



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-368

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 166
License No. NPF-6

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated May 19, 1995, as supplemented July 21, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-6 is hereby amended to read as follows:

2. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 166, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. The license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



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Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 166

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6

DOCKET NO. 50-368

Revise the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE PAGES

3/4 9-3

3/4 9-4

B 3/4 9-1

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INSERT PAGES

3/4 9-3

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B 3/4 9-1

B 3/4 9-3

REFUELING OPERATIONS

DECAY TIME AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.3.a The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours.

3.9.3.b In the event of a complete core offload, a full core to be discharged shall be subcritical a minimum of 175 hours prior to discharge of more than 70 assemblies to the spent fuel pool.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

ACTION:

With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. With the reactor subcritical for less than 175 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of more than 70 fuel assemblies from the reactor pressure vessel to the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.3.a The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

4.9.3.b The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 175 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of the 71st irradiated fuel assembly from the reactor pressure vessel to the spent fuel pool.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

- a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,
- b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is capable of being closed, and
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
 1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or
 2. Exhausting through OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required condition within 72 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at the following frequencies:

- a. At least once per 18 months or (1)² after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of more than 70 irradiated fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow radioactive decay of the short lived fission products such that the heat generated will not exceed the cooling capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling system. This decay time and total assembly limitation is conservatively within the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Operation of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

The containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS provided a minimum of one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident and the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel seated within the reactor pressure vessel. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, a minimum of one personnel airlock door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL WATER LEVEL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 12% iodine gas activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.11 FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM

The limitations on the fuel handling area ventilation system ensure that all radioactive materials released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The operation of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE

Region 1 of the spent fuel storage racks is designed to assure fuel assemblies of less than or equal to 4.1 w/o U-235 enrichment will be maintained in a subcritical array with $K_{eff} \leq 0.95$ in unborated water. These conditions have been verified by criticality analyses.

Region 2 of the spent fuel storage racks is designed to assure fuel assemblies within the burnup and initial enrichment limits of Figure 3.9.2 will be maintained in a subcritical array with $K_{eff} \leq 0.95$ in unborated water. These conditions have been verified by criticality analyses.

The requirement for 1600 ppm boron concentration is to assure the fuel assemblies will be maintained in a subcritical array with $K_{eff} \leq 0.95$ in the event of a postulated accident.