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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2
Docket No. 50-313/368
License No. DPR-51/NPF-6
Licensee Event Report 50-313/95-010-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), enclosed is the subject report concerning radioactive gaseous effluent sampling.

Very truly yours,

Dwight C. Mims

Dwight C. Mims
Director, Licensing

DCM/dc

enclosure

100025

IE22
1/1

cc: Mr. Leonard J. Callan
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NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1	05000313	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
Failure to Establish Alternate Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Sampling Within One Hour Due to Lack of Guidance Regarding Prioritization for Restoration of Sampling Capability Upon Loss of Multiple SPING Channels

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	04	95	95	010	00	10	04	95	Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 2	05000368
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	N/1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: (Check one or more) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	100/45	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	70.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	70.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Specify in Abstract Below and in Text
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Dee Cantwell, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist	501-858-5589

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
C	EC	BKR	G182	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 0629 on September 4, 1995, alternate sampling capability for inservice effluent paths was not established within one hour, as required by ANO's current interpretation of the applicable Technical Specifications, upon loss of normal radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation. This event, initiated by rain water that leaked through the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Building roof into a motor control center, resulted in a loss of power to electrical buses supplying the Super Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) channels. Chemistry personnel immediately began preparations for the installation of alternate sampling equipment. Efforts were complicated by the loss of power to electrical outlets needed for alternate sampling pumps. Extension cords were routed to alternate outlets and the required pumps were obtained. However, alternate sampling was not established for either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 radwaste area ventilation until 0750, exceeding ANO's self imposed one hour time limit. This event can be attributed to lack of guidance regarding prioritization for establishment of alternate sampling upon the loss of SPING channels for multiple release paths. Guidance will be developed to provide instructions to Chemistry personnel in the event of a similar incident. The PASS Building rain water leak was contained and leads were lifted to isolate the fault so that power could be restored to the Unit 2 SPINGs. Unit 2 equipment was inspected and returned to service that same day. The damaged Unit 1 equipment was replaced and returned to service on September 6, 1995.

A. Plant Status

At the time this event occurred, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) was operating at 100 percent full power and Unit 2 (ANO-2) was operating at 45 percent full power.

B. Event Description

At 0629 on September 4, 1995, rain water leakage through the roof of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)[IP] Building created a phase-to-phase short on the supply side of a circuit breaker resulting in loss of power to two Motor Control Centers (MCCs), one for each unit. Loss of power to these MCCs rendered the PASS instrumentation and multiple Super Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) channels inoperable for both units and resulted in a loss of power to local electrical outlets.

ANO-1 Technical Specification 3.5.7.3 and ANO-2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 state that, with less than the minimum number of iodine and particulate channels operable, effluent releases via the affected pathways may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment. Although not specifically stated in the specifications, ANO's current interpretation requires that alternate sampling capability be established within one hour for inservice effluent paths upon loss of normal radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation.

Chemistry personnel immediately began installation of alternate sampling equipment. Efforts were complicated due to the loss of power to multiple SPING channels and to electrical outlets needed for alternate sampling pumps. Extension cords were routed to alternate outlets and the required pumps were obtained. Although all required alternate sampling equipment was installed within one hour and twenty-one minutes, ANO's self imposed one hour time limit was exceeded.

Leads were lifted to isolate the electrical fault so that power could be restored to the ANO-2 MCC. The ANO-2 PASS and SPINGs were returned to service that same day. The damaged ANO-1 circuit breaker was replaced and all associated equipment was inspected and returned to service on September 6, 1995.

C. Root Cause

The failure to comply with the self imposed time limit for establishing alternate sampling was due to lack of guidance provided to Chemistry personnel regarding prioritization for the establishment of alternate sampling upon loss of multiple SPING channels. Timely response was complicated by the need to install multiple sample pumps and because of the loss of power to outlets needed for the pumps.

D. Corrective Actions

The ANO-2 electrical equipment was inspected and returned to service on September 4, 1995.

The damaged ANO-1 circuit breaker was replaced, all associated equipment was cleaned and inspected, and leads were reterminated to restore the system to normal operation on September 6, 1995.

The leak in the Pass Building roof was contained and temporary repairs were completed. The original type roof sealant was procured and preparations have begun for permanent repairs. Design Engineering will inspect and evaluate the PASS Building roof installation and make recommendations for roof modifications and future maintenance practices by March 1, 1996.

Instructions for prioritizing restoration of sampling capability upon the loss of multiple SPING channels will be developed by December 1, 1995.

E. Safety Significance

Based on data obtained before and after this event, it was determined that no significant or abnormal releases of radioactivity occurred. Therefore, this condition was not safety significant.

F. Basis for Reportability

Failure to establish alternate sampling for inservice effluent paths within one hour did not meet ANO's current interpretation of Unit-1 Technical Specification 3.5.7.3 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.9. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

G. Additional Information

No previous similar occurrences requiring a Licensee Event Report were identified concerning the failure to establish alternate sampling within the time specified by ANO's current interpretation of Technical Specifications.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].