NAC Form 386 (9-83) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES. 8/31/85						
FACILITY NAME (1)									DOCKET NUMBER	PAGE (S)						
									0 5 0 0	0121210	0 1 OF 014					
TITLE I	1)				utdown	due t	o Inc	perab	le El	ectromat	ic Relief		1-1-1014			
EVENT DATE (6) LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7) OTHE				OTHER	ER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION	MONTH DAY		YEAR	FACILITY NA		MES	DOCKET NUMBER	(5)			
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MODE (8) N		20	20.402(b)			20.408(a)			80.73(a)(2)(ie)		73.71(b)					
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LEVEL 0,1,2			20	20,405(a)(1)(ii)			80.38(c)(2)			60.73(a)(.)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract				
-			×	20.408(a)(1)(HI) X			60.73(a)(2)(i)			80.73(a)(2)(viii)	(A)	below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
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NAME									TELEPHONE NUMBER							
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				COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH C	OMPONEN	T FAILURE	DESCRISE	ID IN THIS REFO	MT (13)					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	СОМР	DNENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS				
Х	S ₁ B	RIV		D ₁ 2 ₁ 4 ₁ 3	Y			Х	SB	RIVII	D ₁ 2 ₁ 4 ₁ 3	Y				
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 speces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spece typewritten lines) (18)

YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

ABSTRACT

During startup on June 17, 1984 (after the recently completed reactor shutdown, which occurred on June 14, 1984 and was reported in LER 84-13), cyclic surveillance test N1-ST-C2, "Manual Opening of the Solenoid-Actuated Pressure Relief Valves and Flow Verification ," was being performed on all six of the plant's solenoid actuated pressure relief valves. These relief valves recently had maintenance performed on them after they initially failed the surveillance test on June 14, 1984. During this second test, at approximately 0625 hrs, one relief valve (#121) failed to close and three (#112, 113, and 123) exhibited seat leakage after successful testing. The manual blocking valve for #121 was closed to limit reactor blow down. A reactor shutdown was completed in accordance with the plant's technical specifications immediately after the event occurred. Work Requests were issued to perform necessary maintenance on the relief valves to restore them to an operable status. While performing maintenance on the four valves (#112, 113, 121, and 123) material was found in the main valve seats and pilot valve guide openings. Based on this, a decision was made to clean and overhaul all six pilot and main valves. The valves were restored to an operable status and successfully tested on June 22, 1984.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

During startup on June 17, 1984, cyclic surveillance test N1-ST-C2, "Manual Opening of the Solenoid-Actuated Pressure Relief Valves and Flow Verification," was being performed on all six of the plant's main steam line solenoid actuated relief valves. (This test was initially performed on June 14, 1984, and three of the four relief valves tested on that date failed. LER 84-13 reported this event.) These relief valves had maintenance performed on them to make them operable after the initial event occurred. During this test, at approximately 0625 hrs on 6/17/84, relief valve 121 stuck in the open position and seat leakage was detected on relief valves 111, 112, 113, 122, and 123, after successful testing. Subsequently, all six electromatic relief and pilot valves were removed, completely disassembled, cleaned, and refurbished. During cleaning, material was found to be plugging the pilot valve guide openings and also evident on seating surfaces of the main valves. The material lodging in the seat area was suspected as having caused the seat leakage associated with these valves. Material which plugged the pilot valve guide openings on relief valve 121 was suspected as having caused relief valve 121 to stick open when tested. All six valves were reinstalled and successfully passed a third surveillance test performed on June 22, 1984.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The testing of solenoid actuated relief valves is conducted individually, at low power under controlled conditions with ready access to the normally inaccessable primary containment. Under these conditions, failure of a valve to open or failure of a valve to close poses no threat to the safety of the plant. Technical Specifications require this testing once per operating cycle, and station policy in general requires this testing following maintenance activities on these valves. Therefore, station operation with valves inoperable due to maintenance activities is unlikely.

The function of these valves is twofold. First, to limit reactor pressure to reduce the challenges to the primary code safety valves on an overpressure event. Technical Specifications require five of the six valves to operate for this purpose. As a result of the testing on 6/17/84 when all six valves opened upon testing, this function would have been served.

The second function is to blow down the reactor pressure to allow core stray injection during a small break LOCA. Only three valves (with redundancy) are required for this function. The valve sticking open is of no consequence since in this scenario the valves are never given a close signal.

Based on these results, there were no actual adverse consequences from this event and the potential consequences are within the design basis of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION								EUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85				
PACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LE	ER NUMBER	6)		PAGE (3)					
		YEAR		SEGUENTIA	4	REVISION NUMBER						
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TEXT Iff more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's: (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A reactor shutdown was completed in compliance with the plant's Technical Specifications. All six electromatic relief and pilot valves were removed, cleaned and refurbished. The valves were then reinstalled. The surveillance test was then performed a third time on June 22, 1984. During this testing, all valves successfully passed the surveillance requirements.

NRC Form 3668 (9-83) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FAILURE CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPINES 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) LER NUMBER (6) SEQUENTIAL YEAR Nine Mile Point Unit #1 4 OF 0 14 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 4 | - 0 | 1 | 4 010 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) REPORTABLE TO NPROS REPORTABLE TO NPRO? MANUFAC TURER CAUSE SYSTEM MANUFAC-COMPONENT COMPONENT SYSTEM CAUSE

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIRGARA MOHAWK



300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202-

July 17, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220 LER 84-14

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CER 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-14

Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (A), "The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 0702 hrs on June 17, 1984. This Licensee Event Report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges Vice President

Nuclear Generation

TEL/bh attachments cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator