Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

October 3, 1984

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20005

SUBJECT: Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications, NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455

Dear Mr. Denton:

The continuing review of the Byron Station Technical Specifications has identified additional changes as noted on the enclosed attachments. It is requested that these changes be incorporated into the final draft of the Technical Specifications dated August 27, 1984, from B.J. Youngblood to D. Farrer.

Very truly yours,

Dennis L. Farrar
Director, Nuclear Licensing

cc: Byron Resident Inspector
Senior Tech Spec Coordinator
Calvin Moon

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A PDR

ATTACHMENT 29

Byron Station proposes to modify Technical Specification 3/4.7.5 "Ultimate Heat Sink" as indicated on the attached page.

JUSTIFICATION

These revisions are requested based on discussions held on 9/27/84 between Gary Staley (NRC - Environmental and Hydrologic Engineering Branch) and Sargent & Lundy Engineering concerning Minimum Rock River flow and corresponding Rock River level.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

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3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. An essential service water pump discharge water temperature of less than or equal to 98°F, and

b. A minimum Rock River water level at or above ~~XX~~ 670.6 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, at the Byron Screenhouse, with two essential service water make-up pumps OPERABLE, and

c. Two deep wells OPERABLE ~~with the Rock River water level at or above 702 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum, at the Byron Screenhouse.~~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the essential service water pump discharge water temperature not meeting the above requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. ~~With the minimum Rock River water level not meeting the above requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.~~

c. With only one essential service water make-up pump OPERABLE restore two essential service water make-up pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With only one deep well ~~inoperable~~ OPERABLE, restore ~~both~~ two deep wells to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5.1 The UHS shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the essential service water pump discharge water temperature and the Rock River water level to be within their limits.

4.7.5.2 The deep wells shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by starting each pump and operating it for at least 15 minutes and verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position, and

b. At least once per 18 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

b. With Rock River water level less than 670.6', verify Rock River flow is greater than 700 cfs and Rock River level is greater than 664.7'. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours and implement proper plant procedures.

ATTACHMENT 35

Byron Station proposes to modify Table 2.2-1, Table Notations (pages 2-7 and 2-8) as indicated on the attached copies.

Justification

These revisions are requested based on recent changes to the Setpoint-Study as provided by Westinghouse letter CBW-4769 (8/17/84) W. E. Kortier to J. D. Deress.

(0567M)

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 1: OVERTEMPERATURE ΔT

$$\Delta T \left(\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}\right) \leq \Delta T_0 \{K_1 - K_2 \left(\frac{1 + \tau_4 S}{1 + \tau_5 S}\right)[T \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) - T'] + K_3(P - P') - f_1(\Delta I)\}$$

Where:

- ΔT = Measured ΔT by RTD Manifold Instrumentation,
- $\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$ = Lead-lag compensator on measured ΔT,
- τ_1, τ_2 = Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for ΔT, $\tau_1 = 8$ s, $\tau_2 = 3$ s,
- $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$ = Lag compensator on measured ΔT,
- τ_3 = Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for ΔT, $\tau_3 = 0$ s,
- ΔT_0 = Indicated ΔT at RATED THERMAL POWER,
- K_1 = ~~1.48~~ 1.164
- K_2 = 0.0265/°F,
- $\frac{1 + \tau_4 S}{1 + \tau_5 S}$ = The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg} dynamic compensation,
- τ_4, τ_5 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg}, $\tau_4 = 33$ s, $\tau_5 = 4$ s,
- T = Average temperature, °F,
- $\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$ = Lag compensator on measured T_{avg},

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 1: (Continued)

τ_6 = Time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator, $\tau_6 = 0$ s,

T' $\leq$ 588.4°F (Nominal T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER),

K_3 = 0.00134,

P = Pressurizer pressure, psig,

P' = 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure),

S = Laplace transform operator, s^{-1},

and $f_1(\Delta I)$ is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant STARTUP tests such that:

(i) for $q_t - q_b$ between ~~-42%~~ $-\infty$% and ~~+6%~~ +10%, $f_1(\Delta I) = 0$, where q_t and q_b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;

~~(ii) for each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds -42%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 2.86% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER, and~~

~~(iii)~~ (ii) for each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds ~~+6%~~ +10%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by ~~1.86%~~ 2.0% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

NOTE 2: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 3.3% of ΔT span.

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ATTACHMENT 36

Byron Station proposes to modify Table 3.3-6 Table Notations (pg 3/4 3-41) as shown on the attached copy.

Justification

Currently ACTION STATEMENT 29 requires that if both channels are inoperable, a portable monitor be provided and in accordance with ACTION b of Specification 3.9.12 all operations involving movement of fuel or loads over the storage pool be suspended.

This change is based upon conversation with Fred Anderson (NRC) on 9/27/84 When a portable monitor is used, there is no means to automatically place the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust System in the emergency mode and exhaust through the HEPA and charcoal filters. Therefore, at least one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum must be operating in the emergency mode whenever a portable monitor is used. The change proposed would require that if both channels were inoperable a portable monitor would be provided and the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust System would be placed in operation in the emergency mode. It is not necessary to suspend movement of fuel or loads over the storage pool because the radiation monitors have been replaced by a portable monitor. Only if the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust System could not be placed in operation then the requirements of ACTION b of Specification 3.9.12 would be met.

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TABLE NOTATIONS

*With new fuel or irradiated fuel in the fuel storage areas or fuel building.
**Trip Setpoint is to be established such that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 10 mR/hr in the containment building. For containment purge or vent the Setpoint value may be increased up to twice the maximum concentration activity in the containment determined by the sample analysis performed prior to each release in accordance with Table 4.11-2 provided the value does not exceed 10% of the equivalent limits of Specification 3.11.2.1.a in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 26 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour isolate the Control Room Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control Room Make-up System.

ACTION 28 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 29 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, ACTION a. of Specification 3.9.12 must be satisfied. With both channels inoperable, provide an appropriate portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint in the fuel pool area ~~and satisfy ACTION b. of Specification 3.9.12~~ with one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum in operation. Otherwise satisfy ACTION b. of Specification 3.9.12.

ATTACHMENT 37

Byron Station proposes to change the definition of DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (page 1-2) and Table Notations (1) and (2) of Tables 4.3-8 (page 3/4 3-65) and 4.3-9 (page 3/4 3-74) and the Bases (page B3/4 3-3) as shown on the attached pages.

Justifications

Standard Technical Specifications do not define a DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or describe what will be required in table notations for a DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST. The current versions in the table notations were originally taken from the requirements and definitions of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST. As such, they are ambiguous and open to various interpretations when applied to a digital system. To avoid this ambiguity and possible misinterpretation, the proposed changes clearly state what is meant by a DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST and what the requirements of this test will be.

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CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

data base manipulation

1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using diagnostic programs and injecting simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY of alarm and/or trip functions.

Software

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

TABLE 4.3-8 (Continued)

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TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

~~b. Circuit failure, or~~

~~c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or~~

~~d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.~~

} See INSERT (1)

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

~~b. Circuit failure, or~~

~~c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or~~

~~d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.~~

} See INSERT (1)

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

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* At all times.

** During WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM operation.

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

~~b. Circuit failure, or~~

~~c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or~~

~~d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.~~

See INSERT (1)

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

~~b. Circuit failure, or~~

~~c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or~~

~~d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.~~

See INSERT (1)

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing hydrogen and nitrogen.

(5) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing oxygen and nitrogen.

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INSERT (1)

1)

b. MONITOR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS (ALARM ONLY), OR

c. DETECTOR LOSS OF COUNTS, OR

d. DETECTOR CHECK SOURCE TEST FAILURE, OR

e. INSTRUMENT LOSS OF POWER, OR

f. DETECTOR CHANNEL OUT OF SERVICE, OR

g. MONITOR LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW.

2)

b. MONITOR LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS, OR

c. DETECTOR LOSS OF COUNTS, OR

d. DETECTOR CHECK SOURCE TEST FAILURE, OR

e. INSTRUMENT LOSS OF POWER, OR

f. DETECTOR CHANNEL OUT OF SERVICE

g. MONITOR LOSS OF SAMPLE FLOW.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on T_{avg} below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

P-11 On increasing pressure P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure and automatically blocks steamline isolation on negative steamline pressure rate. On decreasing pressure; P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure and allows steamline isolation on negative steamline pressure rate to become active upon manual block of low steamline pressure SI.

P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.

P-14 An increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS TRIP FUNCTION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated ~~ACTION~~ will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel ~~or combination thereof~~ reaches its setpoint, ~~(2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,~~ and (2) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, ~~the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed,~~ the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms ~~or~~ AND automatic ~~isolation action and~~ actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems. The radiation monitor Setpoints given in the requirements are assumed to be values established above normal background radiation levels for the particular area.

ATTACHMENT 38

Byron Station proposes to modify Table 3.3-11 Fire Detection Instruments (page 3/4 3-59), Table 3.7-5 Fire Hose Stations (pages 3/4 7-37 and 3/4 7-38) and Table 3.8-1 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices (pages 3/4 8-19 to 3/4 8-27) as indicated on the attached copies.

Justification

These changes are requested based on recent review by Byron Station as part of the Technical Specification certification process.

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TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	INSTRUMENT TYPE*	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS		
		Heat	Flame	Smoke
6. Station Battery Room				
Zone 67 Elev 451	Detection			13
7. Diesel Generator Room				
Zone 37 Elev 401	Suppression	~~4~~ 6		
Zone 38 Elev 401	Suppression	~~4~~ 6		
Zone 71 Elev 401	Detection		1	
Zone 72 Elev 401	Detection		1	
8. Diesel Fuel Storage				
Zone 39 Elev 401	Suppression	1		
Zone 40 Elev 401	Suppression	1		
Zone 27 Elev 383	Suppression	3		
Zone 28 Elev 383	Suppression	3		
Zone 10 Elev 383	Detection			6
9. Safety Related Pumps				
Zone 41 Elev 383	Suppression	2		
Zone 42 Elev 383	Suppression	1		
Zone 16 Elev 364	Detection			2
Zone 18 Elev 364	Detection			~~2~~ 10
Zone 19 Elev 364	Detection			~~2~~ 3
Zone 20 Elev 346	Detection			3
Zone 21 Elev 346	Detection			3
Zone 52 RSH	Suppression	8		
10. Fuel Storage				
Zone 39 Elev 401	Detection			29
Zone 38 Elev 426	Detection		3	

TABLE NOTATIONS

*A single detector in a zone marked "Detection" will alarm in the Main Control Room. A single detector in a zone marked "Suppression" will initiate suppression and alarm in the Main Control Room.

**These are Containment Ventilation temperature switches. Upon receipt of a Hi-Hi temperature, suppression must be manually initiated. These switches are not 72D supervised.

***The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.

TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION		ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Bldg. (Continued)				
M-18:	By Aux. Feedwater motor driven pump 1A	387	108	OFP383
N-23:	By remote shutdown panel U-1	387	111	OFP376
Q-15:	By 480V MCC 132X3	387	113	OFP382
V-18:	By letdown heat exchanger	387	114	OFP379
P-7:	West Wall 6.9 kV switchgear room	455	20	OFP324
L-11:	In UC HVAC Rm OA of LCSR C-1	455	22	OFP332 ← INSERT A
M-8:	South wall of battery room	451	279	OFP638
M-26:	South wall of battery room	451	280	OFP639
M-18:	North wall U-1 AB by door	444	238*	OFP463
L-7:	East wall LCSR A-1	443	207*	OFP330
M-10:	In the southeast corner of LCSR B-1	443	208*	OFP327
P-10:	In the southwest corner of LCSR B-1	443	209*	OFP325
M-13:	South wall of LCSR C-1	443	210*	OFP326
P-13 ~~P-15~~:	West wall of LCSR D-1	443	211*	OFP328
S-21:	By cabinet 2RY01EC (elec. pen. area)	431	229	OFP455 4
S-24:	By U-2 cont. shield wall (elec pen. area)	431	230	OFP456 5
S-12:	By U-1 cont. shield wall (elec pen. area)	431	237	OFP462 ← INSERT B
P-11:	Outside Laundry Room	430	52	OFP313 ← INSERT C
Q-19:	By U-2 VCT valve aisle	430	54	OFP342
P-24:	By radwaste evaporator	430	55	OFP343
V-17:	By east door to decon/change area	430	58	OFP319
V-17:	By west door to decon/change area	430	61	OFP320 ← INSERT D
L-11:	By waste oil tank room	405	90	OFP315
P-18:	By elevator	405	91	OFP318
P-23:	By spent resin pumps	405	92	OFP349
Q-11:	By laundry tanks	405	93	OFP314
S-21:	East of U-2 hydrogen recombiner	405	94	OFP348
V-21:	West of U-2 hydrogen recombiner	405	95	OFP345
V-15:	West of U-1 hydrogen recombiner control panel	405	96	OFP316

*Fire hoses that do not supply the primary means of fire suppression.

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TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION		ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Bldg. (Continued)				
S-15:	East of U-1 hydrogen recombiner	405	97	OFP377
N-11:	By the recycle holdup tanks	368	130	OFP373
M-13 ~~M-14~~:	By the U-1 stairs	368	131	OFP374
P-13 ~~P-14~~:	By panel 1PL84JB	368	132	OFP369
L-20:	By the U-2 stairs	368	133	OFP355
P-21:	By the blowdown condenser	368	134	OFP356
L-25:	By the PW ~~M/U~~ pumps M/U	368	135	OFP361
N-25:	By chemical drain tank	368	136	OFP357
S-18:	By panel 1PL86J	368	138	OFP362
Q-11:	By Aux. Bldg. floor drain tanks	368	139	OFP368
U-15:	By U-1 spray add tank	368	140	OFP372 ← INSERT E
P-11:	By recycle evaporator feed pumps	350	151	OFP381
M-13:	By U-1 stairs	350	152	OFP370
N-23:	By gas decay tanks	350	154	OFP352
Q-19:	By "B" Aux. Bldg. Equip. drain tank	350	155	OFP365
Q-17:	By "A" Aux. Bldg. Equip. drain tank	350	156	OFP371
Q-13:	By collection sump pumps	350	157	OFP380
S-18:	Between moderating heat exchangers	350	158	OFP354
V-18:	Between BR chiller units	350	161	OFP353
W-15:	By CS pump 1A	350	163	OFP367
M-13:	By leak detection sump	334	165	OFP448
P-18:	By elevator pit	334	166	OFP449 ← INSERT F
Fuel Hand. Bldg.				
Z-15:	South of decon. area	430	170	OFP389
X-21:	North of spent fuel pool	430	171	OFP386
Z-15:	By 480V MCC 134X6	405	172	OFP388
AA-19:	Outside FC pump room	405	173	OFP387
Cont. #1				
R-17:	By reactor head assembly area	430	62	1FP163
R-2:	By accumulator tank 1C	430	63	1FP154

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Inserts to pages 3/4 7-37 and 3/4 7-38

LOCATION	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Bldg.			
INSERT A			
L-25: By OE HVAC room	455	27	OFP335
INSERT B			
S-15: By Pzr htr. transformer (elec. pen. area)	431	236	OFP461
INSERT C			
Q-10: Back of Div. 11 swgr room	430	283	OFP640
INSERT D			
S-15: By Pzr. htr. transformer (elec pen. area)	419	174	OFP 322
Q-10: By electrical penetration area	419	205	OFP321
INSERT E			
V-18: By U-2 cent. chg. pump room	368	141	OFP366
INSERT F			
P-18: By 1B SX pump room	334	167	OFP351
M-23: By 1B SX pump room	334	168	OFP350

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TABLE 3.8-1

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE	
1. 6.9 kV Switchgear		
1RC01PA-RCPA Bus 157 Cub 1	Primary	
Bus 157 Norm. Feed ACB 1571	Backup	
Bus 157 Emerg. Feed ACB 1572	Backup	
1RC01PB-RCPB Bus 156 Cub 2	Primary	
Bus 156 Norm. Feed ACB 1561	Backup	
Bus 156 Emerg. Feed ACB 1562	Backup	
1RC01PC-RCPC Bus 158 Cub 5	Primary	X
Bus 158 Norm. Feed ACB 1582	Backup	
Bus 158 Emerg. Feed ACB 1581	Backup	
1RC01PD - RCPD Bus 159 Cub 5	Primary	
Bus 159 Norm. Feed ACB 1592	Backup	X
Bus 159 Emerg. Feed ACB 1591	Backup	X
2. 480V Switchgear		
1RY03EA - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group A Compt. A1-A6, B1	Primary	
	Backup	
1RY03EB - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group B Compt. B1-B6, A1	Primary	
	Backup	

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE	
2. 480V Switchgear (Continued)		
1RY03EC - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group C Compt. A1-A6, ~~B1~~	Primary	
	Backup	X
1RY03ED - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group D Compt. B1-B6, ~~A1~~	Primary	
	Backup	X
3. 480V A.C. Ckt. Bkrs.		
1VP01CA - RCFC Fan 1A Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 4C	Primary	
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 5C	Primary	
1VP01CC - RCFC Fan 1C Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub ~~4C~~ 2C	Primary	X
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub ~~5C~~ 3C	Primary	X
Bus 131X Norm. Feed 141 Swgr., Cub ~~14~~, 19 ACB 1415X	Backup	X X
1VP01CB - RCFC Fan 1B Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 4C	Primary	
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 5C	Primary	
1VP01CD - RCFC Fan 1D Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 2C	Primary	

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
3. 480V A.C. Ckt. Bkrs. (Continued)	
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 3C	Primary
Bus 132X Norm. Feed 142 Swgr., Cub 14, ACB ~~1423~~ 1425X	Backup
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB)	
	MCC 133X4
1RC01PA-A Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RC01PA-B Cub B2	Primary Backup
1HC22G Cub B3	Primary Backup
1FH03~~P~~G Cub B4	Primary Backup
1VP05CA Cub C1	Primary Backup
1RF03P Cub C2	Primary Backup
1RC01PD-A Cub D1	Primary Backup
1RC01PD-B Cub D2	Primary Backup
1RF02PB Cub D4	Primary Backup
1RF01P Cub D5	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 133X4
1RE01PA Cub D6	Primary Backup
1VP02CA Cub E1	Primary Backup
1VP04CA Cub E2	Primary Backup
1VP04CC Cub F1	Primary Backup
1EW11EA,B,C Cub F3	Primary Backup
~~1EW11E3 Cub F3~~	~~Primary~~ ~~Backup~~
~~1EW11E?~~ ~~Cub F~~	~~Primary~~ ~~Backup~~
1IC02EA Cub F5	Primary Backup
1IC02EB Cub G1	Primary Backup
1IC02EC Cub G2	Primary Backup
	← MCC 134X5
1IC02EF Cub A1	Primary Backup
1IC02EE Cub A2	Primary Backup
1IC02ED Cub A3	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC ~~133x4~~ 133X5
1FH02J Cub G1	Primary Backup
1FH03J Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC01PB-B Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RE01PB Cub B3	Primary Backup
	~~MCC 134x5~~
1RC01PC-A Cub C1	Primary Backup
1RC01PC-B Cub C2	Primary Backup
1VP05CB Cub J1	Primary Backup
1RC01PB-A Cub C3	Primary Backup
1HC65~~8~~G-A Cub D~~3~~	Primary Backup
1VP02CB Cub F1	Primary Backup
1RC01R-A Cub F2 A & B	Primary Backup
1RF02PA Cub G3	Primary Backup
1EW12EA, B, C Cub F3 A & B	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 134X5
~~1EW12EB Cub F3~~	~~Primary Backup~~
~~1EW12EC Cub F3~~	~~Primary Backup~~
1VP04CB Cub F4	Primary Backup
1VP04CD Cub F5	Primary Backup
	← MCC 132X2A
1SI8808C Cub A2	Primary Backup
MCC 132X2 Cub B2 →	
1SI8808B Cub A3	Primary Backup
1RH8702B Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RH8701B Cub B3	Primary Backup
	MCC 132X2
1CV8112 Cub B4	Primary Backup
1OG079 Cub C1	Primary Backup
1WO056A Cub C2	Primary Backup
1OG080 Cub C3	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 132X2
1RY8000B Cub C4	Primary Backup
1RY8003C Cub ~~C5~~ D5	Primary Backup
~~1IP06E~~ ~~Cub C1~~	~~Primary~~
1RC8003B Cub D4	Primary Backup
~~1LL43J~~ ~~Cub E2~~	~~Primary~~ ~~Backup~~
1RC8002A Cub G1	Primary Backup
1RC8002B Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC8002C Cub G3	Primary Backup
1RC8002D Cub G4	Primary Backup
	MCC 131X2A
1SI8808D Cub A2	Primary Backup
1SI8808A Cub A3 ~~Cub B2~~ ~~(MCC 131 x 2)~~	Primary Backup
	MCC 131X2
1RC8001A Cub G1	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	131X2 MCC ~~132X2A~~
1RC8001B Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC8001C Cub G3	Primary Backup
1RC8001D Cub G4	Primary Backup
1RH8701A Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RH8702A Cub B4	Primary Backup
1LL42J Cub C1	Primary Backup
1VQ001A Cub C3	Primary Backup
1VQ002A Cub F1	Primary Backup
1RC8003D Cub C4	Primary Backup
1RC8003A Cub C5	Primary Backup
10G057A Cub D1	Primary Backup
1CC9416 Cub D3	Primary Backup
1CC9438 Cub D4	Primary Backup
10G081 Cub E2	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 133X6
1HC01G - Cub B2	Primary
Cub B1	Backup
1LL04E - Cub C2	Primary
Cub C1	Backup
1VP03CA	Primary
Cub A3	Backup
1VP03CD	Primary
Cub C4	Backup
	~~MCC 132x5~~
~~1CC9414~~	~~Primary~~
~~Cub B4~~	~~Backup~~
	MCC 134X7
1LL05E - Cub B2	Primary
Cub B1, ~~B2~~	Backup
1VP03CB	Primary
Cub A3	Backup
1VP03CC	Primary
Cub B4	Backup
	MCC 131X2B
1WO056B	Primary
Cub A2 4	Backup
1RY8000A	Primary
Cub A5	Backup

ATTACHMENT 39

Byron Station proposes to change Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.f 7) (page 3/4 8-5) as indicated on the attached copy.

Justification

The maximum loading on the diesel generator has been limited to 6050 kW per vendor recommendations. The 6050kW (+0,-150kW) establishes a bandwidth in order to compensate for grid fluctuations.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

5) Verifying that on an ESF Actuation test signal without loss of ESF bus voltages, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the generator steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test;

6) Simulating a loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF Actuation test signal, and

   a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses;

   b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the ESF busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the LOCA sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with emergency loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test; and

   c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss-of-voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation signal.

7) Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours (+0,-150kW). During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to ~~greater than or equal to~~ 6050 kW and during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Specification 4.8.1.1.2f.6)b);*

8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5935 kW;

*If Specification 4.8.1.1.2f.6)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test. Instead, the diesel generator may be operated at 5500 kW for 1 hour or until operating temperature has stabilized.

ATTACHMENT 41

Byron Station proposes to modify Technical Specification Figure 6.2-2, UNIT ORGANIZATION (pg 6-4), as attached.

Justification

This revision to Figure 6.2-2 is to resolve a Byron Station senior resident NRC inspector open item 454/84-42-01; 455/84-29-01. This figure is representative of the unit organization.



O - Reactor Operator's License
SO - Senior Reactor Operator Operator's License
* - The Fuel Handling Foreman shall have a limited or a full Senior Operator's License
** - May be filled by a SCRE

_____Administractive
----------Functional

Figure 6.2-2
UNIT ORGANIZATION

ATTACHMENT 42

Byron Station proposes to modify Table 3.12-1(pg 3/4 12-4), T.S. 3/4.12.3 (pg 3/4 12-14), T.S. 6.5.2 b1) (pg 6-12), T.S. 6.9.1.6 (pg 6-19), T.S. 6.9.1.7 (pg 6-21) and T.S. 6.14.2a (pg 6-25) as shown on the attached pages.

Justification

These changes are requested based on recent review by Byron Station as part of the Technical Specification certification process.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS(1)	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
2. Airborne			
Radioiodine and Particulates	Samples from five locations: Three samples from close to the three SITE BOUNDARY locations, in different sectors, of the highest calculated annual average ground level D/Q; One sample from the vicinity of a community having the highest calculated annual average ground-level D/Q; and One sample from a control location, as for example 10 to 30 km distant and in the least prevalent wind direction.	Continuous sampler operation with sample collection weekly, or more frequently if required by dust loading.	Radioiodine Cannister: I-131 analysis weekly, MAY THROUGH OCTOBER, BI-WEEKLY NOVEMBER THROUGH APRIL. Particulate Sampler: Gross beta radioactivity analysis following filter change;(3) and gamma isotopic analysis(4) of composite (by location) quarterly.
3. Waterborne			
a. Surface(5)	One sample upstream. One sample downstream.	Composite sample over 1-month period. ~~(6)~~ BY WEEKLY GRAB SAMPLES.	Gamma isotopic analysis(4) monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.
b. Ground	Samples from one or two sources only if likely to be affected(7)	Quarterly.	Gamma isotopic(4) and tritium analysis quarterly.
c. Drinking	One sample of each community drinking water supply downstream of the plant within 10 kilometers. One sample from a control location.	Composite sample over 2-week period(6) when I-131 analysis is performed, monthly composite otherwise.	I-131 analysis on each composite when the dose calculated for the consumption of the water is greater than 1 mrem per year.(8) Composite for gross beta and gamma isotopic analyses(4) monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.

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RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.3 Analyses shall be performed on radioactive materials, supplied as part of an Interlaboratory Comparison Program that has been approved by the Commission, that correspond to samples required by Table 3.12-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With analyses not being performed as required above, report the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence to the Commission in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.3 The Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be described in the ODCM. A summary of the results obtained as part of the above required Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

6.13.1 The PCP shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.13.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the PCP:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made. This submittal shall contain:

1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information;

2) A determination that the change did not reduce the overall conformance of the solidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes; and

3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.

6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)

6.14.1 The ODCM shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.14.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the ODCM:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission within 180 days of the effective date of the change(s). ~~in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which change(s) was made effective.~~ This submittal shall contain:

1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information. Information submitted should consist of a package of those pages of the ODCM to be changed with each page numbered, dated and containing the revision number, together with appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change(s);

2) A determination that the change will not reduce the accuracy or reliability of dose calculations or Setpoint determinations; and

3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.

OFFSITE (Continued)

h) Instrumentation and Control

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in instrumentation and control design and/or operation.

i) Metallurgy

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in the metallurgical field.

3) The Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall have experience and training which satisfy ANSI N18.1-1971 requirements for plant managers.

ONSITE

6.5.2 The Onsite Review and Investigative Function shall be supervised by the Station Superintendent.

a. Onsite Review and Investigative Function

The Station Superintendent shall: (1) provide directions for the Review and Investigative Function and appoint the Technical Staff Supervisor, or other comparably qualified individual as the senior participant to provide appropriate directions; (2) approve participants for this function; (3) assure that at least two participants who collectively possess background and qualifications in the subject matter under review are selected to provide comprehensive interdisciplinary review coverage under this function; (4) independently review and approve the findings and recommendations developed by personnel performing the Review and Investigative Function; (5) report all findings of noncompliance with NRC requirements, and provide recommendations to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function; and (6) submit to the Offsite Review and Investigative Function for concurrence in a timely manner, those items described in Specification 6.5.1a which have been approved by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Responsibility

The responsibilities of the personnel performing this function are:

1) Review of: (1) STATION SPECIFIC PORTIONS OF procedures required by Specification 6.8.1 and changes thereto, (2) all programs required by Specification 6.8.4 and changes thereto, and (3) any other proposed procedures or changes thereto as determined by the ~~Plant~~ Station Superintendent to affect nuclear safety;

2) Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety;

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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT*

6.9.1.6 Routine Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports covering the operation of the Unit during the previo s calendar year shall be submitted prior to May 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to May 1 of the year following initial criticality.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include summaries, interpretations, and an analysis of trends of the results of the radiological environmental surveillance activites for the report period, including a comparison with preoperational studies, with operational controls as appropriate, and with previous environmental surveillance reports, and an assessment of the observed impacts of the plant operation on the environment. ~~The reports shall also include the results of the Land Use Census required by Specification 3.12.2.~~ It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculation and/or environmental monitoring identified by the land use census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include the results of analysis of all radiological environmental samples and of all environmental radiation measurements taken during the period pursuant to the locations specified in the tables and figures in the ODCM, as well as summarized and tabulated results of these analyses and measurements in the format of the table in the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. In the event that some individual results are not available for inclusion with the report, the report shall be submitted noting and explaining the reasons for the missing results. The missing data shall be submitted as soon as possible in a supplementary report.

The reports shall also include the following: a summary description of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program; at least two legible maps** covering all sampling locations keyed to a table giving distances and directions from the centerline of one reactor; the results of licensee participation in the Interlaboratory Comparison Program and the corrective actions being taken if the specified program is not being performed as required by Specification 3.12.3; reasons for not conducting the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as required by Specification 3.12.1, and discussion of all deviations from the sampling schedule of Table 3.12-1; discussion of environmental sample measurements that exceed the reporting levels of Table 3.12-2 but are not the result of plant effluents, pursuant to Specification 3.12.1; and discussion of all analyses in which the LLD required by Table 4.12-1 was not achievable.

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*A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station.

**One map shall cover stations near the SITE BOUNDARY; a second shall include the more distant stations.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

"Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, June 1974, with data summarized on a quarterly basis following the format of Appendix B thereof. For solid wastes, the format for Table 3 in Appendix B shall be supplemented with three additional categories: class of solid wastes (as defined by 10 CFR Part 61), type of container (e.g., LSA, Type A, Type B, Large Quantity), and SOLIDIFICATION agent or absorbent (e.g., cement, urea formaldehyde).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a list and description of unplanned releases from the site to UNRESTRICTED AREAS of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents made during the reporting period.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include any changes made during the reporting period to the PCP ~~and to the ODCM~~, pursuant to Specifications 6.13 and 6.14 respectively, as well as any major changes to Liquid, Gaseous or Solid Radwaste Treatment Systems, pursuant to Specification 6.15. ~~It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculations and/or environmental monitoring identified by the land use census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.~~

Sentence moved to pg 6-19

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall also include the following: an explanation as to why the inoperability of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was not corrected within the time specified in Specifications 3.3.3.10 or 3.3.3.11, respectively; and description of the events leading to liquid holdup tanks or gas storage tanks exceeding the limits of Specification 3.11.1.4 or 3.11.2.6, respectively.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT

6.9.1.8 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORVs or RCS safety valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the NRC Regional Office, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT

6.9.1.9 Changes to the F_{xy} limits for Rated Thermal Power (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be provided to the NRC Regional Administrator with a copy to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Attention: Chief, Core Performance Branch, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555 for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes and the plot of predicted ($F_q^T \cdot P_{Rel}$) vs Axial Core Height with the limit envelope at least 60 days prior to cycle initial criticality unless otherwise approved by the Commission by letter. In addition, in the event that the limit should change requiring a new