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Technical specification 3.4.1.2 requires two reactor coolant pumps to be operable with one pump in operation for mode 3 operation. Mode 3 is defined by the technical specifications as reactor coolant system temperature between 350 degrees F and no-load temperature of 547 degrees F with the reactor subcritical as required by the shutdown margin technical specification 3.1.1.1.

At 1600 EST on 05/31/84, Westinghouse notified Sequoyah that consistency between the safety analysis and technical specifications as required by 10 CFR 50.36 may not exist. Mode 3 operation is bounded by the analysis performed for hot zero power. These analyses were performed assuming that either two or all of the reactor coolant pumps are operating. The limiting accidents for hot zero power are main steam line break, rod ejection, and bank withdrawal from subcritical.

Westinghouse has reviewed these accidents under the reduced flow conditions of one pump and determined for the steam line break and rod ejection events that the inconsistency between the safety anlysis and the technical specifications will not impact the conclusions presented in the safety anlysis. For the bank withdrawal from subcritical accident, Westinghouse calculations showed that the DNB design basis for the condition II event may not be met when only one reactor coolant pump is in operation. Based on this evaluation, the margin for safety as defined in the basis for technical specification 3.4.1.2 is reduced and the condition may be an unreviewed safety question according to 10 CFR 50.59.

Westinghouse has stated that on a best estimate basis, DNB design basis can be met since the licensing basis analysis includes conservatisms (such as high reactivity insertion rates) which when removed show that the DNBR is above limits. Therefore, no significant safety hazard exists.

Upon notification of this condition, Sequoyah implemented administrative controls to require either (1) two reactor coolant pumps operating in mode 3, or (2) one reactor coolant pump operating with all rods on the bottom with all power removed from the rods when in mode 3. The administrative controls will remain in effect until a technical specification change can be submitted to and approved by the NRC.

There was no effect on public health or safety. At the time of the notice, unit 1 was in mode 1 (550 degrees F, 2235 psig) at 10% reactor power, and unit 2 was in mode 1 (578 degrees F, 2235 psig) at 100% reactor power. There have been no previous occurrences.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 20Co Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

June 26, 1984

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQR0-50-327/84038

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning notification from Westinghouse that technical specification 3.4.1.2 may be incorrect. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, paragraph a.2.ii.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

R. Walla

P. R. Wallace Plant Manager

Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

> James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah