



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

October 3, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE
DPR-77 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 95-08

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the removal of the biological shield blocks and the opening of the Unit 1 containment vessel equipment hatch; the breaching of (1) both Unit 1 reactor building personnel air locks, (2) an auxiliary building door, and (3) multiple sleeve penetrations; and the removal of a fire barrier wall. These preplanned breaches are for the support of Unit 1 Cycle 7 refueling outage activities. The fire barriers are being breached for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (423) 843-7749.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell
Manager
SQN Site Licensing

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 95-08

I. Unit 1 Reactor Building Biological Shield Blocks and Containment Vessel Equipment Hatch

Description of Condition

On September 9, 1995, with Unit 1 entering a refueling outage, the Unit 1 reactor building biological shield blocks located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734 were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The shield blocks were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit 1 reactor building. The shield blocks will be removed from position (i.e., maintained in a storage position) for the duration of the Unit 1 Cycle 7 (U1C7) refueling outage (RFO).

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. Before entering Mode 4, the equipment hatch will be closed, and the shield blocks will be reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier.

II. Unit 1 Reactor Building Personnel Airlocks

Description of Condition

On September 10, 1995, the lower Unit 1 reactor building personnel airlock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 690, was breached open. On September 12, 1995, the upper Unit 1 reactor building personnel airlock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734, was breached open.

The fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The doors for both personnel airlocks were breached opened to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit 1 reactor building. The doors will be breached for the duration of the U1C7 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

III. Auxiliary Building Door

Description of Condition

On September 11, 1995, auxiliary building Door A-62, located on Floor Elevation 690, was breached. The door provides access to the Unit 1 penetration room from the general auxiliary building area.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition

The door is breached to facilitate U1C7 RFO activities, including the movement of personnel and equipment through the area and the routing of electrical cables (communications and video). The fire breach will remain open for the duration of the U1C7 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished upon the completion of the outage activities.

IV. Sleeve Penetrations

Description of Condition

During September 10 through 12, 1995, the following seven sleeve penetrations located in either the auxiliary building or Unit 1 reactor building were breached.

<u>Sleeve Number</u>	<u>Building</u>	<u>Elevation</u>
Mk-24	Auxiliary	775
Mk-32	Auxiliary	688
Mk-72	Auxiliary	717
Mk-100	Auxiliary	690
Mk-101	Auxiliary	698
X-108	Reactor	688
X-109	Reactor	688

These fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition

The sleeve penetrations are breached in support of U1C7 RFO activities, including the routing of electrical cables (communication and video) and the installation of ice blowing piping. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U1C7 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barriers are reestablished. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U1C7 RFO. The reactor building fire breach will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

V. Fire Wall

Description of Condition

On September 14, 1995, the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room fire wall was removed. The cement block wall provides compartmentalization for the 1B-B CCP from the general auxiliary building access area on Floor Elevation 669.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

Cause of Condition

The penetration is breached to facilitate work being performed on the 1B-B CCP motor. This fire breach will remain open for the duration of the U1C7 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.