




GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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September 28, 1984
RBG-19070
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Mr. Collins:

River Bend Station-Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
Interim Report/DR-191

On August 29, 1984, GSU notified Region IV by telephone that it had determined DR-191 to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). This deficiency concerns Gould-supplied Buchanan stacking type terminal blocks for power cables feeding loads from 125-V dc motor control center 1ENB*MCCL. The attachment to this letter is GSU's 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e)(3) with regard to this deficiency. An interim or final status report addressing actions taken to prevent recurrence will be provided by November 16, 1984.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker
Manager-Engineering
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/LAE/lp

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

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ATTACHMENT

September 28, 1984
RBG-19070

DR-191 Gould-supplied Buchanan Stacking-type Terminal Blocks

Background and Description of Problem

The problem involves improperly sized Gould-supplied Buchanan stacking-type terminal blocks for power cables feeding loads from 125-V dc motor control center 1END*MCC1. The terminal blocks supplied were too large (400 to 250 MCM) for the vendor wire size being used (10 AWG). This resulted in loose wire connections with the set screw cable clamp fully inserted, which could have caused a loss of operating ability for the loads connected by means of these terminal blocks. In addition, the terminal blocks appeared to be inadequately installed, since they were separating from each other at the outer surface of the stacking sections.

Safety Implication

The electrical and mechanical integrity of the terminal block connections is suspect because the motor control centers were seismically qualified with properly sized terminal blocks. There is no evidence to suggest that cable connections to improperly sized terminal blocks could remain secure or function after a design basis seismic event. It must be conservatively assumed therefore that the identified condition could have resulted in failed connections. The loads connected to these terminal blocks include the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) valves. Failed connections would have prevented the proper functioning of these valves because of intermittent voltage, which could have reduced the effectiveness or prevented operation of the RCIC system.

Corrective Action

Nonconformance and Disposition Report No. 6005 was initiated to identify this problem and dispositioned to repair the problem by terminating the field cables directly to the 10-AW pigtailed supplied by Gould using crimped-on ring tongue lugs, stainless steel bolted hardware, and heat shrinkable insulation over the connection. The terminal blocks supplied were removed and scrapped. In a letter dated April 13, 1984, Gould provided acceptance of this permanent resolution and outlined guidelines to follow so that the existing IEEE qualification would not be affected by this field change. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation informed Gould of the conditions identified and requested that Gould investigate the shop tests and inspections performed and provide action to prevent recurrence. This information has not yet been received from Gould.