

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 1 9 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 013
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TITLE (4)  
Loss of Primary Fire Water Suppression System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
06	06	84	84	013	00	06	29	84			050000
											050000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0010	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
20.406(c)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Paul F. Cervenka	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 609 971-4894
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES  IF yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)      X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 6, 1984 at approximately 1330 hours, post indicating valve V-9-12, which branches off the fourteen (14) inch Fire Water Main was damaged by a maintenance vehicle. This resulted in a loss of the Fire Suppression Water System. This fourteen (14) inch line is fed by the two diesel driven fire pumps and supplies an underground loop which feeds the Fire Suppression Water System.

Immediate actions performed consisted of isolating the line which contained the damaged valve. The redundant Fire Protection Water System was then tested for operability and aligned to supply the underground loop which feeds the Fire Suppression Water System. The redundant Fire Protection System is a manually initiated system consisting of a tank, pump, motor, controls and interconnecting piping.

The immediate corrective action was to repair the damaged post indicating valve and restore the integrity of the Primary Fire Water System. This was accomplished in approximately nine and one-half hours.

As a result of this incident all post indicating valves in similar high traffic areas were inspected for adequate physical protection.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

June 6, 1984

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

The Fire Protection System was not operable as required by Technical Specifications 3.4.A.10.b(2) and 3.4.F.1.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The reactor was fueled with the mode switch in the REFUEL position. The reactor vessel cavity was flooded with the fuel pool gates removed.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On June 6, 1984 at approximately 1330 hours post indicating valve V-9-12, which branches off the fourteen (14) inch fire water main, was damaged by a maintenance vehicle. This resulted in the loss of the Fire Suppression Water System. This fourteen (14) inch line is fed by the two diesel driven fire pumps and supplies an underground loop which feeds the fire suppression Water System.

Immediate actions performed consisted of isolating the line which contained the damaged valve. The redundant Fire Protection Water System was then tested for operability and aligned to supply the underground loop which feeds the Fire Suppression Water System.

An immediate telephone notification to the NRC, a telecopy transmitted within one working day and a fourteen (14) day written report have been supplied to the Commission in accordance with Technical Specification section 3.12.B.3. The condition of not meeting Technical Specifications 3.4.A.10.b(2) and 3.4.F.1 were reported within one hour of their determination in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii).

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to the extremely soft soil, and lack of physical protection in the area around post indicating valve V-9-12. These conditions resulted in the soil giving way causing the maintenance vehicle to slide into and damage the post indicating valve.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE and SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Within one hour of the loss of the the Fire Water Suppression System, all work activities on the reactor and its connected systems which could result in lowering the reactor water level were terminated. It should be noted that all other required conditions of Technical Specifications 3.4.A.10 were met at the time of this occurrence. Also within one hour, the affected section of piping was isolated, and the redundant Fire Protection System was aligned and tested for operability. The local fire department was notified of the situation, and was available to respond if needed. Fire watch tours were already underway due to the various maintenance activities associated with the current plant outage. All operable fire detection system panels were energized and available to perform their intended function.

The immediate corrective action was to repair the damaged post indicating valve and restore the integrity of the Primary Fire Water System. This was accomplished in approximately nine and one-half hours and the system was declared operable at 2300 hours on June 6, 1984.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action consisted of the repair of the damaged post indicating valve V-9-12 and restoration of the Fire Suppression Water System to normal operation.

As a result of this incident all post indicating valves in similar high traffic areas were inspected for adequate physical protection. All post indicating valves were adequately protected with the exception of the recently damaged V-9-12 valve. A temporary barricade was erected and V-9-12 will be permanently protected with guide posts.



**GPU Nuclear Corporation**  
Post Office Box 388  
Route 9 South  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388  
609 971-4000  
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 29, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER)  
No. 84-013.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF:dsm  
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator  
Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, NJ 08731

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