

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER ISOLATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
0 6	1 4	8 4	8 4	0 2 5	0 0	0 7	1 6	8 4			
									DOCKET NUMBER (9) 0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 14, 1984, at approximately 0230, with Unit 3 in Mode 5, the isolation valve between the containment and wide range containment pressure transmitter 3PT-0352-2 was found closed. 3PT-0352-2 provides one channel of high-high containment pressure to the Plant Protection System (PPS) for use in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation (ESFAS) of the Containment Spray System. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.2 requires that when one of four channels of ESFAS instrumentation is inoperable, it must be placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within one hour. It is believed that the isolation valve for 3PT-0352-2 was closed after Unit 3 was shutdown. However, there is uncertainty in establishing absolutely when 3PT-0352-2 was isolated.

All other safety-related containment pressure transmitter isolation valves on Units 2 and 3 were verified open. To prevent recurrence, all safety-related instrument manifold valves will be seal wired in their proper position on return to service following their first channel calibration after receipt of the seals and installation tools.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SIG. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	8 4	- 0 2 5	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On June 14, 1984, at approximately 0230, with Unit 3 in Mode 5, the isolation valve between the containment and wide range containment pressure transmitter (EIIS Component Identifier PT) 3PT-0352-2 was found closed.

3PT-0352-2 provides one of four channels of high-high containment pressure to the Plant Protection System (PPS) (EIIS System Identifier JC) for use in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) (EIIS System Identifier JE) logic for the Containment Spray System (EIIS System Identifier BE). Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operator (LCO) 3.3.2, Action 9 requires that when one of the four channels of high-high containment pressure is inoperable in Modes 1 through 3, it must be placed in a bypassed or tripped condition within one hour.

An investigation determined that the isolation valve for 3PT-0352-2 had been verified open on February 16, 1984, at the completion of a channel calibration. Between February 16, 1984, and June 14, 1984, there were no maintenance or operational activities identified that would have required isolation of 3PT-0352-2. It is believed that the isolation valve for 3PT-0352-2 was closed after Unit 3 was shutdown. However, there is uncertainty in establishing absolutely when 3PT-0352-2 was isolated.

To evaluate the safety significance of the condition, a review of maintenance records was conducted to determine if any one of the three remaining channels was removed from service between March 4, 1984 (when Unit 3 returned to Mode 3 following a maintenance shutdown), and June 14, 1984. It was determined that on ten (10) occasions, one of the other channels was removed from service for monthly PPS surveillance. It is estimated that on each PPS surveillance the containment high-high pressure channel was in bypass for ten (10) minutes. Assuming that 3PT-0352-2 was isolated for this entire period, there were ten occasions of approximately ten minutes each where the PPS, which requires 2 of 4 channels to actuate, did not have the number of operable channels required by Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.2 or the Final Safety Analysis Report. However, Emergency Operating Instructions direct manual actuation of Containment Spray if the high-high containment pressure setpoint is reached and automatic actuation has not occurred. An analysis has shown that the delay in Containment Spray initiation resulting from manual actuation would not result in unacceptable consequences on a Loss of Coolant Accident or a Main Steam Line Break.

All other safety-related containment pressure transmitters were verified to be properly aligned and operable. To prevent recurrence, all safety-related instrument manifold valves will be seal wired in their proper position on return to service following their first channel calibration after receipt of the seals and installation tools.

Southern California Edison Company



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SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
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July 16, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-025
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving containment pressure transmitters. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J. G. Haynes / sam

Enclosure: LER 84-025

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)
J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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