July 13, 1984

NUCLEAR LICENSING & SAFETY DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417

License No. NPF-13 File: 0260/L-860.0

Additional Information - Technical Specification Problem Sheet

(TSPS) 181 AECM-84/0347

Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) is providing this letter in response to an informal request for additional information from Mr. Les Kintner and Mr. Jim Knight of your staff. The request for additional information relates to a change proposed in a letter from Mr. J. P. McGaughy to Mr. Harold R. Denton dated June 21, 1984 concerning TSPS 181 on the channel functional test frequency for the reactor protection system electric power monitoring assemblies (RPS-EPA's).

The performance of the RPS-EPA channel functional test will cause the loss of power to an RPS bus as power is switched from the normal to the alternate power supply (and also when switched back to normal) to allow breaker testing. This loss of power to either RPS Bus A or Bus B will cause the following to occur:

- (1) The RPS will receive a half scram.
- (2) The half scram cannot be reset until power is restored to the affected RPS bus since the associated logic interlocks and reset functions will not operate without power.
- (3) The mechanical vacuum pump will trip from loss of power to main steam line high radiation instrumentation.
- (4) The shutdown cooling and head spray modes of residual heat removal will be isolated.
- (5) One half of an isolation signal is sent to valve groups 1, 3 (E12-F037A&B only), 6A, 7 and 10 consisting of approximately 70 valves.
- (6) One half of an initiation signal is sent to secondary containment isolation.

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- (7) One half of an isolation signal is sent to the control room ventilation system.
- (8) Power is lost to two radiation monitoring panels which include monitors for control room ventilation, containment and drywell ventilation exhaust, fuel handling area ventilation exhaust and fuel handling area pool sweep exhaust.

The existence of the half scram, half isolation, and half initiation signals described above do not in themselves cause trips and initiations to occur. However, the existence of the half signal condition places the plant in a condition where a spurious or accidental signal to the other initiation channels could cause full trips, initiations or a reactor scram to occur. The performance of the channel functional test for the RPS-EPA's in the cold shutdown condition would avoid the chance of unnecessary plant trips and challenges to safety systems.

Please contact this office if additional information is required.

Yours truly,

S. H. Hobbs

SN Hobbs

Manager of Nuclear Safety & Compliance

WJH/JOF/SHH:rg

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard

Mr. R. B. McGehee

Mr. N. S. Reynolds

Mr. G. B. Taylor

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

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