

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-397/84-23

Docket No. 50-397


License No. NPF-21


Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968  
Richland, Washington 99352


Facility Name: WNP-2

Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington

Inspection conducted: August 27-31, 1984

Inspectors:  9/19/84  
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1 Date Signed

 9/19/84  
A. Hon, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Approved By:  9/19/84  
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1 Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on August 27-31, 1984 (Report No. 50-397/84-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspections of plant maintenance activity level, follow-up of four TMI (NUREG-0737) items and observation of control room activities. The inspections involved a total of 65 onsite hours by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- \*D. L. Anderson, Mechanical Supervisor
- \*M. Bartlett, Supervisor, Plant Quality Control
- P. Brill, Scheduler
- R. Burk, Systems Engineer
- \*R. L. Corcoran, Plant Operations Manager
- \*K. D. Cowan, Plant Technical Manager
- C. Garren, Shift Manager
- J. Landis, Maintenance Manager
- P. MacBeth, Senior Engineer
- \*J. D. Martin, Plant Manager
- P. McBurney, Electrical Supervisor
- T. Meade, Plant Technical Engineer
- \*B. Olson, Instrument and Control Supervisor
- \*M. M. Monopoli, Manager, Operations Assurance Programs
- \*P. Powell, Manager, WNP-2 Licensing
- \*C. Powers, Assistant Plant Manager
- \*T. Sencier, Supervisor, Plant Engineering and Scheduling
- \*J. W. Shannon, Director, Power Generation
- L. Sharp, Senior Nuclear Engineer
- \*D. H. Walker, Plant Quality Assurance Manager
- \*F. Walton, Plant Planner-Scheduler

### 2. TMI (NUREG-0737) Activities

The inspector closed out the following four TMI actions which were evaluated in an earlier inspection. The requirements and status were summarized in Inspection Report 50-397/84-21.

- a. (Closed) TMI Action 1.C.1 Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures for Transients and Accidents.

WNP-2 committed to implement the GE Owners' Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines which was accepted by NRR. The inspector reviewed Plant Procedure Volume 5, "Emergency Procedure" and the Owners' Group Guidelines. The inspector also discussed with WNP-2 Operation Manager the usage of flow chart and operator training. From these evaluations, the inspector concluded the owner's Group Guidelines have been properly incorporated into the plant emergency procedure and this item is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- b. (Closed) TMI Action 1.D.1 Control Room Design Reviews.

As discussed in the previous inspection, the licensee submitted a preliminary design assessment report to NRR in April 1983, along with an onsite design evaluation audit. NRR issued Licensing Conditions in Attachment 2 to Operating License requiring further licensee action. The licensee addressed the requirements according

to the Licensing Conditions, except a summary report which is due six months prior to first refueling outage.

Since the licensee has already conducted the preliminary design assessment and addressed all of the 20 human engineering deficiencies identified by NRR, and the outstanding summary report will be evaluated by NRR, no further regional inspection effort is needed. Therefore, this item is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

- c. (Closed) TMI Action II.B.2 Design Review of Plant Shielding and Environmental Qualification of Equipment for Spaces/Systems which may be used in Post-Accident Operations.

In Appendix J to the FSAR (evaluation of biological wall penetrations) the licensee identified those penetrations which had not been shielded. The penetrations were required to be shielded or re-evaluated to show that the safety-related equipment has been adequately shielded or not adversely affected.

Through interview with the licensee's engineers, inspection of pertinent records and plant walkdown, the inspector verified that the deficient shieldings have been evaluated and upgraded. The modifications inspected are upgraded shielding of Three Motor Control Centers located in radiation zones 522D, 572D and 527H as well as an area at elevation 501 in the secondary containment. These modifications were performed under Project Engineering Directives PED 210 A-CS-0365 and PED 210A-CS-0518.

No deviations or violations were identified.

- d. (Closed) TMI Action II.E.4.2 Containment Isolation Dependability

To assure the purge valve operability, Technical Specification 3.6.1.8 and Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.8.1-3 were established to limit the valve position to 70 and restrict its operation to 90 hours per 365 days with limited leakage rate. During this inspection, the inspector verified the following:

- 1) The valve was modified to physically limit the opening position to 70 (Maintenance Work Request AY0769).
- 2) Drywell Purge Supply and Exhaust Valve Leak Test was performed on August 1, 1984.
- 3) Wetwell Purge Supply, Exhaust and Vacuum Breaker Leak Rate Test was performed on August 28, 1984.
- 4) In accordance with procedure 7.0.0, "Shift and Daily Instrument Checks" of August 27, 1984, the log showed the total accumulated purge hours to be 29.1 hours for the last 139 days since April 10, 1984.

Thus, the above Technical Specification and surveillance requirements have been properly implemented. This TMI Action is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Maintenance Program Workload (Closed 84-09-08)

The inspector examined the maintenance program workload by a review of maintenance status logs for Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs), Plant Tracking Log, work planning schedules, selected Nonconformance Reports, equipment history records, Quality Assurance Surveillance Reports, and Corporate audits. The inspection included discussions with craft supervisors, planner-schedulers, system engineers, and other cognizant personnel. Items considered during the inspection included open MWRs, documentation, craft workload, priority categorization and work scheduling. Salient observations were as follows:

- a. Currently, a central point does not exist for the overall planning/coordination of the several maintenance department activities, except during outages where the crafts do work to a outage schedule.
- b. Priorities are established by the Shift Manager and items are worked accordingly.
- c. Each maintenance department has their own planning and scheduling section and works to priorities and schedules as set by Operations. The several craft supervisors interviewed believed that the current backlog was manageable and not excessive.
- d. There was a substantial backlog of safety-related items where the work had been completed but the documentation had not. Of the 155 items in this category, about 30 were greater than 3 months old.
- e. There were other MWRs where it was obvious that the work had been completed but the tracking records showed the item was still with the engineer (MWR AY 8819). The inspection showed that the system engineers were also "sitting" on other documents as well, such as Nonconformance Reports (284-0199).
- f. Corporate and site Quality Assurance has performed a number of audits and surveillances in this area and found that not all of the required procedures were being met and irregularities were identified in the handling of MWRs. This area was currently being audited by site Quality Assurance.
- g. The maintenance work request procedure (1.3.7) was being revised substantially and will require normal MWRs to be processed through a "Daily Schedule Group" composed of a representative from the several departments and disciplines, including Plant Scheduling.

Overall impression of the inspector was that the current MWR backlog was not excessive but that the backlog of paper was and that action was needed or else important maintenance history records could be lost. The

same could be said of other records such as outstanding nonconformance reports that are collecting on the desks of system engineers. The bases for these comments stems from time spent trying to locate records to show that a downcomer vacuum breaker (2 MS V 37V) had been repaired after it stuck open during a surveillance test in March 1984. The several status logs examined indicate that this was not even close to an isolated case.

Outstanding item 84-09-08 related to maintenance workloads is considered closed; however, followup item 84-23-01 is opened to follow the licensee's efforts to reduce the outstanding documentation backlog.

4. General

The inspectors toured the plant on several occasions and observed control room operations, including a startup on August 29, 1984. Housekeeping appeared to be satisfactory with no apparent fire hazards identified. Plant and corporate management (Managing Director) were observed to be in the operating portion of the plant on several occasions. Corporate management was also observed to be in attendance at daily meetings.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors discussed the scope and results of the inspection with management representatives denoted in paragraph 1. The licensee stated that an audit was in process and corrective action would be initiated to closeout outstanding completed MWRs. Also, management had been encouraging engineers to closeout other open documentation in recent meetings. The licensee was informed that their amended response pertaining to an inoperable containment airlock door interlock was unacceptable and that opening of the inner door under these circumstances would probably be considered a violation of the Technical Specifications. The licensee stated that consideration would be given to requesting an amendment to clarify the Technical Specifications to permit repair of the interlock during plant operations.