

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 OF 0 4 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Containment Ventilation Isolation - Inoperable

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0	5	2	8	8	4	0	1	4	0	0	0	0
0	5	2	8	8	4	0	0	0	6	2	7	8
											0	5
											0	5

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (8) 1	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(e)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
J. L. Rupp	6 0 9 3 3 9 - 4 3 0 9
AREA CODE	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The Technical Specifications allow the use of a plant vent radio-activity monitor in place of a containment monitor for monitoring, purge and pressure relief operations, provided the plant vent monitor setpoints are reduced to the value of the containment monitor. On May 28, 1984, a containment pressure relief was performed utilizing the plant vent Gaseous Activity Monitor (2R41C) in lieu of the containment Gaseous Activity Monitor (2R12A). The containment atmosphere was sampled prior to the release, plant vent samples were obtained and the plant vent monitors were continuously monitored during the release to verify activity levels remained below the allowable discharge limits. However, 2R41C setpoint was not reduced as required, resulting in a Containment Ventilation Isolation System setpoint which was not consistent with the assumptions used in the FSAR. This occurrence was attributed to the failure to follow the operating procedure as written. The procedure provides for the inoperability of a containment activity monitor; however, a temporary "On-The-Spot" change to the procedure inadvertently omitted the step which required the 2R41C setpoint to be reduced. The individual involved was counseled. In addition, a review of the Administrative Procedure will be conducted for the proper application of "On-The-Spot" changes.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Salem Generating Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER 05000311	LER NUMBER 84-014-00	PAGE 2 OF 4
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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation - Containment Ventilation Isolation - Inoperable

Event Date: 05/28/84

Report Date: 06/27/84

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 84-083

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1150 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On May 28, 1984, during normal power operation, Containment Gaseous Activity Monitor [IL] 2R12A was in an alarm condition, which resulted in a Containment Ventilation Isolation signal [JM]. During this time, a containment pressure relief was necessary, due to containment pressure being very close to the Technical Specification limit. It was necessary to block the Containment Ventilation Isolation signal from 2R12A in order to open the containment purge/pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves and perform the required pressure relief. In the event of inoperability of 2R12A, Technical Specification 3.3.2 allows the plant vent Gaseous Activity Monitor (2R41C) to be used to provide the Containment Ventilation Isolation function, provided its setpoint is lowered prior to opening the containment purge/pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves. The containment atmosphere was sampled and the Containment Ventilation Isolation signal from 2R12A was blocked in preparation for the pressure relief operation. The pressure relief commenced at 1915 hours and ended at 2015 hours. Although 2R41C was monitored during the containment pressure relief, its setpoint was not reduced as required by the Technical Specifications. This resulted in the inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation System.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment Pressure - Vacuum Relief Operating Procedure (OP-II-16.3.1), step 5.6.1.b states: "RMS Channels 2R11A, 2R12A and 2R12B are in operation. All alarms are cleared and reset." The Senior Shift Supervisor believed that a change to the procedure was required because step 5.6.1.b stated that 2R12A was in operation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Salem Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER	LER NUMBER	PAGE
Unit 2	05000311	84-014-00	3 OF 4

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

A temporary "On-The-Spot" change was initiated. This temporary change provided for obtaining plant vent samples and directed that the plant vent Gross Activity Monitor (2R16) and Gaseous Activity Monitor (2R41C) be monitored during the pressure relief operation. It also directed that calculations be performed using the 2R16 to ensure that the release rate was not exceeded. Consequently, the change as written deleted Step 5.6.1.b.1 of the procedure, which states: "If any of the 2R11A, 2R12A, or 2R12B Monitors is inoperable, the appropriate 2R41 Monitor may be used as a substitute. I&C must reduce the setpoint prior to the pressure relief."

OP-II-16.3.1 makes provisions for the inoperability of a Radiation Monitor. This occurrence was attributed to the failure to follow the operating procedure as written, and to unnecessarily initiating an "On-The-Spot" change. Due to oversight, this temporary change inadvertently omitted a step in the procedure, which resulted in the inoperability of the Containment Ventilation Isolation System.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

2R12A and 2R41C are provided to measure gaseous radioactivity in the containment, and to ensure that the release rate through the plant vent during purging is maintained below specified limits. High radioactivity level initiates closure of the containment purge supply and exhaust duct valves, the containment pressure relief line valves and the Waste Gas discharge valve. Technical Specification 3.3.2 requires operation of the Containment Gaseous Activity Monitor (2R12A) with a Containment Ventilation Isolation setpoint signal of less than or equal to 4.5×10^{-2} curies/second, and a response time of less than or equal to five (5) seconds. The Containment Ventilation Isolation System provides the means of isolating the containment atmosphere to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. In addition, the required closure time of the valves ensures that no significant release of radioactivity to the environment can occur during such an event. Although the containment isolation signal from 2R12A was blocked, the monitoring function from this channel was still operable. 2R41C, and 2R16 were monitored during the pressure release to ensure that the release rates were within specification. Although 2R41C would have isolated the Containment Ventilation System, the setpoint at which this would have occurred is not consistent with the Technical Specification requirement, or with the assumptions used in the FSAR. Because this operation was prohibited by the Technical Specifications, this report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Salem Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER	LER NUMBER	PAGE
Unit 2	05000311	84-014-00	4 OF 4

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Senior Shift Supervisor involved with this incident was counseled and apprised of his shortcomings. The proper use of "On-The-Spot" changes will be discussed by department management with the responsible department supervision. In addition, as the result of previous occurrences involving the questionable use of "On-The-Spot" changes, an audit will be performed by the Quality Assurance Department on the application of Administrative Procedure (AP-3) for "On-The-Spot" changes (Sorc Open Item No. 84-075-02).

J.M. Zupke

General Manager-
Salem Operations

JLR:tns

SORC Mtg 84-078B



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 27, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-014-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J. M. Zupko, Jr.".

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager -
Salem Operations

JR:k11

CC: Distribution

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