

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003271 PAGE (3) 1 OF 02

TITLE (4)
Breach of ABSCE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES
09	05	84	84	053	00	10	02	84	Sequoyah, Unit 2
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 05000328

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) <u>1</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) <u>1010</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
<u>Heyward R. Rogers, Compliance Section Engineer</u>	<u>61587076146</u>
AREA CODE	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During a safety inspection of the west steam vault to unit 1, it was noted that the inner and outer door, both of which are arranged in an airlock configuration, were open and ajar respectively. This configuration would have prevented the ABGTS from maintaining a minus 1/4 inch water gauge pressure with a vacuum relief flow of greater than 2000 CFM as required per Technical Specification 3.7.8 Surveillance 4.7.8.d.3.

The inner door is a fire door and was breached using administrative controls in place at the time of the incident. The most probable cause for the outer door being ajar is that a worker failed to realize the door as an ABSCE boundary and did not properly close the door. Upon event discovery the outer door was closed.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Sequoyah, Unit 1	0500032784	84	053	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

With unit 1 at 100 percent power and unit 2 in mode 3, hot standby, both trains at the auxiliary building gas treatment system were declared inoperable due to an uncontrolled breach of the ABSCE boundary. During a routine safety inspection of the auxiliary building and west valve room for unit 1 the inner door was noted to have been breached using the proper administrative controls, however, the outer door was inadvertently left ajar allowing a breach of the ABSCE boundary.

Immediately upon discovery of the event the outer door was closed and the control room notified of the noncompliance. Operations personnel verified that the door was closed and the ABSCE and ARGTS declared operable. A major contributing factor to this breach was the failure of procedures to identify and post doors which are part of ABSCE boundary.

Corrective actions taken and planned to prevent further recurrence are:

1. Plant procedure TI-77 has been revised to list all doors which are part of the ABSCE boundary.
2. A night order was issued by Operations supervisor to require all auxiliary building door breaches to be evaluated by the shift engineer.
3. All ABSCE boundary doors will be appropriately labeled.

A safety assessment was performed and there was no effect upon public health and safety.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

October 2, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-327/84053

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning the breach
of Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure on September 5, 1984.
This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a(2)vii.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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