

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 5	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Inoperability of Control Room Emergency Filtration Trains A and B

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 6	0 6	8 4	8 4	0 0 8	0 0	0 7	0 5	8 4			0 5 0 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):											

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 1 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M. J. Pastva, Jr., Regulatory Technician	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 9 1 9 NUMBER: 4 5 7 - 9 5 2 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS
X	B H	F L T	B 4 5 1 0	No					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 6/06/84 at 0225 it was discovered that both Control Building Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) System trains A and B were inoperable due to a thermal overload trip of each train's fan unit motor. Within five minutes the trips were reset and both trains were started to verify operability and returned to normal standby configuration. At the time, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power and Unit 2 was in a unit refuel/maintenance outage. Inoperability of both trains prevents assurance of Control Room habitability during design basis accidents.

It was determined the incurred trips resulted from anticipated successive starting and stopping of the trains during periodic testing (PT) of the building fire detection instrumentation on 6/05/84 at approximately 1236 to 1504. Following the PT, manual start signals to both trains were initiated to verify the authenticity of CBEAF System train fans' inoperable annunciations. Based on Control Room indications, it was perceived a problem existed with the annunciators' lights and that both CBEAF System trains were operable. As a result of this event, appropriate real-time training will be conducted with specified Operations personnel. The PT and appropriate plant annunciator procedures will be revised as required to help preclude future similar events.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500032584	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		84	008	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

On June 6, 1984, at 0225 investigative efforts, resulting from the Operations Shift Foreman's review of the Unit 1 Control Room annunciator tracking status checklist, revealed that both Control Building Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) System trains A and B were inoperable due to a thermal overload trip of each train's fan unit motor. Within five minutes the subject trips were reset and each train was started to verify operability and returned to normal standby configuration. At the time of the event discovery, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power and Unit 2 was in a unit refuel/maintenance outage with the reactor defueled.

It was determined the incurred thermal overload trips most likely resulted from anticipated successive starting and stopping of the trains during performance of an operability test of the Control Building fire detection instrumentation, Periodic Test (PT) 35.4.5, conducted on June 5, 1984, from approximately 1236 to 1504. During performance of the PT, the CBEAF System Emergency Air Fan Fail to Run annunciation was received and reset numerous times. Following completion of the PT, the annunciation was observed sealed-in and was placed on the Unit 1 annunciator tracking system. During the subsequent Operations shift turnover at approximately 1530, the annunciation cleared and was reset. At this time it was noted that the Unit 2 annunciator lights for the Control Building Emergency Fan 2A and 2B Inoperable annunciation were sealed in. Following the Operations shift turnover, the Unit 2 Control Operator initiated a manual start signal to both CBEAF System trains to verify the authenticity of the subject annunciations. Control Room indications showed the CBEAF System trains' dampers were open and fans running; therefore, it was perceived that both trains were operable and that a problem existed with the subject annunciators.

Operability indication for the CBEAF System is provided by CBEAF train damper position and sensed CBEAF System flow. As a result, it is possible for Control Room indication of the CBEAF train fans running with the trains' fan unit power supply breakers tripped.

The inoperability of both CBEAF System trains prevents the assurance of Control Room habitability during a plant design basis accident.

As a result of this event, specified plant Operations personnel will receive appropriate real-time training. In addition, PT-35.4.5 and appropriate plant annunciator procedures for the CBEAF System will be revised as required to help preclude future similar occurrences.

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429
July 5, 1984

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
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Washington, DC 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-84-8

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/ag/LETAG

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly

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