

NRC FORM 366
(12-81)
10 CFR 50

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

APPROVED BY GMB
3150 0011

CONTROL BLOCK (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 CIAISOIS3000-0000000-0003411111 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

01 REPORT SOURCE L050000362703048300706849 (6) (7) (8) (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With Unit 3 in Mode 5 at 190°F and requirements for Mode 4 entry satisfied,
 03 heatup of the RCS commenced at 0925. At 1028, Containment Isolation Valve
 04 3HV6369 failed rendering Containment Cooling System Train B inoperable. At 1157,
 05 RCS Temperature inadvertently exceeded 200°F, constituting entry into Mode 4. In
 06 accordance with LCO 3.6.2.3, Action Statement 'a', the Unit was returned to
 07 Mode 5 at 1333, and Train B CCS was restored to operable at 1900. LCO 3.0.4
 08 also applied to this occurrence. Public health and safety were not affected.

(see attached)

09 WB A A Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
 17 83 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS ATTACHMENT NRRD-4 PRIME COMP COMPONENT
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
 H H Z Z 00000 Y N Z Z (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of this event was the failure of the operators to follow up on the RCS
 11 heatup following the valve failure. The cause of the valve failure was motor
 12 burnup due to overtorquing. As corrective actions, operators involved in this
 13 incident were counselled on their actions and the valve motor was replaced. As
 14 further corrective action, the incident was discussed in operator retraining.

(see attached)

15 B 0000 NA A Operator Observation (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)

16 Z Z NA NA (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

17 0000 Z NA (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

18 0000 NA (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

19 Z NA (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

20 N NA (44) (45) (46) (47) (48)

NAME OF PREPARED J. G. HAYNES

NRC USE ONLY
PHONE (714) 492-7700

8407230044 840706
PDR ADOCK 05000362
S PDR

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-022, REVISION 1
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO. 3, DOCKET NO. 50-362

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR EVENT DESCRIPTION

Although two trains of CCS are not required in Mode 5, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.2.3 requires two trains of CCS to be operable in Modes 1 through 4 and LCO 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an operational mode unless the conditions of applicable LCO's are met without reliance on the provisions of the Action Statements. Therefore, inoperability of CCS Train B prohibited entry into Mode 4.

At 1157 the average coolant temperature of the RCS was in excess of 200°F resulting in the conclusion that the Unit entered Mode 4 inadvertently with one train of CCS inoperable.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The prohibition of Mode 4 entry was immediately recognized by the operating shift and action was taken to terminate the RCS heatup with the RCS temperature quite close to 200°F, the threshold temperature for Mode 4. At 1240, operating personnel observed RCS temperature to be above 200°F and the Unit thus entered Mode 4 with one train of CCS inoperable. Operations personnel took immediate action to reduce RCS temperature below 200°F which was accomplished at 1333. The maximum temperature attained by the RCS was 206°F based on the Critical Functions Monitoring System (CFMS) computer printout.

The cause of the failure of Valve 3HV6369 was a burnt valve operating motor. As corrective action, the motor was replaced with a similar capacity motor, a surveillance test satisfactorily performed, and the valve declared operable at 1900 on March 4, 1983. Although the valves operated reliably, the motors for Trains A and B CCS containment isolation valves for both Units 2 and 3 were replaced with larger motors having increased torque limits. In addition, larger torque springs with increased torque settings were installed on the valves. These modifications have provided sufficient torque to fully stroke the valve with full flow without exceeding motor torque limits.

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

July 6, 1984

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

SCE

RECEIVED
NRC

1984 JUL 12 PM 12:31

REGION VISE

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:


Subject: Docket No. 50-362
Licensee Event Report No. 83-022, Revision 1
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Reference: Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC),
dated March 18, 1983, Licensee Event Report No. 83-022

The referenced letter provided the required 14-day follow-up report and Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the Containment Cooling System. We also reported that a follow-up LER would be issued to identify the cause of the valve failure and the corrective action taken. Enclosed is LER 83-022, Revision 1.

If you require additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



Enclosure LER 83-022, Revision 1

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

11
1E-29