

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-333/84-14

Docket No. 50-333

License No. DPR-59

Priority _____

Category C

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York

P. O. Box 41

Lycoming, New York 13093

Facility Name: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: Scriba, New York

Inspection Conducted: July 17-19, 1984

Inspectors:

James J. Hawhurst
James J. Hawhurst, Exercise Team Leader

8/27/84
date

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8/28/84
date

Inspection Summary: Inspection on July 17-19, 1984 (Report No. 50-333/84-14)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's emergency exercise performed on July 18, 1984. The inspection involved 113 inspection-hours by a team of seven NRC and NRC contractor personnel.

Results: Four open items from prior NRC inspections (Report Nos. 83-23 and 84-10) were closed. Two additional open items and several improvement items resulted from this inspection. No violations were observed.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

The following licensee management representatives attended the exit meeting on July 19, 1984.

- N. Avrakotos, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- R. Baker, Technical Services Superintendent
- W. Berzins, Assistant Information Officer
- T. Butler, Outage Coordinator
- R. Chase, Information Officer
- R. Converse, Superintendent of Power
- M. Curling, Training Supervisor
- D. Dooley, Radiological Engineer
- T. Dougherty, Director, O&M/BWR Support
- C. Faison, Supervisory Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Engineer
- W. Fernandez, Acting Operations Superintendent
- J. Flaherty, Assistant I and C Superintendent
- J. Haley, Security Supervisor
- H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Service Superintendent
- C. Patrick, Public Relations Manager, Nuclear Information Programs
- C. Spieler, Vice President Public Relations
- T. Taifke, Security/Safety Superintendent
- A. Zaremba, Assistant Emergency Planning Coordinator

The NRC Team also observed and interviewed other licensee emergency response personnel and controllers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.

2. Emergency Exercise

The James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant emergency exercise was conducted on July 18, 1984 from 5:15 a.m. until 3:25 p.m.

a. Pre-exercise Activities

Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, some changes were made to the operator messages and plant data sheets. In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and evaluators on July 17, 1984 and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

- Leakage into drywell floor sump which results in a high water alarm. The unidentified leakage progress exceeds technical specifications and emergency action levels one and two are initiated.
- The electrical relays for offsite power, in the No. 4, 115KV line fail. The B&D emergency diesel generators (EDG) are out of service for maintenance.
- Drywell high pressure alarm, reactor scram. Lo lo water level isolation. Full isolation occurs with all rods full in.
- The core spray and high pressure coolant injection systems initiated. These events lead to the declaration of a site area emergency, based on initiation of ECCS.
- EDG A&C shutdown occurs due to engine trouble. Results in a total loss of all AC. Core uncovers.
- The total loss of AC power has caused an isolation of service air. The air boards on both track bay doors deflated, breaching secondary containment. Radiological effluent release to the atmosphere.

b. Exercise Observation

During the conduct of the licensee's exercise NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of these emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed.

- (1) Classification and assessment of scenario events;
- (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
- (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;
- (4) Communications/information flow and recordkeeping;
- (5) Activation of Emergency Response Facilities;
- (6) Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys;

- (7) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions;
- (8) Accountability of personnel;
- (9) Maintenance of security and access control; and
- (10) Release of information to the public.

The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the offsite emergency response facility; and actions and use of these facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and efficiently implemented:

- Control room operators were very aggressive in finding creative methods for fixing problems;
- Control room operators immediately identified conditions that would justify incident class escalation and recommended that escalation promptly;
- The activities performed relating to accident mitigation in the TSC, were thoroughly planned and priorities were established;
- Continuous accountability was well maintained in the TSC and OSC;
- The location of teams dispatched from the OSC were well tracked and status was routinely posted;
- Doses for OSC personnel were tracked and ALARA considerations were made;
- Site accountability was effectively performed (< 30 minutes);
- Security at the EOF, Plant Entrance and Joint Media Center was effectively provided;
- Initial protective action recommendations were disseminated in a timely manner; and
- The EOF was activated in a timely manner.

The NRC Team also noted that almost all previously identified improvement items (Report No. 50-333/83-23) have been accomplished in a satisfactory manner during this exercise; the one exception was the offsite monitoring team still had a problem in trying to locate the plume centerline.

The NRC team findings in areas for licensee improvement were as follows (the licensee also identified a number of these areas in their critique of the exercise):

- There was apparent prompting noted in the control room during dose assessment and during the performance of offsite monitoring;
 - The emergency director (ED) failed to designate an acting ED while in transit which delayed an emergency classification declaration;
 - The TSC status board was not kept current and at times was as much as 1 hour behind;
 - Noise levels in the OSC appeared to be excessive;
 - The proper use of the radiation survey instrumentation by the on-site, out of plant, survey teams was not demonstrated. No open window-closed windows measurements were made while searching for the release point;
 - Failure to demonstrate the use of the PASS System by simulation;
 - The control room log did not provide enough detail to adequately reconstruct events;
 - Failure to demonstrate the primary emergency response equipment in support of assessing the impact of potential offsite radiological releases;
 - Meteorological data should be periodically updated;
 - Child thyroid should be used for calculating thyroid dose;
 - Downwind survey procedure EAP 7.1 should provide for open/closed window measurements;
 - The recovery mode was not fully exercised; and
 - Additional training should be provided to offsite survey teams in; survey techniques, adherence to the procedure and familiarization with sampling locations.
- c. In addition, the following improvement items from previous emergency preparedness inspections (Report No. 83-23, 84-10) were closed.

Closed (50-333/83-23-01) Develop an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure for activation and operations within the TSC.

The inspector reviewed procedure EAP 14.1 and noted that a procedure had been developed for activation of the TSC.

Closed (50-333/93-23-04) Develop a procedure for decontaminating people shown to be contaminated upon arrival at the EOF monitoring station.

The inspector reviewed procedure EAP-24 and noted that a procedure had been developed for decontamination of vehicles and personnel at the EOF.

Closed (50-333/84-10-06) Revise EAP-1, Emergency Plan Implementation to provide a checklist for the Emergency Director to ensure performance of major tasks during the four classes of emergencies.

The inspector reviewed EAP-1 and noted that the Emergency Director was provided a checklist to track performance of major tasks during all emergency conditions.

Closed (50-333/84-10-02) Update and distribute Emergency Organization assignments quarterly and complete all required training for personnel added to the list within six weeks of being placed on the list.

The inspector reviewed EAP-17; "Emergency Organization Staffing", and noted that the Emergency Planning Coordinator will update Table 5.2; "Emergency Organization Assignments", each calendar quarter.

d. Licensee's Exercise Critique

The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on July 19, 1984 during which licensee evaluators discussed their observations of the exercise. Licensee management indicated that areas highlighted for improvement would be evaluated and appropriate action taken.

3. Exit Meeting and NRC Critique

Following the licensee's critique, the NRC team met with licensee representatives and management listed in Section 1. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the areas described in Section 2.c specifically addressing those areas not covered by the licensee.

The licensee was informed that no violations were observed and although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified areas of concern and items for improvement.

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.