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COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
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July 20, 1984

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USNRC

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In the Matter of

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA

(UCLA Research Reactor)

Docket No. 50-142

(2.206)

(Proposed Renewal of
Facility License)

WITHDRAWAL OF JUNE 22 EMERGENCY PETITION FOR OFF-SHIPMENT OF UCLA REACTOR FUEL
PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF OLYMPIC ATHLETES

(UCLA Olympic Village Has Opened Without Commission Action; Petition Now Moot)

I. Introduction

On July 16, 1984, the following message was provided to the NRC
Secretariat:

The Commission's failure to act on the Committee to Bridge the Gap's June 22 Emergency Petition prior to the opening of the UCLA Olympic Village--which occurred last weekend--makes moot that Petition, which had requested offshipment of the UCLA reactor fuel prior to the arrival of the Olympic athletes. CBG therefore withdraws the Petition as moot. Written confirmation will follow.

This document represents said confirmation.

II. Background

On June 22, the Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) filed an Emergency Petition with the Commission asking that it enforce an agreement reached between the parties to the UCLA reactor proceeding and ordered by that Board, a stipulation with which UCLA declined to comply and which the Board declined to enforce. That agreement had been that the hearing on the adequacy of UCLA's security to protect its Special Nuclear Material, particularly during the

uniquely sensitive period of the Olympics^{1/}, would be suspended on condition that every effort be made to remove the Special Nuclear Material, the subject of the hearing, from the UCLA site prior to the arrival of the Olympic athletes. On the basis of the stipulated condition, the hearing was cancelled--hearings which the Board had previously pledged to complete prior to the Olympics so that any necessary security upgrading could be in place prior to that period of elevated risk. In short, in exchange for not resolving the security matters prior to the Olympics, UCLA agreed to remove the risk (the SNM), "before the Olympics if possible."^{2/}

The particular security concern in question was that sabotage risks from terrorist acts were particularly high due to the proximity of the UCLA reactor a few hundred yards from one of the main Olympic Villages and Games sites, based at UCLA, and that the reactor had been widely identified as a likely target of terrorist attack at the Olympics.^{3/}

^{1/} UCLA withdrew its application for license renewal one week before the security hearings were to commence, announcing it would permanently close the reactor facility and decommission it. See letter of June 14 from Chancellor Young to Chairman Falladino.

^{2/} The stipulation was recited, and the condition ordered, in the Board's Memorandum and Order of June 18.

^{3/} See, for example, Newsweek and Playboy articles, attached. Expert testimony from two former intelligence agents and an expert in intentional destruction of nuclear facilities was scheduled for the week of June 25 to detail the serious nature of this threat. That testimony, as well as other testimony detailing the extraordinary security weaknesses at the facility, was never served (and thus never heard) because of the cancelling of the hearing prior to the due date for such service.

CEG had contended, in Contention XX, that security at the UCLA reactor site was grossly inadequate, both to protect against theft of its weapons-grade uranium and to protect against radiological sabotage. Radiological sabotage was of particular concern, it was made clear during the inherent safety hearings in 1983, because of the densely populated area, lack of exclusion zone and lack of containment structure, vastly elevating potential radiological consequences^{4/}; because the materials of reactor construction (primarily graphite and magnesium metal), as well as the aluminum-uranium eutectic of the fuel itself, were combustible, making a Windscale-type fire through arson or use of incendiary devices a very serious hazard^{5/}; because the very large amount of excess reactivity made an SL-1 type destructive power excursion possible, involving extensive fuel melting, steam explosion, and reactor disassembly^{6/}; the fuel was vulnerable to dissolution through intentional addition of acids or alkali chemicals to the reactor coolant^{7/}; and because use of explosives, for example through insertion in the reactor's irradiation ports to within inches of the fuel, could do severe mechanical damage to the fuel which could result in substantial fission product release.^{8/}

^{4/} See, for example, Panel "1" testimony from October 1983 inherent safety hearings.

^{5/} See affidavit from Professor James C. Warf, November 17, 1982, and Panel II from 1983 inherent safety hearings.

^{6/} See declaration of Boyd Norton, formerly Group Leader of the SPERT project, and Panel I testimony, 1983 safety hearings.

^{7/} See Panel II testimony, 1983 safety hearings, and UCLA Application, p. III/8-8

^{8/} See Panel III testimony, 1983 safety hearings.

Estimates of doses to the public due to any of these potential core disruptions were very high, due to lack of containment structure and exclusion zone and the dense population immediately surrounding the reactor room itself and extending out for miles through Los Angeles.^{9/} The lack of containment and exclusion compensated for the smaller inventory in terms of doses in unrestricted areas; the recent shutdown and other actions have not removed the sabotage risk, as the long-lived isotopes and sabotage scenarios such as those involving incendiaries/arson are unaffected.^{10/}

CBG's Contention XX, to be the subject of the now-cancelled security hearing, alleged that physical security at the UCLA reactor facility was grossly insufficient, particularly to protect against sabotage, and particularly during the Olympics. UCLA had asserted that its security plan "is not designed to provide protection against sabotage"^{11/} and the Staff had asserted it had not required any such protection.^{12/} (These statements were later found by the Board to have been material false statements, although the Board declined to find them intentionally so.^{13/} The accusation occurred after the Board gained access to the UCLA security plan and the Staff's security inspection reports and found sabotage protection throughout; subsequently Staff has admitted sabotage protection had been required since at least 1974^{14/} and that even the 1984 inspection manual requires such protection.^{15/}

^{9/} See January 8, 1983, declaration by Dr. Jan Beyea, and Panel IV direct and rebuttal testimony at the October 1983 inherent safety hearings, which estimates, using the standard NRC Reg. Guides for dispersion and the ANSI standard for site evaluation for research reactors, doses in excess of legal limits for research reactors going out several kilometers through highly populated parts of Los Angeles, and extremely high doses in unrestricted areas near the reactor on campus.

^{10/} See Panel IV rebuttal, A1, from inherent safety 1983 hearings.

^{11/} UCLA August 25, 1983, Response in Support of NRC Staff Petition for Reconsideration of the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order Ruling on Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition.

^{12/} See citations in Board's February 24, 1984, Memorandum and Order

^{13/} See Board Orders of April 13 and June 5, 1984, plus 2/24/84

^{14/} See declaration of NRC's Donald Carlson of January 10, 1984, p. 7

^{15/} See March 16, 1984, letter from Staff Counsel Woodhead

In May, and again in October, the Board denied motions for summary disposition of Contention XX, setting the contention for hearing. Because time was getting short before the Olympics, CBG requested the Board, as a precautionary measure to keep open its option, order preparatory steps be taken in case, after hearing, the Board should decide the UCLA fuel must be removed prior to the Olympics.^{16/} The Board declined to do so, asserting it could not even take the precautionary step of ordering preparatory steps without completion of the security hearings.^{17/} It took, however, official notice of the level of terrorist activity and the "unfortunate fact that Olympic Games may provide a focus for such activity."^{18/} Noting that the "UCLA Argonaut is located in the midst of the 1984 Olympic Games," the Board pledged to expedite resolution of Contention XX to the maximum extent possible and reach a timely determination.^{19/}

Hearings were delayed for several months when the Board suspended the proceedings to resolve its accusations against Staff and Applicant counsel on the misconduct question, but then evidentiary hearings were re-scheduled to commence in Washington, D.C., to hear testimony on issues related to risks of theft of UCLA's weapons-grade uranium, to begin June 21, and then to resume in Los Angeles the week of June 25 to hear testimony primarily on sabotage and Olympics issues. The Board pledged to reach a decision in time to put any additional security measures that might be found necessary in place before the Olympics.

One week before the hearings were to begin, UCLA withdrew its application for re-licensing and requested the hearings be suspended as now moot.^{20/} They did this, thus, after the bulk of the safety hearings but before

^{16/} Motion of December 27, 1983

^{17/} Order of January 18, 1984

^{18/} *ibid.*, at 5-6

^{19/} *id.* at 6

^{20/} See UCLA motion for hearing suspension, June 14; motion for application withdrawal, June 14

any final determination of the safety issues, and one week before the security hearings were to begin. In fact, five of CBG's seven witnesses had not yet even filed their testimony on the sabotage/Olympics matters, as the University withdrew its application shortly before testimony was to be served. The Board had ruled genuine issues were in dispute as to the adequacy of UCLA's security, matters that would require a hearing, but the hearing was suspended in response to the application withdrawal and no evidentiary ruling whatsoever on the sufficiency of UCLA's security has resulted.

CBG agreed to UCLA's proposal to cancel the scheduled security hearings, on the condition--to which UCLA and Staff stipulated--that the fuel be shipped off as soon as possible, before the Olympics if possible.^{22/} That stipulation and condition were included in the Board's June 18 Memorandum and Order, and on that basis, the hearings which were to occur before the Olympics were cancelled on the assumption that the driving force behind having the hearings before the Olympics--the presence of the fuel on site during that period--would if at all possible be removed. On June 19 UCLA announced it would not comply with the stipulation reached on June 15 and included in the June 18 Order; on June 20 UCLA's counsel declined to participate in a conference call with the Board and parties to resolve the matter; and on June 22 the Board vacated its June 18 Order regarding the Olympics, but maintained the suspension of the security hearings which had been premised thereon. It did so on its own motion, without an opportunity for CBG to make known its views on the matter.^{23/}

^{22/} See Order of June 18

^{23/} In a Memorandum of June 25, the Board explained its vacation of its previous Order (the portion ordering the stipulated-to condition to hearing suspension, leaving untouched the hearing suspension itself) as asserting CBG had not met its burden. CBG notes that the motion before the Board had been UCLA's for suspension, for which it had the burden of proof, and that UCLA's refusal to permit a conference call regarding enforcing the Board Order led to a situation where CBG was not even permitted to make an enforcement motion, let alone respond to any sua sponte consideration of vacation.


When UCLA failed to comply with the stipulation made in exchange for termination of the security hearing, and when the Board issued a new order vacating its previous order instead of enforcing it (but not, as indicated above, vacating that portion of the previous order which suspended the security hearings on the basis of UCLA's pledge), CBG appealed the Board's decision directly to the Commission because of the emergency created by the tight frame. Three weeks remained before Olympic Village opened at UCLA (despite implications to that effect in the Board's June 25 Memorandum, the issue was removing the fuel prior to the opening of Olympic Village, certainly not during the time the athletes were in residence). Whereas those three weeks prior to the athletes moving in was sufficient time to remove the fuel if the Commission acted quickly, it would not be if Commission action were delayed. CBG therefore requested in its June 22 Emergency Petition to the Commission that oral briefing be held on June 25 or 26, with an immediate decision to issue thereafter.^{24/}

III. Lack of Commission Action
Moots Petition; Withdrawn

Over three weeks have passed since the Emergency Petition was filed. The Commission did not schedule oral argument, nor take any other action. Olympic Village opened up last weekend at UCLA, and the athletes have now moved in. CBG's Emergency Petition--which requested offshipment before that date--is now obviously moot. CBG withdraws it on that basis, and pray that the lack of action will not result in any untoward events at the Olympics.

dated the 20th of July, 1984,
at Ben Lomond, California

Respectfully submitted,


Daniel Hirsch
President

^{24/} A 2.206 Petition with the Staff was not filed because of the yet unresolved misconduct charges against the Staff on this issue; it is CBG's understanding that the OIA report on the matter is now before the Commission.

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I hereby declare that copies of the attached CBG Withdrawal of June 22 Emergency Petition for Off-Shipment of UCLA Reactor Fuel Prior to Arrival of Olympic Athletes in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on the 20th of July, 1984:

Chairman Palladino
Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Asselstine
Commissioner Bernthal
Commissioner Zech
Secretary Chilk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Christine Helwick
Glenn R. Woods
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
Chairman Frye
Dr. Luebke
Judge Bright
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Daniel Hirsch
President
Committee to Bridge the Gap

NATIONAL AFFAIRS



**The Official
1984 Olympic Program
puts you ringside, poolside
and trackside.**



Lester Sloan—Newsweek

Games people play: The application for Olympic tickets had Californians waiting on line

Who Will Police the Olympics?

It seems that nothing can dim America's Olympic ardor. Despite reports that the 1984 Los Angeles Games might degenerate into a marathon traffic jam—or be obliterated by smog—more than a million Americans streamed into Sears stores and selected banks last week to pick up ticket brochures. The elaborate order forms they are now completing read like an act of faith in the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC). Prices for as-yet-undefined seats at the more popular events such as the gymnastics and swimming finals range from \$40 to \$95, and a pass to all 26 boxing sessions costs \$2,200—providing you are lucky enough to be selected at random by the computer that decides who gets into which sellouts. GET A LOAN, GO TO GAMES, the Los Angeles Times snidely suggested. But the sad truth is that officials will need all of the \$90 million to \$140 million they expect to generate from ticket revenues to ensure that the Olympics are not disrupted by terrorists. In a real sense, the main event at next summer's Games will be a two-week-long exercise in synchronized policing.

Or at least the hope is that the 60-odd federal, state and local agencies charged with handling Olympic security will become synchronized by the time the flame is kindled in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum on July 28, 1984. Rather than face the delicate question of just who is in charge right now, the various authorities have opted for a byzantine method of coexistence in which an Olympics Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee oversees a Security Planning Committee that incorporates an Integrated Planning Group consisting of 16 subcommittees. The endless meetings deriving from this makeshift bureaucracy have made it possible for everyone from FBI operatives to the chief of campus police at the University of Southern California to voice an opinion, and as yet very little

plumage has been ruffled. On the other hand, it's still unclear who would spring into action if, say, a group of Third World "athletes" suddenly made a suicide run on the presidential box. And no one has seemed particularly eager to choose from among the FBI's SWAT team, the marksmen of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the U.S. Army's crack antiterrorist squad, Delta Team—the three most likely candidates for the job.

Threats: The one thing everyone does seem to agree on is that whichever emerges as the ultimate authority will need all the help it can get. "Every conflict that exists anywhere in the world is represented on both sides somewhere in southern California," says LAPD Cmdr. William Rathburn. In that volatile climate, anti-American violence perpetrated by a group such as the Puerto Rican FALN is just one of many possible threats. Of equal concern to authorities are extremists linked to the Arab world, the Irish Republican Army, Armenia, China and the Philippines who might be eager to settle political grudges before an international TV audience estimated at 2.5 billion. One obvious target for terrorists is the small nuclear reactor at UCLA. LAOOC security director Edgar Best insists that the 100-kilowatt training device poses no real danger but UCLA Prof. Walter Wegst disagrees, saying that an explosion could cause fallout that would reach the 5,200-athlete Olympic Village located on campus.

The challenge inherent in policing an Olympics that will be spread over 23 "venues" as far as 200 miles apart only serves to make the job more

attractive to the competing agencies. Unwilling to cede even the international aspect of security without a struggle, Rathburn and LAPD Chief Daryl Gates visited Asia, the Middle East and Europe in the past year to gather information on terrorists in the hope that they can avoid being bullied into a minor role by the FBI and CIA. "Counterterrorism is not their exclusive turf," insists an LAPD official.

The White House, concerned enough to request \$69.1 million in federal funds for Olympic security, is clearly not amused by the prospective turf battles. Six weeks ago the Reagan administration retained the Austin, Texas, consulting firm headed by retired Army Col. Charles Beckwith, ground commander of the ill-fated 1980

Iranian-hostage-rescue mission, to produce an evaluation of antiterrorist planning thus far. NEWSWEEK has learned that in an interim report Beckwith cited the lack of cooperation among the law-enforcement agencies as a chief problem—and called for the appointment of a czar to coordinate the federal role in Olympic security. Armed with Beckwith's findings, White House aide Michael Deaver flew to Los Angeles two weeks ago for an interorganizational meeting—and plans to visit Fort Bragg, N.C., to see the Delta Team in training.

Meanwhile, the White House has named Kenneth Hill, a veteran State Department security officer, to serve as liaison between the LAOOC and the Reagan administration. But for all the apparent confusion, no one in Washington or Los Angeles seems ready to panic. "Security will be there and will be very sufficient," says Rathburn. "There is a very high possibility of something happening, but my gut feeling at this time is that we will not have a major terrorist incident."

Judging by the way they are queuing up for ticket order forms, Americans seem to

share that optimistic view. And despite the long waits and shocking prices, the atmosphere at most outlets was anything but grim. "It's the hottest ticket in town," beamed Californian Craig Furniss after picking up his brochure. At a bank in Los Angeles, one customer got around the one-order-blank-per-household rule by repeatedly going outside to slip into different disguises. Given such old-fashioned American ingenuity, the LAOOC may yet produce an event worthy of America's Olympian expectations.

Beckwith: Concerned



CHARLES LEERHSEN with MARTIN KASINDORF and JANET HUCK in Los Angeles

Olympics Terror Colors U.C.L.A. Reactor Fight

By JUDITH CUMMINGS

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, July 29 — On any school day 50,000 people are studying or working at the sunny, palm-dotted campus of the University of California at Los Angeles. Hundreds of thousands more live near the campus in neighborhoods of upper middle-class apartments and homes.

For more than two decades these people have worked or lived near a nuclear research reactor operated by U.C.L.A. That reactor is now the focus of an anti-nuclear protest that has suddenly become more intense and more successful than in the past.

The nuclear opponents, led by an environmentalist group called the Committee to Bridge the Gap, want the reactor shut down. They say it is a possible safety hazard in a densely populated urban area and, in a sensitive new element of concern, they add that it is presumably a tempting target for potential terrorist sabotage during next summer's Olympic Games.

U.C.L.A. is to be the site of one of the Olympic Villages where athletes competing in the Games will stay. The village will be about a mile from the campus building that houses the reactor. In the aftermath of the 1972 Olympics in Munich, where 11 Israeli athletes were killed in a terrorist attack, security planning is of major concern here.

Relicensing Is Opposed

The environmentalist group is opposing U.C.L.A.'s application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a renewed 20-year license to operate the reactor. A panel of the regulatory commission, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, started public hearings on the application last week. The hearings are expected to continue through October. The board's decision can be appealed, posing the possibility of a long wait before the question is resolved.

There are 70 research reactors throughout the country operating in capacities similar to the one here, but U.C.L.A.'s Argonaut-type reactor, initially licensed in 1960, is one of the older. Jim Hanchett, a spokesman for

the nuclear commission, said the agency had no knowledge of any safety-related incidents at any of them.

Nevertheless, the opponents scored an important victory last February when the licensing board stated: "U.C.L.A. and staff maintain that U.C.L.A.'s Argonaut University Training Reactor is an inherently safe machine. We find that this conclusion is subject to dispute."

Officials at the university maintain the reactor's design makes it "a physical impossibility" for a serious accident or dangerous radiation release to occur under normal operating conditions.

'Power of 100 Hair Dryers'


Tom Tugend, a spokesman for the university, said the research reactor operated at a maximum power level of only 100 kilowatts. "We compare it to the equivalent power consumed by 100 home hair dryers," he said. Nuclear power reactors generate 30,000 times the power, he said.

Opponents reject such reasoning. "U.C.L.A. says it's only compared to power reactors, but we say it's at least as dangerous because it lacks the safety features of a power reactor," said Steven Aftergood, an engineer who is an official of the Committee to Bridge the Gap. The organization was founded in 1970, and many of its members are former U.C.L.A. students who have continued their campus activism.

The licensing board, in an unusual statement in its March 1983 order calling for the hearings, noted the high population density, the lack of a buffer zone between the reactor and the population, and the lack of a containment structure. Under such conditions, the panel said, "the board expects U.C.L.A. to show that the reactor is not only safe, but safe by a wide margin."

University officials concede they cannot rule out a radiation hazard under catastrophic conditions, such as an act of terrorist sabotage.

"I don't know the answer," Mr. Tugend said. "If somebody drops a bomb on the building or explodes a thousand



Nuclear research reactor at the University of California at Los Angeles. Foes of nuclear power challenge its safety. Associated Press

pounds of dynamite, this is what they're debating at the hearing."

Safety Precautions Described

He acknowledged that the reactor included no buffer or containment building, but he said it was encased in more than seven feet of concrete in three separate walls, which created more than adequate protection.

The reactor produces a radioactive gas, argon 41, that university officials say becomes harmless after 14 hours. Nuclear opponents contend some of the radiation would reach the population before the radioactive particles decayed.

The opponents have lined up expert testimony to contend that even under normal, noncatastrophic conditions the

reactor poses unacceptable hazards, among them a threat that an unanticipated surge of power could balloon exponentially before safety mechanisms could intervene to shut down the reactor.

Standoff at Columbia University


A similar standoff pitting the research needs of a major university against those of a dense urban population was seen at Columbia University, where protests in the days after the 1978 nuclear accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island power plant prevented the activation of a reactor on the Morningside Heights campus. As a result, Columbia's Triga Mark II reactor, which was completed in 1968 and licensed in 1977, has never been fueled.

A Columbia spokesman, Judith Lindsey, said the university had no plans to change the reactor's dormant status.

The dispute at U.C.L.A. is the first contested relicensing of any reactor, power or research. Earlier protests have been over initial licensing applications. Local antinuclear forces say the fact that the fight over the U.C.L.A. reactor has advanced this far is evidence of increased skepticism over the safety of nuclear energy operations, and a sign of growing vigor in the anti-nuclear movement.

Even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might not argue with such a conclusion. "We relicensed the research reactor at Berkeley a few years ago without a peep," Mr. Hanchett said. "Berkeley, of all places."

C



A TERRORISTS' GUIDE TO THE 1984 OLYMPICS

if terrorists have plans to make los angeles another munich, the only way to outmaneuver them is to see the games through their eyes

article **By JAMES P. WOHL**

While the 1984 Olympic Games are being touted as Disneyland with sweat by the public-relations staff at the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, it is a safe bet that plans to shatter that showcase of democracy have already been set in motion. The world has come to expect the death of innocents in the pursuit of the principal terrorist goal: publicity. Given the complexities of guarding the 1984 summer games, those plans have an awesome chance of success.

Security for the games is the responsibility of an umbrella group called the Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council. The organizing committee is represented on the council by Edgar Best, a talented, tough ex-special agent in charge of the Los Angeles office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has been meeting for nearly two years with local, state and Federal law-enforcement agencies, as well as with political figures—including the President of the United States. But the logistics are tremendously complex. At the Montreal games, only five agencies needed coordination; in Moscow, only two. For the 1984 Olympics, Best and other top personnel are attempting the task of coordinating 60 law-enforcement agencies. Sources within the Los Angeles Police Department indicate that the task is overwhelming.

The Law Enforcement Coordinating Council has set up 27 subcommittees in charge of intelligence, transportation, SWAT, air support, communications, traffic, crowd control and the like. Although Best downplays the dangers of internal dissension, it is a fact that rivalries, jealousies and the idiosyn-

crasies of individual law-enforcement bureaucracies have crippled police work many times in the past. Those problems could be especially troublesome at the Olympics, where neither Best's council nor the L.A.P.D. has the legal means to force meetings and cooperation with autonomous local agencies—much less with the FBI, the CIA or the Secret Service. "Autonomy is a major problem," a source in the L.A.P.D. told me. "If we can't force cooperation, how are we going to guard Marcos or Castro or Mitterrand or Reagan?"

Cooperation aside, Best doesn't share the feeling—expressed by some front-line cops—that foreign battles will be fought in Los Angeles by terrorists seeking publicity. It is his opinion that the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes caused a backlash that would discredit similar terrorist action now.

"Black September no longer exists because of that," he said.

Over at the L.A.P.D., the spokesman—and the chief of Olympics security for the police department—is Commander Bill Rathburn, whose background in antiterrorist work is nil. He isn't sure what qualified him for the job of Olympics planning. He is sure, however, that no one can guarantee a safe Olympics. He, too, attempts to downplay the coordination problems.

"I was originally uncomfortable with the lack of legislative direction to coordinate security," he said. "Many people in responsible positions were and still are. But I feel now that the recognition of local autonomy is the cornerstone of our effort."

The good news is that there is a reputable (continued on page 182)

presence that caused the anxiety. What electrified the place was the uncertainty. Would it be the man entering the elevator carrying flowers? Would it be the unoccupied taxicab parked by the side of the building? It might be a gun, a rocket, a poisoned apple or the Armenian double-bomb trick, in which the first bomb goes off, a crowd gathers to see what has happened, and then the second bomb goes off. Terrorism: Guess. Guess again.

Just one month earlier, Gemayel's brother, Bashir—himself the newly elected president of Lebanon—had been killed when a 400-pound bomb destroyed the Christian Phalangist headquarters in east Beirut. When Amin Gemayel left the Madison Hotel after a two-day visit, one could see the relief in the faces of the doormen, the concierge and the assistant managers: The place had not been blown up. No one had even phoned in a bomb threat. Gemayel was now someone else's problem.

We hear about terrorism almost daily, yet few of us have a precise notion of what it is. Fewer yet could say what sort of people we would find behind the ski masks. The experts aren't really sure of what most terrorists want. They haven't even been able to agree on a definition of terrorism. But however we choose to define it, terrorism has become a fact of life. Between 1970 and 1980, according to a 1981 conference at Los Alamos National Laboratories, nearly three terrorist operations per day were reported world-wide. The total number of people killed by terrorism in that ten-year period has been estimated at around 10,000. The cost in property destroyed was about \$200,000 per day. At least \$150,000,000 in reported kidnaping ransom was collected by terrorists between January 1, 1971, and late 1982. The security necessitated by terrorism costs billions. But terrorism is not only a major economic influence in the world today, it's a psychological and a political one as well.

It has permanently altered Western Europe, Japan, South America, Central America, the Middle East, Africa—most of the world, in other words. And now, some experts say, the U.S. may be the next big target.

There are people paid to worry about just that possibility, and in the International Club of Washington, where some of them gather to eat lunch, the tension is sometimes as thick as the cigarette smoke. Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (C.S.I.S.) is located in the same building. C.S.I.S. is a private think tank, and a lot of the thinking that goes on there these days concerns terrorism.

I sat in the club one day last summer listening to two of the world's top experts on terrorism, Yacov Heichal, former head

Playboy

TERRORISTS' GUIDE

(continued from page 90)

"The U.S. is a paradise for the terrorist. Everyone wants to help here and usually does."

antiterrorist expert working for the L.A.P.D. He is Commander George Morrison, and my source indicated that he is called in to advise law-enforcement agencies all over the country. Rathburn wouldn't let me talk with him, however. It seems that Morrison has drawn departmental rebukes for his outspoken dealings with the press—for telling it like it is, in other words.

As for the FBI, it has generally maintained a low-profile, no-comment posture on its Olympics planning. Director William Webster has indicated, however, that the bureau expects to take a leading role in the event of a terrorist raid. Its response force will include its own SWAT team, as well as the Delta "Blue Light" Team, the United States' answer to the British anti-terrorist Special Air Service and the West German G.S.G.9.

Sources in the L.A.P.D. bridled at the suggestion that the pizzas that have been developed locally over the past two years will be pre-empted by the bureau. Meanwhile, the FBI's press-relations agent told me, "You're on the right track trying to pin down just who has the responsibility." Then he added, "Lotsa luck."

But even with Morrison's expertise, even with the FBI and the Blue Light Team, this looks like a bad time to be holding an Olympics in the U.S., much less in Los Angeles, where far-flung facilities

make security especially tough. I wanted to find out how the other side might be viewing things, so I got together with someone who knows the terrorist mind and method firsthand.

"You look like shit," I told John Miller when I picked him up at Los Angeles International Airport. Miller is a brawling professional soldier who trained with the Special Air Service in Great Britain. He was undercover in Belfast against the Irish Republican Army. He kidnaped the Great Train Robbery fugitive, Ronnie Biggs, from Brazil. The international press keeps an eye on this archetypal rogue, who's always in transit and trouble. He had just gotten back from a foray into Angola. A discolored right cheek added authenticity.

"I got hit with a rifle butt," he said. "We were reconnoitering—looking for an opportunity to take some British and American mercenaries out of prison down there. Three big guys jumped up. We put them down and left the guns. Stupid. My mate got shot under here." He poked his thumb at my back. "Had to leave 'im with some friends. He was coughing up blood. Nicked the lung, I think."

We started to fill each other in on Olympics logistics. In 1932, Los Angeles was the first Olympics city to build housing facilities specifically for the games. In modern times, it will be the first *not* to build new facilities. The University of California at

Los Angeles and the University of Southern California will house the majority of the athletes. Never have the games been scheduled at such geographic distances as the 1984 venues, the Olympics word for the playing sites. The 23 venues are spread out beyond the boundaries of the County of Los Angeles, which itself covers an area of more than 4000 square miles. Never has so much space been allocated for media representatives: The entire Los Angeles Convention Center—334,000 square feet of floor area—has been leased. And never has the President of the United States officiated at the opening ceremonies.

"To compound the problems, you're also dealing with a nation of nice guys," Miller said as we sat down to dinner at a restaurant on Sunset Strip. "The U.S. is a paradise for the terrorist. Everyone wants to help here and usually does. Especially to help people with a foreign accent. You can't even look over a fence in Russia. Also, the U.S. is an open target because it's the only country in the world where every piece of necessary military equipment is sold right in the open or nearly so. Give me a few hours and I'll get you an antitank cannon with live shells for your front yard."

"They'll send in a four-man cell to reconnoiter," he continued. "They'll dig away and gather information."

"How hard is it to get that kind of information?" I asked.

"How hard? Tomorrow, I'll show you."


The next day, we went to the Olympic Organizing Committee headquarters at the UCLA campus. I told someone in the press wing that I was writing something. Ten minutes later, I had maps, schedules and information about the venues, as well as detailed geographic and demographic information about the city of Los Angeles. I didn't show any I.D. until later, when I interviewed Best. He was the only careful person I spoke with—the only one who seemed to recognize that effective security starts long before the games themselves. On the way out, Miller lifted an official organizing-committee security badge. He just took the badge from a visitor's clothes. "A ticket," he said.

"And if you could do it—" I started to say.

"That's right. So could they. That's America. This badge would get any terrorist admittance to the inside, at least during the planning stages. I don't think there's another country that's so bloody easy."

"No one can guarantee public safety at the 1984 games," he said. "There is no way Russia, even a post-Brezhnev Russia, is going to want to see it blood-free. Whatever the Soviets' involvement in international terrorism, they'd like to demonstrate that which you ignore on an international scale: that the freedom Americans have is fraught with danger and crime and murder. You may be rich and free, but you have no discipline or order—prized values in the rest of the





world. The Soviets would also like to teach the U.S. a lesson for Jimmy Carter's decision to trash the summer games in 1980. It's the only answer to Moscow's broken window on communism. What can L.A. do to protect itself? It can't adequately protect its ordinary citizens from domestic predators."

The city has black and Latin gangs that can't be controlled, plus the cops are going to have their hands full with more ordinary home-grown cons and creeps. Every pimp, whore, grifter, drifter, pickpocket, con man, crackpot, flimflam man, swindler, diddler and panhandler within 500 miles will be in L.A., moving in for the kill.

And then you get to the visitors. Antinuke, antiwar, anti-abortion activists; neo-Nazis; Ku Klux Klanners; the Jewish Defense League; fellow-traveler U.S. citizens from 30 countries; Solidarity activists; the Weather Underground; Black Liberation Army; and uncouth splinter organizations—they'll all be moving in for a shot at the gold: headlines.

"What about the backlash after Munich?" I asked Miller. "Black September is gone from the scene, and the P.L.O.

has, after all, moved into the political arena. Edgar Best thinks that it'll be calm here, like Moscow, Montreal and Lake Placid."

"Maybe," he said. "But these people are terrorists. That's their business. That's how they live. They all work together. Just because the provisional wing of the I.R.A. gets some parliamentary representation doesn't mean that it won't be out killing horses and kids and heroes, like Mountbatten. Terrorists' egos are tied to destruction, and their employment depends on death.

"You retire them like this." He pointed a finger at my temple. "You take them and kill them as quick as you can. They don't sit around rocking at some old folks' home; they have to fucking die. It's like getting fired."

We visited the two principal Olympic Villages—the student housing areas at the huge USC and UCLA campuses. While the facilities weren't built for security, Commander Rathburn said that they would be secured and the athletes would be completely isolated. When I mentioned Munich, he had no comment. He knew

what I was writing about. "I'd like to keep a lid on this whole thing," he said. "You're playing with dynamite."

Maps of the campuses are readily available. When Miller and I visited UCLA, it was difficult for us to figure out how anyone could control traffic and access to those busy areas. "There are service tunnels all over the place," said Miller. "They'll have to watch those. Christ, here's Boelter Hall. You know what's in there?"

"No," I said.

"A fucking nuclear reactor. It's right in the middle of L.A. One terrorist cell—four men—goes in there, sets time charges in satchel bombs and booby-traps the works and..."

"Holy shit," I said.

"That's a lot of publicity, a little meltdown and fallout," he said. "The athletes are going to have exposure going to and coming from those widespread venues. No Olympics participants have ever had to be trucked so far. It's a nightmare to control, and there will be many targets of opportunity."

The weight-lifting events will be held at

Loyola Marymount University. We walked through the gymnasium. "The Israelis will be a number-one target," Miller said. "Weight lifting is one of their sports. It could happen here. A cell could take over or rent one of the little private houses on the road in here and use a couple of hand-launched wire-guided missiles. The bus comes by and—zap!—easy escape. L.A. has a lot of roads."

"What about diversionary tactics?" I asked.

"They're not going to waste bodies with grandstanding," he said. "They'll pick one prime target and a secondary one. Sure,

they could drop a bunch of incendiary devices in the hills and forests. They could burn Southern California and distract an entire raft of police and firemen, but that's not likely. No, it would be risking bodies to take bodies."

The Los Angeles Convention Center will hold news representatives from all over the world. Again, we had no trouble gaining access through a back door. Part of the eight-acre facility was being used for an exotic-plant-growers convention. "This could be a real problem," said Miller. He showed me where city garbage trucks drive right up on the main floor. "Load

one of those trucks with explosives and that's a lot of news. That's I.R.A.-style stuff. And, probably, this facility is not going to get much protection. The security people are going to have to watch everything."

At the Forum, the basketball venue, we ascertained that security would be provided mostly by the guards used for normal activities. "Those guys are OK for rowdies and drunks," Miller said. "A lot of them are off-duty cops, and they can bust teeth. But against trained terrorists, you need pros. That's a problem."

We visited most of the other venues. Even to an untrained eye, the opportunities for a creative scenario for death loomed clear, from sniping at the yachting events in Long Beach Harbor to automatic fire on massed cyclists on the road at Cal State University in Dominguez Hills to a grenade assault at the equestrian events at Santa Anita Park.

"This is a town of theatrics," Miller said. "Terrorism is high theater with publicity as the prize. Whatever terrorists do, it has to be huge and terrible."

When we visited the Coliseum, the site of the opening ceremonies and the track-and-field events, Miller immediately noticed the number of entrances. "There are 90 ways in here. It'll take an army to vet the spectators. At the opening ceremonies, they'll have heads of state, the business-and-industry sponsors. . . ."

"It's an election year; a lot of candidates will be here," I said.

"And President Reagan," he said. "They might try a Sadat-type suicide run, say from the marching athletes. . . ."

We walked into the huge empty arena. No one stopped us. "This would be the prime target," Miller said. "The President will probably land out there on the field by helicopter. Security will have to do a real job here."

We climbed all over, looking for vantage points. It was eerie contemplating destruction. "Maybe they'll just rent a military-type Cobra helicopter and outfit it with fire control," said Miller. "You can rent anything in Hollywood; they use them in films. Then it comes in over the far side there with rockets. *Wham!*"

"Yecch," I said. "They'd have to be crazy. What an end."

"Not quite," he said. "The terrorists are doing business. Security has to bankrupt them. Unless interagency rivalry disappears, unless intelligence is quick and coordination is ironclad, this could be the last Olympics."

The reconnaissance tour was over and I was driving him to the airport. His cheek was almost healed, and he was leaving to find more trouble. He was always in the thick of it.

"So, where are you going to be on July 28, 1984?" I said.

"Right here in L.A.," Miller said. "Where else?"

