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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear)
Station, Unit No. 1))

Docket No. 50-289 SP
(Restart Remand
on Management)

LICENSEE'S COMMENTS
IN RESPONSE TO CLI-84-18

By its Order dated September 11, 1984 (CLI-84-18) the Commission requested comments from the parties to the TMI-1 restart proceeding on the need for further hearings on (1) the issues of the adequacy of Licensee's training program, the Dieckamp mailgram and leak rate practices at TMI-1 previously remanded by the Appeal Board by ALAB-772, (2) the issue of the Hartman allegations as to leak rate testing practices at TMI-2 previously remanded by the Appeal Board to the Licensing Board by ALAB-738, and (3) matters addressed by the NRC Staff in Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-0680. In addition the Commission requested the views of the parties as to whether the Appeal Board

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had the legal authority to impose in ALAB-772 the requirement that Mr. Charles Husted "have no supervisory responsibilities insofar as the training of non-licensed personnel is concerned" where Mr. Husted is not a party to the proceeding and has had no notice of a possible sanction or opportunity to request a hearing. Licensee's comments on these matters are presented in the same order as they are addressed in CLI-84-18.

In brief, it is Licensee's position that the issues remanded by the Appeal Board in ALAB-772 and ALAB-738 need not be the subject of further hearings in the TMI-1 restart proceeding and that the Appeal Board's orders reopening the hearing on these issues were unnecessary and incorrect. Licensee further believes that none of the information addressed in Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-0680 requires or justifies a reopening of the record.

CLI-84-18 also indicates that if the Commission should decide that further hearings are required, it will also decide whether to require completion of those hearings prior to a decision on lifting the effectiveness of its July 2 and August 9, 1979 orders. Licensee's views on this question are fully set forth in Licensee's Comments on ALAB-772 (Management Phase), dated May 29, 1984, and in Licensee's Comments in Response to Commission Order of June 1, 1984, dated July 26, 1984.

1. Training

In its August, 1981 partial initial decision, based on an extensive record, the Licensing Board found that training was adequate and that Licensee complied with the Commission's Orders on training. LBP-81-32, 14 N.R.C. 381, 478-79 (1981). This partial decision, which the Appeal Board did not fault, was made subject to the outcome of the Licensing Board's inquiry into cheating. The Appeal Board does not quarrel with the record subsequently developed by the Licensing Board on the cheating incidents, finding that "the overall inquiry (especially the hearing) was as thorough as possible." ALAB-772, slip op. at 61. The Appeal Board's principal difficulty with the record overall, however, was that the Licensing Board, subsequent to development of the cheating record, did not seek from the independent experts who testified on behalf of Licensee, and who were relied on by the Board in reaching its initial findings on the substantive adequacy of Licensee's training program, further testimony as to their conclusions in the light of the cheating record. Id. at 65, 67.

The Appeal Board's concern suggests that the Licensing Board insufficiently appreciated the infirmities in Licensee's training program which contributed to cheating as disclosed by

the reopened hearing.^{1/} This is not the case. Indeed the Licensing Board took careful stock of Licensee's substantial improvements in test administration designed to cure the identified problems. LBP-82-56, 16 N.R.C. 281, 296-297, 359-360. In contrast, the Appeal Board, in a footnote, simply notes it did not overlook Licensee's improvements. ALAB-772, slip op. at 63 n. 47. The Appeal Board opines that the improvements even when supplemented by additional steps required by the Licensing Board^{2/} are largely ministerial and not sufficiently convincing fixes of "what may be more serious infirmities in the training program." Id. (emphasis added).

To ensure Licensee's examination administration improvements coupled with other improvements added by Licensing Board conditions were sufficient, the Board required that Licensee be subject to a two-year probationary period during which Licensee's qualification and requalification testing and training

^{1/} This view is somewhat surprising, given the Appeal Board's concurrent recognition that "the adequacy of licensee's training program consumed an enormous amount of hearing time below." ALAB-774 (June 19, 1984), at 8, citing ALAB-772, slip op. at 14-15.

^{2/} Licensee took no issue with the Licensing Board's conditions requiring additional improvements. Notwithstanding the Appeal Board's willingness to take note of "newly supplied, essentially 'objective' information," see ALAB-772, slip op. at 157, it ignored the "objective" fact that Licensee has fully implemented the Licensing Board's conditions for licensed operator training and the Staff has approved the implementation. See Licensee's Comments on the List of Integrity Issues (February 21, 1984), attached Status Report at 36, 45-46.

program shall be subjected to an in-depth audit by independent auditors, approved by the Director of NRR, such auditors to have had no role in the TMI-1 restart proceedings.^{3/} This added assurance the Appeal Board treats in two sentences finding it "necessary and desirable"; however, it is unable to determine whether this assurance is sufficient. ALAB-772, slip op. at 65-66.

The fundamental disagreement between the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board was whether the Licensing Board was correct in concluding that Licensee's commitments together with the additional conditions imposed by the Board constituted an adequate resolution of admitted deficiencies in Licensee's training program. Licensee submits that they were. The cheating incidents and poor administration of training tests disclosed in the reopened cheating hearing were matters susceptible to correction and they have been corrected. They have little bearing on the substantive adequacy of the training which the TMI-1 operators received, which the Licensing Board endorsed on the basis of extensive hearings and which the Appeal Board would now have the Licensing Board re-examine.

^{3/} Again, Licensee took no issue with this requirement. And again, although the Appeal Board took no notice under its "objective" evidence standard, Licensee nominated an independent auditor on May 3, 1983, and the Staff on April 9, 1984, approved Licensee's nominee.

The Commission has ample evidence of the correctness and efficacy of the Licensing Board's conclusion. The Commission has available to it from independent reviewers substantial information on Licensee's training program. These independent judgments are subsequent to disclosure of the cheating incidents and the deficiencies in Licensing's administration of training noted in the reopened hearing record. Thus, Licensee's training program has been the subject of NRC reviews and inspections. See, for example, NRC Inspection Reports 82-19, 83-02, 83-10, 83-22, 83-29, 84-04; 1982 SALP (January 20, 1983); 1983 SALP (May 7, 1984); NUREG-0680, Supp. 4 (October, 1983); Operational Readiness Evaluation 84-05 (April 13, 1984); Licensed Operator Review and Summary (March 30, 1984). The training program has been the subject of an independent review by Design Data Laboratories (provided by Board Notification to Appeal Board on October 5, 1982), the very firm which has been endorsed by Mr. Denton to conduct a two-year independent audit of Licensee training as required by the Licensing Board. Licensee's training program has also been the subject of INPO evaluations in October, 1981 and May, 1983, which included assessments of training.

These reports have all been provided and are available for Commission consideration. Together they provide a solid basis for concluding that a sound training program has been in effect at TMI-1. The program specifically protects against cheating

and corrects the deficiencies found by the Licensing Board, noted by the Appeal Board, and acknowledged by Licensee to have existed in the early post-accident training period.

In the area of licensed operator training, the Appeal Board has simply displaced the Licensing Board's determination with its own, despite the Licensing Board's first hand observation of Licensee's program and the people who administer it. The Appeal Board has ordered reopening to explore what even it only postulates "may be" more serious infirmities in the training program. Licensee submits that the Licensing Board's decision, based on its extraordinarily thorough review of Licensee's training programs, procedures and managers, was adequate. The Appeal Board's substituted judgment, which would apply a perfection to the record that is unnecessary, is erroneous. The Commission should reinstate the Licensing Board's decision on licensed operator training.

2. Dieckamp Mailgram

The second area where the Appeal Board found the record is not as complete as it should be concerns the circumstances surrounding a mailgram sent by GPU President Herman Dieckamp to Congressman Morris Udall in May, 1979.

The Dieckamp mailgram was sent on May 9, 1979, to correct what Mr. Dieckamp viewed as an inaccurate news account which followed a tour of TMI two days earlier by Congressman Udall

and others. In pertinent part the mailgram stated, "[t]here is no evidence that anyone interpreted the 'pressure spike' and the spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any information." Today, more than five years after the mailgram, after reviews of this subject by NRC's Special Inquiry Group and a special I and E investigative team which reported its findings in NUREG-0760 and indeed, after questioning of Mr. Dieckamp by the Commission itself, it is clear Mr. Dieckamp's mailgram was accurate. Mr. Dieckamp spoke from a considerable awareness of the information available at the time by virtue of his personal reviews of interviews conducted following the accident and his personal involvement in review sessions with GPU's team which was then trying to recreate the accident events at the TMI site. While it is arguable now that one operator may have gleaned more understanding of the pressure spike than anyone else who was aware of it when it occurred, even that operator's views were not expressed or known to Mr. Dieckamp in May, 1979. In fact, this operator's first real indication of a link between the pressure spike and core damage came a year and a half later during an interview by the NUREG-0760 investigative team. That team subsequently determined:

The investigators conclude that hydrogen was not believed to be the cause of the pressure spike. The testimony reviewed leads the investigators to further conclude that hydrogen was not discussed on March 28, 1979. This conclusion concerning

hydrogen not being identified as the cause of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979, is based on the testimony of operators and a review of the engineered safety systems. (NUREG-0760, "Investigation into Information Flow during the Accident at Three Mile Island" (Jan. 1981) at 24.)

The Appeal Board believes the Licensing Board should have inquired more deeply into this matter on its own,^{4/} and should not have relied on an I&E report on the subject and the testimony of the head of the I&E team that investigated the subject and issued the report.

As with the training issue, the Appeal Board unjustifiably rejects the Licensing Board's belief that it had enough information and more information was not necessary on this matter. While admitting that the additional hearing it orders "may not be particularly fruitful," ALAB-772, slip op. at 133, the Appeal Board believes it's "worth some additional effort," particularly since it is remanding in any event on the training issue. Id. at 134.

The Appeal Board erred in applying a lower threshold for reopening this issue because it was remanding in any event another matter. The test for reopening on each issue should be

^{4/} This is the same Licensing Board about which the Appeal Board states "Our canvas of the record reveals a board well aware of its responsibility to the public and the Commission to ensure that it receives all information necessary to a thorough investigation and resolution of the questions before it." ALAB-772, slip op. at 94 (citations omitted).

independently applied.^{5/} Although on the training issue the Appeal Board finds that the test for reopening is met,^{6/} see id. at 66 n. 50, it does not even make such a determination as to the Dieckamp mailgram, let alone support it.

The Appeal Board regarded it as particularly important that Mr. Dieckamp be questioned on the subject of the mailgram. It faults the Licensing Board for not doing so on its own, despite the fact that no party sought to question Mr. Dieckamp on the subject when he appeared as a witness. With their interest in this subject so keen as to require a reopening, we believe the Appeal Board erred in not pursuing whether Mr. Dieckamp was questioned on this subject. It is a matter of fact that he was questioned, and by the very I&E team that the Licensing Board relied on for its determination in the Dieckamp matter.^{7/} No party challenges that fact, nor could it.

^{5/} See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-756, 18 N.R.C. 1340, 1344-46 (1983).

^{6/} Licensee disputes this determination. See discussion of training record, supra.

^{7/} Licensee explicitly pointed in its brief to the Appeal Board to the fact that Mr. Dieckamp specifically was questioned on this subject. Licensee's Brief at 58 n. 60. Moreover, Licensee's Comments to the Commission on Immediate Effectiveness in which this subject was further addressed were provided to the Appeal Board in September, 1981. The Commission itself has questioned Mr. Dieckamp. See Public Meeting, Presentation on TMI-1 Restart, October 14, 1981, at 10, 91-95 (morning session) and at 3-6 (afternoon session).

Under its "objective" standard, see n. 2, supra, the Appeal Board certainly could have determined conclusively that Mr. Dieckamp was questioned. Its finding that the transcript "suggests" he was questioned is unfathomable under the circumstances.^{8/} Undoubtedly, however, the Commission knows Mr. Dieckamp was questioned. To ignore this fact, to therefore fault the adequacy of the I&E investigation effort upon which the Licensing Board relied, and to consequently fault the Licensing Board and the adequacy of the record on this count is erroneous. The Commission should reverse the Appeal Board's reopening on this matter, and avoid a costly additional proceeding which the Appeal Board itself admits "may not be particularly fruitful."

3. TMI-1 Leak Rate Testing

The third area where the Appeal Board would reopen and remand the proceeding for further hearing concerns leak rate testing practices at TMI-1. This subject was not specifically addressed in the restart hearings nor was it the subject of exceptions or related appellate briefs before the Appeal Board. Rather, it was raised in a motion to reopen in January, 1984, which is granted in ALAB-772. The Appeal Board has erred in

^{8/} The remand on this basis is particularly disturbing given the fact that the Appeal Board never asked a question on this subject during some 30 months when the appeal lay before them or during a full day's oral argument on this appeal.

determining that this matter is so significant that a different result would have been reached by the Licensing Board if this subject had been considered in the hearing.

The Appeal Board in its discussion of leak rate practice first clarifies ALAB-738 by stating that all that it reopened in that decision was preaccident leak rate practices at TMI-2 and that there was no basis at the time to explore leak rate practices at both units. ALAB-772, slip op. at 151-152. It then goes on to cite the Board notifications by the staff of indications of practices at TMI-1 "similar to" (not, as incorrectly stated by the Appeal Board, the "same" as) those at Unit 2. The Appeal Board reasons that if the allegations at Unit 2 which were the subject of a Justice Department investigation (and ultimately a criminal proceeding) were so significant that the Licensing Board made its decision subject to the outcome of that investigation, then "[t]he same necessarily follows for the new allegations concerning leak rate practices at TMI-1." Id. at 152.

Looking only to the cryptic Board Notifications by the Staff, one can understand how the Appeal Board jumped to the conclusion that leak rate practices at TMI-1 could be equated with leak rate practices at TMI-2. But by the time the Appeal Board issued its decision in ALAB-772 it had before it the completed reports of the OI investigation of the subject (#1-83-028 and supplement). Those reports found none of the

leak rate data falsifications or test manipulations alleged to have occurred at TMI-2 nor any other deficiencies of enough significance to warrant reopening the record for further hearings. The Staff's position has now been confirmed in Supplement No. 5. Earlier disturbing references to Unit 1 practices as similar to Unit 2 have been dispelled.

Having already made up its mind on the basis of the Board Notifications, however, the Appeal Board concluded that the OI report "reinforced" its decision, but for reasons having nothing to do with leak rate falsification or manipulation. It arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding its acknowledgement that "the overall conclusion of the report is favorable to Licensee." Specifically the Appeal Board found that the reports "disclosed (1) a lack of understanding concerning record keeping requirements; (2) ignorance (over a period of several years) by both operating staff and management of the existence and significance for leak rate calculations of a "loop seal" in the instrumentation system; and (3) inattention during the pre-accident period to work requests that would have highlighted the loop seal problem." It then concludes, without explanation, that the reports are "the type of material that is best scrutinized by the Licensing Board as part of its review of all of the circumstances surrounding the leak rate testing practices at Unit 1" (emphasis in original). Nowhere does the Appeal Board suggest that the additional information derived

from the reports would in itself meet the test for reopening the record.

4. Mr. Husted

Licensee believes that NRC adjudicatory boards in an ongoing hearing do not have the legal authority to impose a condition on a licensee which in effect operates as a sanction against an individual, when that individual is not a party to the proceeding and has no notice of a possible sanction or opportunity to request a hearing. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Birkenfield v. United States, 369 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1966). In Birkenfield the court stated succinctly the constitutional due process requirement involved:

Due process demands that an individual whose livelihood is threatened by administrative action be given notice and a hearing to fairly rebut the evidence against him. Particularly should this be so in cases where the action of an administrative body, as the regulator of qualifications for an entire field of private employment, may entirely foreclose an individual from employment opportunities." Id. at 493-94.

Whatever inroads the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) may have made on the due process rights of Government employees, we believe that Greene and Birkenfield remain the law with respect to private employees.

1. TMI-2 Leak Rate Testing

Licensee does not suggest that further investigation and public airing of leak rate testing practices at TMI-2 should not take place. On the contrary, as discussed under the next subheading, there needs to be a resolution of allegations and suspicions which now prevent Licensee from making full use of individuals associated with leak rate testing at TMI-2. There is no reason, however, why the further investigations and any public proceedings which may grow out of them need take place in the context of the TMI-1 restart hearing.

Licensee has commissioned its own independent investigation of leak rate testing at TMI-2. The investigation began after the TMI-2 operators were no longer threatened with criminal indictments and therefore available for interview. The results of that investigation will be made publicly available. Licensee also understands that NRC has underway investigations aimed at determining the role of selected TMI-2 personnel in leak rate testing. Presumably the results of those investigations and any enforcement actions concerning those individuals will be made public. Meanwhile, pending the outcome of these investigations, Licensee has agreed that, except for Mr. Ross who has been cleared of involvement, no TMI-2 licensed operator (who therefore could have been involved in leak rate testing at

TMI-2) would operate TMI-1 and has taken other steps described in Mr. Dieckamp's letter of June 10, 1983.

As the NRC Staff concluded in NUREG-0680 Supplement No. 5:

"The evidence presented to the grand jury and developed by the U.S. Attorney did not indicate that any of the directors or officers of GPUN, from the time of its organization in 1982 to the date of the indictment, or any of the directors of Met-Ed, during the period covered by the indictment, participated in, directed, condoned, or were aware of the acts or omissions that were contained in the indictment." (Supplement No. 5, p. 5-4).

This conclusion is also supported by the Statement of Facts submitted by the Department of Justice in support of the plea agreement in the criminal proceeding:

"[T]he evidence presented to the grand jury and developed by the United States Attorney does not indicate that any of the following persons participated in, directed, condoned or was aware of the acts or omissions that are the subject of the indictment:

William G. Kuhns	Frederick D. Hafer
Herman M. Dieckamp	Richard Heward
Robert C. Arnold	Henry D. Hukill
James S. Bartman	Edwin E. Kintner
Shepard Bartnoff	James R. Leva
Bernard H. Cherry	Robert L. Long
Phillip R. Clark	Frank Manganaro
Verner H. Condon	Ernest M. Schieicher
Walter M. Creitz	Floyd J. Smith
Robert Fasulo	William A. Verrochi
Ivan R. Finfrock	Raymond Werts
William L. Gifford	Richard F. Wilson

The above list of individuals includes all directors and officers of GPU Nuclear Corporation from its organization in 1982 to the date of the indictment and all directors of the defendant company during the period covered by the indictment." (OI Report No. 1-83-010, Ex. 48, pp. 1-2).

Thus, the NRC Staff and the Department of Justice found that current GPU management and directors had no involvement in this matter. In addition, the Commission, in its September 11, 1984 Order (CLI-84-18) relating to the Hartman allegations, concluded that the current GPU Board of Directors "had no connection to or responsibility for the actions taken in 1978 and 1979 that led to the criminal convictions." (p. 7). The Commission also pointed out that none "of the individuals who may have been directly responsible for the falsifications [are] currently employed in operational positions at TMI-1." (Id., pp. 7-8). Indeed, all but one of the TMI-2 management personnel whose conduct the Staff questioned in connection with this matter are no longer employed by GPUN, and the remaining individual is not assigned to activities pertaining to the restart of operation of TMI-1.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that the Department of Justice specifically contrasted the problems encountered at TMI-2 on leak rate testing, with the absence of any such problems in other surveillance testing at TMI-2.

"None of the Operations Department employees could identify any other surveillance test conducted at TMI Unit 2 that was treated in the same manner; that is, acceptable test results filed, unacceptable ones discarded, without other documentation created or notification to the NRC supplied. Nor could any employee point to any surveillance test that was functionally inoperable without corrective action being taken." (OI Report No. 1-83-010, Ex. 48, pp. 9-10).

Moreover, the NRC Staff also found that none of the TMI-1 operation or management personnel were involved in or had knowledge of the falsification of TMI-2 leak rates:

"On the basis of its subsequent review of the TMI-1 leak rate investigation...NRR concluded that none of the operational or management personnel at TMI-1 were involved in culpable activities or had knowledge of falsification of TMI-2 leak rate data." (Supplement No. 5, p. 5-5).

Certainly, given these uncontroverted and favorable determinations relating to the absence of any involvement with the Hartman allegations by current TMI-1 management, there is no need to reopen the restart hearings on the Hartman allegations.

2. Reassignment of Personnel

Footnote 3 (second paragraph) to Section II of CLI-84-18 states:

"...The Commission also recognizes that licensee, until the open issues (including the Hartman allegations) are resolved, has temporarily reassigned personnel in such a manner that those functions which provide an overview assessment, analysis, or audit of plant activities, contain only personnel who, prior to the accident, had not been in a management, supervisory, or professional position at TMI-1 or -2. The parties in their comments should address whether or not further evidentiary hearings are required to determine the final disposition of the status of these individuals and whether any such hearings can be separated from the restart proceeding. Licensee in this connection should provide a list of the individuals who have been temporarily reassigned and who licensee may wish to return to TMI-1 at any time in the future." (Emphasis added)

Licensee notes that this is not exactly as stated in Mr. Dieckamp's letter of June 10, 1983 and thus committed to by licensee. Specifically, the June 10, 1983 letter states:

"In order to provide added assurance;

We will reassign personnel such that those functions which provide an overview assessment, analysis, or audit of plant activities specifically;

General Office Review Board
Independent On-Site Safety Group
Shift Technical Advisors
Q/A Audit
Q/A and Q/C Site Staff
Licensing
Radiation Control
Emergency Preparedness

will contain only personnel with no pre-accident involvement as Met Ed exempt employees at TMI-1 or 2. We will continue this constraint until the open issues are effectively resolved." (Emphasis added)

Licensee does not consider that any further evidentiary hearings are needed to determine the final disposition of the status of these individuals. We believe the investigations completed to date by NRC and Licensee and those underway, notably the NRC and Stier investigations of TMI-2 leak rate testing practices, will provide ample basis for decisions by Licensee and NRC for any further action.

If evidentiary hearings are determined to be required, they clearly should be separate from the restart proceeding. The premise of Licensee's actions described in Mr. Dieckamp's letter of June 10, 1983, was precisely to permit and ensure such separation.

With regard to reassignment of those employees temporarily reassigned or barred from certain future assignments by Licensee until the open issues were resolved, Licensee desires to have the ability to use each of them within its nuclear activities without restriction at the earliest date possible. We would expect that completion of the investigations now underway and any NRC assessment of the results would result in an overall conclusion that anyone not specifically identified as having behaved improperly would no longer need to be restricted by us or anyone else with regard to nuclear activities. We believe that these employees are, in fairness, entitled to no less.

The great majority of the GPU System employees who have been temporarily reassigned or barred from certain future assignments until the open issues are resolved have invested a significant part of their lives in acquiring their nuclear training and skills. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to utilize that training and these skills as an employee of the Licensee or any other organization with which they may be associated in the future, unless there is substantial evidence to establish that this is required by the public interest or by violation of the employment and corporate policies of their employer. Moreover, the Licensee believes that it is incumbent upon it, before imposing a sanction upon any employee, to afford to that employee an opportunity to know the reason

for the proposed sanction and to give him an opportunity to present any rebuttal or exculpatory evidence. As the Licensee understands the Commission's regulations and policies, the Commission does not expect a Licensee to do otherwise.

Attachment I is a list of the Met Ed exempt employees at TMI in March, 1979, showing those specifically addressed and those reassigned in accordance with Mr. Dieckamp's letter of June 10, 1983. The current assignment of those individuals (i.e. with GPU Nuclear, with other GPU system companies, or no longer with the GPU system) is identified. GPUNC is interested in resolving any open questions so as to permit unrestricted use of all of these employees now employed by GPU Nuclear, including use in overview assessment, analysis or audit of TMI-1 plant activities.

NUREG-0680, SUPPLEMENT NO. 5

1. TMI-1 Leak Rate Practices

See discussion of ALAB-772 above.

2. Hartman Allegations

As to Hartman's allegations concerning leak rate practices, see discussion of ALAB-738 above. There are four additional Hartman allegations addressed in Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-0680. Three of these relate to pre-accident activities at TMI-2 and the fourth to Mr. Hartman's termination. In

general, Licensee concurs in the Staff's evaluation of these allegations. In any event, we see no link between the allegations and the restart of TMI-1.

In connection with the Hartman allegations Supplement No. 5 also discusses the Faegre & Benson report and repeats, without further inquiry, the conclusion contained in the EDO memorandum to the Commission on June 29, 1983, that Licensee should have made a Board Notification of the report and associated Hartman deposition. Based precisely on the information contained in the EDO memorandum, Licensee disagrees. Thus the memorandum informed the Commission:

"The Report is primarily an investigation of plant records and other technical data related to ways the leak rate data could have been manipulated...The Report and depositions do not add substantially to the information of which the NRC was aware at the time those documents were prepared...While the Hartman allegations are analyzed technically, and a further extensive voluntary statement was taken to aid the investigation, the Report does not evaluate the role or knowledge of any other individuals in the acts alleged...The substance of the Hartman allegations remain (sic) virtually unchanged as a consequence of the Report."

Bearing in mind that the Staff had advised the Licensing Board in Supplement No. 2 to its Safety Evaluation Report that "the leak rate matter was only of historical significance" and that the Licensing Board made only a brief reference to the subject in its management decision, it is pure hindsight to

assert that Licensee should have assumed a Board interest in the Faegre & Benson report. Further, with respect to the timing of any report to the Board, the report by itself could not have been of any use to the Board at a time when, because of the restraints placed by the Department of Justice investigations on the availability of those individuals who participated in leak rate testing, it was impossible for the Board to explore the substance of the Hartman allegations.

3. Reportability of BETA/RHR Reports

CLI-84-18 instructs the parties not to "address matters where motions to reopen have already been granted or denied on the same information cited by staff, but rather should specify what, if any, new information has not yet been passed on by a Board warrants reopening of the record." In ALAB-774 the Appeal Board denied the Aamodt's motion, based on the same OI investigative report referenced in Supplement No. 5 (1-83-013), to reopen the hearing with respect to Licensee's alleged failure to provide the BETA/RHR reports in a timely fashion. Licensee is unaware of any new information on this issue.

4. Training

As to post-accident training at TMI-1, see discussion of ALAB-772 above. With respect to alleged pre-accident training irregularities addressed in Supplement No. 5, the Appeal Board in ALAB-774 denied the Aamodts' motion, based on the same OI

report referenced in Supplement No. 5 (Q-1-84-004), to reopen the hearing with respect to pre-accident training irregularities. Licensee is unaware of any new information on this issue.

5. Keaton Report

Supplement No. 5 addresses five subtopics under the heading of Keaton Report and summarizes the Staff's conclusions at p. 8-36. Licensee concurs in conclusions (1), (3), (4) and (5), none of which provide a basis for reopening the hearing. With respect to conclusion (2), relating to the accuracy of information contained in Met-Ed's response to the October 25, 1979 Notice of Violation, two GPU individuals are implicated by Supplement No. 5. Neither of these individuals is involved with restart of TMI-1, and there is thus no reason to reopen the restart hearing even if the Staff's questions regarding the two individuals are valid.^{9/}

6. Changes to the Lucien Report

Supplement No. 5 addresses the question whether improper influence by management or by individuals from Licensee's startup and test organization had been exerted on a contractor

^{9/} As to questions regarding these individuals, it is Licensee's belief that these two individuals deserve an appropriate opportunity to air the questions in an individual forum so as to remove any cloud on their actions.

whose 1980 report on pre-accident practices at TMI-2 was critical of Licensee. Even prior to the issuance of Supplement No. 5 NRR concluded that the information developed by OI concerning the contractor report did not raise questions concerning the integrity of management or the Licensee employees involved, and further determined that the individual employees have been contributors to important changes in the present startup and test program at TMI-1 which Region I characterized as exceptional. Memorandum from the Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors Safety, to the Director, Office of Investigations, Region I, Field Office, dated April 24, 1984, at 4-5 (Exhibit 6 to OI Investigation Report Q-1-84-006). Supplement No. 5 reinforces this conclusion and provides no basis for reopening the hearing.

7. Parks, King, Gischel

In early 1983, allegations were made by three Licensee employees and one Bechtel employee at TMI-2 that they were harassed or discriminated against for raising safety concerns. There have been two major investigations of these allegations, one by OI and one commissioned by Licensee and performed by Edwin Stier, former Director of the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice. After reviewing in excess of 1000 documents and obtaining sworn statements from approximately 80 witnesses, Mr. Stier found that none of Licensee's employees had harassed these individuals as they alleged:

The allegations that accuse management of following a policy of ignoring problems brought to its attention and of punishing employees who raised the issues are untrue.

Stier Report, ("TMI-2 Report: Management and Safety Allegations"), dated November 16, 1983, Volume I at 13.

Supplement No. 5 and the corresponding OI report did not give Licensee management the same clean bill of health. However, they raise no question regarding any Licensee management personnel who are involved with restart and operation of TMI-1 and thus provide no basis for reopening the restart decision.^{10/}

8. Change of Operator Testimony

OI reports no evidence that Licensee management influenced or made any attempt to influence the testimony of the operators in the B&W litigation. OI reported that the operators' testimony was based on their recollection of events during the accident and their review of technical data compiled and provided

^{10/} The one individual whose actions were questioned by OI and who had any responsibilities for TMI-1 was the then President of GPUN, Robert Arnold. Mr. Arnold has provided his views on the OI Report to Chairman Palladino in a letter dated June 8, 1984. Since Mr. Arnold has removed himself from the management of GPU Nuclear operations, resolution of his role, if any, in the alleged harassment -- or in any of the other issues in this proceeding -- is no longer necessary to resolution of the management integrity issues connected with the restart decision. Again it is Licensee's belief that Mr. Arnold deserves an individual forum in which to pursue and set straight the propriety of his actions. Licensee encourages the Commission to extend Mr. Arnold that opportunity.

to the operators during the course of the litigation. Supplement No. 5 reaches the same conclusion and provides no basis for reopening the restart hearing.11/

Respectfully submitted,

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

George F. Trowbridge, P.C.
Ernest L. Blake, P.C.

Counsel for Licensee

Dated: October 9, 1984

11/ Once again, the actions of at least one individual remain in doubt. Licensee believes that this individual deserves an individual forum to set the record straight.

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT I DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
* Plant Chem. Mgr.	3230	Fuhrer, E. C.	Eng. III-Nuc.	10/01/78
Chemistry Foreman	3230	Houser, E. W.	Chemistry Foreman	03/06/78
* Technical Analyst Sr. I	3200	Harbin, R. S.	Eng. Asst. II-Nuc.	06/14/76
* Mgr. Plant Operations	3210	Ross, M. J.	Supvr. Station Oper.	04/01/78
Engineer Sr. I	3210	Seitz, C. C.	Engr. II - Nuc.	10/01/78
* Engineer Sr. II	3210	Shipman, H. B.	Eng. III-Nuc.	12/01/78
Engineer Asst. Sr. II	3210	Desh, W. R.	Tech. Analyst Sr. I	04/01/78
** Shift Foreman	3211	Paules, J. R.	Eng. I-Nuc.	11/28/77
* Shift Supervisor	3211	Noll, L. G.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.	07/14/75
* Shift Supervisor	3211	Crouse, T. L.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.	03/01/78
* Shift Supervisor	3211	Janes, D. C.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.	05/15/78
** Radwaste Oper. Mgr.	3212	Mehler, B. A.	Shift Supvr.	04/01/78
Group Supvr.-Radwaste	3212	Hydrick, L. D.	Foreman-Radwaste Oper.	08/01/77
Group Supvr.-Radwaste	3212	McCann, R. D.	Foreman-Rad Protection	02/02/74
* Control Room Operator BU	3211	Bezilla, M. B.	Eng. Assoc. II	06/01/78
* Mgr. Plant Maint.	3220	Shovlin, D. M.	Supt. Maintenance	12/01/77
Plann. & Sched. Mgr.	3220	Troutman, R. C.	Unit Supvr. Mgmt. Control	01/01/79
Maintenance Planner III	3220	Daniels, E. W.	O.C. Spec.-Nuc.	04/01/75
Preventative Maint. Mgr.	3220	Snyder, M. G.	Supvr. I&C Maint.	12/01/78
Supvr. Prevent. Maint.	3220	Wilson, H. L.	Foreman-Maint.	01/01/74
Elec. Maint. Sr. Foreman	3227	Bowman, J. R.	Foreman-Maint.	10/06/75
Tech. Analyst III	3220	Eich, R. A.	Tech. Analyst II-Nuc.	09/18/78
Supvr. Welding	3220	Leonard, C. F.	Foreman-Maint.	09/01/74
Lead I&C Maint. Foreman	3221	Lawrence, E. G.	Foreman-Maint.	03/14/77
I&C Maint. Foreman	3221	Kalenevitch, B. R.	Foreman-Maint.	06/21/78
Mech. Maint. Foreman	3222	Snow, R. A.	Foreman-Maint.	07/07/75
Lead Elec. Maint. Foreman	3223	Rippon, C.E.	Foreman-Maint.	04/05/76
Elec. Maint. Sr. Foreman	3223	Light, G. R.	Foreman-Maint.	10/16/78

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
Lead Util. Maint. Foreman	3224	Grim, T. L.	Utility Foreman	06/01/78
Shift Maint. Foreman	3220	Herneisey, N. S.	Foreman-Maint.	09/01/74
Eng. III Mech.	3310	Bashista, J. R.	Eng. I-Nuc.	01/01/79
Lead Mech. Eng.	3310	Barley, R. O.	Eng. Sr. I-Nuc.	09/01/78
Eng. Sr. I	3310	Summers, R. L.	Engr. III-Nuc.	12/01/77
Eng. Sr. I	3310	Pearce, J. R.	Eng. III-Nuc.	05/15/78
Engineer III	3310	Shatto, M. A.	Eng. Assoc. II-Nuc.	01/01/76
* Lead Nuclear Eng.	3320	Wilkerson, W. S.	Eng. II-Nuc.	01/01/78
* Lead Elec. Eng.	3330	Hartman, C. E.	Eng. Sr. I-Nuc.	04/01/78
* Lead I&C Eng.	3340	Orlandi, V. P.	Eng. III-Nuc.	09/01/75
* Chemist Sr. II	3360	Reed, J. G.	Chem. Foreman-Nuc.	06/01/76
* Lead Fire Prot. Eng.	3370	O'Conner, T. A.	Tech. Analyst Sr. I	10/01/78
Chem Tech A BU	3230	Busansky, W. J.	Site Protection Sergeant	07/01/78

* SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER

** SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER AND REASSIGNED TO PRESENT POSITION

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT II DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
Lead System Eng. Supvr.	4241	Warren, R. P.	Eng. Sr. I - Nuc.	01/01/79
GMS Coordinator	4220	Beeman, R. P.	Tech. Analyst III - Nuc.	07/18/79
Lead Elec. Eng.	4241	Lawton, J. D.	Eng. II - Nuc.	10/30/78
Lead Mech. Eng.	4241	Ream, W. C.	Eng. II - Nuc.	03/01/78
Safety Review Eng.	4420	Benson, M. L.	Eng. II - Nuc.	04/01/77
Utility Lead Foreman	4224	Abromitis, J. C.	Utility Foreman - Nuc.	05/01/73
Utility Foreman	4224	McKinney, C. F.	Utility Foreman - Nuc.	08/01/77
Mgr. Plant Maint.	4220	Sieglitz, R. E.	Supvr. Unit Maint.	11/01/78
Mech. Eng.	4241	Jenkins, D. B.	Eng. III - Nuc.	11/01/78
Operations Eng.	4200	Marshall, W. J.	Eng. III - Nuc.	02/01/77
Shift Foreman	4211	Acker, T. H.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	06/13/77
Radwaste Support Manager	4214	Conaway, W. T.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	03/01/78
Foreman Radwaste Oper.	4215	Guthrie, C. L.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	03/01/73
Rad. Field Eng. Superv.	4374	Hoyt, K. R.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	05/09/77
Mgr. Plant Operations	4210	Miller, A. W.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	08/01/78
Chem. Lab. Service Mgr.	4212	Harner, K. L.	Chem. Foreman - Nuc.	01/01/77
Mgr. - Special Proj. II	4400	Potts, W. E.	Unit Supt. Tech. Sup. - Nuc.	01/15/79
Mgr. - Safety Review	4420	Kunder, G. A.	Unit Supt. Tech. Sup. - Nuc.	12/01/77
Lead DeCon Eng.	4374	McGarry, J. J.	Supvr. Mech. Maint. - Nuc.	07/07/73
Radwaste Oper. Mgr.	4215	Smith, B. G.	Shift Supvr.	09/01/74
Mech. Lead Foreman	4222	Jules, S. E.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	09/28/73
Mech. Foreman Sr.	4222	Games, J. N.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	08/01/69
I&C Eng. Asst. Sr. I	4221	Beare, M. F.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	09/15/77
Elec. Lead Foreman	4223	Rittle, B. J.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	08/01/73
Proj. Parts Coord.	4220	Crawfoot, E. R.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	05/06/74
I&C Foreman Sr.	4221	Knoche, A. J.	Foreman, Maint. - Nuc.	10/24/77
Plant Chem./Rad. Chemist	4212	Chevalier, G. E.	Chem. II - Nuc.	02/12/79
Budget & Cost Analyst Sr.	4361	Knoll, J. R.	Adm. - Nuc. Bud. and Rep.	06/01/78
Project Coord. Sr. III - Nuc.	4220	Stambaugh, G. E.	Foreman - Maint. - Nuc.	07/01/72
Fire Prot. Eng.	4241	Quinnette, J. W.	O. C. Assistant	12/05/77

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
Eng. Sr. I -TMI	5351	McGettrick, D.	Eng. II-Nuc.	01/01/77
Eng. Comp. Applications	5421	Fels, W. J.	Eng. III-Nuc.	01/08/76
Eng. Comp. Applications	5421	Geiger, R. C.	Eng. II-Nuc.	06/01/77
** Eng. TMI Fuels Parsip.	5412	Crawford, H. C.	Eng. I - Nuc.	06/01/77
* Manager, Startup & Test	5620	Hawkins, T.	Eng. Sr. I - Nuc.	07/01/78
Startup & Test Manager	5620	Porter, I. D.	Eng. Sr. I - Nuc.	06/01/78
Eng. Startup & Test	5620	Garrison, J.W.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.	08/01/78
Project Coordinator	5620	Mitchell, H. M.	Supvr. Elect. Maint.	09/01/74
Technical Analyst	5620	Shaffer, M. R.	Tech. Analyst III-Nuc.	10/18/76

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ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
NUCLEAR ASSURANCE DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
** QC Inspector - Unit II	6112	James, Z. L.	QC Asst. - Nuc.	08/31/77
** QC Program Eng. - Maint/Mods Unit II	6112	Shumaker, W. E.	QC Asst. - Nuc	01/03/78
** QA Systems Eng. Mgr.	6111	Fornicola, J. E.	Eng. II - Nuc.	08/01/77
** QA/QC Systems Eng. Supv.	6111	Potter, J. J.	QC Spec. Nuc.	09/01/77
** Unit II Project QA Eng.	6112	Hosking, D. L.	QC Spec. Nuc.	05/01/78
** QA Systems Eng.	6111	Tremblay, K. M.	QC Asst. Nuc.	01/29/79
** QA/QC Trng/Admin. Prog. Supvr.	6111	Deiter, D. R.	Shift Foreman - Nuc.	07/01/78
Welding Doc. Coordinator	6151	McConnell, D. K.	QA Spec. - Nuc.	09/25/78
** QA Audit Supvr. - Unit II	6161	Heysek, W. G.	QC Spec. - Nuc.	03/01/76
Protection Trng. Instr.	6211	Finicle, S. R.	Site Prot. Sergeant	10/13/78
* Supvr. Simulator Trng.	6211	Boltz, D. J.	Admin. - Nuc. Tech.Trng.	01/01/77
Simulator Instructor	6211	Showalter, E.	Eng.II-Nuc.	06/01/77
Technician Training Mgr.	6211	Zechman, R. W.	Supvr. Trng. Nuc.	11/14/77
Instructor - Elec.	6211	Randolph, C. E.	Tech. Analyst III - Nuc.	02/01/78
Instructor - Mech.	6211	Conrad, A.D.	Foreman - Maint. Nuc.	01/01/79
Instructor - Rad Con	6211	Deman, J. H.	Foreman - Rad. Proc.	10/01/79
** Safety Review Eng.	6301	Adams, C. D.	Shift Foreman	10/06/75
*** Safety Review Eng.	6301	Husted, C. E.	Admin. Nuc. Tech. Trng.	07/10/78
** Sr. Emergency Planner Unit II	6412	Brown, N. D.	Admin. Nuc. Tech. Trng.	06/01/75

* SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER

** SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER AND REASSIGNED TO PRESENT POSITION

*** SPECIFICALLY AND IDENTIFIED: ALAB - 772 05/24/84 AND JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTERS TO GOV. THORNBURGH AND CHAIRMAN PALLADINO. REASSIGNED TO PRESENT POSITION

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
ADMINISTRATION DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979PRESENT POSITIONTITLEDATE INTO POSITION

Supervisor Record Services	7132	Stowe, A.	Admin. Asst.	08/01/77
Coord. Gen.-Date Mgmt.	7132	Herman, W. D.	Tech. Analyst III	03/01/79
Staff Specialist	7250	Baney, K. L.	Supvr. Stores-Nuc.	01/01/78
Supervisor - Issue	7231	Reuter, G.	Foreman-Stores	07/02/73
Security-Supv. Unit II	7412	Stintzcum, R. D.	Site Prot. Sgt.	06/14/76

ATTACHMENT I (A)

GPU NUCLEAR
HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION

EXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

PRESENT POSITION

TITLE

DATE INTO POSITION

Administrator III

7320

Nixdorf, C. A.

Office Supvr.-Nuc.

05/15/74

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979PRESENT POSITIONTITLEDATE INTO POSITION

Public Affairs Manager	8100	Gross, W. R.	Coord.-Public Affairs	06/28/78
Communications Specialist	8200	Neidig, Jr. R. E.	QC Spec.-Nuc.	04/01/76

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
RADIOLOGICAL & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
Respirator Prot. Supvr.	9240	Gee, E. F.	Rep. Safety-Nuc.	03/01/77
Admin. Health Services	9710	Hengeveld, P. J.	Admin. Safety-Nuc.	08/01/78
Rad. Eng. Unit II	9242	Velez, P. P.	Foreman-Rad Protec.-Nuc.	06/13/77
Rad Eng. Unit II	9242	Mulleavy, T. L.	Supvr. Rad Prot. Nuc.	07/01/77

ATTACHMENT I (A)GPU NUCLEAR
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION DIVISIONEXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>			<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE INTO POSITION</u>
Manager Facilities (Pars.)	A050	Parker, W. H.	Supvr. Admin.	01/01/79
Supvr. of Services	A250	Wealand, J.	Admin. Safety TMI	11/01/77
Area Supvr. Rep. & Maint.	A250	Trautman, R.	Utility Foreman-Nuc.	03/22/76
Manager, M&C Planning	A210	Faulkner, J. T.	Unit Supvr. Mgmt. Const.	03/01/79
** Mgr. M&C Tech Supp.	A230	Bensel, R. W.	Eng. III-Nuc.	11/01/78

** SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER AND REASSIGNED TO PRESENT POSITION.

ATTACHMENT I (B)EMPLOYEES OF GPU SYSTEM COMPANIES OTHER THAN GPU NUCLEAR
WHO WERE EXEMPT METED EMPLOYEES MARCH 1979EXEMPT METED POSITION HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>PRESENT POSITION</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Coord.- Comec Date Flow (TMI)	GPU Service Corp	Gee, D. K.	Admin. Asst.
Foreman Utility (Titus)	MetEd	Campbell, R. R.	Tech. Analyst III - Nuc
Tech. Eng. - Gen. II	MetEd	Brummer, J. A.	Eng. II - Nuc.
Coord. - COMEC II	GPU Service Corp	Good, D. L.	Tech. Analyst Sr. I - Nuc
* Supt. Gen. Station (Titus)	MetEd	Zewe, W. H.	Shift Supvr. - Nuc
Dir. - Gen. Opers.	MetEd	Miller, G. P.	Mgr. - Gen. Station - Nuc
Supvr. - Station Maint. (Titus)	MetEd	Weaver, D. E.	Foreman - Maint. - Nuc
Foreman - Maint. Station (York Haven)	MetEd	Leakway, M. N.	Foreman - Maint. - Nuc

* SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER

10/04/84

ATTACHMENT I (C)

EXEMPT EMPLOYEES OF METED MARCH 1979
NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY GPU SYSTEM

EXEMPT METED POSITIONS HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Morck, T. E.	Eng. II-Nuc.
Landry, L. J.	Eng. II-Nuc.
Berry, D. J.	Eng. III-Nuc.
Pilsitz, D. L.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.
Parnell III, R. L.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.
Scheimann, Jr. F. J.	Shift Foreman-Nuc.
Huwe, F.	Foreman-Rad Prot.
Seelinger, J. L.	Unit Supt.-Nuc.
Logan, J. B.	Unit Supt.-Nuc.
Floyd, J. R.	Supvr.-Station Oper.Nuc.
Dubiel, R. W.	Supvr.-Rad Prot. & Chem. Nuc.
Mackey, T. A.	Supvr.-Q/C Nuc.
Limroth, D. F.	Supt. Adm. Tech. Supp. Nuc.
Bryan, K. P.	Shift Supvr.-Nuc.
Chwastyk, J. J.	Shift Supvr.-Nuc.
Hitz, G. R.	Shift Supvr.-Nuc.
Hutchison, R.	Shift Supvr.-Nuc.
James, J.	Site Prot. Sergeant
Corl, David	Site Prot. Sergeant
St. Pierre, R. L.	Q/C Spec.-Nuc.
Powell, J. C.	Q/C Spec.-Nuc.
* Rowe, C. D.	Q/C Asst.-Nuc.
Orwig, E. W.	Admin.-Nuc. Tech. Trng.
McCormick, F. A.	Group Supvr. Tech. Trng.
Beers, M. L.	Group Supvr. Tech. Trng.
Woska, L. D.	Foreman-Stores-Nuc.
Smith, J. R.	Foreman-Rad. Waste Opers.
Metzger, W. M.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.
Meck, E. A.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.

* SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED IN JUNE 1983 DIECKAMP LETTER

ATTACHMENT I (C)

EXEMPT EMPLOYEES OF METED MARCH 1979
NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY GPU SYSTEM

EXEMPT METED POSITIONS HELD AT TMI, MARCH 1979

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Gilbert, J. R.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.
Bennett, N. K.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.
Tcole, M. F.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.
Donahey, W. M.	Foreman-Maint. Nuc.
Dunlap, K. L.	Coord.-Public Info.
Daise, S.	Admin. Asst.-Nuc. Budget
Harris, E. W.	Suprv. - Comp. Appl.
Tennis, K. M.	Admin. Asst. Tech. Trng.
Mackey, T. A.	Supvr. QC
Kline, K. S.	Utility Foreman

October 9, 1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In the Matter of)	
)	
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY)	Docket No. 50-289
)	(Restart Remand
(Three Mile Island Nuclear)	on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1))	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of "Licensee's Comments in Response to CLI-84-18," dated October 9, 1984, were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 9th day of October, 1984.

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

Ernest L. Blake, Jr., P.C.

Dated: October 9, 1984

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In the Matter)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY) Docket No. 50-289 SP
) (Restart Remand on Management)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear)
Station, Unit No. 1))

SERVICE LIST

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	Administrative Judge John H. Buck Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	Administrative Judge Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
James K. Asselstine, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	Administrative Judge Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	Administrative Judge Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Lando W. Zeck, Jr., Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	
Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555	

Administrative Judge
Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docketing and Service Section (3)
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
Panel
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal
Board Panel
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Jack R. Goldberg, Esq. (4)
Office of the Executive Legal
Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Thomas Y. Au, Esq.
Office of Chief Counsel
Department of Environmental
Resources
505 Executive House
P.O. Box 2357
Harrisburg, PA 17120

William T. Russell
Deputy Director, Division
of Human Factors Safety
Office of NRR
Mail Stop AR5200
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Henry D. Hukill
Vice President
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, PA 17057

Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt
R.D. 5
Coatesville, PA 19320

Ms. Louise Bradford
TMI ALERT
1011 Green Street
Harrisburg, PA 17102

Joanne Doroshow, Esquire
The Christic Institute
1324 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20002

Lynne Bernabei, Esq.
Government Accountability
Project
1555 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20036

Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon, Weiss & Jordan
2001 S Street, N.W., Suite 430
Washington, D.C. 20009

Michael F. McBride, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036

Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Hunton & Williams
707 East Main Street
P.O. Box 1535
Richmond, VA 23212