)
- 5.11 Why must the injection of accumulator nitrogen into the RCS be prevented? (1.0)

Sheet of Information

ΔT

$$\Delta T = \Delta T_0 \{K_1 - K_2 (T - T^1) + K_3 (P - P^1) - f_1 (\Delta I)\}$$

ΔT_1 = Indicated ΔT at rated power

$$K_1 = 1.072$$

$$K_2 = .0265 \text{ per } ^\circ\text{F}$$

T = average temperature

$T^1 = 587.7$ (Nominal Tave at rated thermal power)

$$K_3 = .00134 \text{ per psi}$$

P = Pressurizer pressure, psig

$P^1 = 2235$ psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure)

Figure 5.5-1

SCS-1
REV. 9 (7/18/83)
Figure 5

Moderator Temperature Coefficient (ppm/°F)

Bank D In

Banks C, D In

850 950 1050 1150 1250

Boron Concentration (ppm)

Redded Moderator Temperature Coefficient At HZP (557°F)

vs Boron Concentration BOL no Xenon


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- 5.12 a. What is the maximum Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio value which will permit indefinite operation at 100% power? (0.5)
- b. Name two events, not including a failed power range channel, which could cause the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio to exceed the value in part "a". (1.5)
- 5.13 Name three reasons (bases) for the establishment of a minimum RCS temperature for criticality. (1.5)

- 6.1 State the automatic actions (if any) associated with the following process/area radiation monitors:
- a. Main Control Room Turbine Building Air Intakes (0.5)
 - b. Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor ORE-PR009 (0.5)
 - c. Fuel Building Area Radiation Monitors ORE-AR055 and ORE-AR058 (0.5)
 - d. Gross Failed Fuel Detector (0.5)
- 6.2 List the signals that will automatically activate the main power transformer's fire protection deluge system. (1.0)
- 6.3 List 4 of the 6 conditions which must be satisfied in order for breaker 1592 to AUTO close. (2.0)
- 6.4 Which signal(s) is (are) used to generate the following:
- a. Rod Insertion Limit (0.5)
 - b. Pressurizer Level Program (0.5)
 - c. Mainfeed/Main Steam Differential Pressure Program (0.5)
- 6.5 Explain why, when a moisture separator reheater tube bundle is removed from service, the bundle on the opposite side must also be removed from service. (1.0)
- 6.6 What problem may result if the moisture separator shell drain tank level drops too low? (1.5)
- 6.7 Why is reverse rotation of an RCP undesirable? (1.0)
- 6.8 Explain how one of the pressurizer PORVs (PCV-455A) is designed to open at a pressure below 2335 psig for a very fast high pressure transient. (1.5)
- 6.9 Explain how the letdown orifice isolation valves are interlocked with the letdown line control valves (CV460 and CV459). (1.5)
- 6.10 On Figure 6.10-1, circle the valves which will be open and place an X through the valves which will be shut when the BTRS is in the Boration mode. (3.0)
- 6.11 What four interlocks must be satisfied in order to open the RCS Hot Leg Suction valves to the RHR pumps, 8701A(B) and 8702A(B)? (2.0)
- 6.12 a. What interlock prevents damage to the component cooling water pumps due to loss of suction head? (1.0)

- b. How is the CCW piping from the thermal barrier heat exchanger protected from overpressurization due to an RCS to CCW leak? (2.0)
- 6.13 When is hot leg recirculation initiated and why? (2.0)
- 6.14 State the timing sequence of the Safe Shutdown (Blackout) Sequential Timer. (2.0)



**BORON THERMAL
REGENERATION SYSTEM
(BTRS)**

FIGURE 16-1

Figure 6.10-1

- 7.1 "Adverse Containment" as used in the Byron Emergency Procedures exists when either or both of two criteria are met. What are those criteria? (1.0)
- 7.2 Why does 1BEP-0 require the RCPs to be stopped if containment pressure exceeds 20 psig? (2.0)
- 7.3 What parameters (setpoints are not required) must be satisfied prior to terminating an SI? (2.0)
- 7.4 What actions can be taken in the control room to trip the turbine if the Turbine Manual Trip push button will not work? (2.0)
- 7.5 a. What action must be taken if criticality is achieved below the low low insertion limit? (1.5)
- b. What is the zero-power rod insertion limit? (0.5)
- 7.6 How quickly must RCP shaft rotation occur after the RCP's breaker is shut? (0.5)
- 7.7 Why must the B and C Main Feedwater pumps be placed on their Turning Gear prior to filling and venting the Condensate System? (1.0)
- 7.8 Why should the RCP Seal Return Valves be shut prior to depressurizing the RCS? (1.0)
- 7.9 a. How is the de-energization of an ESF DC bus verified? (1.0)
- b. What immediate action must be taken if the de-energization of an ESF DC bus is verified? (1.0)
- 7.10 What effect will the failure of two power range detectors have if the failures occur while the plant is in cold shutdown? (1.0)
- 7.11 a. In the event of Control Room Inaccessibility, where does the Shift Engineer go? (0.5)
- b. Where does the NSO go? (0.5)
- 7.12 a. An explosive flammable mixture is a concentration of hydrogen between ___ and ___. (1.0)
- b. If stator coil inlet conductivity is equal to or greater than _____, then manually trip the Main Generator without delay and go to 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (0.5)
- 7.13 Briefly explain how water could be added to a steam generator if none of the feedwater pumps or AFW pumps are operable. (2.0)
- 7.14 How is a reactor trip verified? (1.5)

7.15 Why is Manual SI actuation not advisable during an ATWOS? (1.5)

7.16 List the steps, in detail, for two different methods of emergency
boration. (3.0)

- 8.1 Name four reasons, other than the completion of his work assignment, which would require an individual to leave the controlled area as quickly as possible. (2.0)
- 8.2 a. When can an extended RWP be used? (1.0)
- b. What is the maximum amount of time for which an extended RWP is valid? (0.5)
- 8.3 a. What is the NRC quarterly external dose limit for radiation exposure to the skin? (0.5)
- b. How can the skin get exposed but not the whole body? (1.0)
- 8.4 Why are thyroid blocking agents administered to individuals in case of a fission product release? (1.5)
- 8.5 What is the purpose of the OSC? (1.0)
- 8.6 a. Who normally functions as the initial GSEP Station Group Director? (0.5)
- b. During the more serious emergencies, the GSEP Corporate Command Center Director is responsible for activating a _____ at the affected station's _____ (1.0)
- 8.7 What is the function of NARS? (1.0)
- 8.8 What is the Daily Order Book used for? (1.0)
- 8.9 List the Critical Safety Functions in their order of priority. (1.5)
- 8.10 a. What are Caution Cards used for? (1.0)
- b. Special Order Cards are used on what equipment? (0.5)
- 8.11 What do the large circle and small box around step 31, RCP starts, on the BGP 100-1 Flowchart signify? Refer to Figure 8.11-1. (2.0)
- 8.12 Verification of the correct alignment of components during System Lineups can be accomplished by any of three methods. Name two. (2.0)
- 8.13 a. Who normally functions as the Fire Chief? (0.5)
- b. A fire brigade of at least _____ members shall be maintained at all times. (0.5)
- 8.14 One criterion which must be met before a Temporary Procedure is written is that there be no change in intent for any established procedure. What is meant by the term "change in intent"? (2.0)
- 8.15 a. How many reactor coolant loops must be operable in mode 3? (0.3)

- b. What is the maximum allowable leakage through a pressurizer safety valve? (0.3)
- c. What is the RCS limit for fluoride contamination in the RCS? (0.3)
- d. What are the two specific activity limits of the RCS? (0.6)
- 8.16 a. When must low temperature overpressure protection be operable? (0.5)
- b. What are the two methods of satisfying the low temperature overpressure protection requirement? (2.0)

BGP 100-1 Flowchart

exceptions

heatup

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B.O.S.R.

ENTER

time	
date	
SE	

C

D

E

Prerequisites

Precautions

Limitations

and Actions


UNIT #

Initial each

RO

SRO

Figure 8.11-1



RCS Press 375

temp 150°F/hr

250 350

2

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ANSWERS

5.1 ΔT setpoint = ΔT full power $[K_1 - K_2 (T - T^1) + K_3 (P - P^1) - f(\Delta I)]$. (0.2)

at normal pressure and flux distribution, $K_3 (P - P^1)$ and $f(\Delta I)$ both equal zero. (0.2)

ΔT setpoint = ΔT full power $[K_1 - K_2 (T - T^1)]$ (0.2)

With plant power at 100% at the time of the trip, ΔT setpoint = ΔT full power. (0.5)

therefore $\frac{\Delta T \text{ setpoint}}{\Delta T \text{ full power}} = 1$ (0.2)

$1 = K_1 - K_2 (T - T^1)$ (0.1)

$1 - K_1 = -K_2 (T - T^1)$ (0.1)

$K_1 - 1 = K_2 (T - T^1)$

$1.072 - 1 = .0265 (T - 587.7)$ (0.1)

$.072 = .0265T - 15.574$ (0.1)

$.0265T = 15.646$ (0.1)

$T = 590.4$ (0.1)

$590.4 - 587.7 = 2.7$ (0.1)

At 100% power, if Tave rises 2.7 degrees from its normal value an OTDT trip will occur.

Ref: Tech Specs Table 2.2-1, p 2-8.

5.2 The thermal conductivity of the gas in the gap between the clad and fuel decreases with burnup (0.5) due to the buildup of the fission product gases krypton and xenon which possess very poor thermal conductivities. (0.5) *(see notes)*

fuel densification (0.5) and buildup (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual p. 11-8

5.3 1. Flatten the radial flux distribution. (0.5)

2. Lower the beginning-of-life, hot zero power boron concentration to guarantee a negative moderator temperature coefficient. *(see notes) allows loading of excess (0.5)*

Ref: Training Manual p. 11-5 *allows minimizing*

5.4 a. Hafnium (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual p. 11-18

b. 1. Californium 252 undergoes spontaneous fission. (0.5)

2. Plutonium undergoes alpha decay. *(not required)* (0.5)

Pu/Be is not required

The alpha combines with beryllium, emitting a neutron in the process. (0.5)

Ref: Lesson Notes, Nuclear Fuel Structure, p. 31

- 5.5 As moderator temperature rises, the migration length of the neutrons will increase, so each control rod will interact with more neutrons, absorbing additional neutrons and removing them from the fission chain. (1.0) With more control rods inserted, more neutrons will be removed from the fission process for a given rise in moderator temperature. (1.0)

Ref: PWR Core Physics Text, Phase I, Module B-3 p. 24.

- 5.6 Peak clad temperature shall not exceed 2200°F even during postulated accident conditions. ~~7200°F~~ (1.0)

Ref: Training Manual 11-11; 10 CFR 50.46(b)(1)

- 5.7 Normal steam generator temperature at 50% power is obtained from the steam tables.
1030 psig = 1045 psia which corresponds to 550°F. (0.4)

The steam generator safety valve with the lowest lift setting will open at 1175 psig = 1190 psia, which corresponds to 566°F. (0.4)

The steam generator temperature must therefore be raised 566-550 = 16°F. (0.4)

Normal Tave at 50% power is $(557 + 587)/2$, which is 572°F. (0.4)

If Tave rises to $572 + 16 = 588$ at 50% power the steam generator safety valve with the lowest relief setting will open. (0.4)

Ref: Tech Specs 3/4 p. 7-3; Training Manual Figure 14-1

- 5.8 a. RT_{NDT} is the reference transition nil ductility temperature, the temperature below which a material will fail in a brittle rather than a ductile manner. (may) (1.0)

b. The RT_{NDT} increases with EFPY due to neutron embrittlement, the deformation of the metal lattice caused by high-energy neutrons striking metal atoms. (1.0) At 3/4T, 3/4 of the distance from the inner wall of the reactor vessel to the outer wall of the reactor vessel, the high energy neutron flux is less than it is at 1/4 T because of the shielding provided by the metal in the reactor vessel. (0.5) With a smaller neutron flux at 3/4T than at 1/4T the neutron embrittlement will be less, so the increase in RT_{NDT} will not be as great. (0.5)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-31; B 3/4 4-8

5.9 a. In modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the shutdown margin is based on a postulated steam line break and resulting uncontrolled cooldown. (0.5) In mode 5, Tave is below 200°F, so the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam line break cooldown are minimal. (0.5)

Ref: Tech Spec B 3/4 1-1

b. The control rods are withdrawn beyond the rod insertion limits. (1.0)

Ref: Tech Specs 4.1.1.1.1.b; B 3/4 1-3

(RIL met)

c. Consideration of the following factors

1. RCS boron concentration (0.2)
2. Control rod position (0.2)
3. RCS Tave (0.2)
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation (0.2)
5. Xenon concentration (0.1)
6. Samarium concentration *← not req'd* (0.1)

Ref: Tech Specs 4.1.1.1.1.e

d. Immediately initiate boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm (0.5) of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required shutdown margin is restored. (0.5)

Ref: Tech Specs 3.1.1.1

5.10 a. Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (0.2), is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux.

(0.8) $\frac{\text{peak}}{\text{ave}}$ at height Z Mitigating Core Damage page 1-27

Ref: Tech Spec B 3/4 2-1

b. Coolant temperature increases as it flows upward through the core, (.75) so DNBR is lowest towards the top of the core. (.75)

or

During a LOCA, the top of the core is the first part uncovered. (0.5) When the ECCS refills the core, the top portion of the core is the last recovered. (0.5) Since the top of the core is uncovered for the longest period of time, it will reach the highest temperature. (0.5)

Ref: Thermal-Hydraulic Principles and Applications to the Pressurized Water Reactor II, Chap 13, p. 33

5.11 Nitrogen is an insoluble, incompressible gas which has poor heat transfer characteristics. (0.4) If it accumulated in the reactor vessel head, coolant flow through the core might be blocked. (0.3) If it surrounded the fuel rods, the heat removal rate would be reduced greatly, causing fuel temperature to rise drastically. (0.3)

Ref: IBCA-2 p. 20

5.12 a. 1.02 (0.5)

Ref: Tech Specs 3.2.4

b. Any two of the following:

Misaligned control rod (0.75)

Flow blockage through the core (0.75)

Improper fuel loading (0.75)

radial xenon oscillation

5.13 Any three of the following:

1. MTC is within its analyzed range (0.5)

2. Trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range (0.5)

3. The pressurizer is capable of being in an operable status with a steam bubble (0.5)

4. The reactor vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature (0.5)

5. The plant is above the cooldown steam dump premissive, P-12 (0.5)

6. *Plant operation will be in the bounds of accident analysis*

Ref: Tech Specs B 3/4 1-2

ANSWERS

- 6.1 a. None (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 49-16
- b. Shuts the vent valves on both component cooling surge tanks. (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 49-8
- c. Booster fans OVA04CA and B start and bypass dampers shut to route the exhaust through the filter prior to release. (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 50-16
- d. None (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 49-10
- 6.2 Differential current (0.5)
Sudden pressure (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 4-17
- 6.3 Any 4 of the following:
- a. No overcurrents (phases or to ground) breaker 1592 (0.5)
 - b. No overcurrents (phases or to ground) breaker 1591 (0.5)
 - c. No malfunctions on SAT 142-1 (0.5)
 - d. Breaker 1591 open (0.5)
 - e. Control switch for breaker 1591 in "after close" (0.5)
 - f. Control switch for breaker 1592 in "after trip" (0.5)
- Ref: Training Manual 4-100
- 6.4 a. Auctioneered high ΔT (^{.5}~~.25~~) and auctioneered high Tave (^{multiplied by zero}~~.25~~) (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 12-44
- b. Auctioneered high Tave (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 12-44
- c. Total Steam Flow (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 27-20
- 6.5 To limit the temperature differential across the LP turbine. (1.0)
Ref: Training Manual 35-38

6.6 Steam from the moisture separator may be passed directly to the heater drain tank (0.5) allowing water contained in the heater drain tank to flash to steam (0.5), possibly overpressurizing the heater drain tank. (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual 36-29

6.7 If an attempt were made to start an RCP rotating in the reverse direction, excessive starting currents would be drawn (0.5), resulting in overheating of the motor. (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual 13-16

6.8 The pressure signal used to actuate the PORV is a PID compensated signal. (0.5) (PID stands for proportional, integral, and derivative.) The derivative function will reduce the setpoint in direct proportion to the rate at which pressure is increasing. (1.0)

Ref: Training Manual 14-28

6.9 1. To open any of the letdown orifice isolation valves, CV459 and CV460 must be opened. (.75)

2. Closing either CV459 or CV460 will automatically close all the letdown orifice isolation valves. (.75)

Ref: Training Manual 15a-9

6.11 1. 8812A(B) RHR pump suction valves from the RWST must be shut. (0.5)

2. 8804A(B) RHR to charging (SI) pump suction valves must be shut. (0.5)

3. 8811A(B) RHR pump suction valves from the containment sump must be shut. (0.5)

4. The RCS pressure must be less than 382 psig. (0.5)


Ref: Training Manual 18-12

6.12 a. A low-low level in the CCW surge tank will trip the CCW pumps. (1.0)

Ref: Training Manual 19-13

b. A leak into the CCW system at the thermal barrier would greatly increase the flow rate in the return line from the RCP. (0.5) (A check valve prevents leakage out the supply line. (0.5)) The increased flow through the return line would be sensed by a flow orifice, which would cause MOV 685, the CCW thermal barrier return line isolation valve, to shut. (0.5) The CCW piping between the check valve in the thermal barrier supply line to the isolation valve is designed to withstand full RCS pressure. (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual 19-15, 28, 39



**BORON THERMAL
REGENERATION SYSTEM
(BTRS)**

FIGURE 16-1

Figure 6.10-1

6.13 Approximately 18 hours after the initiation of cold leg recirculation. (0.5)
Hot leg recirculation provides a means of terminating boiling in the core should a LOCA be due to a break in one of the RCS cold legs (0.5), reduces boron precipitation in the top of the core (0.5), and maintains the core in a subcooled condition as long as core cooling is required. (0.5)

Ref: Training Manual 58-52

6.14 4160V/480V transformer 10 sec. (0.5)
Component Cooling Pumps 30 sec. (0.5) 4
Essential Service Water Pumps 35 sec. (0.5) 4
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 45 sec. (0.5) 4

Ref: Training Manual 9-31

Cent Ch pump 10 sec (1.4)
MCR Refrigeration unit 25 sec (1.4)

ANSWERS

- 7.1 1. Containment Pressure greater than 5 psig. (0.5)
2. Containment Radiation greater than 10^4 R/hr (0.5)
Ref: 1BEP-0 p. 2
- 7.2 1. Containment pressure exceeding 20 psig will cause a phase B containment isolation. (1.0)
2. A phase B containment isolation will cause component cooling water flow to the RCPs to be isolated. (0.5)
3. The RCPs must be stopped if CCW is lost for greater than one minute. (0.5)
Ref: Training Manual 13-31, Figure 19-2, 61-39; Tech Specs 3/4 6-22; 1BEP-0 p. 9; BGP 100-1, p. 1
- 7.3 1. RCS pressure (0.5)
2. RCS subcooling (0.5)
3. Pressurizer level (0.5)
4. Secondary heat sink (0.5)
Ref: 1BEP-0, p. 12; 1BEP-1, p. 3; 1BEP-2, p. 8; 1BEP-3, p. 15
- 7.4 1. Pull-to-lock the EH pumps (1.0)
2. Close the MSIVs and their bypasses (1.0)
Ref: 1BEP-0 p. 3
- 7.5 a. Emergency borate 100 ppm (.75) and reinsert all control rods (.75)
Ref: BGP 100-2 p. 5
b. 47 steps on bank C or 162 steps on bank B (0.5)
Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 1-22
- 7.6 10 seconds (0.5)
Ref: BGP 100-1 p. 3
- 7.7 Prevent the Main Feedwater Pumps from rotating without the oil systems running. (1.0)
Ref: BGP 100-1 p. 5
- 7.8 Prevent backflushing the Seal Return Filter into the RCP Seals. (1.0)
prevent crud from entering RCP seals
Ref: BGP 100-5 p. 17

- 7.9 a. Feedwater regulating valves will fail closed. (1.0)
 b. Manually trip the reactor. (1.0)
 Ref: BOA Elec - 1 p. 3, 4
- 7.10 A false P-10 will be generated, deenergizing the high voltage to the Source Range detectors. (1.0)
 Ref: 1BOA INST-1, p. 5
- 7.11 a. TSC (0.5)
 b. Shutdown panel (0.5)
 Ref: 1BOA Pri - 5
- 7.12 a. 4% (0.5) and 75% (0.5)
 Ref: OBOA PRI-8, p. 3
 b. 9.5 micromhos (0.5)
 Ref: 1BOA SEC-7, p. 4
- 7.13 Use a running CD/CB pump (0.5) to supply water through an idle FW pump (0.5) to a S/G which has been depressurized below 670 psig (1.0).
 Ref: 1BFR-H.1, p. 8
- 7.14 1. Rod bottom lights are lit. (0.5)
 2. Reactor trip and bypass breakers are open. (0.5)
 3. Neutron flux is decreasing. (0.5)
 Ref: 1BEP-0, p. 3
- 7.15 A possible loss of heat sink (0.5) due to tripping of the main feedwater pumps (0.5) and a feedwater isolation actuation. (0.5)
 Ref: 1BCA-1, p. 2; Training Manual 25-47
- 7.16 Two of the following:
1. a. Manually open emergency boration valve 1CV8104 (0.5)
 b. Manually start a boric acid transfer pump (0.5)
 c. Verify emergency boration flow (0.3)
 d. Manually increase charging flow (0.2)
 2. a. Increase pot setting for boration flow to maximum valve (0.3)
 b. Place make-up control selector switch to borate (0.3)
 c. Place make-up control switch to start (0.3)
 d. Verify 1CV110A and 1CV110B open (0.3)
 e. Verify required boration flow (0.3)

3.
 - a. Manually Open 1CV112D/112E (0.5)
 - b. Manually Close 1CV112B/112C (0.5)
 - c. Verify one centrifugal charging pump running (0.3)
 - d. Verify charging flow of at least 105 gpm (0.2)

4.
 - a. Manually open 1CV110A (0.4)
 - b. Obtain key for pad lock on 1CV8439 from Shift Engineer and locally open 1CV8439 (0.6)
 - c. Manually start a boric acid transfer pump (0.4)
 - d. Verify required boration flow (0.1)

Ref: 1BOA PRI-2, p. 3

ANSWERS

8.1 Four of the following:

- a. When instructed or signaled to do so by the Radiation Chemistry Department (0.5)
- b. Failure or suspected failure of personnel protective equipment (0.5)
- c. Unexpected deterioration of radiological conditions (0.5)
- d. In the event that the worker's current accumulated dose equivalent status becomes uncertain for any reason or dose equivalent is equal to the exposure authorized for the job. (0.5)
- e. "Assembly" sirens sound - practice or actual (0.5)
- f. Injury (0.5)
- g. Unexpected area radiation monitor alarm and the area dose rate is unknown. (0.5)

Ref: Radiation Protection Standards, p. 7

- 8.2 a. Routine job (0.3) where workers may receive greater than 50 mrem but less than 100 mrem in one day for two or more days (0.4), but less than 300 mrem in a week on a given task. (0.3)
- b. 7 days (0.5)

Ref: Radiation Protection Standards, p. 13

- 8.3 a. 7.5 rems (0.5)
- b. Beta radiation (0.5), which exposes the skin but does not penetrate past the skin into the body (0.5).

Ref: Radiation Protection Standards, p. 24

- 8.4 ^(relatively) A large proportion of fission products are radioactive iodines (0.5). Iodines will collect in the thyroid until the thyroid is saturated. (0.5) A thyroid blocking agent administered to an individual will result in sufficient accumulation of stable iodine in the thyroid to prevent significant uptake of radioiodine. (0.5)

Ref: GSEP p. 2-3

- 8.5 Location to which support personnel will report during an emergency (0.5) and from which they will be dispatched for assignment or duties in support of emergency operations. (0.5)

Ref: GSEP p. 3-3

- 8.6 a. Shift Engineer (0.5)

- b. GSEP Recovery Group (0.5)
Nearsite EOF (0.5)
- Ref: GSEP p. 3-2
- 8.7 The Nuclear Accident Reporting System is a dedicated telephone voice communications system (0.5) that has been installed for the purpose of notifying State and local authorities of declared nuclear emergencies. (0.5)
- Ref: GSEP p. 7-5
- 8.8 Issuing management instructions (0.5) which have short term applicability and require dissemination. (0.5)
- Ref: BAP 300-3, p. 1
- 8.9
- a. Subcriticality (.25)
 - b. Core Cooling (.25)
 - c. RCS Integrity (.25)
 - d. Heat Sink (.25)
 - e. Containment (.25)
 - f. Inventory (.25)
- Ref: BAP 300-11, p. 6
- 8.10 a. Call attention to a temporary change of normal operating routine of equipment or a special condition of an operating system. (1.0)
- Ref: BAP 300-18, p. 6
- b. Equipment under the jurisdiction of the load dispatcher. (0.5)
- Ref: BAP 300-18 p. 3
- 8.11 a. The large circle signifies a major step in procedure. (1.0)
- b. The box signifies a step that is to be approved prior to starting and initialled after completion by an SRO. (1.0)
- Ref: BAP 300-34, p. 2
- 8.12 a. Functional testing (1.0)
- b. Second qualified individual (1.0)
- c. Automatic System Status Monitoring System (1.0)
- Ref: BAP 399-3, p. 3

8.13 a. Cognizant Shift Foreman (0.5)

Ref: BAP 1100-1, p. 3

b. 5 (0.5)

Ref: BAP 1100-1, p. 1

8.14 Changes which result in operation outside the FSAR described design envelope (1.0) and result in operation outside the Plant Safety Analysis as described in the FSAR. (1.0)

Ref: BAP 1310-4, p. 1

8.15 a. 2 (0.3)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-?

b. 0 (0.3)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-19

c. .15 ppm (0.3)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-23

d. Less than or equal to 1 microcurie per gram dose equivalent I-131. (0.3)

Less than or equal to 100/E microcuries per gram of gross radioactivity. (0.3)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-25

8.16 a. When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than 380°F and the reactor vessel head is on. *250°F is also correct* (0.5)

b. 1. Two PORVs with nominal setpoints which vary with RCS temperature. *BAP 100-5 Rev-1 p. 13* (1.0)

2. The RCS depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches. (1.0)

Ref: Tech Spec 3/4 4-35