NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Diesel Generator Start when back feeding Powerboard 102 from Powerboard 16

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 6	0 1	8 4	8 4	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 7	0 1	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Robert Randall, Supervisor Technical Services	3 1 5 — 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

On June 1, 1984, during a refueling outage, work was to be done on breaker R1012, which supplies 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. This made it necessary to backfeed Powerboard 102 through 600 Volt Powerboard 16. Breaker R1012 was opened in preparation for this maintenance. Immediately thereafter, new protective relays sensed undervoltage on 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. As a result, tie breaker R1042 tripped, and Diesel Generator 102 started at approximately 1000 hrs. The undervoltage condition experienced on 4160 Volt Powerboard 102 was due to the combination of the voltage drops associated with the backfeeding process and the new 4160 Volt Powerboard 102 protective relay settings (which are considerably higher than previously set). Immediate corrective action taken included returning to the normal 115K Volt supply on Powerboard 102. Operating procedures are being reviewed to determine if any procedural changes are required which will prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	8 4	0 1 2	0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

On June 1, 1984, during a refueling outage, maintenance work was to be done on breaker R1012, which supplies 4160V Powerboard 102. This made it necessary to backfeed Powerboard 102 through 600V Powerboard 16. The interlock between sections A and B on Powerboard 16 was defeated to allow tie breaker R1042 to be closed, which completed the backfeed to 4160V Powerboard 102. At that point, breaker R1012 was opened in preparation for maintenance. Immediately after this breaker was opened, new protective relays sensed an undervoltage condition on 4160V Powerboard 102. As a result, tie breaker R1042 was tripped and Diesel Generator 102 started at approximately 1000 hrs. The undervoltage condition experienced on 4160V Powerboard 102 was due to the combination of the voltage drops associated with the backfeeding process and the new 4160V Powerboard 102 protective relay settings (which are considerably higher than previously set).

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences arising out of this event because: 1) the reactor was in cold shutdown and subcritical; 2) all control rods were fully inserted at the time of the event; 3) there were no loads on the 4160V Powerboard 102 at the time of the event; and 4) all engineered safety features involved in this event operated as designed; therefore there was no possibility of damage to the plant or danger to plant personnel arising out of this event. The effect of this event on the plant and its personnel, had the plant been at any other power level, would still be negligible, because all of the engineered safety features involved in this event operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action taken included returning to the normal 115KV supply on Powerboard 102. Operating procedures are being reviewed to determine if any procedural changes are required which will prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

June 29, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 84-12

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-12 Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 1015 hrs on June 1, 1984. This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/lo
attachments
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator

IE22
1/1