

TABLE 3-6

REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SURVEILLANCE

<u>REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
1.1 Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels	Visual inspection of upper surface of top disc and bottom surface of bottom disc; volumetric inspection from circumference of <u>all</u> disc segments.	When motor is disassembled for maintenance purposes.

TABLE 3-7

CAPSULE REMOVAL SCHEDULE

<u>Removal Sequence</u>	<u>Refueling Schedule EFPY**</u>	<u>Capsule Removed</u>
1	2.4	225°
2	5.9	265°
3	20	45°
4	21	85°
5	27	95°
6	28	265°*
7	32	225°*
8	Standby	275°

* Replacement capsule assemblies were installed in the 225° and 265° locations following early removal of the 265° capsule. These capsules benchmark the change in core loading design initiated at 5.9 EFPY.

** Based on a rated power level of 1500 MWt.

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DISCUSSION AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
FOR SURVEILLANCE CAPSULE REMOVAL SCHEDULE

Reference: Letter from W. C. Jones to Mr. James R. Miller, dated January 27, 1984 (LIC-84-021).

Table 3-7 (on page 3-27), the surveillance capsule removal schedule of the Technical Specifications, was revised to document the early withdrawal of surveillance capsule assembly W-265 and to document the installation of two replacement capsule assemblies; one at W-225 and one at W-265. The original W-265 capsule assembly was removed early, at 5.9 EFPY, to benchmark the end of a core loading design used up to that time and the two replacement capsule assemblies were installed to document the reduced fluence expected as a result of a core loading design change.

It is the District's position that Table 3-7 need not conform to the current version of 10 CFR 50, Appendix H since it was not in effect when the surveillance capsule program was initiated. Nonetheless, the proposed capsule removal schedule does conform to 10 CFR 50, Appendix H. In order to illustrate this fact, the following table is presented:

<u>Removal Sequence</u>	<u>Anticipated Fluence</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
3	3.3×10^{19}	EOL fluence at vessel wall
4	2.0×10^{19}	EOL fluence at 1/4 thickness
5	2.5×10^{19}	75% EOL fluence at vessel wall
6	1.6×10^{19}	50% EOL fluence at vessel wall
7	3.6×10^{19}	EOL Sample

The peak EOL fluence anticipated at the vessel wall is 3.3×10^{19} n/cm² and the peak EOL fluence at the 1/4 thickness location is anticipated to be 2.0×10^{19} n/cm². It is noted that sequences 3, 4, and 7 are set up such that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, are satisfied. It is noted further that it may prove highly desirable to remove early the capsule scheduled for sequence 7 in order to provide additional material properties information which would be useful to the Pressurized Thermal Shock analysis program. If this is done, the schedule will be such that the terms of the referenced letter are maintained.

It is anticipated that further vessel wall neutron flux reduction will be achieved by fuel management schemes currently under investigation. This may necessitate another revision of the surveillance capsule removal schedule.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, the following significant hazards considerations have been made:

- (1) Will the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. Early removal of the W-265 capsule assembly and the installation of the two replacement capsule assemblies will not cause a significant

increase in the probability or consequence of a previously evaluated accident, but instead will provide better information on the fluence to the inside surface of the reactor vessel. The surveillance capsule holders mounted in the reactor vessel were originally designed to allow the insertion of replacement capsule assemblies as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. The two replacement capsule assemblies are of the same design, installation, and manufacture as the original capsule assemblies.

- (2) Will the change create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The replacement capsule assemblies will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated accident because they are of the same design, installation, and manufacture as the original capsule assemblies.

- (3) Will the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. There is no significant reduction in the margin of safety involved because the replacement capsule assemblies occupy the holders of the original capsule assemblies and are, therefore, in the same configuration as the original capsule assemblies and do not affect the operation of the plant.