

**DUKE POWER COMPANY**

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June 29, 1984

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 4

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station  
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. Denton:

Section 9.5.1.2 of the Catawba Safety Evaluation Report discusses fire protection program requirements. This section specifically states that the fire protection program should be operational before initial fuel loading. This is to advise that the fire protection program will be complete and in place inside the Unit 1 protected area prior to Unit 1 fuel load with the following exceptions:

1. Certain features associated with operability of the Standby Shutdown System will not be completed by initial fuel loading. This integrated system is provided, in part, to assure that a single fire will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain hot standby condition and to maintain negative reactivity in the primary system. This system is not required for fuel loading since there is no fission product inventory and therefore no decay heat. Each of these features will be complete prior to initial criticality.

The following features are involved:

- a) Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Generator Fuel Line Modification
  - b) Standby Makeup Pump Capacity Modification
  - c) Train A Disconnect Enclosure Cover Modification
  - d) Standby Makeup Pump SSF Flow Gage Modification
  - e) Standby Shutdown System Related 8-hour Emergency Lights Modifications
  - f) Standby Shutdown System Related Equipment Access Platforms
2. Damage Control Measures and Cold Shutdown Procedures required by Appendix R, Section III L will be completed and personnel will be trained on these procedures by initial criticality. These procedures will be developed to recover from an event which affects redundant trains of equipment required to achieve cold shutdown. There is no need for these procedures prior to initial criticality for the same reason as discussed above.

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
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3. Floor drains located between the 57 column line and the interim barrier are generally capped off as these drains terminate in sumps located on the Unit 2 side of the barrier. The Unit 2 contaminated sump which serves the affected floor drain will not be put into service while the interim barrier is in place, to mitigate the possibility of contaminated fluids being collected in this sump which is on the Unit 2 side of the interim barrier. This is part of the overall effort to isolate Unit 2 equipment from Unit 1 equipment. This results in the sprinklered area of component cooling pumps 1A1 and 1A2 being without floor drainage. This condition is acceptable as water accumulation would be negligible since operable floor drains are nearby and essential equipment is positioned well above floor level. Damage control team members would additionally control water accumulation as appropriate.
4. Unit 2 component cooling pumps 2B1 and 2B2 are located on the Unit 1 side of the interim barrier. The sprinkler systems protecting these pumps will not be operable until Unit 2 fuel load. This is acceptable as these pumps are located on elevation 577 and do not expose Unit 1 pumps located on elevation 560. These pumps are not required until Unit 2 fuel load. The sprinkler systems will be in service prior to Unit 2 fuel load.
5. The carbon dioxide fire protection system for 1A Diesel Generator is not completely installed and the acceptance test has not been conducted. The diesel generator is being overhauled and will be in service by initial criticality. The installation and testing of the fire protection system will be completed to support this schedule.
6. A fire detector will be installed in the bay above the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Pit on elevation 543 prior to initial criticality. Detection is provided throughout the remainder of the area. The combustible loading is light in this area. Cables associated with Train A and the turbine driven pump are wrapped with a 1-hour fire rated insulating material. Equipment in this area is associated with auxiliary feedwater which is not required to remove decay heat prior to initial criticality.
7. Cork filler material installed in seismic expansion joints between the Reactor Building and Auxiliary Buildings east of column line EE will be replaced such that fire areas 4, 11, and 18 will be completely separated. Due to the presence of open spiral stairs between elevation 594 and 577, fire areas 18 and 22 will be combined.

In the draft SSCR, these are considered a single fire area due to the presence of cork filler material. Since this portion of the Auxiliary Building has been accepted as a single fire area, further subdivisions will enhance the fire safe quality of the station. This modification will be complete by initial criticality.

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Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

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