

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 3, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Ms. E. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

Enclosed is our response to your May 29, 1984 letter to H. G. Parris, which requested TVA to provide operational data on PORV/SV failures and challenges at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. However, we would like to note that all of the information requested by the NRC, with the exception of the valve manufacturer and model number, has been previously submitted. The description of the system, including the number of valves and the associated setpoints, is in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Also, valve failures and challenges as well as block valve closings are reported to the NRC in accordance with technical specification requirements.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with Jerry Wills at FTS 858-2683.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills
L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 3rd day of July 1984

Bryant M. Lowery
Notary Public
My Commission Expires 4/8/86

Enclosure

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure)
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL DATA
ON PORV/SV FAILURES/CHALLENGES

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

1. Give the vendor and model name and how many PORVs and SVs you have at your facilities.

SQN has three safety valves and two relief valves per unit. Currently, both units use Target Rock 82F001 solenoid-operated relief valves. Prior to the last refueling outage on unit 1, a Masoneillan series 20,000 two-inch by three-inch globe valve was used. Prior to the last refueling outage on unit 2, a two-inch Copes Vulcan globe valve was used. Both units use Crosby 6 b" M by 6 (HB-86-BP) safety valves. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) figure 5.1-1 shows the arrangement.

2. Do the PORVs have an associated block valve?

Yes, each relief valve has an individual block valve. FSAR Figure 5.1-1 shows the arrangement.

3. List the PORV and SV pressure setpoint.

At full power, the relief valve setpoints are 2,335 and 2,395 psig. A variable setpoint is used as part of the cold overpressure protection system when the reactor coolant temperature is less than 310°F. The safety valve setpoints are 2,485 psig + 1 percent. Additional information on these valves is available in FSAR Table 5.5.13-1.

4. For each PORV and SV, list how many failures and challenges have occurred from April 1, 1980, to present. List actions to correct any failures. List transients causing challenges and number of challenges per transient.

SQN has had no safety valve challenges and one failure. One safety valve lifted at a lower pressure than expected and reset during a recent unit startup. The valve was replaced. SQN unit 1 experienced one momentary relief valve challenge during the special natural circulation test program. The challenge was attributed to a transient induced by the testing. SQN unit 2 experienced one relief valve failure prior to initial startup. The problem was attributed to a control wiring error. It has been corrected. This information has been previously transmitted to NRC in the monthly operating reports required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.10.

5. What percentage of this time period have the PORVs been blocked off? Give reasons for blocking off, i.e., leakage past PORV, packing leak on block valve, etc., which PORVs are blocked off now, if any?

Based on the licensee event reports required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13, the following information is available.