Commonwealth Edison Company June 29, 1984

RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETED

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

*84 .11 -2 12:25

In the Matter of)	Docket No			
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY)		STN	50-455	OL
(Bryon Nuclear Power Station,)				

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF BOBBY G. TREECE ON ISSUES 5 AND 6 (CABLE OVERTENSIONING) AS LIMITED BY THE LICENSING BOARD'S ORDER OF JUNE 8, 1984

- I. Bobby G. Treece of Sargent & Lundy is the Senior Electrical Project Engineer for Byron Station.
- II. All of the safety-related cables which were installed in conduit prior to the December, 1982, implementation of the electrical contractor's revised cable installation procedure will perform their intended functions.
 - A. This conclusion is borne out by the analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy.
 - B. This analysis comprised the following steps:
 - Available cable pull reports for cables pulled in conduit before December, 1982, were reviewed. Many of the cables covered by these reports were found to be acceptable.
 - For those cable pull reports in which the allowable pulling tensions had been exceeded,

8407030208 8406 PDR ADOCK 05000

Units 1 and 2)

based upon the <u>general</u> pull criteria, the details of the cable pulls were forwarded to the cable manufacturers for the performance of a <u>specific</u> analysis to determine the acceptability of the cable pulls.

- All of these cable pulls were found to be acceptable, based upon the manufacturers' <u>specific</u> analysis.
- Sargent & Lundy then analyzed approximately 2600 conduits, which included <u>all</u> safety related cables pulled in conduit prior to December, 1982.
- The safety-related cables in all but three of the approximately 2600 conduits analyzed were found to be acceptable.
- 6. The details of these three conduits were forwarded to the cable manufacturer for the performance of a <u>specific</u> analysis. Based upon the cable manufacturer's analysis, these cables were found to be acceptable.
- C. The NRC accepted this analysis and concluded that there was a reasonable assurance that the safetyrelated cables installed in conduit prior to December, 1982, would perform their intended functions.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of)	Docket		50-454 50-455	
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY)		om	50 455	UL.
(Bryon Nuclear Power Station,) Units 1 and 2)				

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF BOBBY G. TREECE ON ISSUES 5 AND 6 (CABLE OVERTENSIONING), AS LIMITED BY THE LICENSING BOARD'S ORDER OF JUNE 8, 1984

- Q-1. Please state your name.
- A-1. Bobby G. Treece.
- Q-2. What is your residence address?
- A-2. My residence address is 807 South We-Go Trail, Mt. Prospect, Illinois 60056.
- Q-3. By whom are you employed . 1d in what capacity?
- A-3. I am employed by Sargent & Lundy. My position is Associate and Senior Electrical Project Engineer for Byron and Braidwood Stations.
- Q-4. Please describe your educational background.
- A-4. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering from the University of Arkansas in 1948.

I am licensed as a professional engineer in the states of Arkansas, Florida and Illinois.

Q-5. Please describe your employment experience.

- A-5. I went to work for Ebasco Services in 1948 as a cadet engineer. In 1951, I joined Sargent & Lundy as an Electrical Engineer. In 1963, I became an Electrical Project Engineer and was promoted to Senior Electrical Project Engineer in 1968, the position which I hold today. During this period, I have been responsible for the engineering and design of the electrical aspects of numerous power plants, both fossil and nuclear. In addition to Byron Station, I have performed electrical engineering work for the Dresden, Zion and Braidwood Nuclear Stations.
- Q-6. Please describe your duties as Senior Electrical Project Engineer for Byron Station.
- A-6. I have principal responsibility for the electrical engineering and design for the Byron project. My duties include the division of work among the Electrical Project Engineers and Electrical Engineers assigned to the Byron project team. I supervise and review the work performed by these engineers and provide the interface between the Electrical Department of Sargent & Lundy and personnel at Commonwealth Edison with respect to Byron Station.

Q-7. Please describe the scope of your testimony.

- A-7. My testimony is in response to Issues 5 and 6, relating to potential cable overtensioning, or overstressing, at Byron Station, as those issues have been limited by the Licensing Board's Order of June 8, 1984. This testimony is intended to supplement the testimony of James O. Binder, of Commonwealth Edison Company, which also relates to potential cable overtensioning. Specifically, my testimony will describe the analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy of all of the safetyrelated electrical cables installed in conduit at Byron Station prior to December, 1982. The purpose of that analysis was to determine whether or not any of those cables had been rendered unacceptable due to overtensioning. I will describe how the analysis came to be done, the methodology used in performing the analysis, the results of the analysis, and the conclusions which were drawn from it. The attachments to my testimony consist of various letters and an NRC Inspection Report which pertain to this matter. I am familiar with the contents of all of these attachments to the extent that they pertain to the cable overtensioning matter.
- Q-8. Did Sargent & Lundy perform an analysis of all of the safety-related electrical cables installed in conduit at Byron Station prior to December, 1982, to determine whether any of those cables had been rendered unacceptable due to overtensioning?

A-8. Yes.

- Q-9. Is electrical cable installed only in conduit?
- A-9. No. Electrical cable may also be installed in cable trays.
- Q-10. Why did the analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy not consider cable installed in cable trays?
- A-10. Potential overtensioning of cable installed in trays was not considered to be a problem and thus was not included in the analysis performed by Sargent & Lundy because the majority of these cables are laid in trays by hand. The possibility of exerting too much tension during such cable installations is small. For the remainder of the pulls through trays, the contractor uses pulling guides, or sheaves, for turning the cable around bends in the tray. For a given pulling tension, these guides reduce the sidewall pressure experienced by a cable below that for a conduit of the same radius. Sargent & Lundy's installation drawing aduressed cable sidewall pressure by specifying minimum cable pulling guide radii.
- Q-11. Please explain why Sargent & Lundy performed an analysis of all of the safety-related electrical cables installed in conduit at Byron Station prior to December, 1982, with respect to potential overtensioning.
- A-11. As previously described in the testimony of Mr. Binder, an NRC inspection in the Spring of 1982 identified as

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an item of noncompliance the fact that the cable installation procedure used by the electrical contractor, Hatfield Electric, did not address the requirements to calculate allowable cable pulling tensions. Commonwealth Edison's response to this item was to revise the cable installation procedure so as to address the subjects of concern to the NRC. In addition, Commonwealth Edison committed to take appropriate action to ensure that all safety-related cables installed prior to the implementation of the revised procedure in December, 1982, would perform their intended functions. This was to be accomplished by a review of cable pull reports and the performance of additional analysis by Sargent & Lundy.

- Q-12. Did you review cable pull reports covering all safetyrelated cables pulled in conduit prior to December, 1982? A-12. No. Cable pull reports do not exist for all such cables.
- Q-13. Why do they not exist?
- A-13. Originally, the electrical contractor's cable installation procedure did not require that cable pull reports be prepared for all safety-related cable installations.
- Q-14. Please describe the review of cable pull reports performed by Sargent & Lundy.
- A-14. Sargent & Lundy began by reviewing the available cable pull reports for cables pulled in conduit before the revised

-5-

cable installation procedure was implemented in December, 1982. In addition, Sargent & Lundy reviewed the cable pull reports attached to Commonwealth Edison Nonconformance Report (NCR) F-747. For each cable covered by a cable pull report, Sargent & Lundy calculated the allowable pulling tension, using criteria supplied by the cable manufacturer, and compared that tension to the tension which had been documented on the cable pull report. This review revealed that 25 of the cable pulls covered by the cable pull reports exceeded the allowable pulling tensions. Of these 25 cases, five cable pulls exceeded the allowable pulling tension determined by tensile strength, 16 cable pulls exceeded the pulling tension determined by sidewall pressure and four cases exceeded the allowable pulling tension determined by both tensile strength and sidewall pressure. For these 25 cable pulls, it was determined that additional analysis was required before it could be concluded whether the monitored pulling tensions were acceptable.

- Q-15. How could additional analysis demonstrate that the pulling tensions recorded in the 25 cases mentioned in Answer 14, above, were acceptable?
- A-15. The cable pulling criteria as provided to Sargent & Lundy by each cable manufacturer are general pull

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criteria. As such, then do not establish the <u>maximum</u> tension which the cable can withstand without damage. The general criteria thus include a margin of conservatism. Sargent & Lundy, using these general criteria from each manufacturer, develops composite criteria applicable to all cables installed in Byron Station. Because these composite criteria are based upon the most stringent of the cable manufacturers' general criteria, they provide an additional margin of conservatism for some types of cables. Sargent & Lundy's analysis of the cable pull reports was based upon each cable manufacturer's <u>general</u> pull criteria. However, due to the manufacturer's margin of conservatism inherent in the general pull criteria, the manufacturer can perform a <u>specific</u> analysis to determine the acceptability of a particular cable pull.

- Q-16. What was done regarding the 25 cable pulls in which the allowable pulling tension was exceeded?
- A-16. Details of these specific cable pulls were forwarded to the cable manufacturers by Sargent & Lundy with a request that they perform a specific analysis of each cable pull. Based on the cable manufacturers' review, all 25 of these suspect cable pulls were found to be acceptable. See Attachment A (letter from Sargent & Lundy to Commonwealth Edison dated January 26, 1983) and Attachment B (letter from Sargent & Lundy to Commonwealth Edison dated December 12, 1983).

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Method 2. Sargent & Lundy determined the critical (maximum) conduit length for each conduit size assuming a worst case conduit configuration and the actual installed cable configuration. If the actual length of the conduit did not exceed the calculated critical length, it was concluded that the cables in that conduit had not been overtensioned. If the actual length of the conduit run exceeded the calculated critical length, that conduit run was subjected to further analysis using Method 3, below.

Method 3. For the remaining conduits, Sargent & Lundy calculated the expected pulling tension for the actual installed conduit configuration containing the actual installed cable configuration. This expected pulling tension was then compared to the allowable pulling tension as determined by the manufacturer's <u>general</u> criteria. If the expected pulling tension (as calculated) did not exceed the allowable pulling tension, it was concluded that the cables in that conduit had not been overtensioned. If the expected pulling tension (as calculated) exceeded the allowable pulling tension, details of the cable installation were forwarded to the manufacturer with a request that a <u>specific</u> analysis be performed.

Out of the approximately 2600 conduit runs analysed using the method(s) described above, only three conduits were identified for which a <u>specific</u> analysis by the manufacturer was required to determine the acceptability of the cables. See Attachment C (letter from Sargent & Lundy to

-9-

Commonwealth Edison dated June 23, 1983). Based upon the <u>specific</u> analysis performed by the cable manufacturer, the cables pulled in these three conduits were determined to be acceptable. See Attachment B (letter from Sargent & Lundy to Commonwealth Edison dated December 12, 1983).

- Q-19. What conclusion did Sargent & Lundy reach regarding whether any of the safety-related cables installed in conduit at Byron Station before December, 1982, had been rendered unacceptable due to overtensioning?
- A-19. Sargent & Lundy concluded that none of the safety-related cables pulled in conduit prior to December, 1982, was unacceptable; that is, their ability to perform their intended functions had not been irpaired by overtensioning.

Q-20. Please describe the basis for that conclusion.

A-20. That conclusion is based upon Sargent & Lundy's analysis of the safety-related cables installed in approximately 2600 conduits. This analysis included cables for which cable pull reports were and were not available. Most of the safety-related cables involved were determined to be acceptable based upon Sargent & Lundy's analysis, which indicated that the expected pulling tensions (as calculated) did not exceed the allowable pulling tensions for these cables. For the remaining safetyrelated cables, although the <u>allowable</u> pulling tensions as determined by the manufacturer's <u>general</u> criteria had been exceeded, a <u>specific</u> analysis performed by the manufacturer demonstrated that the cables will perform their intended functions. Thus, those cables were also found to be acceptable.

- Q-21. Did the NRC accept this analysis of safety-related cables pulled in conduit prior to December, 1982?
- A-21. The NRC accepted this analysis in Inspection Report 50-454/84-27; 50-455/84-19, which is Attachment D to my testimony. The NRC inspector concluded that there was a reasonable assurance that the safety-related cables would perform their intended functions. See Attachment D at pages E-14 to E-15.

TREECE ATTACHMENT A ENGINEERS 55 EAST MONROE STREET CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60603 13121 269-2000 TWX 910-221-2807

> January 26, 1983 Project Nos. 4391/2 & 4683/4

> > A-1

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2

Cable Pull Criteria

111

Mr. J. T. Westermeier Project Engineer Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Dear Mr. Westermeier:

In response to the NRC's findings concerning the Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures (Byron IE Inspection Reports Nos. 50-454/82-05 and 50-455/82-04), Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECo) letter dated November 5, 1982, stated that cable pull reports would be reviewed to verify that the allowable sidewall pressure was not exceeded for cables installed prior to the implementation of the revised Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures. The expected date for completion of the review was January 31, 1983. As a basis for this review, Sargent & 'Lundy received 44 cable pull reports (listed in Attachment A) from Byron Station Construction. This summarizes the results of Sargent & Lundy's review of these cable pull reports.

The cable pull reports were reviewed against the Electrical Installation (EI) drawings to identify the conduit containing the referenced cables. This identification was required to define the factors necessary to calculate the allowable sidewall pressure pulling tension (i.e. conduits smallest bend radius). For 29 of the cable pull reports received, the conduit containing the referenced cables was identified. These 29 cable pull reports covered 35 cable pulls for 54 safety-related cables. For the remaining 15 reports, the review of the electrical installation drawing did not reveal any conduit containing <u>only</u> the referenced cables.

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Mr. J. T. Westermeier SARGENT & LUNDY Commonwealth Edison Company CHICAGO

January 26, 1983 Page 2

To increase the data base for this review effort, Sargent & Lundy also used the cable pulling information included in Non-Conformance Report (NCR) F-747. This data covered 136 cable pulls for 159 safety-related cables. This NCR had been written for cables pulled following the issuance of ECN's 2579 and 3015 but prior to implementation of the revised Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures.

Sargent & Lundy's review of the above referenced data revealed that 17 of the 35 cable pulls covered by the cable pull reports, and 8 of the 136 cable pulls covered by the NCR, potentially exceed the allowable pulling tensions (reference Attachment B). In these 25 cases potentially exceeding the allowable pulling tension, five cable pulls exceeded the allowable tensile strength pulling tension, 16 cases exceeded the allowable sidewall pressure tension, and four cases exceeded both the tensile strength and the sidewall pressure pulling tension. Additional analysis is required before it can be determined whether the monitored pulling tensions are acceptable. For example, conversations with Okonite Company indicate that for certain cable configurations the .6 multiplying factor can be increased to .8. Also, for cases where the allowable sidewall pressure pulling tension has been exceeded the location of the bends in the conduit can result in additional relief. A list of the 17 cable pulls and associated cables covered by the cable pull reports requiring additional analysis have been given to Mr. J. O. Binder for his use in preparing an NCR.

Sargent & Lundy will continue work in this area to provide calculations and/or analysis to address the safety-related cables pulled in conduit prior to the implementation of the revised Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures for which pull reports do not exist.

GOPY

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Yours very truly,

T. R. Eisenbart Electrical Engineer

TRE:sh In duplicate Enclosure Copies: G. Sorensen/J. O. Binder (1/1) D. L. Leone/W. C. Cleff (1/1) R. J. Netzel (1/1)

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO

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ATTACHMENT "A" to Sargent & Lundy's (T. R. Eisenbart) letter dated January 26, 1983

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2 Project Nos. 4391/2 & 4683/4

CABLE PULL REPORTS SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW

PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY REPORT NUMBERS

CP-40	CP-316
CP-80	CP-319
CP-81	CP-320
CP-90	CP-336
CP-91	CP-338
CP-109	CP-339
CP-124	CP-340
CP-218	CP-323
CP-250	CP-321
CP-251	CP-322
CP-293	CP-330
CP-294	CP-324
CP-298	CP-317
CP-299	CP-318
CP-300	CP-295
C2-308	CP-313
CP-309	CP-331
CP-311	CP-310
CP-312	CP-337
CP-314	CP-8
CP-315	CP-7
CP-219	CP-301
CF-219	
	CP-125

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO

ATTACHMENT "B" to Sargent & Lundy's (T. R. Eisenbart) letter dated January 26, 1983

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2 Project Nos. 4391/2 & 4683/4

CABLE PULLS POTENTIALLY EXCEEDING

ALLOWABLE PULLING TENSIONS

Cable Pull Report Numbers

E. ...

Cable Numbers

CP-40												1AP183			
CP-80												1AP073,	1AP320,	1AP322	
CP-81												1AP072,			
CP-90	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	2SX138,	2SX140,	2SX153, 2SX260,	2SX258, 2SX139,
														2SX137,	
												2SX112,			
CP-91												2AP179,	2AP182,	2AP300.	2AP401
CP-218	В											1VC028			
CP-250	C											1IP005,	1IP006		
CP-251	L											1IP033,			
CP-315	5											1VA578,			
CP-316	5											1VA580,			
CP-319	9													1VA560	
CP-320		100										1VA374,	the second se		1VA549
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TREECE ATTACHMENT B

December 12, 1983 Project Nos. 4391/2-00

B-1

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron Station - Units 1 & 2

Byron-IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-454/82-05 and 50-455/82-04

Cable Pull Criteria

Reference: (a) Letter dated January 26, 1983,

- SEL (TRE) to CECO (JTW)
- (b) Letter dated June 23, 1983, S&L (TRE) to CECO (JTW)
- (c) Letter dated June 22, 1983, S&L (JFC) to Okonite (CD)

Mr. J. T. Westermeier Project Engineer Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Dear Mr. Westermeier:

Reference (a) summarized the results of an S&L review of cable pull reports obtained from Byron Station. Reference (b) summarized the results of an S&L analysis of safety-related cable pulls (in conduit), prior to the implementation of a revised pulling procedure, for which cable pull reports did not exist. As noted in Reference (b), three of the conduits required further analysis by the cable manufacturer. Reference (c) transmitted the necessary cable pull information to the Okonite Company and requested their analysis of same.

Based on Okonite Company's October 11, 1983 letter (copy attached) and subsequent discussions with Hatfield Electric Company (i.e., a review of Hatfield cable pull records to determine actual direction of pull), we have concluded that the cable pulled in these three conduits are acceptable. The finding in this letter, together with References (a) and (b), complete the S&L review of the subject IE Inspection Reports.

S&L FILE

Mr. J. T. Westermeier Commonwealth Edison Company

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December 12, 1983 Page 2

B-2

Based on our findings, we recommend that you supplement your previous responses to the NRC as follows:

As discussed in Commonwealth Edison Company's (CECo) November 5, 1982 and January 24, 1983 letters, CECo concurs with the NRC findings relative to the contractor's cable pulling procedures not addressing cable side-wall pressure criteria. As indicated in CECo's November 5, 1982 letter, revised design documents were issued (May 19, 1982) which specified the allowable cable pulling tensions for cables in conduit, considering both the conductor tensile strength and the cable side-wall pressure criteria. The contractor's cable pulling procedures have also been revised accordingly. Cable pulled in tray was not considered a potential problem since the architect-engineer's cable information drawing addressed cable side-wall pressure by specifying minimum cable pulling guide radii. In addition, the majority of cable pulled in tray was hand pulled.

In order to verify the acceptability of cables installed prior to the issuance of revised procedure, the architectengineer (a) reviewed cable pull reports, where available, and (b) performed generic analyses/calculations, where cable pull reports were not available.

The architect-engineer's review of the cable pull reports identified several cable installations in which the recorded pulling tension exceeded the allowable pulling tension, as determined from cable manufacturer's general pull criteria. Each of these cable pulls was identified and a Non-Conformance Report was issued by CECo to track their resolution. The architect-engineer forwarded the details of these specific cable pulls to the cable manufacturer with a request that the manufacturer perform a specific analysis to determine the acceptability of each cable pull. Based on the cable manufacturers review, all of these suspect cable pulls were found to be acceptable.

Where cable pull reports did not exist, the architectengineer performed an analysis, utilizing one of the following (generic or specific, as appropriate) calculations to determine the acceptability of each cable installation:

 Calculation for an assumed worst case conduit configuration containing the worst case cable configuration.

S&L FILE

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Mr. J. T. Westermeier Commonwealth Edison Company

December 12, 1983 Page 3

- (2) Calculation for an assumed worst case conduit configuration containing the actual cable configuration.
- (3) Calculation utilizing the actual conduit configuration containing the actual cable configuration.

This analysis identified several cable installations which could not be verified acceptable, based on the cable manufacturer's general pull criteria. The details of each such cable installation were forwarded to the cable manufacturer, with a request that the manufacturer perform a <u>specific</u> analysis to determine acceptability of each cable pull. Based on the cable manufacturer's review, all of these suspect cable pulls were found to be acceptable.

The cable pull reports, analyses, calculations, and other supporting documentation used in responding to these inspection reports are available for NRC review.

S&L FILE

If you have any questions, please call me.


Yours very truly,

T. R. EISENBART

T. R. Eisenbart Electrical Engineer

TRE:daa In duplicate Enclosures Copies: D. L. Leone/W. C. Cleff (1/1) R. J. Netzel (1/0)

B-3



1515 Centre Circle Post Office Box 626 Downers Grove.Illinois 60515 312-932-0200

October 11, 1933

SARGENT & LUNDY EPED CCT 13 1983

Mr. J. F. Clancy, E.E. Sargent & Lundy Mail Code 25D15 55 East Monroe Chicago, Illinois 60603

RECEIVED

Subject: Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Braidwood Stations-Units 1 & 2 Cable Pull Criteria S&L Spec. F/L-2823 & 2851 CECo P.O. Nos. 203608, 203609, 207113 & 207114

Dear Mr. Clancy:

In response to your letter dated June 20, 1963 please be adviced of the following as you requested.

Attached are calculations for the cable pulls for the drawings submitted by you. Pulling from 1JB261A to Gear in one continuous length provides excessively high pulling tension and sidewall pressures. This is caused by the excessive number of offsets located in this run. The total tension calculates out to 52,000 lbs. in this direction. The coefficient of friction actual was probably lower than 0.35 but in any case the allowable tension and sidewall pressures were exceeded by the wide margin. These calculations appear on pages 1 and 2 of the attached sheets.

If cable had been pulled from the gear to 158261A, they would have reduced the total tension down to approximitely 16,000 lbs. and a maximum sidewall pressure of 3726 lbs./it. These values although extremely high are well below the pull in the other direction. It would have been helpful if the pulling crew had used a dynamometer to give us an idea what the actual tensich was, but it is assumed they did not.

If the cable was pulled from 158261A to gear it should be replaced because of the very high pulling tension and sidewall pressure that would have been experienced.

Mr. J. F. Clancy -2- October 11, 1983

The cable is okay for use if it was pulled from the char to 1JB261A since the calculations show pulling tension and sidewall pressure to be acceptable.

Please call if we can be of further service.

Very truly yours,

THE OKONITE COMPANY

Dun lone 7 11

Charles L. Doerr District Manager

CLD/cmj



By 1J. Kerry Date 9/27/83 Mandet & G Caracanter Sheet 1 of 4
the state of the s
Chient/Project SARCEN- AND LUNDY / COM-DNIJEACE FELISON Specification No Rev./Date
Subject PULLING TENSION CALCULATION FOR JACK CLANCY
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CABLOS - 3 x 1/c 7 SOMEM, 140" OKOSULID, SHELLOSD, OKOLOW - 5-21
CABUE WT 1/C = 3.25 LB3/FT
CABLE 0: D1/c = 1.65"
MAXIMUM TOUSION = .008×3×CMA= 18,000 LBS (ABSOLUTE)
1 FRICTION = 0.35 (LUBRILATED) CONDUIT SIZE = 5"= 5.04.7"ID.
WT. CURR FACTOR (C) = $1 + \frac{4}{5} \left[\frac{1.65}{5.017 - 1.65} \right]^2 = 1 + .315 = 1.315$
CABLEWY X. NO. OF LONDS X FRICTION X WT COLL FACTOR = WT FACTOR
3.25 × 3 × 0.35 × 1.315 = 4.5 LBS/FT
WT FACTOR = 4.5 LBS Por FT
(Cf) FACTOR = 4.5 LBS Port FT (Cf) FACTOR = 1.315 × 0.35 = 0.46 (Cf) CALCULATIONS)
158261 A TO 15° BEND = 11 FT × 4.5 LES/OF = 49 LBS AROUND 15° BEND = 49 853 = 49 85.163(26) = 49 8(12) = 49(1.13) = 55265
$AROUND 15°BEND = 49 e^{C32} = 49 e^{C-163(126)} = 49 e^{(-12)} = 49(1.13) = 55285$
13 BENO TU 15 60ND = 2.5 ET X 4.5LO = 11LOS + 55LBS = 66LBS
AROUND SECURI 15"BEND = 66683 × 1/3 = 7668.
15° BOND TO 44° BOND = 49 FT X 4.5 LBS/FT = 220 2B3 +76 LB3 = 296 LBS ARDUND 44° BOND = 296 X e 646/6787 = 296 LBS × 1.424 = 422 LBS
44"Gand TJ 44"BOND = SFT X 1.5 LES/ET = 23685 + 422 LBS = 445 LGS.
ARUMP 44"BEND = 445 × 1.424 = 634 LBS.
44° BOND 7026° BOND = 65FT X 4.5 - 291FT = 293LBS + 634LBS = 927 LBS.
AROUND 200 DEND = 927 103 × 1.232 - 1142 183.
26° BOND TO 26° BOND = 2 ET X 9.5 LOGET = 9685 + 1142 LES= 1151 LES.
ARUND 22"BEND = 1151 LBS × 1.232 = 1418 LBS.
- 26° BOND TO 32° GONG = 20 × 4.5 = 90135 + 1418 LBS = 1508 LBS
AROUND 32° BOUD = 1508685 × 1.293 = 1950685.
 32°6000 TO 32° BOND = 2 × 4.5 = 9665 + 1950 665 = 195963. ARUND 32° BEND = 1.292 × 1959 665 = 2533685.
나는 것 같은 것 같
32° BOND TO 130262 = 60 Fr × 4.5 LOJET = 270685 + 2533685 = 2803685.
TENSION AROUND LAST 32" GOID 2 2533 200 = 740 263/FT
740 LBS/FT OK SING BROW 1000 CBS/FT MAX.
156261A TO 158262 - PULL GK MAX MAX MAX - 2803265
E/080 MAY 3100201 TO 100202 POLL OK MAX MAY 2803265 E/080 MAY 3100WALL PROSERS 740185 Int

•	By L.J. Kary Dute 9/27/23. ENGINEERING CALIFICATION Sheet Rot 4
	Chient Project Sabacher 100 Ludoy / Commendation EDISON
-	Specification No. Sev. Date
0	Subject PULLING TENSION CONCETTION FUR CALL CONCY
	156262 To 47° ELLO = 10 FT X4.5 = 45265 + 2803 = 2848 LOS.
	ARUND 47°6010 = 2848 LOS × 1046 = 4158 LBS
	SIDEWALL BRESSUER = 4158 = 1188 LOS/FT EXCEEDS 1000 CAS/FT
	47"BOND TO 43"BOND = 11 × 4.5 = 50LBS +-4.158 = 4208 LBS
	ARUND 43° COND = 4208 X / 412 = 5942 LBS
	SIGNAL PROSSUR = 5942 = 1620 405/FT EXCERDS 1000 LBS/FT
	43°6000 TO 90° BOND = 2×4.5 = 9685 + 594.2685 = 5951 LBS
	ARWNO 90° BOND = 5951235 × 2.05 = 12,200 485
	SIDOWALL PROSSURE = 12200 135 = 4067 LOS/ EXCESPS 1000 CBS/FT
-	90°END TO 22° BOND = 22 × 4.5 = 99603 + 12200 = 12,299605
•	ARUUND 22" COND = 12, 299 × 1.193 = 14,670 LBS
- 7	SIGNALL FRESSURE _ 19,670 = 4870 CO/ Except 1000 CBV
	22° BOND TO 22° GOND = 3×4.5 = 14 LGS + 14,670 LBS = 14,684 LBS.
	ARJUNO 220 BOND = 14,684 X1.193 = 17,518 CBS
	SIDENAL PRESULE = 17, 518 LBS 2 5000 USS/ EXCEROS 1000 LBS/ 3.5 FT EXCEROS 1000 LBS/
	3.5 FT /FT
	22° BOND to 45'600 = 31 FT × 4,5 = 140 LBS + 17,518 = 17,658 LES.
	. AROUND 45000 = 17,658 × 1.44 = 25,428 LBS
	- SIDEWALL PRESSURT = 25428 - 7824 LBS/FT EXCORS 1000 CHS/
	45°BUD to 90° COND = 9×1.5 = 40.5 × 25,428 BS = 25,4690
•	AROUND 900,000 - 25,469 × 2.05 - 52,211 LBS
	SIDEWALL PRESSULE: 52,211/3.33 2 15,676 LISS/PT
	E:680 BREAKING STRENGTH (31755 MCM GUIDNON 63,000) LBS.

ENGINE SING CALCULATION By L. J. Karyone ?/2010 Sheet 3 ut 4 Clikd. By Date Inquiry/F.O. No. Client/Project SARSSN- 120 LUNISY/COMMINIDERACE EDISON Specification No. 'Rev. Date Subject CALCULATION PLULING FROM GEAR TO IJB251A SET PASOS I AND 2 FOR EALCULATIONS OF STRAIGHT RUNS TO FIRST 90° AT GEAR= 414 × 3.25×3= 41 65 ARJUND 950 BEND 2 2.05×41- 24285 90° BOND TO 450 BOND = 40, 5255 + 84 065 - 125 65 AROUND 450 BOND = 125 LAS X 1.44-2 180 LBS 45° LOND 10 22° 200 = 140 155 -120 LBS = 320 LBS ARUUNO 22" BOND = 320 LAS X 1.193 = 382 LBS 22° bond to 22° jon - 14 LBS + 382 LBS = 396 LBS ARJUND 220 6200 = 396005 × 1.193 = 472 LBS 22°0 END tO 90° 5 END = 99 USS + 472.45 = 571 LBS AROUND 900 6:NO = 57/ LSS X 2.05 = 1170 LBS 90°BIND TO 43°BIND = 9+1170 = 1179 LBS AROUND 43° DOND = 1179 × 1.412 = 1665 LBS 43°000 - 247°BNO = 5035 + 166505 = 1715 LBS ALINO 47 5540 = 1715 X1.46 = 2503 LBS 47 35ND TO 156 262 = 45 + 2513 = 2548 LBS 156262 To 32" USHO = 270 LES + 2548 LOS = 2818 LOS 32"BMD TO 32" BOND = 96BS + 281865 = 2827 655 ANUNO 32"6540 = 2827 × 1,293 = 3655 (63 SIDEMALL - 3635 - 1075LBS/FT EXCORDS 1000 32 ison 7, 26 soun = 70 + 3655 = 3745 Las AROUND 20° SEND - 3745185 × 1,252 = 4613 LBS SIDENAL = 46:3/275 = 1230 COS/FT EXCEDOS 26 OND TO 26" SOUD = 9 LOSS + 4613 = 4622 LBS ARUJNO 250 BIND - 4522 × 1.232 - 5694 LBS SILENAL - 5694/35 = 1627 LBS/PT ERCORTS 1000 26° BIND TU 44° BOND: 293065 - 5,94 = 59876BS A-ROUND 470 AMO = 5987LAS + 1.424 = 8525 LAS SIDENALL = 8525/354 = 2220 LBS/Fr EICEDS 1000 4+ COND to ++ 2010 = 23 65 +8525 = 8543 655 ARJUND 44' USNO = 8548 × 1.424 = 12,172 Lbs SID-MALL = 12,172/ ... = 2933 455/Er EXCHOS 1300 440 5NO TO 15 5.NO = 220 CAS + 12172+BS = 12, 372 LBS.

E/630

ENGINEERING CALCULATION By 2.5.Kan Date 9/28/2 Sheet 4 . 1 4 Client/Project SARSENT AND LUNCH COMMENTURENTS EDISON ARUNO 150 6000 = 12,392 × 1.13 = 14,002 LBS SIDEWALL = 14,002/4.26 = 29.41 LD/AF 526505 1000 150 BOND TO 158 2614= 49LBS + 15,834 LBS= 15,893 LBS. TOTAL TONSION GEAR TOWARD IJB261A = 15,893LBS -WORST SIRE WALL PROSSULT = 3326LBS/FT. -----# 1 4 1 1 1 1 m 1 m 1 -----------------------.

TREECE ATTACHMENT C

SARGENT & LUNDY INGINEERS 55 EAS. MONROE STREET CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60603 TELEPHONE 312-269-2000

> June 23, 1983 Project Nos. 4391/2 & 4683,

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Eraidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2

Cable Pull Criteria

Mr. J. T. Westermeier Project Engineer Commonweelth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Dear Mr. Westermeier:

This letter supplements my January 26, 1983, letter concerning an initial response to the NRC findings regarding the Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures (Byron IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-454/ 82-05 and 50-455/82-04). That letter summarized Sargent & Lundy's (S&L) review of cable pull reports obtained from Byron Station Construction. In addition to a review of cable pull reports, an analysis was required to address safety-related cable pulls in conduit prior to implementation of the revised Contractor's Cable Pulling Procedures for which pull reports did not exist. This letter summarizes the result of this additional analysis.

As a basis for this additional analysis, S&L received a listing of all safety-related cables pulled in conduit prior to December, 1982, from Byron Station Construction. This listing identified approximately 2600 conduits requiring analysis. S&L has completed the analysis for these conduits by utilizing one of the following methods:

- 1. Calculations for an assumed worst case conduit configuration containing a worst cable configuration.
- Calculations for an assumed worst case conduit configuration containing the actual cable configuration.
- 3. Calculations for the actual conduit configuration containing the actual cable configuration.

S&L's review identified three conduits that require additional analysis by the cable manufacturer. Cable pulling information for these conduits has been forwarded to Okonite Company, by S&L letter dated June 22, 1933, copy enclosed, for their use in performing a

C-1

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO

Mr. J. T. Westermeier Commonwealth Edison Company

June 23, 1983 Page 2

detailed analysis. We will advise you of their findings at a later date. S&L's analysis concludes that the remaining conduits/ cable pulls are acceptable.

The results of this analysis and the supporting calculations are presently being put together into an auditable format. We expect to complete this effort by July 22, 1983.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Yours very truly,

T. R. EISENBART

T. R. Eisenbart Electrical Engineer

TRE:dw In duplicate Enclosure Copies: G. Sorensen/J. O. Binder (1/1) D. L. Leone/W. C. Cleff (1/1) R. J. Netzel (1/1)

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS 55 EAST MONROE STREET CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60603 13121 269-2000 TWX 910-221-2807

> June 22, 1983 Project Nos. 4391/2 & 4683/4

Commonwealth Edison Company Byron/Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2

Cable Pull Criteria S&L Specifications F/L-2823 & F/L-2851 CECO P.O. Nos. 203608, 203609, 207113 & 207114

Mr. C. L. Doerr The Okonite Company 1515 Centre Circle Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

Dear Mr. Doerr:

Enclosed are copies of two sketches covering three separate cable installations at Byron Station. Records of the tensions experienced during the cable pulls are not available, and the acceptance of these installations is dependent upon the acceptance of calculated pulling tensions.

These sketches are being sent to you for your analysis and comment, because our preliminary calculations for these installations indicate that the maximum allowable pulling tensions for the installed cables, based on Okonite's cable pulling criteria, may have been exceeded.

Will you please analyze these cable installations and give us your recommendation covering the disposition of the installed cables.

(1/1)

(1/1)

(1/1)

If you have any questions about the installations shown on the sketches, please contact us.


Yours very truly,


J. F. Clancy

J. F. Clancy Electrical Engineer

C-3

JFC:dmm In duplicate Enclosure Copies: J. T. Westermeier G. Serensen D. L. Leone/M. C. Cleff







PAGE 2 OF 4

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UB 261A SKETCH 5-8-1 DIRECTION OF PALL: GEAR TO 15326. INSTALLED CARLES: 3-1/2750K.H.L. EMJ PULLINGERE USED: ONE CONT. DAMA FALL. POLL SLEEDE NOT UTILIED

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN ILLINOIS 60137

JUN 6 1984 -7 HT.

Docket No. 50-454 Docket No. 50-455

Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. R. S. Love and E. Christnot of this office on April 24-27, April 30-May 4, and May 10-11, 1984, of activities at Byron Station authorized by NRC Construction Permits No. CPPR-130 and No. CPPR-131 and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. R. Tuetken and R. B. Klingler and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Appendix. A written response is required.

As a result of this inspection, it is our understanding that you will conduct a reinspection of all electrical conductor butt splices at Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, as outlined in your letter of May 17, 1984, D. Farrar to James G. Keppler.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure(s) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1). If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter, the enclosure(s), and your response to this letter will be placed in the Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter (and the accompanying Notice) are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511. Commonwealth Edison Company

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Rd ispenserk

R. L. Spessard, Director Division of Engineering

Enclosures: 1. Appendix, Notice of Voilation 2. Inspection Reports No. 50-454/84-27 and No. 50-455/84-19 cc w/encls: D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager Gunner Sorensen, Site Project Superintendent R. E. Querio, Station Superintendent DME/Document Control Desk (RIDS) Resident Inspector, RIII Byron Resident Inspector, RIII Braid-cod Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division Ms. Jane M. Whicher Diane Chavez, DAARE/SAFE R. Rawson, ELD

TREECE ATTACHMENT D

Appendix

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Commonwealth Edison Company

Docket No. 50-454 Docket No. 50-455

As a result of the inspection conducted on April 24-27, April 30-May 4, and May 10 and 11, 1984, and in accordance with the General Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions, (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), the following violations were identified:

 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report (CE 1-A), Section 5, requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions or procedures

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that the requirements of S&L Drawing 6E-0-3237 B, February 1983 Revision, Note 47, were translated into instructions or procedures. Note 47 requires the electrical contractor to inspect for caple tray separation and add caple tray covers when the minimum separation requirements have been violated. This is exemplified by the fact that 124 units of safety-related caple tray has been installed since February 1983 and this tray has not been inspect for separation requirements. Additional details are discussed in Paragraph 2.d of Inspection Report 454/84-27; 455/84-19(CE).

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).

 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by Commonwealth Edison Company Topical Report (CE 1-A), Section 16, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that nonconforming cable tray hangers were identified and corrected. This is exemplified by the fact that as a result of this NRC inspection, 345 previously accepted cable tray hangers were reinspected and 119 were found defective and 19 were indeterminate because they were inaccessible for reinspection. A contributing factor to this item is that CECo Quality Assurance failed to determine the effectiveness of the electrical contractor's cable tray hanger reinspection program (Reference - HECo NCR 407R). Additional details are discussed in Paragraph 2.c of Inspection Report 454/84-27; 455/84-19(DE).

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).

Appendix

2

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance: (1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

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Dated

R.L. Spenned

R. L. Spessard, Director Division of Engineering

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/84-27(DE); 50-455/84-19(CE)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

Licenses No. CPPR-130; CPPP-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 & 2

Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: April 24-27, April 30-May 4 and May 10-11, 1984

Inspectors: R. S. Love P.S. Pore

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Approved By: C. C. allians, Chief Plant Systems Section

Inspection Surnary

Inspection on April 24-27, April 30, May 4, and May 10-11, 1964 (Report No. 50-454,84-27(DE); 50-455,84-19(DE))

Areas Inspected: Review of licensee action on previously identified items. This involved the review of applicable procedures, drawings, records and calculation on-site and at Sargent and Lundy (licensee's A/E). This inspection involved a total of 146 inspection hours by two NRC inspectors. Six of these inspector hours were expended in Nuclear-General Employee Training which will be required for unfettered access (Ref. 10 CFR 50.70).

Results: In the areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified (Paragraph 2.c, failure to identify and control nonconforming conditions-Criterion XVI, and Paragraph 2.d, failure to assure that activities affecting quality are prescribed in instructions or procedures-Criterion V).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)

G. Sorensen, Construction Superintendent

K. J. Hansing, Quality Assurance Superintencent

*J. O. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor

*R. B. Klingler, Project Quality Control Supervisor

*J. L. Bergner, Quality Assurance Supervisor

*M. V. Dellabetta, Electrical Quality Assurance Engineer

*E. T. Sager, Electrical Field Engineer

*J. W. Rappeport, Quality Assurance Engineer

E. L. Martin, Quality Assurance Supervisor

J. W. Zid, Quality Assurance Engineer

P. T. Myrda, Quality Assurance Supervisor

Hatfield Electric Corpany (HECo)

D. L. Heider, CA/CC Maracer S. Hubler, Lead Quality Control Inspector

Sangent and Lundy (S&1)

J. D. Regan, Electrical Engineer

B. G. Treece, Senior Electrical Project Engineer

J. F. Clancy, Quality Assurance

T. R. Eisenzart, Electrical Engineer

J. J. Karba, Senior Structural Engineer

T. J. Ryan, Structural Project Engineer

The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this reporting period.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview conducted on May 4, 1984

Action on Previously Identified Items 2.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-454/80-09-01; 50-455/80-08-01): During a a. previous inspection it was identified that the requirements of the Byron SAR and Specification 2831 were not adequately translated into Specification 2815 in that corrosion protection (painting) was not specified for the exposed carbon steel material and exposed spot welds utilized in the installation of seismic Category I electrical raceway hanger supports. Engineering Change Notice (ECN) Number 4362 was issued to revise Specifications F/L 2815 and F/L 2831. The licensee's painting contractor (Midway Industrial Contractor, Inc.) has a program in place that will assure that the items have been painted. CECo Project Construction Department (PCD) is monitoring the progress of the painting contractor. This item is closed.

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- (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-454/82-17-02; 50-455/82-12-02): During b. a previous inspection it was identified that conduit and cable tray hanger bolts no longer met the bolt torque requirements as specified in the applicable procedures. The licensee was requested to evaluate these relaxed torque conditions and determine if they were acceptable. With respect to cable tray hangers, as part of the hanger reinstection program, the harger bolt torque was verified and any bolts found not meeting the torque requirements were re-torqued to procedure requirem ments. With respect to conduit hangers, a reinspection of 300 conduit hangers was conducted. This reinspection identified 89 conduit hanger bolts with less than the specified torque. These hangers were then analyzed for worst case conditions. This analysis was reviewed by the inspectors and found to be adequate. The analysis identified that the conduit hanger would have performed their design function in the asfound condition. This item is closed.
- (Open) Unresolved Item (50-454/82-17-04; 50-455/82-12-04): During a C . previous inspection it was identified that the hanger connection details under fireproofing were being accepted without CD insteam tion. The HECo CA Manager had instructed the QC inspectors to accept connection details covered by fireproofing based on the information on the weld tra.eler for the subject connection detail. These instructions were documented in QA/QC Memorandum Number 295. These instructions were provided in conjunction with the caple pan harger reinspection requires by HECo NCR 407. At that time, the Region 111 inspector informed the licensee that the weld traveler could be utilized for acceptance providing the hanger connection detail used was noted on the traveler. In accordance with a CECo letter, dates Speterter 22, 1982. HECo was required to submit certain data pertaining to this reinspection program on a periodic basis. Current this reporting period, the Region III inspector reviewed these data provided by HECo. These data indicated that of 4,308 hangers re -spected, fireproofing had to be removed from 131 hargers to determine acceptance. This report indicated that 3 of the hangers were rejected after the fireproofing was removed. To determine why these three hangers were rejected, the inspectors reviewed the applicatie weld travelers, hanger de-hang/re-hang forms (HCRF), rework requested. field change request(FCR), deficiency reports (DR), nonconformance reports (NCR), and the hanger inspection checklists. Following are the results of this review:

(1) Hanger BHV11 on Drawing 0-3097H, Revision T.

- HDRF 1151 indicates hanger originally installed August 19, 1980. HECo could not locate a weld traveler for this installation.
- FCR 1807, dated August 19, 1980, was issued to relocate the hanger.
- DR 119, dated June 11, 1982, stated that the hanger could not be inspected due to installation of fireproofing. This DR was closed on December 21, 1982.
 - HDRF-1151, dated September 30, 1982, indicates that the hanger was not installed per the drawing and FCR 1807. Hanger was removed on October 12, 1982.

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- Weld Traveler 19038, dated October 12, 1982, states. "Welded plate to tube steel and structural steel (South side only)." Accepted by QC Welding Inspector.
- Weld Traveler 19039, dated October 15, 1982, states, "Repaired weld on plate to structural and tube steel".
 - Accepted by QC Welding Inspector.
- HDRF 1151 indicates hanger was reinstalled on October 22. 1982.

Hanger installation was accepted by CC.

- The following discrepancies were observed:
 - Initial we'd traveler missing,
 - Weld traveler for North side of hanger missing,
 - NCR, DR, or Inspection Report (as applicable) identifying that the hanger was not installed per drawing and FCR
- 1807 was missing.
- (2) Hanger HCCS, Drawing 1-3051H, Revision H
 - Weld Traveler 24943, dated July 25, 1978, documents the installation of the hanger. Accepted by QC welding Inspector.
 - Inspection checklist, dated September 27, 1982, rejected the hanger because the inspector could not verify the hanger type and configuration. Was later accepted by Memo #295.
 - HECo to CECo summary report, dated October 10, 1982. indicates this hanger was rejected during the reinspection.
 - The following discrepancies were observed:
 - No documentation to show why the hanger was rejected.
 - No occurrentation to indicate that the hanger was received
 - or remorked, as applicable.
 - No inspection checklist/weld traveler to indicate that the hanger is now acceptable.
- (3) Hanger H 153, Drawing 1-3061H, Revision S,
 - Inspection checklist, dated February 22, 1984, was a final acceptance of this hanger. The checklist referenced: FCR 22920, Revision 1; FCR 21871; Rework Request 648; DR 1025; and HDRF 2197.
 - Work Request 648 involved the removal and replacement of the hanger horizontal members.
 - FCR 21871 involved the pan to hanger attachments. Work Request 648 and FCR 21871 were not in the area of concern and the inspector chose not to followup on these items during this inspection.
 - DR 1025, dated October 23, 1982, documents that Connection No. 1 was a DV5 detail instead of a DV4 as specified, and Connection No. 2 was a DV89C2 instead of a DV89E1 as specified.
 - FCR 22920, dated November 8, 1983, changed connection No. 1 to a DV3 detail and Connection No. 2 to a DV89G2.

- The following discrepancies were observed: The inspectors could not determine how FCR 22920 was implemented in that a HDRF/Work Request was not available for review. The inspection checklist, dated February 22. 1984, indicated that Details DV3 and DV89G2 were actually installed.
- (4) Based on the results of the records review of the three rejected hangens, the inspectors elected to review a random sample of the records for hangers that had been reinspected and accepted by HECO QC. Following are the results of this review:
 - (a) Hanger H043, Drawing 0-30614, Revision M. was accepted on Inspection Report 4270, dated October 5, 1962. Inspection appeared to be adequate.
 - (b) Hanger H148, Drawing O-3063H, Revision L, was accepted on Inspection Report 4172, dated October 21, 1982. Inspection appeared to be adequate.
 - (c) Hanger HCO1. Drawing 1-3051H. Revision H. was accepted on Inspection Report 3650, dated September 17, 1982. Connection details 1 and 2 were accepted on the Inspection Report based on weld Traveler 24900, dated July 18, 1978. A review of the traveler indicated that a DV84 connection detail was utilized as specified on the drawing. This was found to be acceptable.
 - (d) Harger HILE. Drawing 1-3051H, Revision H, was accepted or Inspection Report 3657, dated October 7, 1982. Correction details 1 and 2 were accepted based on Weld Traveler (4843, dated July 26, 1978. During a review of the traveler, it was observed that the traleler did not indicate which connection details were used to attach the hanger to the structural steel, i.e., details 1 and 2. Based on the documentation presented, this hanger installation could not be accepted by the Region III inspectors.
 - (e) Hanger H080, Drawing 0-3051H, Revision L, was accepted on Inspection Report 3484, dated October 16, 1982. Connection details 1 and 2 were accepted based on Weld Travelers 24801, 24804, and 24834. During a review of these travelers, it was observed that the travelers did not denote which connection details were used to attach the hanger to the structural steel. Based on the documentation presented, this hanger installation could not be accepted by the Region III inspectors.
 - (f) Hanger H028, Drawing 0-3051H, Revision L, was inspected on Inspection Report 3433, dated October 5, 1982. This Inspection Report referenced DR542. During a review of this DR, it was observed that the auxiliary steel plate size was listed as being the wrong size. This item was not disposition nor corrected and the DR was improperly

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closed. Based on the documentation presented, this hanger installation could not be accepted by the Region III inspectors.

- (g) Hanger HDS5, Drawing 1-3051H, Revision H, was noted as being unacceptable on Inspection Report 3734, dated July 30, 1982. Reasons noted were: (1) unable to verify connection details 1 and 2 because they were covered with fireproofing, and (2) weld travelers did not specify the connection details installed. On Sectember 27, 1982, this hanger was accepted per Memo 295. Based on the documentation presented, this hanger could not be accepted by the Region III inspectors.
- (5) Based on the results of the documentation review for the ten above listed hangers, the Region III inspectors terminated their review of caple tray hanger documentation. On April 26, 1984, the inspectors conducted a minirexit-interview with CEDD and HECO QA and construction personnel. During this interview, the inspectors reviewed their concerns with the acceptability of the caple tray hanger documentation. The inspectors requested that the licensee review the hanger documentation and determine what hangers were unacceptable. On May 1, 1964, the inspectors were informed by the licensee that there were approximately 345 hanger that were accepted based on Mero 295

The licensee stated that approximately 6000 hanger packages were reviewed by CEDo CA and HECO CD personnel. The licensee continued to provide daily updates on the progress of the hanger reinspection effort and their findings. During a telephone conversation between Mr. J. Binder (CECo) and Mr. R. S. Love (RIII) on May 11, 1984, Mr. Binder provides the following results of the reinspection effort:

Total number of hangers requiring reinspection	314	
Number of hangers inaccessible	19	
These hangers were documented on HECo NCR 990		
Total number of hangers reinspected	295	
Total number of deficiencies identified	129	
Deficiencies by attribute:		
Welding fitup	91	
Wrong connection detail	7	
Wrong weld length, elevation, auxiliary steel		
plate size, and missing bolts	31	

Fit up deficiencies are documented on HECo NCR 989. Connection detail and steel plate deficiencies, etc. are documented on HECo DRs 4921-4928, 4930, 4932, 4934-4937, 4943, 4945-4948, 5003, 5007, 5013-5017, 5019, and 5022-5032.

(6) As a result of the inspector's observations noted above, the inspectors requested that the licensee provide the last three audit/surveillance reports performed by CECo in the area of hanger acceptance for the subject reinspection program. As stated earlier in this report, this initial reinspection effort involved 4308 hangers. The CECo CA Engineer informed the inspectors that to the best of his knowledge, no audits or surveillances were performed in this area and furthermore, re-(CECo QA Engineer) was not aware of this hanger reinspection program. On May 10, 1984, Messns. C. C. Williams and R. S. Love of the Region III staff contacted Mr. K. J. Hansing, CECo C4 Superintencent, by telephone and discussed the reinspection program and lack of CECo CA audits and/or surveillances in this area. In summary, Mr. Hansing stated that: (1) CECo C4 was aware of the hanger reinspection program; (2) CECo QA crose not to perform a special audit/surveillance of this hanger reinspection program; (3) CECo QA was not aware of Region III's interest in this program. It should be noted that Region III's incovement with this reinspection effort was documented in Inspection Reports 454/82-17; 455/82-12 and 454/83-48.

On May 11, 1984, Mr. R. S. Love, Region III, contacted Messns. J. O. Binder, J. L. Bergher and others of the CECo PCD and CA Byron site organization by telephone. During this conversation it was learned that CECo QA had in fact performed an audit of the subject reinspection program in June 1983 and had a concern with HECo Mero 295. Mr. Bergher did not elaborate on this concern. Mr. Binder stated that during this inspection period. he (Mr. Binder) directed the HECo QA-QC Manager to precare a letter to cancel Memo 295. Upon review of the secuence of events and the results of the hanger reinspection effort, it would appear that the 129 deficiencies observed on 119 safetyrelated cable tray hangers would have gone undetected if the Region III inspectors had not uncovered the problem areas and requested CECo to perform an indepth review of hanger documentation and the subsequent reinspection program. The licensee was informed that failure to establish a program to assure that conditions adverse to qualify are promptly identified and corrected is an item of noncomplaicance in accordance with Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (50-454/84-27-01; 50-455/84-19-01).

d. (Open) Noncompliance (50-454/82-17-05; 50-455/82-17-05): During a previous inspection it was identified that the licensee was not identifying, controlling, and correcting cable tray separation violations. As part of the corrective action, during the latter part of 1982 and early 1983 a concerted effort was made by CECo, HECo and S&L to identify all cable tray separation violations. This information was compiled and analyzed by S&L. The corrective action were: (1) relocate one or more cable trays to correct the violations; or (2) install cable tray covers on one or more of the cable trays (by the installation of covers, the separation criteria is reduced

from 3" horizontal and 12" vertical to 1" horziontal and 1" vertical); or (3) based on the analysis, accept the installation as installed; and (4) place a distinctive mark (black octagon mark) on the applicable drawings to indicate that a separation violation had been identified in that area and that the violation had been analyzed by the engineer, S&L.

During this reporting period, the inspectors: (1) reviewed the engineer's analysis and found it to be adequate; (2) reviewed selected drawings and verified that they were marked to indicate that the engineer had analyzed the separation violations; (3) reviewed select drawing to verify that tray covers were specified as part of the corrective action; and (4) toured the power block and identified separation violations and verfied that the violations had been addressed by the engineer and appropriate action taken. During interviews with S&L personnel identified in Paragraph 1 of this report, the inspectors were informed that several notes had been added or relised on Drawing 62-0-32378, February 1983 revision, to prevent recurrance of cable tray separation violations. During a review of Drawing 6E-0-32378. Revision L, it was observed that Note 47 directed the electrical contractor, HECo, to install cable tra, covers in accordance with the electrical specifications when the 3 horizontal and 12" vertical separation requirements were violated even though the applicable drawing does not show the subject tray to be covered. Note 48 directs the electrical contractor to notify Sal if the 1" metal to metal separation is violated after the installation of cable tra, covers. During a review of HECo 9 Series procedures, it was observed that the requirements of Note 48 were adecustely accressed but the requirements of Note 47 were not accressed. During interviews with the CECo Project Electrical Supervisor, CECo Electrical CA Engineer, CECo Electrical Field Engineer, HECo CA CO Manager, and HECo Project Engineer, it appeared that these personner were not aware of the requirement of Note 47 on Drawing 6E-0-32378 until it was brought to their attention by the Region III inspectors It was also learned that HECo QC, engineering, and construction were not verifying cable tray separation.

During this reporting period, the licensee instituted a program to determine the amount of safety-related cable tray installed in Units 1 and 2 since February 1983 (effective date of Note 47). As a result of this review, it was determined that 83 cable tray inspection reports (Note: each report can address 1 or more sections of cable tray) had been prepared for Unit 1, and cable tray separation requirements were not verified (Reference: HECo NCR 975, dated May 4, 1984), and 41 reports were submitted for Unit 2 (Reference: HECo NCR 976, dated May 4, 1984). The licensee was informed that failure to assure that activities affecting quality are prescribed in documented instructions or procedures is an item of noncompliance in accordance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (50-454/84-27-02; 50-455/84-19-02).

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-454/82-17-06: 50-455/82-12-C6): During е. a previous inspection it was identified that the licensee was not identifying, controlling, and correcting cable separation violations inside of parels, cabinets, motor control centers, switchcear, etc. As part of the corrective action, during the latter part of 1982 and early 1983, a concerted effort was made by CECc. HECo and SSL to identif, all caple separation violations inside of equipment. This information was compiled and analyzed by S&L. The corrective actions were: (1) relocate/reroute one or more of the caples to correct the violation, or (2) install fire barriers between the involved daties; or (3) route one of the involved caple inside a conduit that dualing fies as a fire carrier; or (4) based on the analysis, accept the installation as installed; and (5) establish a propriat to inform Sil of future violations so that they could be analyzed and corrective action assigned.

During this reporting period, the inspectors: (1) relieves the engineer's analysis and found it to be adequate; (2) relieves the electrical contractor's (HEDO) termination inspection procedure and identified that the QC inspector was required to inspect for and identify separation violations between safety-related and normalfely related catles and between redundant caples; and (3) verified indicentiation of this program by reviewing caple separation proclements that were being forwarded to the engineer for analysis. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence appeared to be an endineered.

(Closed) Noncorpliance (B1-464 83-37-01): During a previous audit. it was identified that the CELD Manager of Quality Assurance rad established an Interim Leap Auditor certification program that was not documented in the CELD Quality Assurance Manual, or in the CELD Topical Report nor is it permitted by ANSI N45.2.23-1976. Qualifican tion of Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants." This informal programmad been established within CELD to certify an individual as an Interim Lead Auditor when he/ste did not meet the qualification requirements of a lead auditor as specified in ANSI N45.2.23-1978.

As part of CECo's corrective action, the Interim Lead Auditor correct was discontinued, the personnel holding Interim Lead Auditor certifications were de-certified, and records were reviewed to determine the names of personnel that had been certified that did not meet the minimum qualification requirements. The records review indicated that between 1977 and 1983, eight (8) CECo personnel had been certified as Interim Lead Auditors by the CECo Manager of Quality Assurance. The audits performed by these 8 people were reviewed and evaluated by qualified CECo Lead Auditors. With a few exceptions. the audit reports and the objective evidence and the audit deficiency close outs were in compliance with the CECo audit program. During a review of these audit evaluations, the most significant audit deficiencies observed by the Region III inspectors were:

 One item on the checklist had insufficient objective evidence for acceptance. This attribute was adequately covered on a subsequent audit by a different auditor and found acceptable.

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(2) One item as relating to records storage was marked acceptable and from the information documented in the report, it should have been listed as a deficiency. This item was subsequently identified and corrected.

The corrective action and corrective action to prevent recurrence appears to be adequate. This item is closed.

- 9. (Cpen) Noncompliance (50-454/82-49-04). During a previous inspection, it was identified that Kellem type cable grips (used to succert electrical cables in cable pan risers and in vertical corouit runs) were not installed in accordance with the electrical specifications. This item is also identified in 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports 454 83-14-EE and 455 83-14-EE. During this reporting period, the Region III inspectors coserved that the installation of cable grips in safety-related risers R277, R345, R363, and R369 were deficient in that they were not supporting the cables in accordance with the design specifications. Pending verification of the licensee's corrective action, this item remains open. This item has been assigned Category 1 and must be closed prior to fuel load.
- h. (Closed) Open Item (50-454/84-02-03, 50-455/94-02-03): During the ASLB hearing for Eyron Station, Unit 1, the licensee stated that the cable pull reports for cables already installed are being reviewed to ensure that the maximum allowable cable pulling tension and maximum allowable cable sidewall pressure had not been exceeded. As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-454 84-09 and 50-458 84-07, the Region III inspector reviewed the on-site reports and with one exception (Noncompliance 454 84-09-02; 455 84-07-02), these reports where found to be adequate. During this reporting period, the Region III inspectors reviewed the engineering calculations at the engineer is facilities. The engineering analysis was performed utilizing one or more of the following methods:
 - (1) Calculations for an assumed worst case conduit configuration containing a worst cable configuration, i.e. conduit run with four 90° bends with minimum bend radius (270° total bends allowed at Byron Station) and with the maximum cable density. Utilizing this methodology, a critical conduit length was calculated for each conduit size. Using this information, a review of the approximate 2600 conduit runs was made. If the actual length of the conduit run approached the calculated critical length, that run was flagged for further analysis per paragraph (2) below. Worst case accepted, as observed by the inspectors, during this first cut, had a safety factor of approximately four, i.e. allowable pulling tension 400# versus calculated of approximately 100#.
 - (2) Calculations for an assumed worst case conduit configuration (4-90° bends) containing the actual installed cable configuration. The worst case accepted, as observed by the inspectors, had a safety factor of approximately 3.3. Again, questionable conduit runs were flagged for analysis per paragraph (3) below.

- (3) Calculations for actual conduit configuration containing the actual cable configuration. Worst case accepted, as observed by the inspectors, had a safety factor of approximately 4.7. Upon completion of this three step analysis, three conduit runs were questionable. They were analyzed by Okonite Company, cable manufacturer, as described in paragraph (4) below.
- (4) The following information was forwarded to Okonite to assist in their evaluation of cables installed in conduits COA-6188. CCA-6192 and CCA-5193:
 - Conduit size all 5'
 - Conduit configuration from as-built drawings
 - Capie configuration from cable pull cards
 - Conduit COA-6158 2 1/C-750 MCM, 5KV, cables Conduit COA-6192 and 6193 - 3 - 1/C-750 MCM, 5KV, cables Cable built direction

The maximum cable pulling tension for the subject raples was not in question for these three installations in that the maximum allowable tension for the 2-1/0-750 MCM cable pull is 120,000# and 180,000# for the 3-1/0-750 MCM cable pull. Due to concuit configuration, Okonite was requested to perform an analysis for possible cable sidewall pressure violations. Okonite's letter of October 11, 1983 indicates that they performed their analysis and found no sidewall pressure violations. It should be noted that each cable manufacturer establishes the maximum cable sidewall pressure that their cables are designed to withstand without causing damage to the conductor insulation. Based on the results of previous inspections have a reasonable assurance that these safet, related cables will perform their intended function. This item is closed.

- i. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-454/84-09-01; 50-455/84-07-01): During a previous inspection, it was observed that there were several outstanding NCRs that were prepared to document possible over tensioning of safety-related cables during initial installation or during rework (pull back). During this reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the disposition and implementation of CECo. NCRs F838, F839, F840, F864, and F865. The inspectors also reviewed the back up data for these NCRs and found it to be adequate. This item is closed.
- J. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-454/84-09-02; 50-455/84-07-02): During a previous inspection it was identified that HECo DR 3382 was inadequately dispositioned, resulting in 12 cables being installed whose quality was indeterminate. Subsequent to the inspectors findings. HECo prepared NCR 841 to document the overstressed cables. During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the cables had been replaced, and action to prevent recurrence had been implemented. This item is closed.

3. Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports

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(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report (454/82-07-EE and 455/82-07-EE): Direct current (DC) control power cable failures. Several single conductor ASA #2 DC control power cables, which run from the auxiliary building to the essential service water cooling tower in an underground duct, have failed to ground. The failures occured after the cables had been tested and placed in service. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's action on the failure of DC cables 1 CC 073 and 1 DC 075 in Unit 1 and DC cables 2 CC 073, 2 CC 074 and 2 CC 075 in Unit 2. Records indicated the following.

- a. Cables, 1 DC 073 and 1 CC 075 in Unit 1 were replaced by multiconductor cables 1 DC 742 and 1 DC 243 respectively
- b. Cables 2 DC 073, 2 DC 074 and 2 DC 075 in Unit 2 were replaced p. multirconductor cables 2 DC 244, 2 DC 245 and 2 DC 243 respectively.
- c. Two nonconformance reports (NCR) 666 and 732 were written documenting the failures and both NCR's were closed out on April 18, 1984.
- d. A sample of the caples was pulled and tested by the manufacturer. The sample failed a production test (e.g. a 13,800 volt spark test) which it has passed prior to shipment.
- e. The procedule failure to pass the test was due to elorgation of the caple insulation.

The inspectors determined from a reliew of installation records that the cables were replaced in accordance with approved procedures. This item is closed.

4. Conductor Butt Solices

Due to the problems encountered with conductor butt splices at other Nuclear Plants, the inspectors queried the licensee as to what actions had been taken or were planned to verify the acceptability of the butt splices at the Byron Station. The inspectors were informed that CECO QA initiated a review of approximately 11,000 cable termination reports and identified 646 of these reports that documented the installation of butt splices. Between March 13-16, 1984, CECo QA and HECo QC randomly checked 221 safety-related and 78 non-safety-related conductor butt splices. Following are the results of the checks made on the 221 safety-related butt splices as documented in CECo QA Surveillance Report 5944, dated March 27, 1984:

27 splices were not inspected because they were covered with tape or heat shrink material.
194 splices were visually inspected and 72 were "tug-tested".
1 butt splice failed the tug-test and was replaced.
16 splices were identified as defective and replaced. Failure attributes were not provided.
All 194 butt splices were installed with the proper crimping tool.

CECo NCR F899, dated April 5, 1984, was prepared to document that the conductor insulation on cables provided by Okonite Company would not fit inside the insulation barrel of Amp butt splice connectors. This NCR has been forwarded to CECo Project Engineering Department (off-site) for resolution. As of May 4, 1984, a resolution/disposition had not been received on-site.

To understand why the conductor butt splices were rejected, the inspectors requested the applicable inspection checklists/termination reports for review. The inspectors reviewed the following Cable Inspection Termination Reports (CITR) and Equipment Modification Inspection Requests (EMIR):

Report No.	Cable No.	No. Rejects	Remarks
CIRT 12318	25×033	1	Butt Splice Replaces
CITR 12130	1R-058	2	Butt Splice Replaced
CITR 12119	1RH262	1	Butt Splice Replaced
CITR 12143	1R-163	3	Butt Splice Replaced
CITR 12145	105260	2	Butt Splice Replaces
CITR 12144	18-112	2	Bult SPlice Replaces
CITR 12131	1R-069	3	Butt Splice Replaced
CITR 12180	18-042	이번 이 물건 가지?	Butt Splice Replaced
CINR 12123	19-043		Butt bolice Replaced
EMIR E990	100165		Cut insulation between
			Butt Splice and terminal
			lug-replaced.
EMIR 5988	180189		Cut insulation-recaired
			with shrink-fit reterial
	190137	물건을 통하는 것이 없다.	Bas crime on connector-
			replaced
	1R0147	3	Cut insulation-replaced
	1R0168	1	Exposed copper at splice
			replaced
	1RC170	1	Exposed coper at Splicer
			replaced
	106157	1	Butt splice replaced
	100158	1	Cut insulation-repaired
			with shrink-fit material
	10G163	_1	Butt splice replaced

27 Total

From the above information, it would appear that an addition ten butt splices were rejected and repaired during the repair of the 17 rejected by CECo QA. Utilizing this latest information, it would appear that the reject rate 27/194 is 13.9%. During interviews with the CECo and HECo personnel involved in this reinspection effort, the inspectors were informed that the largest number of rejected butt splices were because the conductor (copper) was not visible at the connector crimp.

The inspectors also performed a general review of the 646 CITRs identified by the licensee that doucmented butt splices. It was observed that a large percentage of these splices were associated with the termination of

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metal shielding braid or tape-shield on control or instrument cables as addressed in S&L Standard EA-215. The inspectors made a detailed review of 34 of these CITRs. Following are the results of this review:

CITR No.	Cable No.	No. of Splice	Remarks
119	1M5528		
11942			
	1AF181	1	
11941	1AF180	(1 - 1)	
11940	1AF179	1	
11939	1AF170	1	
11935	1VACE3	ī	Partiana dimensional and a
			Replaced-damaged conductor
11933	1VA533		insulation
11918	100245	1	
11906	100245	1	
41200	100590	1	Replaced-damages consuctor
			insulation
11905	1CV548	2	Replaced-damages conductor
			insulation
11904	107491	2	Declarate decision
			Replaced-damaged conductor
11891	105115	1. 10 A 10	insulation
11860	151528	2	
		1	Replaced butt splice
11859	151523	1	Replaced butt splice
11858	1V4143	1	Replaced butt splice
11987	1VA102 1NR208	1	Replaced butt splice
10928	1102004	1	Shield braid splice
10897	158227		Shield wire splice
12896	1NP226	:	
0.000	#11 # 2 P	:	Shield wire splice
8037 8033	174818	1	
6023	1VA707	1	
7925	1VA709	1	
7964	1VA705	1	
7963	1V4817	1	
5594	1NR014	1	In process inspection
5550	100010	;	in process inspection
5549	100001		
		1	In process inspection
5534	1F#218	3	
5528	1RC439	1	In process inspection
5527	1NR102	1	In process inspection
5526	1RC436	1	In process inspection
5272	1FW221	5	an process inspection
4561	1M5308	4	
4391	1FW055	1	Calas to 2
	TLWODD	1	Crimp tool not calibrates-
			replaced butt splice.

Dates of these inspections ranged from March 3, 1982 thru February 25, 1984. It was observed that all of the inspection reports randomally selected were for Byron Station Unit 1. In the 34 reports reviewed, it appeared that there were five defective butt splices and six examples of damaged/cut conductor insultation identified.

To determine if all QC termination inspectors were documenting butt splices on CIRTs, the CECo Electric1 Field Engineer interviewed the HECo Electrical QC termination inspectors and determined that only approximately 50% of those interviewed documented their inspection of butt splices. In view of the information obtained by CECo during their review of potential butt splice problems at the Byron Station (i.e., 13.9% reject rate), the Reigon III inspector expressed his concern as to why CECo failed to implement a 100% reinspection/inspection of conductor putt splices. As a result of the inspector's concern, CECo, Byron Station, provided a versal notification to Region III of a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) report on May 10, 1984, relative to electrical conductor butt splices. As a result of teleprore conversations between Mr. R. Tuetken (CECo Byron Staff) and Mr. C. C. Williams (Region III) on May 10 and 11. 1984, CECo deleloped an inspection plan for the reinspection of electrical conductor butt splices at the Eyron Station, Units 1 and 2. This inspection plan is documented in Mr. D. Farrar (CECo Director of Nuclear Licensing) letter to Mr. James G. Keppler (NRC Regional Administrator), dated May 17, 1984.

Region III has assigned an inspector to monitor the conductor butt splice reinspection program. Upon completion of the reinspection program. Separate inspection reports (50-454 54-29 and 50-455 34-21) will be issued to document the findings and corrective action taken.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denotes in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the prosite portion of the inspection on May 4, 1984, and discussed the scope and concerns of this inspection. As stated in paragraph 4 of this report, Region III personnel discussed the concerns of this inspection with Mr. R. Tuetken on May 10 and 11, 1984 by telephone. On May 25, 1984, Mr. R. Love telephonically presented the findings of this inspection to Mr. R. B. Klingler (CECo Byron Station staff). The licensee acknowledged this information.