

February 21, 1992

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE -- PNO-IV-92-14

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region IV staff on this date.

FACILITY: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. Licensee Emergency Classification:
 Wolf Creek Generating Station Notification of Unusual Event
 Docket: 50-482 Alert
 Site Area Emergency
 General Emergency
 Not Applicable

SUBJECT: FORCED OUTAGE TO EXCEED 72 HOURS

On February 20, 1992, with the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the licensee identified a reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leak. The RCS leakage was found to be through a cable that penetrates a Conoseal installed in the reactor vessel head. The licensee is proceeding to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to repair the RCS pressure boundary leakage. The forced outage is expected to take approximately 5 days.

The licensee identified the RCS leakage during a walkdown of the reactor vessel head area following the reactor trip on February 19, 1992. At 9:08 p.m. (CST), a reactor protection system (RPS) actuation occurred because of a low-low steam generator level. The RPS actuation resulted in a reactor trip from 100 percent power. Engineered safety feature actuations received included a main feedwater isolation, and an auxiliary feedwater system actuation.

The low-low steam generator level resulted from a reduction in feedwater flow. A safety-related inverter failed causing a loss of power to a 120 Vac bus. The bus, in part, powered two steam generator water level control system channels. When the bus was lost, the associated controllers failed low resulting in reduced feedwater flow from a turbine-driven feedwater pump to Steam Generators B and C. Both steam generators experienced low water levels. Operator attempts to manually restore steam generator water levels were not successful. Steam generator water levels were restored to the normal range following the reactor trip using the auxiliary feedwater system. The inverter failure resulted from a faulty synchronizing card which caused two inverter fuses to fail. The card has been replaced and the inverter returned to service.

The licensee plans to issue a press release. The NRC is prepared to respond to media inquiries.

The state of Kansas will be informed.

Region IV received notification of this occurrence by telephone from the resident inspector at 3 p.m. (CST) on February 20, 1992, and updated at 8 a.m. on February 21. Region IV has informed EDO, NRR, and PA.

This information has been confirmed with a licensee representative.

CONTACT: W. B. Jones FTS 728-8137

RIV: DRP
ABBeach;df
2/21/92

RM
RBMartin
2/21/92

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(5520: 2/21/92 @ 10:30
Regions & HQ)

(PHONE VERIF: 2/21/92 @ 10:30
NRR 964-1168 or 964-1166)