NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Turkey Point Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 6	0 1	8 4	8 4	— 0 0 8	— 0 0	0 6	2 8	8 4	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
N		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(a)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 1 1 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(a)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Paul A. Roach, Regulation and Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 3 0 5 — 2 4 5 - 2 9 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 1, 1984, a reactor trip occurred. The root cause was determined to stem from a personnel error that resulted in reactor power reaching 10% with the turbine in a tripped condition and occurred during attempts to open the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). The MSIVs are opened only after equalizing the steam generator pressures with the steam header pressure. This is accomplished by opening the associated bypass valves around the MSIVs and increasing atmospheric steam dump in the respective headers to reduce the pressure upstream of the MSIVs. The steam usage associated with equalizing the steam pressure across the MSIVs reduces the average reactor coolant system temperature (T_{avg}). During attempts to open the MSIVs, the licensed operator increased reactor power in anticipation of a sagging T_{avg}. However, reactor power reached 10% during the evolution and since the turbine was in a tripped condition, a reactor trip resulted. All equipment functioned as designed on initiation of the engineered safety feature actuation signal (ESFAS) generated in the reactor protection system. Immediate corrective actions included supervisor discussions with the licensed operators on the initiating conditions and plant parameters and understanding the significance of their actions. The health and safety of the public were not affected. Similar occurrences: None.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On June 1, 1984, at 11:12 p.m., a reactor trip occurred while performing the unit evolution - hot shutdown to power operation. The root cause was determined to stem from a personnel error that resulted in reactor power reaching 10% with the turbine in a tripped condition. A reactor trip resulted on reactor protection system (RPS) logic - "Turbine Trip" coincident with reactor power above 10%.

Opening the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is performed under step 8.13.6 of Operating Procedure 0202.2, Unit Start-up - Hot Shutdown to Power Operation. Prior to performing this step, the bypass valves for the MSIVs are opened to equalize the steam header pressure with the steam generator (S/G) pressures, equalizing the steam pressures across the MSIVs which is required to open these valves. The steam usage associated with equalizing the pressure across the MSIVs reduces the average reactor coolant temperature (T_{avg}). During attempts to open the MSIVs, the licensed operator increased reactor power in anticipation of a sagging T_{avg} by movement of Bank D control rods. However, reactor power exceeded the nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) P-10 ("Permissive") setpoint of 10% power on 2/4 NIS power range channels (N-41 and N-44) and resulted in the reactor trip.

All equipment functioned as designed on initiation of the engineered safety feature actuation signal (ESFAS) generated in the RPS. Following completion of the post-trip review, having identified no other problems, the unit evolution hot shutdown to power operation re-commenced without problem. The unit returned to service at 2:22 a.m., on June 2, 1984.

FPL

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

June 28, 1984
PNS-LI-84-221

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 251-84-008
Turkey Point Unit 4
Date of Event: June 1, 1984
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Reactor Trip

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Williams, Jr.
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

JWW/SAV/js

Attachment

cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
File 933.1

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