

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

84 JUN 14 AIO: 07

June 11, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


Please refer to my letter to you dated March 19, 1982 which contained our response to Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/82-01, 50-260/82-01, 50-296/82-01 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. In the enclosure, Item 4, "Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violation," we provided information regarding cage installation which has now determined to be unnecessary. Enclosed is a revised response to Item 4 which also provides our justification for this change.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 853-2725.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

8407060033 840619
PDR ADOCK 05000259
Q PDR

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-259/82-01, 50-260/82-01, AND 50-296/82-01
R. C. LEWIS'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS
DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1982

Appendix A - (259/82-01-01)

4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

In the original response to this violation, wire cages were to be installed around and on top of critical plant panels. These cages were to be lockable and cardkey operated to provide accountability for entry into the panel. The installation work was scheduled to be performed under design change requests (DCRs) P-2881 and -2877. There have been no recurrences of this violation since it was first identified in January 1982. In view of this, and after reviewing the impact these DCRs would have on plant modification and work schedules, the DCRs have been cancelled and no further corrective action is anticipated. All appropriate surveillance instructions have been changed to require the installation of lead seals after the valve is placed in the final operating position and verified. To date, these corrective actions alone have been sufficient to prevent recurrence. If unauthorized operation of the valves were to become a problem, even with the lead seals, additional corrective action could be taken, such as securing valve handles with a screw that requires a special tool to remove.