

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)  
Inadequate Isolation of Building Heat System Between Reactor and Turbine Building

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 6	1 5	8 4	8 4	0 2 5	0 0	0 7	0 3	8 4	Browns Ferry - Unit 2		0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0
									Browns Ferry - Unit 3		0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6

OPERATING MODE (9)  N

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Jimmy B. Walker	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 0 8 6 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A review of the building heat system by Engineering Design during the Information Bulletin 79-14 inspection determined that the isolation, between the turbine and reactor building heat system lines were inadequate.

The failure to follow design criteria as specified in Browns Ferry Nuclear Final Safety Analysis Report and inadequate design review by the reviewer was the main problem.

A safety evaluation of secondary containment capability was performed immediately. An evaluation of the calculated inleakage rate, based on the latest performance of the surveillance instruction, concluded that a compromise of secondary containment does not exist.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5   0   0   0   2   5   9	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8   4	- 0   2   5	- 0   0	0   2	OF 0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power, unit 2 was operating at 61 percent power, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. All three units were affected by this event.

On June 15, 1984, during the IE Bulletin 79-14 inspection of the building heat (JK) system between the reactor and turbine building, TVA Design personnel estimated an inleakage, for total line failure, to exceed safety limits for maintaining secondary containment (BD) integrity.

A safety evaluation of the secondary containment capability was immediately performed. The flow rate calculated by the total heat system line loss was taken from the original technical specification limits and compared to the flow rate capacity value obtained during the last time the surveillance instruction was performed. It was concluded from the calculations obtained that a compromise of secondary containment does not exist.

The units were not affected by this event. Although the additional flow of air contributed by the heat system lines in the event of a total line failures to secondary containment was not taken into the original calculation, the Design values and technical specification limits were large enough to accommodate this additional flow should a failure of this nature ever occur.

Additional corrective action may be performed after an evaluation of secondary containment isolation requirement and alternatives are examined.

Responsible Section - ED

Previous Similar Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

P. O. Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602

JUL 3 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  
REPORT BFRO-50-259/84025

The enclosed report provides details concerning inadequate isolation of  
building heat system between reactor and turbine building. This report is  
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



G. T. Jones  
Power Plant Superintendent  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):  
Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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