NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
High Reactor Pressure Scram from Main Turbine Bypass Valve Closure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 6	0 1	8 4	8 4	— 0 5 6	— 0 0	0 6	2 8	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	2 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.72(b)(2)(ii)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
C.M. Powers, Reactor Engineering Supervisor	5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 5 0 1 Ext. 2996

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
B	J J	D C C	W 1 2 0	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip on high reactor pressure occurred as a result of the closure of all four main turbine bypass valves. Control of the BPVs was lost when an electronic circuit card which provides the open/close demand to the valves failed in the Digital Electro-hydraulic (DEH) Control System. The inability to pass steam to the main condensor resulted in a Reactor pressure increase to the RPS setpoint of 1038 psig.

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 4	— 0 5 6	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

a) Power Level - 20%
b) Plant Mode - 1
c) During Power Ascension Testing Program

Event

On 6-1-84 during the Power Ascension Testing Program the DEH system was being operated in DEH mode 3 (Turbine Load Control) due to a DEH system fault preventing operation in DEH mode 4 (Turbine Follow Reactor Manual). All four main turbine bypass valves closed causing Reactor pressure to increase to approximately 1000 psig. In an attempt to force the bypass valves into opening against a possible increase in additional close bias, control rod 42-19 was withdrawn two notches and the governor valves were moved in the close direction to increase the pressure signal to the DEH pressure control circuitry thus increasing BPV opening demand. The bypass valves did not respond to the increased opening demand. Reactor pressure increased to the High Pressure Reactor Trip setpoint and an Automatic Protection Trip resulted.

Immediate Corrective Action

The Plant was recovered per Plant Operating Procedure PPM 3.3.1. The increase in Reactor pressure to the Automatic Trip Setpoint was due to a failure of the DEH Pressure Control circuitry and unsuccessful attempts to regain positive control of Reactor pressure. The operating staff took appropriate action utilizing Plant Operating Procedures and technical recommendations from the Shift Technical Advisor, Turbine Startup Test Director and Westinghouse Technical Representatives.

Further Corrective Action

Troubleshooting revealed a failed DEH protective logic card that incorrectly produced a close control signal to the bypass valves. The defective card was replaced and bypass valves were tested satisfactorily. No further corrective action was necessary.

Safety Significance

The DEH component failure and attempts to regain pressure control resulting in Reactor pressure excursion posed no threat to the health and safety of Plant personnel or to the public because the Plant Protective Systems functioned as designed. Also, Plant Operators took appropriate recovery actions during the event.

Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397
June 28, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-056

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-056 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 0047 hours on June 1, 1984.

Very truly yours,

G K Hoffstatter for

J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-056

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1450 Maria Lane
Walnut Creek, California 94596
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman
American Nuclear Insurers
The Exchange Suite 245
270 Farmington Ave.
Farmington, CT 06032

IE22
1/1