

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-70

DATE OF EVENT: November 5, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Spent Fuel Pool Negative Pressure Boundary Door 400 not completely closed and latched

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2686 and Load (Gross MWE) = 906

Description of Occurrence: On November 5, 1982 at 1350 hours, an operator found door 400 not completely closed and latched. This door opens into the southwest stairway in the Auxiliary Building on the 603' level and is a part of the negative pressure boundary for the spent fuel pool area. The door was not blocked open, but was being held open by a differential pressure across it.

Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires two independent Emergency Ventilation Systems (EVS) servicing the spent fuel pool area to be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. Due to door 400 being open, the effectiveness of the EVS in drawing down the spent fuel pool area to a negative pressure $\geq 1/3$ " water gauge, is reduced. The action statement requirements of Technical Specification 3.9.12 were being met since there were no operations ongoing at the time of the occurrence involving the movement of fuel within the pool or crane operations with loads over the pool.

Technical Specification 3.7.10 was also invoked since door 400 is also a fire door. Upon discovery, the operator closed the door, removing the unit from the action statements.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is personnel error in that the last person through the door did not ensure that it was securely closed. However, the responsible person(s) could not be identified. Under normal ventilation conditions, the closure mechanism on this door will ensure that it is completely closed. The stairwell in which door 400 opens into is serviced by the Radwaste Area Supply and Exhaust Fans. On November 5, 1982, the supply fan tripped, and the exhaust fans kept running. This created a negative pressure in the stairwell and prevented the closure mechanism from completely closing the door.

Nonetheless, the person passing through the door should have noticed that the door did not slam shut, as it does under normal conditions, and should have personally ensured that the door was securely latched.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. In the event of an EVS actuation, the

Radwaste Area Exhaust Fans would have been automatically tripped, and the differential pressure due to the EVS would have caused the door to close.

1 | Corrective Action: The station has previously taken many actions to prevent recurrences of this problem. However, in addition to these actions, Security has implemented a program which requires every person to read and sign a page of "Basic Security Procedures" prior to receiving a badge. Item ten of the page emphasizes that it is the individual's responsibility to make sure all negative pressure boundary and fire doors are secured behind them when entering or exiting an area.

1 | Failure Data: There have been many previous occurrences of open fire and negative pressure boundary doors. However, those reported within the last year include NP-33-81-91 (81-076), NP-33-82-04 (82-003), NP-33-82-05 (82-004), NP-33-82-11 (82-009), NP-33-82-16 (82-014), NP-33-82-17 (82-016), NP-33-82-27 (82-022), NP-33-82-29 (82-026), NP-33-82-35 (82-031), NP-33-82-42 (82-037), NP-33-82-48 (82-043), NP-33-82-53 and (82-048).



July 6, 1984

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Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 82-057. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please destroy your previous copy of this report and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Terry D. Murray'.

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001

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