NRC FORM 366 **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION** (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) (1)Ø 3 4 25 26 0 OHDBS (2)Ø Ø 0000-Ø Ø LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T REPORT (7) 1 1 Ø 0 1 L Ø 5 | Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6 8) Ø (6)SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) (NP-33-82-70) On 11/5/82 at 1350 hours, an operator found door 400 not completely 0 2 closed and latched. The door was not blocked open, but was being held open by a dif-0 3 ferential pressure across it. Since door 400 is a negative pressure boundary door for 0 4 the spent fuel pool area and a fire door, the unit entered the action statements of 0 5 Technical Specifications 3.9.12 and 3.7.10. There was no danger to the health and 0 6 safety of the public or station personnel. The differential pressure created by an 0 7 Emergency Ventilation System actuation would have caused the door to close. 8 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CAUSE COMP VALVE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE X (13) Z Z (14) SH ZI ZI ZI Z (15 9 A Z Z (16) 19 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REVISION REPORT CODE EVENT YEAR REPORT NO TYPE LER/AO NO REPORT 8 2 Ø 15 17 ØI 3 X 11 NUMBER 30 EFFECT NPRD-4 FORM SUB PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT ACTION FUTURE SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED HOURS Z | (21 H XI 01 ØI Ø Y N Z 21 91 9 18 41 4.4 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause is personnel error in that the last person through the door did not ensure that it was securely closed. Upon discovery, the operator closed the door, removing 11 the unit from the action statements. In addition to previous actions taken to prevent recurrence, Security now requires all personnel to sign a page of "Basic Security Procedures" prior to receiving a badge. 1 4 80 FACILITY METHOD OF DISCOVERY (30)% POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) E (28) 91 7 ØI NA A (31) Found by an operator 10 CONTENT 9 ACTIVITY 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED_OF RELEASE Z (33) (34) NA NA 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE Ø Ø Ø (37) Z (38) NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NA (40) 20 8407180153 840706 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION E22 (43)PDR ADOCK 05000346 PDR Z (42) NA 9 5 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) N (44) NA 68 69 2-135 & 82-136 PREPARER DVRs Lynn E. Richter (419) 259-5000, Ext. 369 PHONE ..

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-70

DATE OF EVENT: November 5, 1982

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Spent Fuel Pool Negative Pressure Boundary Door 400 not completely closed and latched

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2686 and Load (Gross MWE) = 906

Description of Occurrence: On November 5, 1982 at 1350 hours, an operator found door 400 not completely closed and latched. This door opens into the southwest stairway in the Auxiliary Building on the 603' level and is a part of the negative pressure boundary for the spent fuel pool area. The door was not blocked open, but was being held open by a differential pressure across it.

Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires two independent Emergency Ventilation Systems (EVS) servicing the spent fuel pool area to be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. Due to door 400 being open, the effectiveness of the EVS in drawing down the spent fuel pool area to a negative pressure $\geq 1/3$ " water gauge, is reduced. The action statement requirements of Technical Specification 3.9.12 were being met since there were no operations ongoing at the time of the occurrence involving the movement of fuel within the pool or crane operations with loads over the pool.

Technical Specification 3.7.10 was also invoked since door 400 is also a fire door. Upon discovery, the operator closed the door, removing the unit from the action statements.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is personnel error in that the last person through the door did not ensure that it was securely closed. However, the responsible person(s) could not be identified. Under normal ventilation conditions, the closure mechanism on this door will ensure that it is completely closed. The stairwell in which door 400 opens into is serviced by the Radwaste Area Supply and Exhaust Fans. On November 5, 1982, the supply fan tripped, and the exhaust fans kept running. This created a negative pressure in the stairwell and prevented the closure mechanism from completely closing the door.

Nontheless, the person passing through the door should have noticed that the door did not slam shut, as it does under normal conditions, and should have personally ensured that the door was securely latched.

<u>Analysis of Occurrence</u>: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. In the event of an EVS actuation, the TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-70 PAGE 2

1

1

Radwaste Area Exhaust Fans would have been automatically tripped, and the differential pressure due to the EVS would have caused the door to close.

<u>Corrective Action</u>: The station has previously taken many actions to prevent recurrences of this problem. However, in addition to these actions, Security has implemented a program which requires every person to read and sign a page of "Basic Security Procedures" prior to receiving a badge. Item ten of the page emphasizes that it is the individual's responsibility to make sure all negative pressure boundary and fire doors are secured behind them when entering or exiting an area.

Failure Data: There have been many previous occurrences of open fire and negative pressure boundary doors. However, those reported within the last year include NP-33-81-91 (81-076), NP-33-82-04 (82-003), NP-33-82-05 (82-004), NP-33-82-11 (82-009), NP-33-82-16 (92-014), NP-33-82-17 (82-016), NP-33-82-27 (82-022), NP-33-82-29 (82-026), NP- 3-82-35 (82-031), NP-33-82-42 (82-037), NP-33-82-48 (82-043), NP-33-82-53 and (82-048).



July 6, 1984

Log No. K84-788 File: RR 2 (NP-33-82-70)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 82-057. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please destroy your previous copy of this report and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Tery Dominay

Terry D. Murray Station Superintendent Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/1jk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III

> Mr. Walt Rogers DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001