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June 8, 1984

MURRAY R. EDELMAN
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
HPCS Interfaces to the Suppression
Pool Clean-up System [RDC 99(84)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is the final report on the potential significant deficiency concerning the design of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) interfaces to the Suppression Pool Clean-up System. Mr. P. R. Pelke of your office was notified on February 16, 1984, by Mr. B. D. Walrath of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated and two interim reports, dated March 16 and April 30, 1984, were also submitted. This discrepancy was identified during a safety system functional capability review performed for CEI by GDS Associates. This letter contains a description of the deficiency and an evaluation of this condition.

As a result of our evaluation, we have determined that this condition is not reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

Description of Deficiency

The nonsafety-related Suppression Pool Clean-up (SPCU) System takes suction from the High Pressure Core Spray suction via valve E22-F015. The HPCS System will automatically start upon a Level 2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal but the clean-up pump suction valves close on a Level 1 LOCA signal per elementary diagram B-208-065. In this situation, the HPCS pump will experience opposing pump suction from the SPCU pump. In addition, due to the non-seismic classification of the SPCU system, this situation would create a non-seismic interface with the HPCS system.

Evaluation of Potential Deficiency

Our Architect/Engineer, Gilbert/Commonwealth, Inc., has completed their evaluation of this discrepancy. The results of the evaluation are that no reduction in the ability of the HPCS System to perform its intended safety function can be postulated. Therefore, this condition is not reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

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A design change for Unit 1 will be instituted to change the logic for the SPCU isolation valves so that they will close upon a Level 2 LOCA signal. A similar situation does not exist in Unit 2 as the respective isolation valves currently close on a Level 2 LOCA signal.

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely,

Murray R. Edelman
Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:pab

cc: Mr. J. A. Grobe
NRC Site Office

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