

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point No. 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Unreviewed Safety Question

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	1 0	8 4	8 4	0 1 0	0 0	0 7	1 6	8 4			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ix)(B)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(x)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME John J. Anderson	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 1 4 7 3 9 1 - 8 2 0 0
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Following previous discussions with the NRC and Brookhaven National Laboratory, a problem was postulated on July 10, 1984 concerning the Residual Heat Removal System. During our evaluation, NYPA recognized that a postulated loss of Station Battery 32 with a concurrent loss of coolant accident may prevent the automatic starting of some redundant safeguards equipment and thus not meet single failure criteria required in General Design Criteria (GDC 35). A change to plant equipment was developed and installed immediately to alleviate this concern. The NRC was notified of a potential unreviewed safety question. Subsequently NYPA determined that the problem was an unreviewed safety question. However, the installed change relieved this concern and brought the plant into compliance with GDC 35.

This LER also serves to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR21.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point No. 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	- 0 1 0	- 0 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

On July 2, 1984 discussions were initiated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Brookhaven National Laboratory concerning a postulated loss of Station Battery 32. On July 10, 1984 further discussions took place which identified a potential failure to comply with the single failure criteria as defined in GDC 35. During our evaluation of this problem, NYPA recognized that a postulated loss of Station Battery 32 with a concurrent loss of coolant accident may result in the prevention of some redundant trains of safeguards equipment from starting automatically. In particular Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps 31 and 32, Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pumps (ABFP) 31 and 33, and selected essential Service Water (SW) Pumps either 35 and 36 or 33 might fail to start automatically. The scenario that develops centers on the loss of two of the four safety related 480 volt electrical buses (3A and 6A). By way of an example the situation concerning the RHR pumps is cited.

RHR pump 31 is powered from 480v Bus 3A and RHR pump 32 is powered from 480v Bus 6A. Control power is supplied to Bus 3A from DC Bus 33 and to Bus 6A from DC Bus 32. DC Bus 33 is normally supplied from Station Battery 33 and DC Bus 32 is normally supplied from Station Battery 32. With the postulated failure of Station Battery 32 the DC Bus 32 would then be supplied power from Battery Charger 32 via Motor Control Center (MCC) 37. An ESS actuation removes non-essential loads from all 480 volt buses. MCC-37 would then be stripped from Bus 6A causing a loss of power to Battery Charger 32 with a subsequent loss of DC Bus 32. RHR pump 32 will not start automatically due to the loss of control power to Bus 6A. RHR pump 31 will start automatically during the normal safeguards loading sequence, but will trip when the 6.9 KV bus fast transfer is initiated from the unit transformer to the station transformer for 480 volt safeguards buses 2A and 3A. Bus 2A will have a successful transfer to the 6.9 KV bus 5. Bus 3A will become de-energized since the transfer to the 6.9 KV bus 6 will not occur due to the loss of control power from failed DC Bus 32 to the tie-breaker UT3-ST6. Even though Bus 2A has a tie-breaker to Bus 3A, it will not automatically close because of an interlock which prevents closure when its associated Diesel Generator supply breaker 52/EG1 is not closed. Thus manual action would be necessary to start both RHR pumps.

As a result of this scenario, NYPA developed a change immediately which would ensure compliance with GDC-35. A "jumper" was installed on July 10, 1984 across the contacts 29 and 30 in Diesel Generator 31 output breaker (52/EG1) which provides for a permissive signal to close the tie-breaker 2AT3A on an undervoltage condition on bus 3A. This allows Bus 2A to supply Bus 3A automatically from the Station Service Transformer No. 2 should normal power to bus 3A become unavailable. Loading on bus 2A is administratively limited to preclude overloading Station Service Transformer No. 2 if it is required to supply both buses 2A and 3A due to an undervoltage on Bus 3A. During a blackout condition normal sequencing will occur and Diesel Generator No. 31 will supply power to both buses 2A and 3A as per the original design.

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		8 4	— 0 1 0	— 0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

The NRC was then notified of the potential unreviewed safety question and of the change to alleviate this concern. A safety evaluation concluded that this corrective action does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

On July 11, 1984, NYPA determined that the postulated scenario was an unreviewed safety question and Westinghouse concurred that the change installed is acceptable from a safety standpoint and ensures compliance with GDC-35. NYPA and Westinghouse are further reviewing the corrective action taken.

Performance of the reactor was not affected by this incident. No similar events have been reported to date.

This LER also serves to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR21.

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
914 739.8200



July 16, 1984
IP-FWG-2854


Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 84-010-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in Paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

Very truly yours,


John C. Brons
Resident Manager

FWG/bam
Attachment

cc: Dr. Thomas Murley
Regional Administrator
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