NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|
| Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 | 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 | 1 OF 0 2 |

TITLE (4)

Reactor Scram Initiated by Incorrect Test Connection

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 0 5 0 0 0 |
| 0 9 | 1 0 | 8 4 | 8 4 | - | 0 9 5 | - 0 0 | 0 9 | 2 7 | 8 4 | | 0 5 0 0 0 |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | 1 | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| POWER LEVEL (10) | 0 6 6 | 20.402(b) | 20.405(c) | X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | 50.36(c)(1) | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(c) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | 50.72(b)(2)(ii) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(x) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| NAME | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
|---|---|
| | AREA CODE |
| R. L. Koenigs, Compliance Engineer | 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 1 2 5 0 1 1 Ext. 2279 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D | J C | - F U | - - - | N | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) | | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | X NO | | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the Power Ascension Test Program, at Test Condition 3, a reactor scram resulted from the improper connection of a test switch. The test switch was to be used to initiate a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps. The test switch was inadvertantly connected to the Reactor Protection System logic rather than the Reactor Pump Trip logic. Misreading the test procedure drawing lead to the incorrect connection of the test switch. Scram recovery procedures were followed and the blown fuses replaced.

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 | 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 | 8 4 | — 0 9 5 | — 0 0 0 | 0 2 OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

## Plant Conditions

a) Reactor Power - 66%
b) Plant Mode - 1

## Event

During preparation for a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps as part of the Power Ascension Test Program, a reactor scram was experienced. The cause of the scram was subsequently linked to improper connection of the test switch which was to be used for a test trip of both pumps. Instead of being connected to the Reactor Pump Trip (RPT) logic, the test switch was inadvertantly connected to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic. When the test switch was put in the circuit it resulted in a failure of the power fuses to all four channels of RPS, subsequently causing the scram. The root cause of the scram was due to a utility (Supply System) test engineer misreading the drawing in the procedure. The test connections were also checked by other test engineers prior to being put in the circuit. All concurred it was connected properly; yet all misread the drawing.

## Immediate Corrective Action

An uneventful Reactor scram recovery was performed by Plant operators. The blown fuses were identified and replaced.

## Further Corrective Action

Analysis of the failure and inspection of RPS relays and logic was performed to ascertain if the event caused any harmful effects; none were found. No corrective action was taken with regard to the procedure since it is a one time test and it has subsequently been successfully performed. The drawing associated with this procedure was found to vary from the standard format and thus no further corrective action is required.

## Safety Significance

This event did not compromise the health and safety of the public. All system functioned as designed to shut down the reactor.

**Washington Public Power Supply System**
P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

September 27, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-095

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-095 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 2317 hours on September 10, 1984.

Very truly yours,

J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-095

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA

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