



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION I
 475 ALLENDALE ROAD
 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket No. 50-336
 File RI-87-A-0137

MAR 27 1989

[REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of our findings related to your allegations concerning security matters at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.

Please find enclosed a copy of NRC Inspection Report 50-336/89-03, documenting the most recent resident safety inspection conducted at Millstone Unit 2. Section 10.1 of the report addresses the licensee review of and response to the issues you raised to the NRC resident staff at Millstone in August 1988. As stated in the report, the licensee actions in this matter have been evaluated as prompt, thorough and complete. We consider this item closed and plan no further action.

Please contact me if you have any additional information.

Sincerely,

Ebe C. McCabe, Jr.
 Ebe C. McCabe, Jr., Chief
 Reactor Projects Section 1B
 Division of Reactor Projects
 Tel: (215) 337-5231

Enclosure: As Stated

bcc w/o encl:
 A. Shropshire
 S. Barr
 W. Raymond

Information in this record was deleted
 in accordance with the Freedom of Information
 Act, exemptions b7/C
 FOIA: 91-162

E/20



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

67-25-117

Docket/License: 50-336/DPR-65

MAR 06 1989

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
ATTN: Mr. Edward J. Mroczka
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Engineering and Operations Group
P.O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270

Gentlemen:

Subject: Millstone 2 Routine Inspection 50-336/89-03 (1/11/89 - 2/10/89)

This refers to the routine resident safety inspection conducted at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2. The results of the inspection are described in the NRC Region I Inspection Report enclosed with this letter and were discussed with Messrs. Scace and Keenan of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

No violations were identified during this inspection and no reply to this letter is required.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Lee H. Bettenhausen, Chief
Projects Branch No. 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-336/89-03

cc w/encl:

- W. D. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- R. M. Kacich, Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing
- D. O. Nordquist, Director of Quality Services
- S. E. Scace, Station Superintendent
- Gerald Garfield, Esquire
- Public Document Room (PDR)
- Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
- Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
- NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- State of Connecticut

8903170441 7pp

MAR 06 1989

bcc w/encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o enclosures)
DRP Section Chief
J. Shedlosky, SRI, Haddam Neck
D. Jaffe, LPM, NRR
R. Bores, DRSS
E. Conner, DRP (Detail 3.2)
R. Keimig, DRSS (Details 8.0, 10.0)
V. Hodge, NRR
P. Eiselgroth, DRS (Detail 3.1)
W. Lazarus, DRSS
J. Strosnider, DRS (Details 5.2, 9.0)
P. Eapen, DRS (Detail 5.2)
N. Blumberg, DRS (Detail 5.2)
M. Shanbaky, DRSS (Detail 6.2)
A. Shropshire, DRMA (Detail 10.0)
V. Hodge, NRR (Detail 3.4)
C. Anderson, DRS (Detail 3.3)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 1

Report No. 50-336/89-03

Docket No. 50-336

License No. DPR-63

Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P.O. Box 270
Hartford, CT 06101-0270

Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2

Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut

Dates: January 11 through February 10, 1989

Reporting Inspector: P. J. Habighorst, Resident Inspector

Inspectors: W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone
G. S. Barber, Resident Inspector, Millstone 3
L. M. Kolonauski, Resident Inspector, Millstone 1

Approved by: E. C. McCabe, Jr.
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1B

3/6/89
Date

Inspection Summary: 1/11/89 - 2/10/89 (Report 50-336/89-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine NRC resident inspection (174 regular hours, 4 backshift hours, and 8.5 deep backshift hours), of plant operations, outage activities, surveillance, maintenance, previously identified items, NRC bulletin follow-up, Plant Incident Report (PIR) follow-up, design changes and modifications, and committee activities.

Results: No unsafe conditions were identified. No violations or deviations were identified. Attached to this report is the licensee's January 26 presentation on Steam Generator (SG) Eddy Current Testing (Detail 9.0). Four previously identified items were closed (Detail 3.0)

8903170443 SPP

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The licensee checked all ammunition currently issued to the guard force to verify only the standard issue bullets (correct type and numbers) were in use. The matter was discussed with the security force to increase guard awareness and sensitivity in the search for contraband at the station access points. The licensee also ordered posters which graphically display types of contraband material and which will be incorporated in the general employee training program. The inspector had no further questions on the licensee corrective actions.

The inspector noted that a similar incident on December 4, 1980 involved .22 caliber rounds as described in NRC Inspection Report 50-336/88-28. The licensee's ability to detect such contraband is discussed in that report. The inspector concluded that no security threat existed on January 19 based on the amount of contraband. The corrective actions from the previous incident (NV5 88-28-01) could not have been reasonably expected to prevent the January 19 event. This licensee identified item is closed (NV5 89-03-01).

9.0 Steam Generator (SG) Eddy Current Testing (ECT) Presentation (73753)

On January 26, the licensee provided a presentation concerning steam generator (SG) eddy current testing (ECT) to the resident staff. The licensee presentation providing information on five specific areas of SG ECT: inspection engineering, data acquisition, data analysis, data management, and computer data screening. SG ECT is to be conducted beginning on February 4, 1989. The licensee's information is enclosed as Appendix A to this inspection report.

The inspector noted that the licensee's presentation described comprehensive SG ECT scope, improved inspection techniques, implementation of computer data analysis, a plant specific data analysis training program, and independence of data analysis. Enhancements for the licensee's 1989 SG ECT program include increased sensitivity for the wide-groove and segmented bobbin coil probes, increased full length probe testing speed (with no compromise to sample/linear inch of SG tube), and inclusion of the computer-assisted data analysis.

The effectiveness of SG ECT program enhancements will be reviewed during and after the scheduled 1989 refuel outage.

10.0 Allegation by Former Security Guard (RI-87-A-137)

This allegation concerned issues raised by a former guard in the licensee's contact security force. Some of the issues identified to the NRC resident inspector during a meeting on August 4, 1988 were the same as those previously addressed by the NRC (reference: NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-423/88-12). New issues identified on August 4 concerned: (i) alleged drug use offsite by a Millstone employee; (ii) guard sergeant termination after arrest for drug

use offsite; (iii) guards drawing weapons on each other; and, (iv) guards using weapons in horse play. By letter dated 9/19/88, the NRC staff referred these matters to the licensee for review and followup.

The licensee interviewed the alleger and reviewed the above issues. The results of the licensee's investigation were provided in a November 18, 1988 letter to NRC Region I. The licensee concluded the allegation of drug use offsite by a Millstone employee or the former guard sergeant could not be substantiated. The licensee also could not substantiate the use of weapons in horse play. The licensee found the issue involving guards drawing their weapons referred to an incident on March 28, 1988 in which one guard accused another guard of drawing his weapon during an argument. The matter was reported to security and licensee management at that time and was promptly investigated. The investigation exonerated the accused officer. Licensee oversight of the incident and guard force was maintained.

As part of his follow-up to the above issues, the licensee documented his program for Fitness for Duty Policy on Drug Abuse and summarized actions taken to implement the program for Millstone and contractor personnel. The licensee's program provides oversight of contractor and licensee personnel. To assure continued effectiveness of contractor oversight, the licensee committed to complete additional fitness-for-duty training for contractor supervisory personnel by 1/31/89. The inspector reviewed the guard attendance records for the training completed in December - January, as summarized in a January 26 memorandum to the Security Supervisor.

Licensee actions on this item were assessed as prompt, thorough and complete. No unacceptable conditions were identified.

11.0 Committee Activities (40500)

The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings 2-89-05, 2-89-06, 2-89-07, 2-89-09, 2-89-10, 2-89-19, and 2-89-21 on January 11, January 13, January 18, January 27, February 1, February 9, and February 10. The inspector noted by observation that committee administrative requirements were met for the meetings, and that the committees discharged their functions in accordance with regulatory requirements. The inspector observed a thorough discussion of matters before the PORC and a good regard for safety in the issues under consideration. No inadequacies were identified.

12.0 Maintenance (62703)

The inspector observed and reviewed selected portions of preventive and corrective maintenance to verify compliance with regulations, use of administrative and maintenance procedures, compliance with codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, use of bypass jumpers and safety tags, personnel protection, and equipment alignment and retest. The following activities were included.

- AWO M2-89-1353 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator voltage/frequency switch change-out on 2/7/89.

ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

PANEL MEETING - 2

Priority: Medium

Safety Significance: Unknown

An allegation panel reconvened on 1/11/88 regarding RI-87-A-0137 at Millstone, where it was alleged that:

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Attendees:

S. Collins	Panel Chairman
L. Bettenhausen	Branch Chief
E. McCabe	Action Office Contact
P. Habighorst	Reactor Engineer, RPS-1B
A. Shropshire	Office Allegation Coordinator

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

NOTE: The allegor was given DOL information. The SRI found that item 1 did occur; item 2 remains unknown and cannot be determined. The AOC's concerns: The implications if item 2 were true and item 3.

- 1) The SRI will continue to investigate the possibility of item 2 occurring and its implication and learn more about item 3.
- 2) The SRI's findings will be documented in the next monthly report.
- 3) A closeout letter will be sent to the allegor (ECD 3/31/88).

Branch Chief concurrence on closeout.

H. Shropshire
A. Shropshire, OAC

E. McCabe
E. McCabe, AOC

S. Collins 2/3/88
S. Collins
Panel Chairman

CC:
J. Allan
J. Gutierrez
C. White, OI:RI
W. Johnston
L. Bettenhausen
E. McCabe
Allegation File

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b7C
FOIA- 91-162

E/21

ALLEGATION DESCRIPTION

Millstone 1
(Site or Licensee)

50-336
(Docket No.)

Allegation RI-87-A-0137 was received on 11/3/87 at 1130 by E.L. Conner.

Characterization of the 3 concern(s):

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Confidentiality: No (OAC has alieger's address & phone)

Employer: Burns International Security

Position: Sergeant

Type of Regulated Activity: Reactor

Functional Area(s): Safeguards

DETAILS: (Timeframe of Allegation: Early September to the present)

The alieger called to complain about being fired for two security events:

- On 9/2/87, while in the turnstile exiting the plant, the alieger realized [redacted] had not turned in [redacted] badge to the guard. [redacted] gave the badge to a contract employee friend who passed it on to the guard.
- On 10/21/87, while in charge of the CAS, the alieger gave a guard permission to leave a gate that had not been confirmed operable by checking the E-field in front of the gate.

The alieger was told by Burns management that these incidents were reportable to the NRC. [redacted] wanted to know if this was true because if it was, [redacted] knew of numerous reportable incidents. [redacted] said that people are leaving with their badges daily and there were lots of things being covered up. The alieger then provided the following two specific allegations:

- 1) During first shift on 10/22/87, the alieger had not checked on the ring of security keys kept inside a locked blue box at Millstone 2, Door 232. The alieger said this was a new check that [redacted] had not been told about. When this was discovered on 2nd shift [redacted] was on a 12 hour shift), [redacted] another shift sergeant, insisted that [redacted] did make the key check on 1st shift. Although [redacted] insisted that [redacted] had not made the check, he entered her name on the rounds sheet. The alieger reported the event to Captain [redacted]. [redacted] observed [redacted] talking with [redacted] and put white-out over the alieger's name on the rounds sheet. The alieger said that [redacted] told the Captain he had misunderstood what she said. The alieger said "he knew damn well [redacted] didn't misunderstand."
- 2) The alieger knows of a person who had the wrong badge and key card for approximately eight hours in July or August at about 7:00 p.m. Burns management was aware of this because [redacted] wrote a report and gave it to NNECO. The alieger does not think it was reported to the NRC. I asked for the names of the badge, worker and date of the incident. The alieger said [redacted] would check [redacted] records and get back to us.

The alieger was informed about contacting DOL and a copy of the DOL procedures has been provided to [redacted]. [redacted] was called on 11/5/87, to see if [redacted] had located any more information- [redacted] said that [redacted] was still looking.

ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

PANEL MEETING # 1

Priority: Medium

Safety Significance: Unknown

An allegation panel met on 11/19/87 regarding RI-87-A-0137 at Millstone, where it was alleged that:

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Attendees:

S. Collins	Panel Chairman
L. Bettenhausen	Branch Chief
E. McCabe	Action Office Contact
J. Joyner	Chief, NMS&SB
R. Keimig	Chief, Safeguards
P. Habighorst	Reactor Engineer, RPS-1B
A. Shropshire	Office Allegation Coordinator

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

- 1) The AOC will recontact the alleger (ECD 11/20/87) to explain what we are planning.
 - 2) A routine inspection will be conducted (ECD 11/30/87) by the SRI to determine if the incident was reported; learn about the keys; and check the rounds sheets.
 - 3) The findings will be documented (ECD 1/15/88) in the next monthly report.
 - 4) The allegation panel will reconvene (ECD 1/7/88) following the inspection.
-

- ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

A. Shropshire, OAC; E. McCabe, AOC; S. Collins, Panel Chairman

cc:

J. Allan
J. Gutierrez
C. White, OI:RI
W. Johnston
L. Bettenhausen
J. Joyner
R. Keimig
E. McCabe
Allegation File

ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

PANEL MEETING 3 -

Priority: Medium

Safety Significance: Unknown

An allegation panel met on 8/18/88 regarding RI-87-A-0137 at Millstone, where a closed allegation has been reopened because the alieger recontacted the resident inspectors. The alieger's concerns included cocaine use by guards and horseplay with weapons by guardforce members (quick drawing on each other). (SEE PAGE 2 of the ALLEGATION RECEIPT FORM.)


Attendees:


W. Kane	Panel Chairman
E. McCabe	Action Office Contact
R. Keimig	Chief, Safeguards Section
S. Barr	Reactor Engineer, RPS-1B
A. Shropshire	Office Allegation Coordinator

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

- 1) The AOC will recontact the alieger (ECD 8/19/88) to obtain more specific information (the call will be documented to the allegation file).
- 2) The licensee will be called by the AOC, followed by a letter, requesting a followup and to be sure the licensee understands the approach the NRC would like taken in pursuing this matter (ECD 8/31/88).
- 3) A closeout letter will be sent to the alieger (ECD 11/15/88).

Branch Chief concurrence required for closeout.


A. Shropshire, DAC


E. McCabe, AOC


W. Kane
Panel Chairman

cc:
J. Allan
J. Gutierrez
C. White, OI:RI
W. Johnston
R. Bellamy
R. Keimig
Allegation File

Information in this record was deleted
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Act, exemptions b7C
FOIA- 91-162

E/22

ALLEGATION DESCRIPTION

Millstone 1
(Site or Licensee)

50-336
(Docket No.)

Allegation RI-87-A-0137 was received on 11/3/87 at 1130 by E.L. Conner.

Characterization of the 3 concern(s):

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Confidentiality: No (OAC has alleger's address & phone)

Employer: Burns International Security

Position: Sergeant

Type of Regulated Activity: Reactor

Functional Area(s): Safeguards

DETAILS: (Timeframe of Allegation: Early September to the present)

The alleger called to complain about being fired for two security events:

- On 9/2/87, while in the turnstile exiting the plant, the alleger realized [redacted] had not turned in [redacted] badge to the guard. [redacted] gave the badge to a contract employee friend who passed it on to the guard.
- On 10/21/87, while in charge of the CAS, the alleger gave a guard permission to leave a gate that had not been confirmed operable by checking the E-field in front of the gate.

The alleger was told by Burns management that these incidents were reportable to the NRC. [redacted] wanted to know if this was true because if it was [redacted] knew of numerous reportable incidents. [redacted] said that people are leaving with their badges daily and there were lots of things being covered up. The alleger then provided the following two specific allegations:

- 1) During first shift on 10/22/87, the alleger had not checked on the ring of security keys kept inside a locked blue box at Millstone 2, Door 232. The alleger said this was a new check that [redacted] had not been told about. When this was discovered on 2nd shift [redacted] was on a 12 hour shift), [redacted] another shift sergeant, insisted that [redacted] did make the key check on 1st shift. Although [redacted] insisted that [redacted] had not made the check, he entered [redacted] name on the rounds sheet. The alleger reported the event to Captain [redacted] [redacted] observed [redacted] talking with [redacted] and put white-out over the alleger's name on the rounds sheet. The alleger said that [redacted] told the Captain he had misunderstood what [redacted] said. The alleger said "he knew damn well [redacted] didn't misunderstand."
- 2) The alleger knows of a person who had the wrong badge and key card for approximately eight hours in July or August at about 2:00 p.m. Burns management was aware of this because [redacted] wrote a report and gave it to NNECO. The alleger does not think it was reported to the NRC. I asked for the names of the badge, worker and date of the incident. The alleger said [redacted] would check [redacted] records and get back to us.

The alleger was informed about contacting DOL and a copy of the DOL procedures has been provided to [redacted]. [redacted] was called on 11/5/87, to see if [redacted] had located any more information. [redacted] said that [redacted] was still looking.

On 8/4/88, the allegor, who previously identified security concerns to the NRC, came to the resident inspectors with concerns in addition to those raised in 1987.

The allegor stated that as [redacted] was exiting the Groton Motor Inn, after watching the Tyson-Spinks fight, [redacted] saw five Millstone workers snorting cocaine. [redacted] said when the group saw [redacted], one of them dropped some of the cocaine on the ground. They stated to one another that they had nothing to worry about since [the allegor] no longer worked at the site. [redacted] recognized them by face and thought they worked for building services, maintenance and I&C. The allegor will call if [redacted] remembers their names.

The allegor stated that the sergeant, who whited out the form that indicated that [redacted] performed a check that [redacted] claimed that [redacted] did not perform, was arrested for cocaine use one month after [redacted] was fired. [redacted] stated this to add credibility to [redacted] side of the story saying that the supervisor did forge [redacted] signature. The NRC concern is that security supervisors are not receiving adequate training in recognizing people entering the PA under the influence of drugs or alcohol even if they are coworkers.

[redacted] said that two guards were reported to have drawn their weapons (handguns) on one another as a result of an argument. This was handled by burns internally. One of the individuals was fired and the other was reprimanded.

The allegor said that guards were accused of practicing their "quick-draw" technique. The allegor stated that the guards practice their quickdraw on back shift when they are bored.

ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

PANEL MEETING # 1

Priority: Medium

Safety Significance: Unknown

An allegation panel met on 11/19/87 regarding RI-87-A-0137 at Millstone, where it was alleged that:

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Attendees:

S. Collins	Panel Chairman
L. Bettenhausen	Branch Chief
E. McCabe	Action Office Contact
J. Joyner	Chief, WMS&SB
R. Keimig	Chief, Safeguards
P. Habighorst	Reactor Engineer, RPS-1B
A. Shropshire	Office Allegation Coordinator

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

- 1) The ADC will recontact the alieger (ECD 11/20/87) to explain what we are planning.
- 2) A routine inspection will be conducted (ECD 11/30/87) by the SRI to determine if the incident was reported; learn about the keys; and check the rounds sheets.
- 3) The findings will be documented (ECD 1/15/88) in the next monthly report.
- 4) The allegation panel will reconvene (ECD 1/7/88) following the inspection.

- ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

A. Shropshire, OAC; E. McCabe, ADC; S. Collins, Panel Chairman

cc:

J. Allan
J. Gutierrez
C. White, DI:RI
W. Johnston
L. Bettenhausen
J. Joyner
R. Keimig
E. McCabe
Allegation File

ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

PANEL MEETING - 2

Priority: Medium

Safety Significance: Unknown

An allegation panel reconvened on 1/11/88 regarding RI-87-A-0137 at Millstone, where it was alleged that:

- 1) Discrimination
- 2) Attempted falsification
- 3) A person had the wrong badge and key card for up to 8 hours.

Attendees:

S. Collins	Panel Chairman
L. Bettenhausen	Branch Chief
E. McCabe	Action Office Contact
P. Habighorst	Reactor Engineer, RPS-1B
A. Shropshire	Office Allegation Coordinator

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS:

NOTE: The allegor was given DOL information. The SRI found that item 1 did occur; item 2 remains unknown and cannot be determined. The AOC's concerns: The implications if item 2 were true and item 3.

- 1) The SRI will continue to investigate the possibility of item 2 occurring and its implication and learn more about item 3.
- 2) The SRI's findings will be documented in the next monthly report.
- 3) A closeout letter will be sent to the allegor (ECD 3/31/88).

Branch Chief concurrence on closeout.

A. Shropshire, OAC

E. McCabe, AOC

S. Collins
Panel Chairman

cc:

J. Allan
J. Gutierrez
C. White, OI:RI
W. Johnston
L. Bettenhausen
E. McCabe
Allegation File

Tinsel-Lodge ←

[REDACTED]

FIDUCIA
ETC [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 AN.

Primary C-Met Form

S MAS - Tins - 1

- How know to cocaine?
- Are some of them?

[REDACTED] oriented? where? after time

[See Supv. met being asked by a Hispanic male
about PA under influence]

2 people drew weapons.
who? when?

Quick draw - who/when

[ok to ident [REDACTED] man to increase for contact?]

Cocaine: Night of Tyson fight. working as a 24/7th, know
cocaine when [REDACTED] see it. [REDACTED], also see:
shots when later on that evening - seems to be a
common thing - all know when they're to be
killed & stay clear for a few days.

[REDACTED] told them, before [REDACTED] was found, that he was on drugs.
believe it was in Waterford (a New London) perhaps
the father lot of [REDACTED] people afraid to
talk to NRC. Took [REDACTED] excuse, which
was a blatant lie.

thing on

gave [redacted] a badge - s.i.p.v - training was done on [redacted] run
because got no help - finally got a sgt to
help [redacted] on that [redacted] should have had
[redacted] didn't get the training the others did.
Incidents - 1 walks away, other gets disciplined - they don't
know who did it.

drug wars on each other - [redacted] was + there - overhead
in a bar - one gay, other wasn't. high-up reps
saying didn't draw, others say they did.
in December 1987.

- [date] time] - they'll trust date &
situation around to cover themselves
& they're getting away with it & [redacted] the
only one saying it, & someday someone
will listen to [redacted]. & they know how
to even things up. asked for more
questions & that's why she got
booted. was

3RD SHIFT] may have been after [redacted] would then
guards ^{at} picnic - go on top
of bldg & practice guard down the board

as incidents when can bend - party all over -
not casual - lady in bulbs down fl + see
of them can be

1/1 unacc know you don - no one else would give
[redacted] told [redacted] about some of the

stuff - saw [redacted] who taken a [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] like the plague.

Biggest plot works for NNECO now [redacted] -
if anyone's good @ cover up, Steve is -
makes the other person look like a heavy
idiot. eg report not written for months
until [redacted] pushed the issue - the S.I.P.U. covered
up another mistake.

when [redacted] did wrong, [redacted] went to S.I.P.U. &
said [redacted] did this - badge
got [redacted] to neglect of duty.

badge go home every night on that site, have
worn bag on back the next night
wanted to fire [redacted] over that - but couldn't

stuck in CAS longer than supposed to be - couldn't
get released - made mistake - got fired.

(next day someone disarmed a don superv caught
it - no report written on it - they denied it

(not useful - [redacted] got the job done.
Even [redacted] was asked to do similar later

asked about incident in '86 - [redacted] was involved
in it - never got a straight answer -
Ltr in [redacted] file - LT grabbed letter out of [redacted]



lin
Jan

hand - ^{was} info that [redacted] needed had been after.
 OAS checkin @ the 'ems - got alarms ^{etc} a crazy. called
 in another guard to assist. [redacted]
 came up - strange too - next day, got suspended -
 the other guard wasn't. [redacted] and asked how
 one other guy wasn't suspended - ans only that

alarm annulled but not destabilized to -
 the to Marco ask to us there - but then
 said he wasn't.

[As son as ya recall better, not then too
 long.]

[redacted] know [redacted] better class better here.
 You wasn't get the use you should

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 went [redacted] ^{club} ^{rec} quiet club. said tell the [redacted]
 used to come into the lounge until he
 was [redacted], [redacted]
 [redacted] not as area anymore.
 [redacted] is just as bad.

REDPEN UNDER OLD ALLEGATION RI-87-A-0137



NEW ALLEGATION OF 8/14/88

- did not get arrested for cocaine # [redacted], in WINTERFIELD/VA.
- did guards pull pants & get reprimanded / fined # gang issue, 12/87
- quick draw by guards #

Remind residents @ talking in public

* TURN OVER TO WENSEE (WITH DISCRETION)

phonecall + letter

Hygiene

Check with [redacted] about particulars + names on cocaine use by side of road.

Document phonecall as acknowledgement

RIGHT OF TOWN FIGHT, NEW ORANGE & ENROUTE

2-58-A-0014

Ask Jim Miller by 5 to request get shot down

assist / full refusal

Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions b7C
FOIA 91-165

E/24/1