



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report No.: 50-302/95-17

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
 3201 -34th Street, South
 St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302

License No.: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3

Inspection Conducted: September 5-8, 1995

Inspectors:	<u>William J. Tobin</u>	<u>9/29/95</u>
	William J. Tobin, Senior Safeguards Inspector	Date Signed
	<u>Lori C. Stratton</u>	<u>9/29/95</u>
	Lori C. Stratton, Safeguards Specialist	Date Signed
Approved by:	<u>Douglas M. Collins</u>	<u>10/2/95</u>
	Douglas M. Collins, Chief Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards	Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Security Training and Qualification and Safeguards Information. In addition, portions of the Access Authorization Program were evaluated.

Results:

In the areas inspected, violations were not identified. Training and Qualification records were accurate and reflected a well-versed training program. The performance of the licensee's security force was exhibited in their professionalism in carrying out operational duties and the proficiency of their training program and tactical exercises. Safeguards Information was deemed adequate. Selected portions of the licensee's Access Authorization Program were reviewed. Records reflected that the required background investigations, FBI record inquiries, and psychological evaluations were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *A. Auner, Manager, Nuclear Training
- R. Black, Nuclear Engineer
- *G. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production
- *T. Catchpole, Sr. Nuclear Licensing Engineer, Licensing
- T. Domitrovich, Nuclear Engineer
- *G. Foster, Access Control Coordinator
- *G. Longhouser, Manager, Nuclear Security
- *B. McLaughlin, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist, Licensing
- *R. Nicholas, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- *S. Robinson, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
- *D. Watson, Access Authorization Manager

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians, security force members, and administrative personnel.

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- R. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
- T. Cooper, Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

2. Access Authorization

On April 27, 1992, 10 CFR 73.56 Access Authorization became fully effective. By letter dated April 27, 1992, the licensee certified to the Commission that it was in compliance with the Rule, as reflected in Revision 6 of the Crystal River Physical Security Plan dated May 27, 1992, committing to Regulatory Guide 5.66.

a. Access Authorization Program Administration (2515/127)

The Access Authorization (AA) Program is implemented through the licensee's Nuclear Training Staff in conjunction with the Human Resources Office in Crystal River, Florida. Two individuals are assisted in this AA effort by two administrative clerks and one fingerprint technician.

There are seven major contractors classified as "self-screeners" within the licensee's AA Program.

Three procedures are used by both the licensee and their contractors:

No. 92-02 (Revision 1, January 1, 1994) Contractor Access Authorization Screening Procedure,

No. 92-01 (Revision 2, May 1, 1992) Nuclear Operations Access Control Procedure, and

No. 94-02 (Revision 1, November, 1994) Access Authorization Procedure for FPC Screened Contractors.

The licensee anticipates merging their AA Program with the Nuclear Energy Institute's Plant Access computerized records system by the end of this year.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's AA staff and procedures were adequate and meeting NRC criteria.

b. Background Investigation (BI) Elements

The inspectors randomly selected 20 names of individuals badged at the site with unescorted access authorization. The BI elements of these 20 individuals (to include five contractors) were reviewed with respect to determining true identity, employment, education, credit, criminal history, military service, character and reputation. Individuals reviewed were regular employees as well as "casual" employees (temporary personnel hired by the licensee for a defined period of time). Several newly hired employees happened to have been randomly chosen for review. The inspectors found the BI elements were adequately addressed, criminal records were thoroughly reviewed, and adjudication was appropriate.

c. Unescorted Access Authorization

The inspectors reviewed unescorted access authorization records relative to Grandfathering (7), Reinstatement (5), Updating (3), Transfer (3), and Temporary (2). "Full" investigations were also reviewed. FBI fingerprints checks, psychological evaluations (to include clinical interviews) and background investigations were verified.

It was noted as a strength that the licensee performs state and local police records as well as motor vehicle records checks on their regular employees in addition to their security force contractor.

In conclusion, the inspectors found the AA program for these various types of authorization to be meeting and exceeding NRC criteria.

d. Audits

Audit No. 95-06-ISEC was performed in June, 1995, and concluded that the licensee's AA program was effectively meeting NRC criteria. The auditors conducted random records verifications, interviews and procedures reviews. As a result of the audit, Problem Report 95-0010 was generated to resolve an issue relative to the inadvertent destruction of 26 files for employees who have had longstanding access authorization. The inspectors reviewed the audit and this Problem Report and verified corrective actions were adequate and effective.

In conclusion, the audit was found to be thorough and meeting NRC criteria.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

3. Security Training and Qualification (81501)

The inspectors reviewed the security training and qualification program to ensure that the criteria in the Security Personnel Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), Revision 7, dated January 1, 1995, were met.

The licensee has four security trainers, two Florida Power Corporation (FPC) employees and two contract employees. The inspectors reviewed random lesson plans and task assignments that are currently used for training. Review of these documents and interview of security trainers confirmed that the licensee has a comprehensive system for selecting, training, equipping, and documenting of individual security force members.

Members of the security organization were requalified at least every twelve months in the performance of their assigned tasks, both normal and contingency. This includes physical exercise requirements and the completion of the firearms course, as committed to in the licensee's T&QP. Security force member requalification due dates are tracked on the licensee's computer system, which gives notice to each individual 90, 60, and 30 days in advance of their qualification expiration date. Each member of the security force was trained, equipped, and qualified to perform security duties before being assigned such duties.

The inspectors concluded through observation, interview, review of security force personnel and trainers, and review of procedures that the security force could adequately cope with the design-basis threat described in 10 CFR 73.1(a) and requirements of the licensee's T&QP.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

4. Safeguards Information (81810)

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.21, Safeguards Information (SGI) shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's SGI program to ensure the licensee was protecting and storing SGI accordingly.

The inspectors reviewed Florida Power and Light Company Policy 23, "Management of Safeguards Information," dated October, 1993. This policy establishes a uniform position regarding the handling and storage of SGI. The policy is signed by Florida Power Corporation's Chief Executive Officer. The inspectors also evaluated Nuclear Operations Procedure (NOD) 50, "Management and Control of Safeguards Information," Revision 1, dated September 1, 1994. This procedure implements FPC's company policy for the Crystal River site. In addition, six Crystal River departments, such as Quality Assurance and Security have individual compliance procedures committing to implementing NOD-50. Through discussion with the licensee, the inspectors learned that NOD-50 is currently being revised to reflect one site policy to be implemented by all departments.

The licensee is currently reviewing SGI documents to reclassify those which have been determined to no longer contain SGI. The inspectors noted that lock changes had been timely, access lists updated accordingly, and training was adequate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Problem Reports for an 18 month period and determined that appropriate remedial measures have prevented the reoccurrence of isolated and minor SGI events.

Through observation of activities and SGI areas, reviewed of procedures and other pertinent documents, and discussion with the licensee, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's SGI program was functioning as intended and in accordance with regulatory requirements.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

5. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 8, 1995, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.