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July 13, 1984

MURRAY R. EDELMAN

VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Main Steam Isolation Valves
Logic [RDC 104(84)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter serves as the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the deficiencies concerning the single failure criteria in the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) circuitry. Mr. R. Knop of your office was notified on April 24, 1984, by Mr. B. D. Walrath of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated and our interim report dated May 24, 1984, was subsequently submitted.

This report contains a description of the potential deficiency and of the evaluation of this condition. As a result of our evaluation, it has been determined that this condition is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).

Description of Deficiency

During the safety system functional capability review performed for CEI by GDS Associates, it was identified that single failure criteria in the MSIV circuitry might not have been met relative to relay K7D in panel H13-P694 (contacts T1, M1, T3, and M3).

Completion of Evaluation

General Electric, our NSSS supplier, has reviewed this condition and has determined that a single failure resulting in the electrical short circuiting of relay K7D contacts T1, M1, T3, and M3 would not disable the isolation logic of the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves. The logic path for this circuit has relays K7B and K7D in series. Since the K7B relay contact is in each logic circuit ahead of the relay K7D contact, the isolation relays (K14A,B) would be de-energized, performing the isolation, by the opening of the K7B relay contact regardless of the condition of the relay K7D.

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
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During their review, GE also investigated the physical arrangement of the wiring for the K7B and K7D relays. The design arrangement used requires the electrical signal that de-energizes either K14A or K14B to always pass through 1H13-P694. The review determined that the K7B and K7D wiring associated with K14A and K14B in panel 1H13-P694 is separated by more than the 6-inch minimum required by IEEE-384 and R.G. 1.75 and is not a violation of design requirements.

Upon completion of this review, we determined that the GDS Associates identified concern is not reportable.

Please call if there are additional questions.

Sincerely,


Murray R. Edelman
Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:pab

cc: Mr. J. A. Grobe
NRC Site Office

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