UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos. 50-369/95-22 and 50-370/95-22

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: August 6, 1995 - September 2, 1995

Inspectors: R. V. Crlenjak 9/15/95
George F. Maxwell, Sr. Resident Inspector Date Signed
per telecon 9/15/95
Garry A. Harris, Resident Inspector
Marvin D. Sykes, Resident Inspector

Approved by: R. V. Crlenjak 9/15/95
R. V. Crlenjak, Chief, Branch 3 Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. Some of the inspections were conducted during backshift hours. Backshift inspections were conducted on August 6, 11, 18, 20, 25, and September 2, 1995.

Results: **In the area of operations:**

Licensee initiatives have contributed to a reduction in the number of significant component mispositionings but mispositionings continue to need management attention (paragraph 3.a). The site has developed a Plant Operations Review Committee to strengthen the technical review process and to evaluate important safety issues (paragraph 3.c). the Nuclear Safety Review Board conducted a site meeting in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. The Board provided station management with thorough recommendations concerning current site issue (paragraph 3.d).

Enclosure

In the area of maintenance:

A Non-Cited Violation was identified due to the inoperability of the Unit 1 containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor (paragraph 4.c).

In the area of engineering:

Prompt corrective action was taken by the licensee during a short-term loss of Unit 2 containment integrity (paragraph 5.a). Engineering conducted a thorough and timely evaluation to reduce an elevated control room temperature (paragraph 5.b).

In the area of plant support:

The Fire Protection Program has been effectively implemented. The suppression equipment was found to be in good condition and the fire brigade training has been frequent and challenging. Management controls have been effective in identifying and correcting fire protection issues (paragraph 6).

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

1. **PERSONS CONTACTED**

Licensee Employees

*K. Beal, Emergency Procedure Group
*A. Beaver, Shift Operations Manager
*J. Boyle, Superintendent Work Control
*S. Bradshaw, Operations
*D. Caldwell, Regulatory Compliance
T. Curtis, Manager Mechanical/Nuclear System Engineering
*R. Deese, Safety Review Group
*B. Dolan, Safety Assurance Manager
*E. Evans, System Engineering
*G. Frix, Engineering
*E. Geddie, Station Manager
*G. Grier, Corporate Engineering Support Division Manager
*P. Herran, Engineering Manager
*S. Horn, Operations
D. Jamil, Manager, Electrical System Engineering
*R. Jones, Superintendent of Operations
*B. Matthews, System Engineer
*C. Majure, Training Director
*T. McConnell, Corporate Station Support Division Manager
*T. McMeekin, Site Vice President
M. Nazar, Maintenance Superintendent
*R. Ouellette, Engineering
*R. Peele, Oconee Nuclear Station, Station Manager
*M. Rains, System Engineer
*L. Ree, Engineering
*K. Reece, Maintenance
*G. Rothenberger, Operations Superintendent
J. Snyder, Regulatory Compliance Manager
*P. Stiles, Engineering
B . Travis, Component Engineering Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

*G. Maxwell, SRI
*G. Harris, RI
M. Sykes, RI

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. PLANT STATUS

a. Unit 1

Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% power throughout the inspection report period.

b. Unit 2

Unit 2 operated at essentially 100% power throughout the inspection report period.

c. Inspections and Items of Interest

On August 9, 10, and 29, senior Region II management visited the station to conduct plant tours and interview station management.

3. OPERATIONS (NRC Inspection Procedure 71707 and 40500)

Throughout the inspection period, inspectors conducted facility tours to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. The tours included entries into the protected area and radiologically controlled areas of the plant. During these inspections, discussions were held with operators, radiation protection technicians, instrument and electrical technicians, mechanics, security personnel, engineers, supervisors, and plant management. Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshift inspections. The inspectors attended licensee meetings to observe planning and management activities. The inspections confirmed Duke Power Company's compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications (TS), License Conditions, and Administrative Procedures.

a. Component Mispositioning

The problem of component mispositioning continues to need improvement at the station. The licensee has aggressively addressed the issue by implementing a number of initiatives. Some of these initiatives include the following:

- Monthly management meetings are held to discuss issues, focus on emerging trends, track corrective action, and evaluate the effectiveness of work process interface problems.

- Enhanced mispositioning reporting methods are being used to improve categorization of mispositionings.

- Common cause analysis is performed every six months for all mispositionings such that similarities are evaluated for the purpose of root cause analysis. In addition the PIP process

has been revised to provide for a more accurate common cause analysis.

- Continued implementation and enhancement of the configuration control card system.

- Proactive system walkdowns conducted by operations and chemistry to identify mispositioned components and evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions.

The licensee component mispositioning evaluations has shown that work practices continues to be a dominate contributor to the problem. The inspectors concluded that the licensee initiatives have contributed to a reduction in the number of significant component mispositionings, but continued management emphasis is needed in this area.

b. Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Temperature

On August 17, a series of service water flow balance tests were performed following the repair of 1RN442, Control Room Air Conditioner Condenser Control #1 Valve. Flow balance testing involved recirculating service water to the SNSWP and measuring the flows through the essential heat exchangers. The inspectors, concerned about the effects of recent hot weather on plant equipment, questioned the control room operators about the SNSWP temperature. The operators informed the inspectors that the pond temperature was 80 degrees F and had not exceeded the TS limit of 82 degrees F. Station engineering personnel evaluated the elevated temperature and determined that the increase was due to the service water flow balancing tests. The SNSWP temperature decreased to normal value during the next several days. The inspectors and site engineering personnel reviewed the flow balance procedure and noted that there were no cautions to warn the operators that the tests could result in elevated pond temperatures during the summer months. Also the inspectors noted that SNSWP temperature does not have an control room alarm and could not be trended.

Subsequently, the licensee revised the controlling procedure to include a caution concerning temperature increases and also new instructions for actions to be taken if elevated temperatures should occur.

c. Plant Operations Review Committee

The inspectors conducted an assessment of PORC effectiveness and evaluated the licensee's use of the PORC process. The PORC was

established to review issues at the site management level that may have the potential to significantly impact safe and reliable nuclear plant operations. These issues may include complex safety issues. The PORC process was developed to strengthen the technical review process and improve management's ability to evaluate important safety issues.

The inspectors attended a PORC meeting to review an implementing procedure that provided controls for the Steam Generator Replacement Project preparatory work. Minor modifications to structures inside the reactor building were to be completed using this procedure and associated modification packages. The modifications included adding stiffeners to both ends of the unit 1 and unit 2 polar crane girders, installing base plates on the containment operating floors, and core drilling holes through the steam generator divider walls.

The inspectors noted that detailed information packages had been provided to the PORC members in advance of the meeting to allow for preliminary reviews. The inspectors observed that the committee members were prepared to discuss the topic. During the meeting safety issues including seismic interaction, material compatibility, crane movement and load lifts, use of hot work permits, and foreign material exclusion were discussed in detail. The inspectors observed that all necessary station groups were represented. The inspectors concluded that the PORC adequately addressed any potential safety issues that may have impacted the implementation of this procedure.

d. Nuclear Safety Review Board Meeting

The inspectors attended a Nuclear Safety Review Board meeting held at the station. The NSRB is required by Technical Specifications to provide an independent review and audit of specific station activities that includes: nuclear power plant operations, nuclear engineering, chemistry and radiochemistry, instrumentation and control, radiological safety, administrative control and quality assurance practices. The TS requires that the board be composed of at least five members including an individual to serve as the Director. The inspectors verified through a review of station records that board members met academic and technical experience requirements. The inspectors observed that board members were both from within the company and from other utilities. The inspectors verified that a quorum was present for the performance of NSRB duties. The inspectors concluded that the NSRB met the organization requirements as specified in Technical Specifications.

The inspectors observed that the first day of the NSRB meeting consisted of extensive plant tours by board members. In addition,

committee sessions were held to evaluate plant safety issues in both engineering and operations. Some of these committee discussions included KC piping stress corrosion, on-line maintenance, configuration control, and loose parts monitoring. The inspectors observed the committee proceedings and determined that issues were adequately addressed.

The inspectors observed the second day of the NSRB meeting which consisted of detailed presentations from station management and the Safety Review Group. The presentations included diesel generator issues, component mispositioning and reactivity management events. The inspectors observed that the presentations were well prepared, detailed, and comprehensive. This allowed the board the opportunity to conduct a proper evaluation of safety issues.

At the conclusion of the meeting an exit was held with senior plant management. Some exit discussion items included the following:

- Continued management attention needed in reactivity management and component mispositioning
- Continued attention needed in command and control
- Perform an assessment of the procedure validation initiative
- Station material condition has improved however continued attention is needed
- Continued attention to overdue preventative maintenance activities

The NSRB members recognized the positive efforts of the station in areas such as; work backlog reduction, corrective actions for problems in missed TS surveillances, reactivity management, KC piping corrosion, safeguards information, and station material condition.

The inspectors concluded that the NSRB meeting was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and established procedures. The Board adequately evaluated safety issues at the station and provided station management with thorough recommendations.

4. **MAINTENANCE** (NRC Inspection Procedures 62703 and 61726)

The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to verify that approved procedures were available and in use, test equipment in use was

calibrated, test prerequisites were met, system restoration was completed, and acceptance criteria were met. In addition, resident inspectors reviewed and/or witnessed routine maintenance activities to verify, where applicable, that approved procedures were available and in use, prerequisites were met, equipment restoration was completed, and maintenance results were adequate.

a. Spent Fuel Pool Inventory, PT/0/A/4550/03B

The inspectors observed the performance of spent fuel pool inventory periodic surveillance. The surveillance involved 1) conducting a piece count of all special nuclear material in the spent fuel pools and 2) inspecting each spent fuel pool rack location and recording the assembly region reference number. The inspectors verified that all spent and/or new fuel was in its proper location as specified on the recent spent fuel pool map. The inspectors concluded that the surveillance was conducted in accordance with the procedure. No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test, PT/1/A/4350/01B

The inspectors observed the performance of PT/1/A/4350/01B, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test, and performed a walkdown of the 1B diesel generator and its associated components. The test was conducted in accordance with the procedure and verified that the diesel generator 1B was operable. The inspectors found the material condition of the 1B diesel generator and its auxiliaries to be acceptable. No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Unit 1 RCS Leakage Detection System

On August 21 the licensee discovered that the Unit 1 containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor, 1EMF38, had been inoperable for several months. The monitor was declared inoperable when licensee technicians discovered that the filter paper, necessary for proper monitor operation, had been exhausted.

The inoperability of 1EMF38 was discovered during an 18 month surveillance activity. This surveillance required a visual inspection of internal monitor components. Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the associated alarm circuit, designed to indicate a loss of paper or paper not moving, had failed. Therefore, no alarm was available in the control room to alert the operators of the system inoperability. The licensee has reviewed data covering the period of inoperability and determined that no abnormal levels of particulate activity was present during the period of inoperability.

The inspectors discussed the equipment failure and evaluated the actions taken by the licensee. The inspectors observed that the alarm was repaired, a new roll of filter paper was installed, and the monitor was tested and returned to service. The inspectors noted that the licensee has drafted an LER and has initiated additional corrective actions that include routinely replacing the filter paper at least once every 45 days and possibly upgrading the alarm circuit. The inspectors determined that the failure of this instrument had minimal safety significance and the licensee's corrective actions should prevent recurrence. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item will be identified as Non-Cited Violation 50-369/95-22-01: EMF inoperability.

5. **ENGINEERING** (NRC Inspection Procedures 37550 and 92700)

a. Unit 2 Loss of Containment Integrity

On August 16, the licensee reported a loss of containment integrity due to the deflation of containment door seals. Containment integrity is maintained by pressurizing seals on both the reactor and auxiliary building doors. The incident occurred when a limit switch failed in a drive actuator for the auxiliary building side door causing the door seal to deflate at the same time the reactor building side door was open. Containment integrity was lost for less than two minutes. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires that containment integrity be restored within 1 hour. The defective actuator was promptly replaced and the containment doors were declared operable. The inspectors observed the actions taken by the licensee during this event and determined that the licensee's prompt actions minimized the risk to public safety.

b. Elevated Control Room Temperatures

During the period, Operations personnel experienced discomfort due to elevated control room temperatures. The increased temperatures were noticed by the operators following the replacement of the control room light bulbs. Station management became concerned about the effects that the increase in temperature may have on control room operator performance.

The bulb replacement was performed under a routine PM task which installed bulbs with a higher wattage. This increased wattage apparently caused an additional heat load in the control room. The replacement bulbs were installed after an investigation revealed that there were inconsistencies between the original lighting bill of material and instructions on the work order and PM procedure.

Engineering conducted an evaluation of the temperature increase and as a result recommended that the bulbs be replaced with bulbs that maintain the same illumination but dissipated less heat to the control room environment. This new type bulb was installed and as a result the increased temperatures were eliminated yet the control room illumination was improved.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's corrective actions and determined that they were adequate and timely in resolving the elevated control room temperatures.

c. (CLOSED) LER 50-370/85-24: Gradual Decrease in Indicated Full Power Delta-T

Following the startup of Unit 2 after 1EOC2 in May 1985, a gradual decrease in the indicated value of the full power delta-T was identified. Delta-T is used as a measure of reactor power for both the overpower delta-T and overtemperature delta-T reactor trip setpoints.

The controlling procedure, PT/0/A/4150/21, Post Refueling Controlling Procedure for Criticality, Zero Power Physics and Power Escalation Testing, was subsequently revised to set delta-T values for the overpressure delta-T and overtemperature delta-T processing circuits to more conservative values. The procedure was also revised to use data from the reactor coolant flow test to make a delta-T evaluation at 80% and 100% power. The inspectors evaluated the procedural revisions and additional testing which was conducted on the station feedwater flow measuring system. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions taken by the licensee should assure that the setpoints used for overpower and overtemperature delta-T reactor trip setpoints are conservative. This item is closed.

6. **PLANT SUPPORT** (NRC Inspection Procedures 71750 and 64704)

The Site Fire Protection System And Program

Background

The fire protection system provides water to various points throughout the plant area, administrative buildings and exterior yard. The system consists of three electric motor driven pumps, two jockey pumps, hydrants, headers, and deluge and sprinkler water spray systems that are connected to a yard main that loops the periphery of the plant and critical yard areas. The system also consists of a pressurizer tank that acts as an accumulator or surge tank water volume that expands or contracts with pressure fluctuations in the system. The water for the three main motor driven pumps is supplied from Lake Norman. The two

redundant jockey pumps are provided to maintain normal fire protection system pressure and to prevent frequent starts of the main fire pumps. Halon suppression systems are used in the emergency diesel generator rooms and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.

The station fire protection program implements the operational and administrative procedures for the station.

Materiel Condition

The inspectors conducted extensive walkdowns of the fire suppression and detection equipment. No active leaks were observed on the system. Some minor discrepancies were noted, including: missing handwheels, painting, and missing insulation, etc. These discrepancies were discussed with the licensee and repairs were initiated. There were no outstanding CRIP items on the system. The outstanding work backlog had been minimized. The materiel condition of the fire protection system was found to be good.

Equipment Reliability

A review of component trending reports, open work items, and TSAIL entries did not reveal any chronic problems with major components in the fire protection system. There were no fire protection components on the station's major equipment problem resolution list. Most of the existing work around items have been completed. These included nuisance alarms from containment fire zones and detection equipment associated with the VP filter beds.

A review of past surveillance testing of the fire protection suppression equipment did not reveal any performance problems. The inspectors witnessed portions of and/or evaluated the following activities:

- The inspectors observed the performance of PT/0/A/4400/10C, Fire Pump Operability Test, following the completion of maintenance on the "C" main fire pump. The inspectors verified that the test was conducted in accordance with established procedures and that all acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors also observed a portion of the fire protection system annunciator functional test. The test was used to verify the proper operation of alarms in various locations throughout the site. All of the associated alarms and annunciators actuated as required.

- The inspectors observed the performance of a fire protection system flow test to verify that an adequate volume of water could be transported to a given location despite infrequent system use. Also, the inspectors observed the use of a fire hose in filling a diesel generator sump for a TS surveillance test. As a result of these tests, the inspectors determined that an adequate volume of

water could be delivered to a fire at various locations throughout the plant.

- The inspectors evaluated the results of eight recently completed fire protection surveillance tests. No discrepancies were identified.

The inspectors evaluated the operations availability data for the SSF and determined that the SSF unavailability was low. A review of Problem Investigations reports did not reveal any adverse fire protection equipment related trends.

The inspectors verified that on each level of the auxiliary building and turbine building, portable CO2 extinguishers, hose stations and suppression equipment were in place and in good condition.

The inspectors examined portions of the electrical and mechanical seals and fire barriers in the auxiliary building at elevations 716 ft., 733 ft., and 750 ft. The areas inspected were designated as fire areas 2, 2A, 3, 3A, 4, 9, and 10. No discrepancies were identified. The inspectors verified that valve lineups were correct for selected deluge and sprinkler flow paths and for the main distribution piping.

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the main fire water pumps and the fire water jockey pumps to verify system operability as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements as well as station license commitments. Main fire water and jockey pumps were determined to be in good operating condition. The inspectors visually verified the correct pump suction and discharge valve positions. The inspectors also reviewed pump performance data and noted no discrepancies.

Hose stations and hydrant houses were randomly inspected throughout the station. Access to fire suppression equipment was good. The material condition of interior and exterior hose stations was adequate. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the Halon 1301 System. The inspectors visually verified rate of rise and fixed temperature detector positioning, audible alarm sirens, and warning lights in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater and emergency diesel generator rooms of both units. Halon system supplies and system pressure were verified to be adequate. The equipment was determined to be in good condition.

The inspectors evaluated the installed condition of various safety-related cable trays throughout the auxiliary building to verify compliance with fire prevention specifications. Cable trays were adequately spaced vertically and horizontally. Sprinklers were located at various elevations to provide adequate coverage in the event of a fire. Fiberboard and bulk fiber barrier materials were verified in place in the cable spreading, switchgear, pump and EDG rooms for both units. Where applicable, foam fill material was used.

The inspectors randomly verified operability of emergency lighting at various locations throughout the turbine and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors verified that adequate emergency breathing equipment was available for control room personnel. Ten SCBA units were located within the control room for the operators. These units are available for the fire brigade but may also be used by control room operators. Additional SCBAs and fire brigade equipment is located in the turbine building of both units for use by station personnel. The inspectors verified calibration dates of the regulators and verified tank capacities. The inspectors observed the use of this equipment during a simulated fire emergency.

Program Implementation

The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program and implementation procedures and found that the program had been adequately implemented. The inspectors verified that procedures had been developed and implemented for combustible material control and fire hazard reduction. To verify implementation of these procedures the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the turbine and auxiliary building areas where extensive use of paints, chemicals, and other combustibles were being used. No discrepancies were noted. Procedures had been developed for housekeeping, fire control capabilities, and fire risk maintenance evolutions. The inspectors verified through several direct observations of work activities that the procedures were being complied with.

Station Fire Protection System Readiness

The inspectors reviewed station procedures to access the required fire brigade composition and expectations. The inspectors noted that the fire brigade is a self-sufficient organization normally consisting of an Incident Commander (Senior Reactor Operator), a Safety Officer (Non-licensed Operator), another NLO, and two Single Point Of Contact (SPOC) team members. Five additional fire brigade members are designated to provide additional support when necessary. These positions are assigned during normal and backshift hours. The fire brigade conducts periodic drills during normal and backshift hours. Upon activation of the fire brigade, the assigned individuals are expected to carry out their designated fire brigade duties and respond to fires involving property under site control. The Fire Brigade may also provide limited support during an onsite hazardous materials emergency. There may be instances when certain plant conditions may take priority over a fire. Fire brigade equipment (boots, coats, gloves, etc.) was readily accessible.

The inspectors reviewed procedure AP/2/A/5500/24, Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire. The purpose of the procedure was to describe steps to be taken to achieve and maintain Hot Standby following a fire event that could result in a loss the control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel. The inspectors reviewed the procedure and determined that it provided the necessary instructions to mitigate the effects of a loss of

control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel due to a fire emergency. Control room operators were interviewed and found to be knowledgeable of procedural requirements.

Fire Watches

Individuals designated as fire watches were interviewed and were found to be knowledgeable of Fire Watch responsibilities and duties. Training for the fire watches included classroom instruction and hands-on training. Those that were interviewed were familiar with the requirements to contact the control room immediately upon discovery of a fire. The inspectors observed personnel performing fire watch duties during hot work activities and found their performance acceptable.

Fire Brigade Drill

The inspectors witnessed a simulated unannounced fire emergency drill in the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room. The inspectors observed that all persons involved were knowledgeable of their roles and responsibilities. The members of the fire brigade donned fire fighting equipment appropriately and responded promptly to the simulated fire emergency.

The inspectors noted that the fire brigade leader used procedures to develop an action plan and took prompt and appropriate steps to mitigate the simulated emergency. A post event critique was held. The inspectors concluded that the simulated fire emergency adequately tested the capability of fire brigade to response to an actual fire emergency.

Program Quality Assurance Controls

The inspectors evaluated the most recent surveys that were conducted by the licensee's fire insurance company. The surveys were conducted on January 17-18, 1995, and June 20-22, 1995. Each survey documented evaluations that affected: Fire Impairment Plan, Fire Brigade Organization and Training, Fire Brigade Drill, Fire Incident Reports, Use of Fire Watches, and Routine Tests on Fire Protection System.

The inspectors also evaluated the most recent triennial fire protection self-audit. The audit was conducted May 22-June 8, 1995. The audit documented assessments in the areas of: Condition of Fire Fighting Equipment, Routine Tests on the Fire Protection System, Fire Drills, Fire Loading Calculations, Appendix R review for Plant Modifications, Hot Shutdown Equipment/Shutdown Risk Program, Emergency Lighting, and Cold Shutdown Equipment Repair Capability. The inspectors determined that the QA program should aid the licensee in identifying and correcting fire protection program discrepancies.

The inspectors noted that the fire protection engineer met the qualification requirements and had good knowledge of both the program and system components.

Conclusion

The inspectors determined that the fire protection system material condition, equipment reliability and program implementation was good. The inspectors noted that the fire protection system had been designed and operated in accordance with established standards, well maintained and had adequate engineering attention. Fire brigade training has been frequent and challenging. Audits and surveys were through and comprehensive and no major weaknesses were identified in the operation, maintenance or engineering of the system. Licensee controls had been effective in identifying and correcting system and program deficiencies that could impact plant operations or safety.

7. EXIT INTERVIEW

The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on September 7, 1995, with those persons listed in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings in the Summary and listed below. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The following items were discussed in detail:

Item Number	Status	Description and Reference
NCV 50-369/95-22-01	CLOSED	EMF inoperability (paragraph 4.c)
LER 50-370/85-24	CLOSED	Gradual decrease in indicated full power delta-T (paragraph 5.c)

8. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CRIP - Control Room Indication Problem
EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator
FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report
KC - Component Cooling Water
LER - Licensee Event Report
NC - Reactor Coolant
NCV - Non-Cited Violation
NLO - Non-Licensed Operator
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSRB - Nuclear Safety Review Board
OAC - Operator Aid Computer

PORC	-	Plant Operation Review Committee
RN	-	Standby Nuclear Service Water
RP	-	Radiation Protection
SCBA	-	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SNSWP	-	Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond
SPOC	-	Single Point of Contact
SSF	-	Standby Shutdown Facility
TSAIL	-	Technical Specification Action Item Log
VP	-	Containment Purge and Ventilation
YC	-	Chilled Water