



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 13, 1984

✓ MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Phillip Stohr, Director  
Division of Emergency Preparedness  
and Materials Safety Programs  
Region II

FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Emergency Preparedness  
and Engineering Response  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT: FEMA EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE EDWIN I. HATCH  
ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT

The enclosed letter from Richard W. Krimm, Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs, FEMA, dated January 24, 1984 forwarded the FEMA Region IV report of the October 13, 1983 joint exercise for E. I. Hatch.

FEMA Region IV did not observe any deficiencies at the State or county level that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures could be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. However, the FEMA report does contain a summary of deficiencies and recommended improvement areas that when corrected will enhance State and local response capabilities. However, none are significant enough to cause a negative finding. FEMA has requested a schedule of corrective actions from the State. FEMA's analysis of the State's response will be forwarded to you when received.

It is recommended that you transmit the FEMA exercise report to the licensee and continue to coordinate with FEMA Region IV to ensure that the deficiencies in offsite emergency preparedness identified in the FEMA report for E. I. Hatch are corrected and that the improvement areas are addressed in a timely manner with the assistance, if necessary, of the licensee.

Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Emergency Response  
and Engineering Response  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:  
FEMA Ltr. dtd. 1/24/84

cc: See Attached

CONTACT: Donald J. Perrotti  
492-4871

8404040322 XA

J. Phillip Stohr

-2-

cc: w/o Attachment to FEMA Ltr.

E. Blackwood, DEDROGR  
D. M. Collins, Region II  
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# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

JAN 24 1984

50-321  
50-366

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan  
 Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness  
 and Engineering Response  
 Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krimm*  
 Richard W. Krimm  
 Assistant Associate Director  
 Office of Natural and Technological Hazards  
 Programs

SUBJECT: Exercise Report for the October 13, 1983, Exercise of  
 the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness  
 Plans for the Edwin I. Hatch Electric Generating Plant

Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report for the October 13, 1983, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Edwin I. Hatch Electric Generating Plant. The State of Georgia and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties participated in the exercise. The exercise report, submitted on November 14, 1983, was prepared by Region IV of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and includes the comments of the Regional Assistance Committee.

FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of Georgia. Specific NUREG 0654 deficiencies observed as well as several improvements being suggested to the State for some of the facilities and activities evaluated during the exercise are discussed in Section II, entitled "Detailed Discussion." Additional equipment, training and coordination meetings among the various response agencies are being recommended to accomplish these improvements and thereby enhance the emergency response capability of the involved governments and agencies. A schedule of actions regarding these improvements will be requested from the State. As soon as we receive and analyze the State's response, we will send you the results.

Appendix E provides a detailed discussion along with a summary listing of deficiencies observed in the December 8, 1982, exercise. Note that all but four of the deficiencies observed in the earlier exercises have been satisfactorily corrected. Copies of the December 8, 1982 and the October 8, 1980 exercise reports were furnished to your office on May 18, 1983.

Based on the results of the October 13, 1983 exercise, there are no deficiencies which impact the original 44 CFR 350 approval dated May 5, 1981, for the Edwin I. Hatch Electric Generating Plant.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Marshall Sanders, Acting Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 287-0179.

Attachments  
 As Stated

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 F PDR

*IE95*  
*1/1*



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309

November 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD W. KRIMM, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
OFFICE OF NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS SL-NT

From: *Phillip May*  
Major P. May,  
Regional Director

Subject: Final Exercise Report - Edwin I. Hatch Electric  
Generating Plant

In compliance with the memorandum from Dave McLoughlin dated August 5, 1983, Subject: "Procedural Policy on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluations, and Interim Findings", three copies of the Final Report on the Edwin I. Hatch Exercise conducted on October 13, 1983, are attached.

This exercise demonstrated that the off-site preparedness continues to be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

This report was distributed to the Regional Assistance Committee. Minor changes were made which are reflected in the attached report.

No copies have been made available to the State of Georgia or to the Georgia Power Company.

Please notify us promptly when this report is transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission so that distribution can be made to Georgia officials.



FINAL REPORT

OCTOBER 28, 1983

EDWIN I. HATCH ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT

EXERCISE

OCTOBER 13, 1983



FEDERAL EMERGENCY  
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

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F PDR



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309

## EDWIN I. HATCH ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT EXERCISE

Conducted on October 13, 1983

Final Report October 28, 1983

Utility: Georgia Power Company  
Plant Location: Baxley, Appling County, Georgia

Participating State and local governments:

State of Georgia  
Appling County  
Jeff Davis County  
Tattnall County  
Toombs County

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I.

EXERCISE SUMMARY

This full-scale State and local exercise was conducted on October 13, 1983, and was observed by twenty-one Federal evaluators representing seven Federal Agencies. Fourteen specific NUREG 0654 deficiencies were observed during the exercise. In addition, there are several improvements suggested in Section II, "Detailed Discussion", for some of the facilities and activities evaluated. Additional equipment, training and coordination meetings among the various response agencies are recommended to accomplish these improvements and thereby enhance the emergency response capability of the involved governments and agencies.

The purpose of the exercise was to test the emergency response plan with four goals in mind: 1) notification/communication; 2) response capability to radiological emergency operations; 3) protect the off-site population in the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ); and 4) inform the public concerning exercise activity. All but the goal to inform the public concerning exercise activity appear to have been accomplished. A total of fourteen NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 deficiencies were observed.

The following is a succinct account of the Federal evaluators' reports of the involved State and county facilities.

State of Georgia

State Emergency Operations Center - Direction and control, operations management and the physical facilities were adequate in a support role function.

Forward Emergency Operations Center - The FEOC was staffed and set up in an operational mode in a timely and efficient manner; including excellent leadership, adequate space, furniture, security, communications to effectively evacuate the public where necessary and assure the safety and health of emergency workers and people within the EPZ.

Dose assessment and protective action activities were carried out in an efficient and professional manner. Handling and interpretation of radiological data used for protective action decisions was outstanding.

Radiological Laboratory - No obvious equipment and staffing deficiencies were noted in the mobile radiological laboratory activity.

Field Monitoring Teams - Coordination between the utility and the State to accomplish the field monitoring tasks was excel-

lent. There should, however, have been better task assignment within the various monitoring teams.

Emergency Operations Facility - Performance by Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) and Environmental Protection Division (EPD) enhanced the interface between the State and the utility and was sufficient to get the job done.

News Center - There were some coordination problems among the various public information staffs and their sources of official information to be provided to the public. More efficient use of the tone-alert system in conjunction with the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) is needed.

#### Appling County

Organization, management, control, and political support were well-demonstrated, and indicate the Baxley-Appling EOC could handle a radiological emergency quite well.

The Baxley Fire Department responded promptly to an oil spill fire on-site and with the on-site brigade extinguished the fire in a timely fashion.

Appling County demonstrated its protective response capability by activating a reception center and processing six individuals through registration, monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering assignment. This procedure reflected the presence of a sound foundation upon which--with more training and exercises--a completely well prepared relocation capability can be developed.

#### Jeff Davis County

The Jeff Davis EOC was adequately staffed and operated effectively. While the facility is not of optimum size, the staff, with additional telephones and exercise play, could maintain a high level of response capability. A better coordination link between Prompt Notification System (PNS) and EBS needs to be addressed.

The reception center and decontamination activities were adequate. Traffic and access control around the decontamination site needs addressing.

#### Toombs County

Toombs County emergency response personnel performed very capably. Activation and staffing were excellent. The EOC facility needs a closer link to the sheriff's communication office and also more telephones for operations staff.

The reception center was activated and staffed and was more than adequate for the scenario needs.



Tattnall County

The county's response was much improved over last year. Staffing and facilities were generally good. Some improvements in the communications area are needed.

Activation and staff mobilization procedures were not adequately tested due to pre-positioning.



## II.

### DETAILED DISCUSSION

#### Introduction

The last exercise evaluated at Plant Hatch was a full-scale exercise conducted on December 8, 1982.

Seventy-three NUREG 0654 deficiencies were observed during the 1982 exercise. Most of these were in Appling, Jeff Davis, and Tattnall Counties. Most of last year's deficiencies have been corrected over the past year. Deficiencies are contained in Section III with an asterisk by those that reappeared in 1983.

Fourteen NUREG 0654 deficiencies were observed during this exercise. Problems were concentrated in the PNS/EBS coordination, monitoring teams, and public information areas. All appear to be easily correctable with additional training, equipment, more specific scenario inputs, and minor adjustments to agency checklists.

The Federal evaluators list, exercise objectives, scenario (both GEMA and Georgia Power) with actual event times noted and State and county resources used are contained in Appendices A through E in the last section of the report.

The Criteria used to evaluate the current exercise are contained in the new "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" issued by FEMA in June, 1983.

#### STATE OF GEORGIA

##### Forward Emergency Operations Center

The FEOC at the Baxley National Guard Armory was activated and staffed in a timely, efficient, and expedient manner. In approximately 15 minutes it was set up and operational.

The GEMA Deputy Director, Billy Clack, was in charge. Excellent leadership was demonstrated and the operation was run smoothly with input by the participating staff. Briefings were timely and informative.

The space, security, furniture, telephones, radios and other essentials necessary to run a smooth, efficient and effective operation was evident.

Communications were clear and no problems were observed. Dedicated line, commercial telephone and radio were all available and used effectively.

Excellent coordination existed between Radiological Health (Department of Human Resources (DHR) and Department of Natural Resources (DNR)) and GEMA.

The GEMA communication van and EPD's radiological laboratory was utilized and located in close proximity to the FEOC.

Superior items noted in this years exercise include; correction of deficiencies from previous exercises, use of the armory as opposed to the mobile command post and quality of displays.

No obvious equipment and staffing deficiencies were noted in the mobile radiological laboratory activity. Laboratory staff persons were highly knowledgeable regarding radioisotopic identification and analysis.

Dose assessment and protective action activities were carried out in an efficient and professional manner. FEOC operations were well organized with all participating individuals very familiar with their assigned tasks. Handling and interpretation of radiological data used for protective action decisions was outstanding.

#### State Emergency Operations Center

Once messages were verified, activation and staffing went smoothly and was completed in a timely fashion. In the area of operations management it was observed that command and control was effective in a support role function.

The SEOC is indeed an adequate physical facility. Status boards should be more centrally located.

Verification and duplication of information from different sources caused delays of up to 20 minutes.

Protective action recommendation messages were unclear as to source of information on protective measures.

Status board recorder did not know to pass his incoming messages along, and no message runners picked up his messages.

It was observed that the PNS was not activated within fifteen minutes of escalating events. (E.6.) Quicker actions needs to occur so that a more timely notification to the public is assured.

### Field Monitoring Teams

Control of the field monitoring teams was well coordinated between the utility and the State. There was excellent cooperation and coordination exhibited while recovering from several actual power failures in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

Two radio nets were used to control the teams. Neither net was dedicated to the exercise. Therefore, exercise messages and non-exercise messages were competing for time on the air.

The State should assign a technical person as radio operator on the DNR net. There was confusion and time was lost because the radio operator was unfamiliar with the technical terminology.

Integrated monitoring teams is a workable concept. In this exercise, the teams were too large to function as the State would have liked them to function. One team had three utility, two State and one county member. This is contrary to description of the integrated team concept and the concept of operations of the State plan. Almost all of the equipment used was utility equipment. Almost all of the monitoring activity was accomplished by utility personnel. Consequently the State personnel did not get the hands on training that this exercise could have provided.

Some State personnel were not familiar with personnel exposure control procedures in the State plan. (K.3.b.) In addition, some State and local team members were not familiar with conditions under which to take KI. (J.10.f.)

Excluding the communications problem, the teams were not informed or updated on the plant status, release information or weather conditions.

### Mobile Radiological Laboratory

The equipment used by the radiological laboratory personnel was excellent. Considerable staff training was obvious. Sample analysis and screening was accomplished in a highly professional manner.

### Emergency Operations Facility

Activation and staffing, facilities, communications, and the scenario were evaluated. All areas appeared to be adequate.

The only problem noted was that two ring down lines for use by the EOF liaison were a considerable distance apart. It is recommended that both telephones should be on the same table.

### Joint News Center

The State Public Information Officer staff was separated from the county PIO's and the utility PIO's which hindered good coordination.

Electrical power actually failed, but no back-up power was available.

PIO's from the State had a very small room in which to work, too small to work in with NRC and county PIO's.

It was observed that inadequate provisions have been made to accommodate media who would call in to the news center in lieu of coming there. In fact, no phone numbers were made known to the media for their use in calling the news center for updates.

Exchange of information just before scheduled press conferences was haphazard. State was not given an informational copy of a news release before it was released to the media. State announcements at the press conference were not coordinated with the utility or counties. An error in a news release concerning the release of radiation was not made known to all parties involved. Better coordination procedures are needed for all entities involved.

EBS and PNS were not used together effectively. The State did not coordinate with the news center nor the counties when the PNS was going to be activated. (E.5., E.6.) A review of PNS and EBS use procedures and coordination of same is needed.

No PIO at the news center knew what was being said to the public via EBS. Drafting of emergency instruction messages for use over EBS did not take place.

No procedure was established for feedback from the rumor control telephone operation to the State PIO at the news center. (G.4.c.) State, utility and county PIO staffs need to review coordination procedures for rumor control and develop adequate feedback procedures.

The scenario did not adequately test the capabilities of the public information staffs of the State and local governments. In fact, during this exercise which included an aircraft crash into the plant, plant and public evacuation, a fire, and several activations of the PNS and EBS, not a single call from any media was injected into the scenario. (N.1.b.) A more "real-world" scenario for the public information function needs developing.



## Appling County

### Emergency Operations Center

Activation and staffing of the EOC was promptly and smoothly accomplished. Eighteen agencies and offices had representatives at the EOC.

Elected officials support was quite evident. Six elected officials, including the Mayor of Baxley and the Chairman of the County Commissioners, were present throughout most of the exercise.

Organization, management and control were very good. The Director consulted elected officials and the State Area Coordinator appropriately and was effectively in charge of the response organization.

Although the communications room was located separately from the operations room, message flow and logging was well done. Internal displays were well-displayed and easily visible. Briefings were frequent and the status board was updated promptly.

There were no deficiencies at this EOC; however, there is one relatively minor suggestion for improvement, i.e., at least two additional telephones are needed in the operations room (only one was installed for the exercise).

### Relocation Center

Appling County demonstrated its protective response capability by activating a reception center where six individuals were processed through registration, monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering assignment. A "skeleton" shelter staff was also activated. Participation of all players was excellent, interest was high, and reflected a sound foundation upon which a well-prepared relocation response can be realized.

No NUREG 0654 deficiencies were noted. There were; however, some correctable weaknesses identified. More specific planning is needed in the registration process, i.e., how evacuees are to be identified as having gone through the reception center, how they are to be directed to shelter, who can be admitted to the shelters, how a count is to be kept of how many have been directed where, etc.

Additional training is needed for participants as to their specific responsibilities, as well as how each interacts with others.

In general, this exercise demonstrated that Appling County has prepared well, and does have the capability and resources to activate and conduct measures to protect the population.

#### Fire Activity

An on-site fire drill involved the Baxley Volunteer Fire Department and the utility Fire Brigade beginning at 8:20 a.m. on October 13, 1983. The drill required the combined units of fire personnel to attack an extremely hot fire created by igniting fuel contained in a pit designed for training. The Baxley Fire Department responded in prompt time with eight firefighters properly attired in turn-out gear and with a 750 GPM pumper and a 950 gallon tanker.

It was very apparent that prior training and pre-planning had been conducted by participants of the drill.

Contact with a second off-site fire department was seriously hampered by lack of radio communication between on-site and off-site fire units and resulted in a delayed response by the second unit. It is strongly recommended that radio equipment be provided to enable the fire brigade to communicate with incoming fire units. Other than radio communication problems the drill demonstrated good training and pre-planning of the off-site fire personnel.

#### Decontamination Activity

A monitoring and decontamination exercise was scheduled at the Appling County High School. Upon arrival at the scene by this evaluator the school bus was reported to have been contaminated and was to be washed down by the Baxley fire unit on detail. However, because of heavy rain the firefighter stated no wash down would be demonstrated.

#### Jeff Davis County

##### Emergency Operations Center

The EOC, while small, functioned adequately. Additional space would certainly be appropriate but response functions do not seem to be hampered due to the location or size of the EOC.

Staffing of the EOC was adequate and timely. Political support was exceptional.



Maps, displays and the uniform status board enhanced the overall operation.

Checklists (SOPs) were available and utilized by all agencies.

Additional telephones are needed for agencies in the operations room. The one telephone primarily for use by the fire department is not adequate for Jeff Davis County's emergency operation.

It was not clear who was effectively in charge of the emergency response. The Director, Mrs. Mary Allen, is quite capable of providing this direction but her leadership role was diminished by the State personnel over-involving themselves in the play. GEMA personnel can certainly assist but should be assuming more of a technical assistance role rather than a direction and control role. In a real emergency it is doubtful that GEMA personnel would respond and begin making decisions at the "Alert" phase.

More agency play is needed. Most agencies that became part of the EOC staff were given no messages or situations to respond to. In a real situation, even though the plume is not directly endangering the county, response personnel would have to deal with real emergencies. Injecting message play would also serve as an excellent training tool.

Observations made during the exercise would indicate that there is not a solid, consistent, coordinated link between the PNS activation done by the SEOC and the EBS activation initiated by the county. What would really be going out over EBS from the county should be coordinated with other counties and the State prior to activation. (E.6.)

Two field activities were observed which were unrelated to the scenario. Activities at both the reception center, located at the Jeff Davis Middle School, and the decontamination area, at the Hazelhurst Recreation Area, indicate that training has been occurring. Personnel at both sites understood their roles well.

The Jeff Davis Middle School is a superb facility for use as a reception center. Processing evacuees, including personnel decontamination, could be handled adequately. Additional monitoring personnel would be needed, however.

Firefighters at the Jeff Davis decontamination site were appropriately outfitted and demonstrated both the need for decontamination and the actual decontamination of two vehicles. Greater attention needs to be given to the firefighters own contamination along with appropriate monitoring and decontamination.

The decontamination site appears to be adequate for the projected traffic volume. Attention needs to be given to traffic and access control. It was not apparent how many, if any, uniformed officers would be on hand to control the traffic in and around the site. (J.10.i.)

### Tattnall County

#### Emergency Operations Center

The county's response was much improved over the previous exercise, reflecting a dedicated effort on the part of county officials, county agency staff, volunteers, and GEMA.

Staffing for the exercise was good and included representatives of the County Commission and seven other departments. Staff appeared knowledgeable of their emergency duties. Operations were smooth and well-coordinated.

Control and direction was largely provided by the GEMA area coordinator, which is not in accordance with the county plan.

Activation and mobilization procedures were not fully demonstrated due to pre-positioning of several staff. (E.2.) Training in activation procedures is needed for each dispatcher at the Reidsville Police Department to ensure that notification procedures are followed whenever a call comes in..

The new EOC facility is a big improvement and contains excellent maps and displays. The space is crowded and noisy, however. Additional telephones would be needed to cope with a real radiological emergency.

Communications via the Emergency News Network (ENN) and Civil Defense radio were a problem as messages were often inaudible or unintelligible and had to be repeated. (F.l.b.) Improvements are needed in this area.

Internal communications were recorded on hard copy message forms. Additional staff training and additional clerical help would increase the effectiveness of operations.

The staff responded promptly to changes in plant status, using written checklists for each emergency level. EBS was activated promptly, and the timing of message broadcasts was coordinated with PNS activation. Representatives of the Health Department, Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) and School Superintendent discussed evacuation measures, although as it turned out, the plume direction required no protective actions for Tattnall County residents. The DNR was requested to send a helicopter to warn any hunters or fishermen who might be in the affected sector.

Public notification was supplemented by route alert crews. They also carried radiological monitoring equipment, in case the plume came toward Tattnall; these monitoring efforts should be integrated with those of the State and utility. Dosimetry was provided, along with appropriate instructions. However, low-range dosimeters and TLDs or film badges are needed.

Overall, the participants made maximal use of the exercise for training purposes and benefited by the experience. A more challenging scenario should be provided for the next exercise.

#### Toombs County

The activation and staffing of the EOC was fully demonstrated. Call-up checklists were used to achieve timely staffing within 25 minutes. Eventually over 60 personnel representing 19 agencies and functions responded. Elected and public official support was good.

Management of the EOC was effective. SOPs and plans were present and used. Message handling was efficient.

The EOC, although marginally adequate, needs a closer link to the sheriff's communications room. The message volume in a real event would likely create problems in conveying information from one office to the other. Additional phone lines are necessary for the operations room staff--especially considering the large response. (H.3.)

Activation of the EBS system needs to be more closely coordinated with the PNS activation. (E.6.) The use of PNS activation to key the EBS broadcast should be considered.

Protective actions in the county were timely and appropriate. Toombs Central School and river traffic were dealt with on a precautionary basis. Evacuation of the 2 mile zone demonstrated the county's abilities to open and staff a reception center. The center was well staffed and managed.

In summary, Toombs County emergency response personnel performed very well and capably.

#### Mobile Evaluation

The Georgia State Patrol, Appling County, and Toombs County Sheriff's Departments manned the traffic control points (TCP). The three TCP's listed were the only points manned and each TCP was staffed in a timely manner with adequate personnel and adequate equipment to do the job.

The Georgia State Patrol was particularly responsive to this activity and provided exceptional support.

All of the workers had adequate self-monitoring equipment and in all except one instance were trained in self-monitoring. The one exception was an Appling County Deputy Sheriff at Eason Bluff Road and 10 Mile Road.

One Deputy Sheriff from Toombs County seemed exceptionally well trained and knowledgeable concerning exposure.



III.

Summary Listing of Deficiencies

- a. There were no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 deficiencies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
- b. The following NUREG 0654 items reflect an inadequate performance in that given area, but would not lead to a negative finding.

State of Georgia

<u>NUREG 0654 Item</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>	<u>Projected Date of Completion</u>
E.5. <u>Notification Methods and Procedures</u>		
E.6. <u>Notification Methods and Procedures</u>		
G.4.b. <u>Public Education and Information</u>		
*G.4.c. <u>Public Education and Information</u>		
J.10.f. <u>Protective Response</u>		
*K.3.b. <u>Radiological Exposure Control</u>		
N.1.b. <u>Exercises and Drills</u>		

\* Unresolved deficiency from December, 1982 exercise.

Appling County

NUREG 0654 Item

Corrective Action

Projected Date  
of Completion

There were no NUREG 0654 deficiencies observed.



Jeff Davis County

<u>NUREG 0654 Item</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>	<u>Projected Date of Completion</u>
E.6. <u>Notification Methods and Procedures</u>		
J.10.i. <u>Protective Response</u>		

Tattnall County

<u>NUREG 0654 Item</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>	<u>Projected Date of Completion</u>
E.2. <u>Notification Methods and Procedures</u>		
F.1.b. <u>Emergency Communications</u>		

Toombs County

<u>NUREG 0654 Item</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>	<u>Projected Date of Completion</u>
*E.6. <u>Notification Methods and Procedures</u>		
*H.3. <u>Emergency Facilities and Equipment</u>		
* Unresolved deficiency from December, 1982 exercise.		

IV.

APPENDICES

- A. Evaluator List and Assignments
- B. Exercise Objectives
- C. Exercise Scenario
- D. State and Local Resources
- E. Deficiencies Noted in Past Exercise

APPENDIX A

FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENT

HATCH EXERCISE  
October 13, 1983

CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC CHAIRMAN  
Glenn C. Woodard, Jr. (FEMA)

STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (ATLANTA)  
Rick Mayson (FEMA)

GEMA FIELD EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER  
John Heard (FEMA)  
Dorothy Nevitt (USDA)  
Dave Lassiter (DOE)

RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT - EOF  
Ron Marston (NRC)

RADIOLOGICAL MOBILE LABORATORY  
Ray Boyett (FEMA)

RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT - GEMA FEOC  
Dick Payne (EPA)

FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS  
Brad Eichorst (FDA/HHS)  
Karen Guziel (FEMA)  
Jim Opelka (FEMA)

PUBLIC INFORMATION/MEDIA ACTIVITIES  
Jack Glover (FEMA)

COMMUNICATIONS/ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM  
Gene Davis (FEMA)

APPLING COUNTY  
Tom Hawkins (FEMA)  
\*Russ Yarbrough (FEMA)  
Virginia Baker (FEMA)

JEFF DAVIS COUNTY  
Brad Loar (FEMA)  
Shana Aucsmith (FEMA)

TATTNALL COUNTY  
Ken Lerner (FEMA)



TOOMBS COUNTY  
Tony Foltman (FEMA)

TRANSPORTATION/MOBILE  
\*\*Al Hall (DOT)

- \* Will Also Serve As Fire Evaluator
- \*\* Will Serve As Mobile Evaluator In Four County Area

APPENDIX B

LW  
JH  
BL

# Georgia Emergency Management Agency



MAJ GEN BILLY M. JONES  
DIRECTOR

P.O. Box 18055  
Atlanta, Georgia 30316  
TEL: (404) 656-5500



BILLY J. CLACK  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

15 June 1983

Mr. Major P. May  
Regional Director  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Region IV  
1375 Peachtree Street, N.E.  
Suite 664  
Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Phil:

On behalf of the State of Georgia, the attached list of objectives for the October 1983 exercise at the Georgia Power Company Plant Edwin I. Hatch is furnished for review and comment. These objectives have been agreed upon by all involved state agencies.

The advice of the FEMA IV representative, Mr. Brad Loar, was most helpful and is appreciated.

I am available to answer any questions you or your staff may have. Please do not hesitate to call me at 656-5500.

Sincerely,

BILLY J. CLACK  
Deputy Director

Attachment:  
(as stated)

cc: J. Setser, DNR, EPD  
J. Morris, DHR  
B. Ollinger, GPC  
J. Hill, GEMA Plans  
H. Heath, GEMA PAO

## PLANT HATCH REP EXERCISE - 1983

### I. Purposes:

- A. Meet selected exercise requirements of NuReg 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev 1.
- B. In conjunction with the Georgia Power Company, to conduct a full scale exercise to demonstrate the readiness and response capabilities of local governments and responsible state agencies in radiological emergency operations under simulated emergency conditions.

### II. Exercise Goals and Objectives:

- A. Goal: Demonstrate appropriate notification and communication capabilities of state and local agencies.
  - Objectives:
    - 1. Demonstrate the state and local capabilities for receipt and dissemination of event notification using the Emergency Notification Network and/or other communication systems.
    - 2. Demonstrate the ability to notify required support agencies at all government levels.
    - 3. Demonstrate the ability of state and local agencies to receive, interpret and communicate concise and timely information between the GPC, State EOC, local EOCs and field teams, as appropriate.
- B. Goal: Demonstrate the appropriate response capability of the state and local governments to radiological emergency operations requirements.
  - Objectives:
    - 1. Demonstrate the ability to notify and simulate the deployment of the State Radiation Emergency Response Team (RERT).
    - 2. Demonstrate the ability to support the State Disaster Coordinator as required.
    - 3. Demonstrate the ability of each county within the Plume Exposure EPZ to activate their respective emergency response organizations.
- C. Goal: Demonstrate the ability of the state and local governments to manage resources and protect the off-site population in the Plume Exposure EPZ.
  - Objectives:
    - 1. Demonstrate the ability of the RERT to determine off-site levels of radiation through field monitoring and/or dose projection calculations.

2. Demonstrate the ability of RERT to make recommendations regarding protective and remedial actions to the State Disaster Coordinator based on relevant technical information from the utility, field teams, and analysis of environmental media.
  3. Demonstrate the ability of state agencies to carry out support responsibilities as assigned in the Georgia Natural Disaster Operation Plan (NDOP) and the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP).
  4. Demonstrate the ability of utility, state and local government to effectively coordinate required emergency response. Included are the transfer of technical data and information, internal coordination and input for issuance of required directives to protect the health and safety of persons within the Plume Exposure EPZ.
  5. Demonstrate the ability to manage the approval requests and simulate distribution of potassium iodide as required, and to provide essential health physics support.
  6. Show the ability of evacuee care by demonstrating a sample group processing through a reception center, to include registering, monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering assignment.
- D. Goal: Demonstrate the ability to inform the public concerning exercise activity.

- Objectives:

1. Demonstrate the ability of the utility, state, and local governments to provide timely, accurate and coordinated public information.
2. Demonstrate the ability to exercise the Prompt Notification System for simulated emergency instructions to the public in the Plume Exposure EPZ.
3. Demonstrate the ability to use the Emergency Broadcast System by the local government in the Plume Exposure EPZ sector(s) for which protective actions are directed.



APPENDIX C

*Heard  
Loar*

# Georgia Emergency Management Agency



GEN BILLY M. JONES  
DIRECTOR

P.O. Box 18055  
Atlanta, Georgia 30316  
TEL: (404) 656-5500



BILLY J. CLACK  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

27 July 1983

Mr. Glenn Woodard, Jr.  
Natural & Technological Hazards  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Region IV  
1375 Peachtree Street, N.E.  
Suite 664  
Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Glenn:

For the State of Georgia, the attached Off-Site Scenario for the October 1983 exercise at the Georgia Power Company Plant Edwin I. Hatch is furnished for review and comment. The Scenario has been agreed upon by all involved state agencies.

We appreciate the consultation and attendance of Mr. Brad Loar in the development meetings.

I am available to answer any questions you or your staff may have. Please do not hesitate to call me at 656-5500.

Sincerely,

*Billy J. Clack*  
BILLY J. CLACK  
Deputy Director

Attachment:  
(as stated)

cc: J. Setser, DNR, EPD  
J. Morris/B. Slocumb, DHR  
B. Ollinger, GPC  
J. Hill, GEMA Plans  
H. Heath, GEMA PAO

Hatch REP Exercise 83  
Off-Site Scenario

GENERAL SCENARIO:

On Exercise Day, events occur at Plant Hatch that escalate to a general emergency condition resulting in off-site plume release requiring appropriate actions to be conducted by participants to meet stated Exercise Goals and Objectives. After de-escalation, Hatch is placed in a controlled condition and the exercise terminates in the afternoon. State response personnel will be prepositioned in the Hatch area since deployment is not to be tested in this exercise.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: The times stated for plant events are approximate and may vary by one-half hour or more.

SPECIFIC SCENARIO:

<u>Time (Approx.)</u>	<u>Plant Event</u>	<u>Actions to Demonstrate Stated Objectives</u>
<u>Actual Time</u> 6:30 a.m. 0617	Unusual Event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. GPC notifies local and state thru ENN.</li> <li>b. GEMA notifies EPD (Note: EPD notifies Rad. Health).</li> </ul>
7:30 a.m. 0723	Alert	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. GPC notifies local and state thru ENN.</li> <li>b. GEMA notifies EPD (Note: EPD notifies Rad. Health).</li> <li>c. Locals alert to standby status using checklists on p. 6 of the local plans.</li> <li>d. GEMA:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Activate State EOC and notify emergency coordinators.</li> <li>2. <u>Simulate</u> deployment of state agency response personnel and equip. (RERT, MCP, and Mobile Lab).</li> <li>3. PAO coordinate w/GPC for appropriate information release.</li> <li>4. Notify FEMA, Governor, and congressional delegation.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<u>0800</u>		
8:30 a.m. 0946	Fire Drill	Off-Site (Applying 1st priority, Toombs 2nd priority) FD responds to the site.

Time (Approx.)

Plant Event

Actions to Demonstrate Stated Objectives

9:30 a.m.

Site Emergency

- a. GPC notifies local and state thru ENN.
- b. GEMA notifies response agencies.
- c. State EOC staff briefed.
- d. GEMA notifies adjacent states and FEMA, update information to Governor and congressional delegation.
- e. PNS activated --- Test message 2(Y) used.
- f. Local augmentation of PNS by actions listed on page 7(c-1) of local plans.
- g. Full activation of local EOCs, dispatch representative to EOF.
- h. Dispatch monitoring teams to EOF as requested. Brief as required.
- i. State EOC PAO rep. coordinate w/GPC for information update release.
- j. Arrival of State Response Teams.
  1. State on-site personnel notify State EOC of arrival.
  2. GPC briefing of SDC, Rad. Coord., and local rep. at EOF.
  3. Normal set-up procedures.
  4. PAO update based on GPC briefing.

1037

11:30 a.m.

General Emergency

RELEASE DATA: Expected release SE into Appling County. Protective actions will be necessary.

- a. GPC notifies thru ENN.
- b. State EOC briefed.
- c. Adjacent states and FEMA notified, update information to Governor and congressional delegation.
- d. GEMA request FAA airspace restriction.
- e. SDC briefed by Radiation Coordinator.
- f. SDC issues protective measures.
- g. PNS notification of protective measures/evacuation order. Test message 3(B) and/or 4(R) used. Activate local EBS as necessary.
- h. Actions as required in state and local plans to include traffic control, receipt of authorization for use of KI, field monitoring, PNS follow-up including tourists and handicapped, open reception center(s) and staff - include decontamination if necessary, open and staff shelter(s) - receive, register, check for contamination, and assign evacuees to shelter(s), coordinate activities w/adjacent jurisdictions, recommend placing milk animals on stored feed, coordinate transportation requirements.

1136

1231

Time (Approx.)

Plant Event

Actions to Demonstrate Stated Objectives

General Emergency  
(Continues)

and other checklist items found in local plans.

- i. Maintain radiation exposure data.
- j. Integration of GPC and off-site monitoring teams.
- k. PAO release information via local media as required.

2:00 p.m.

De-escalation  
of Emergency

GPC begins input of information to de-escalate. Notify FEMA, Governor and congressional delegation of return to controlled status.

2:30 p.m.

Exercise Ends  
(Controlled  
Status)

- a. PNS notification -- Test message 5(G).
- b. Notify all players that exercise is terminated.
- c. Collect all data needed for critique.

1330

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: Critique will be held the following day.



APPENDIX D

EXERCISE ASSIGNMENTS  
PLANT HATCH

Exercise Date - 13 October 1983

## GEMA ON-SCENE

Governor's Representative  
EOC Chief (Forward)  
Assistant EOC Chief (Forward)  
Message Control Officer  
Action Officer  
Communications Officer  
EOF Liaison  
PAO  
NRC/FEMA Liaison  
Military Support Liaison

Appling County EOC  
Field Coordinator  
NRC/FEMA Liaison  
Jeff Davis County EOC  
Field Coordinator  
NRC/FEMA Liaison  
Tattnall County EOC  
Field Coordinator  
NRC/FEMA Liaison  
Toombs County EOC  
Field Coordinator  
NRC/FEMA Liaison

## GEMA EOC

Chief EOC  
Operations Officer  
Intelligence Officer  
Message Center  
Action Officer  
  
Communications  
  
PAO  
Military Support Liaison

Primary

B. Clack  
J. Stockelman  
D. Moffet  
F. Brent  
N. Holton  
D. Garrett  
J. Wilbanks  
H. Heath  
J. Hill  
R. Winslett

W. Brinson  
J. Harrop

G. Autry *Julian Buckner*  
~~██████████~~ *Gregory*

G. Adams  
W. Aderholt

J. Scott  
A. Manning

J. Morris  
M. McLaughlin  
A. Francisco  
G. Hill  
~~C. Gregory~~ *L. Wells*  
G. Waters  
H. Bruce  
J. Born  
B. Diamond  
M. Cleaton

Relief

Gen. Jones *Sally Gregory*  
~~J. Buckner~~  
W. Aderholt  
A. Manning  
L. Dotson (Chatham)  
(local Commo)  
J. Hill  
J. Harrop

W. Morris  
(Wayne County)

C. Shearouse  
(Telfair County)

F. King  
(Evans County)

R. Bracewell  
(Laurens County)

Bill Smith  
Al Witt  
Chuck Hall  
Bolton Hall  
George Brooks  
R. Turner  
M. Starley  
C. Musial

401-  
766  
3220

APPENDIX E

## DETAILED DISCUSSION

### STATE OF GEORGIA

#### I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES: (Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security).

There were insufficient and inadequate displays in the Mobile Command Post (MCP), including the absence of a status board with indication of the emergency classification sequence. Population distribution and evacuation routes were not displayed.

Furthermore, the MCP is not of sufficient size to provide for adequate space for all who would be involved in an FNF emergency. Also, there are too many communications systems in the MCP for the operators to manage effectively. The antenna placement did not provide for a good communications system with the four affected counties.

At the State EOC in Atlanta, it was noted that posting on the status board was not evident. Also, no population distribution was mapped and evacuation routes were not shown. Furthermore, the State EOC was not aware what, if any, information was being provided to the public.

#### II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF: (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness).

Adequate, but the RAD Health Lab deployment could have been sooner. Twenty-four sustained capability for lab work was not demonstrated with results available.

- III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: (Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow between levels and organizations, decision making, checklists and procedures).

Field Monitoring Teams:

Standard operating procedures were not evident.

Survey teams "rested" in plume area.

EOF:

Written procedures (SOP's) for emergency actions were not obvious or in evidence.

DNR at the EOF did not clear recommendations with the state DNR and EOC before recommending to GEMA.

Twenty-four hour operation not demonstrated.

RAD Health Lab:

Direction and control not demonstrated. There appeared to be no one in charge of the emergency response. There was no demonstrated leadership of the lab or monitoring teams.

Twenty-four hour capability not demonstrated with resources present.

- IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION: (Means of notification, e.g. sirens, vehicles or other systems notification timeliness).

EOC Atlanta:

Alert not as timely as required.

Notification was not well coordinated between mobile command post, EOF and the counties.

- VI. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS: (Publications, press facilities, media briefings, release coordination).

A GEMA PIO needs to be in Atlanta for coordination purposes and to know what the media center is dispensing. No rumor control mechanism was present.

Increased coordination with risk counties concerning timely protective action is needed.

Relocation of media center to an area further out needs to be explored to avoid additional evacuation.



A specific approach to Congressional interest and rumor control needs to be in place.

- VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: (Staff and field operation, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations).

State - RAD Health Mobile Lab:

Not enough samples were received at the lab.

Monitoring Teams:

Adequate protection of the Survey Teams was lacking - PAGs not emphasized.

No situation updates were provided to the field. One team did not have radioactive monitoring capability and was working in the plume area.

- VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC: (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation).

At the State Mobile Command Post no actions were observed to provide notification to railroad officials in areas affected.

EOF-NOAA monitors were not activated until 50 minutes after decision was made by state utility to evacuate.

- VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES: (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment).

Mobile RAD Health Lab: The use of KI was advised by RAD-Health but no monitoring teams were advised to take KI.

EOF:

Adequacy of a 24-hour a day capability to determine dose received by emergency workers was not demonstrated.

Environmental Monitoring:

The demonstration of adequate and frequent emergency worker dosimeter readings and maintenance of dosage records was not evident from the field teams. Evidence

that appropriate action levels have been specified for determining need for decontamination was not apparent.

IX. RECOVERY AND RE-ENTRY: (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures)

Local officials were not involved in discussions.

X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE: (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario).

In Atlanta, the state agencies had little participation. RAD Health area identified scenario deficiencies in the area of direction and control of lab activity and monitoring team activity.

Recovery and Re-entry plan should have involved more people.

APPLING COUNTY

I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES: (Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security).

The EOC is really just the everyday office of the Civil Defense Director. It is totally unprotected and cramped for any sustained operation. There would be enough room for three/four people. No security measures were observed.

Maps showing reception centers, evacuation routes, and shelters were not displayed.

Communication equipment appeared to interfere and "drowned out" each other when there were two or more incoming messages or announcements from different sources. This situation over even a short period of time would strain the capability of anyone, particularly when few staff are available. As demonstrated, the facility and personnel would be severely strained during 24-hour operation.

II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF: (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness).

Staff was alerted but none mobilized until assistant came in during mid-morning.

No observed interest from county officials.

Twenty-four hour capability was not demonstrated.

Too much activity for one person to handle in what would be the most affected county.

III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: (Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow between levels and organizations, decision-making, checklists and procedures).

Director was the only person present, thus organization control, leadership, information flow, and decision

making as well as support by officials was not demonstrated.

Over simulation.

IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION: (Means of notification, e.g. sirens, vehicles, other systems, notification timeliness).

Tone alert radios were activated after evacuation was begun.

EBS activation not checked by county.

No method for notification of transient population demonstrated.

V. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS: (Publications, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordination).

Not demonstrated.

VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: (Staff and field operations, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations).

Not applicable.

VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC: (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation).

Reception and sheltering was simulated, therefore, the capability to protect the public could not be evaluated. Due to the close proximity of the Appling County High School recreation center to the 10 mile EPZ, and the evacuation order given to that same sector beyond the 10 mile EPZ, consideration should be given to choosing another site for that reception center. No provisions were made for management personnel (actual or simulated) at the high school when evacuation was ordered.

The Jeff Davis reception center was not open when 20 bus loads of Appling County evacuees were sent to Jeff Davis County. (This entire operation was simulated).

VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES: (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment).

Not demonstrated.

IX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS: (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures).

Not demonstrated.

X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE: (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario).

The few who participated benefited only slightly from the exercise.

The scenario allowed far too much simulation to really exercise the emergency response function of Appling County. No way to say that they have the capability to protect the populace.

No training benefit from simulation.



JEFF DAVIS COUNTY

- I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES: (Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security).

No status board. No security evident. Radio reception was poor and would be a hinderance to effective operation.

Additional display maps showing population by sector needed.

- II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF: (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness).

Twenty-four hour capability not demonstrated.

- III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: (Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow between levels and organizations, decision making, checklists and procedures).

Lack of written checklists/procedures.

EOC operations were not well-organized. Indecision was present.

No demonstrated local official support. Information flow needs to be stepped up. Staff did not receive adequate briefings.

- IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION: (Means of notification, e.g. sirens, vehicles, other systems, notification timeliness).

Notification timeliness inadequate.

- V. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS: (Publication, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordination).  
Not demonstrated.
- VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: (Staff and field operation, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations).  
Not applicable.
- VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC: (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation).  
Capability for implementation of protective measures not demonstrated.
- VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES: (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment).  
Not applicable.
- IX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS: (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures).  
Not applicable.
- X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE: (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario).  
More extensive scenario with actual play needed.

TOOMBS COUNTY

- I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES: (Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security).  
Adequate.
- II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF: (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness).  
Adequate.
- III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: (Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow-between levels and organizations, decision making, checklists and procedures).  
Adequate.
- IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION: (Means of notification, e.g. sirens, vehicles, other systems, notification timeliness).  
EBS was not activated.
- V. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS: (Publications, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordination).  
There was no observed coordination with other counties.
- VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: (Staff and field operations, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations).  
Not applicable.

VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC: (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation).

Adequate.

VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES: (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment).

Not applicable.

IX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS: (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures).

Not applicable.

X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE: (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario).

The exercise did not call for a significant off-site response.

TATTNALL COUNTY

I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES: (Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security).

There were inadequate displays showing shelters, reception centers, and population distribution. No status board was evident. No security was evident.

There is a need for a backup or second communications operator due to heavy message flow during emergency.

The EOC needs to be enlarged and additional telephones made available.

Standardized message logs needed.

II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF: (Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness).

County understaffed. Night shift dispatcher unfamiliar with alert list. Call up list was simulated. No way to evaluate capability.

III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT: (Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow between levels and organizations, decision making, checklists and procedures).

No active participation by county agencies or public officials.

No demonstrated local support. Over simulation.

IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION: (Means of notification, e.g. sirens, vehicles, other systems, notification timeliness).

No coordination with EBS and tone alert radios.

No demonstrated method of transient notification observed.



- V. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS: (Publications, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordination).

Not demonstrated.

- VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: (Staff and field operations, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations).

Not applicable.

- VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC: (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation).

Evacuation was ordered when no recommendation or supporting technical data warranted such an action.

Because of the amount of simulation, capability was not demonstrated.

- VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES: (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment).

Not applicable.

- IX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS: (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures).

Not applicable.

- X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE: (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario).

Extensive use of simulation defeated exercise objectives.

SUMMARY LISTING OF MAJOR DEFICIENCIES

A major deficiency is a weakness that impairs the State or Local capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a fixed nuclear facility. The major deficiencies must be corrected or demonstrated to ensure an adequate level of preparedness. (This level of weakness is delineated in the REP Data Base by an "\*\*").

STATE OF GEORGIA

<u>NUREG ITEM</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
None	

APPLING COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
H.3.	Emergency Facility & Equipment
J.10.c.	Protective Response
J.12.	Protective Response
N.1.a.	Exercise & Drills

JEFF DAVIS COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
None	

TATTNALL COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
E.6.	Notification Methods & Procedures

TOOMBS COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
None	

SUMMARY LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

A significant deficiency is a weakness that does not preclude the State or Local capability to respond to an incident at a fixed nuclear facility. The weakness is not of sufficient magnitude to impair the State or Local capability to protect the health and safety of the public but is of sufficient importance to warrant a classification of a more serious nature than "minor deficiency". (This level of weakness is delineated in the REP Data Base by a "?").

STATE OF GEORGIA

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
A.1.e.	Assignment of Responsibility
A.4.	Assignment of Responsibility
K.5.a.	Radiological Exposure Control

APPLING COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
F.1.b.	Emergency Communications
J.10.a.	Protective Response
J.10.b.	Protective Response
A.1.e.	Assignment of Responsibility
A.4.	Assignment of Responsibility
H.4.	Emergency Facility & Equipment
A.1.a.	Assignment of Responsibility
A.2.a.	Assignment of Responsibility
E.6.	Notification Methods & Procedures
J.9.	Protective Response
J.10.g.	Protective Response
J.10.k.	Protective Response
J.10.h.	Protective Response

JEFF DAVIS COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>Planning Standard Title</u>
H.3.	Emergency Facility & Equipment

TATTNALL COUNTY

NUREG Item

Planning Standard Title

H.3.

Emergency Facility & Equipment

J.10.a.

Protective Response

J.10.b.

Protective Response

N.1.a.

Exercises & Drills

TOOMBS COUNTY

NUREG Item

Planning Standard Title

E.5.

Notification Methods & Procedures

E.6.

Notification Methods & Procedures

G.1.

Public Education & Information

G.4.b.

Public Education & Information

N.1.b.

Exercises & Drills

SUMMARY LISTING OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES

A minor deficiency is a weakness to be corrected that will enhance the established response capability. (This level of weakness is delineated in the REP Data Base by a "D, M, or T").

STATE OF GEORGIA

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
F.1.b.	M, equipment
F.1.c.	M, equipment
J.10.b.	M, equipment
A.1.a.	M, personnel
A.2.a.	T, OJT
C.1.a.	T, OJT
G.4.c.	D, content
C.3.	T, formal
J.11.	T, formal
K.3.b.	T, OJT
N.1.a.	T, formal

APPLING COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
F.1.c.	M, equipment
C.1.c.	T, OJT
E.1.	T, formal
E.2.	T, OJT
F.1.a.	M, equipment
F.1.e.	M, equipment
D.4.	M, personnel
E.5.	M, equipment
E.7.	M, equipment
J.10.p.	T, OJT

JEFF DAVIS COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
F.1.b.	M, equipment
F.1.c.	M, equipment
F.1.d.	M, equipment
C.1.c.	M, equipment
J.10.a.	M, equipment
A.1.e.	T, OJT
E.1.	T, OJT



JEFF DAVIS COUNTY (cont'd)

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
G.3.a.	T, OJT
G.4.c.	T, formal
J.9.	T, OJT
N.1.b.	T, OJT

TATTNALL COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
E.1.	T, formal
A.2.a.	T, OJT

TOOMBS COUNTY

<u>NUREG Item</u>	<u>*Weakness</u>
H.3.	M, equipment
H.4.	T, OJT
G.4.c.	D, content
J.10.j.	T, formal
K.3.a.	M, equipment
K.3.b.	T, formal
N.1.a.	D, content

\*D = Plan, M = Resources, T = Training ( Exer crit Code)