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Radford J. Converse
Resident Manager

February 21, 1992
JAFP-92-0158

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-006-00 - Inadequate
Performance by Fire Watch

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to
Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6071.

Very truly yours,

RADFORD J. CONVERSE

RJC:WVC:lar

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 3** PAGE (3) **1 OF 0 3**

TITLE (4) **Inadequate Performance of Fire Watch Duties**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER (8)		
01	22	92	92	006	00	02	21	92		0 5 0 0 0		
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OPERATING MODE (9) N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.422(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409(a)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409a(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.304a(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409a(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.304a(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vi)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409a(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vii)(A)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409a(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vii)(B)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.409a(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **W. VERNE CHILDS, SENIOR LICENSING ENGINEER** TELEPHONE NUMBER **3 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 0 7 1**

AREA CODE **3 1 5**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

EIIS Codes are in []

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On January 22, 1992 a continuous fire watch, required by Technical Specification 3.12.F in an area with fire barrier penetration seal deficiencies and ventilation ductwork damper deficiencies was observed to be less than fully attentive to the assigned fire watch duties. The fire watch was relieved by another fire watch person and disciplined. The fire watch was assigned duties in an area with ventilation system fire damper and/or fire barrier penetration seal deficiencies. The fire areas of concern contain portions of systems required for accident mitigation and for safe shutdown in the event of postulated fires. LER-92-001 describes related events concerning inadequate performance of fire watch duties.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's (17))

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Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. A fire barrier penetration seal base line inspection, which was started in November 1991, was ongoing. A number of fire watches were posted (as required by Technical Specification 3.12.F) in several plant areas as compensatory actions for fire barrier penetration seal and/or fire damper deficiencies. LERs 91-010 and 91-024 provide additional details concerning the nature of deficiencies which result in the posting of fire watches.

On January 22, 1992 at 1120 hours a continuous fire watch posted in a portion of the turbine building [NM] near the miscellaneous oil storage room and the north end of the east and west electric bays was observed to be less than fully attentive to the assigned fire watch duties. The fire watch was relieved by another individual and was disciplined.

Cause

The apparent less than adequate performance of fire watch duties was caused by inattention of the assigned fire watch person. The individual had been trained and understood the fire watch responsibilities.

Analysis

The fire watch was assigned to provide compensatory action for potential fire damper binding in ventilation ductwork which penetrates the north wall of the east and west electric bays, and the miscellaneous oil storage room (see LER-91-010). In addition, the fire watch was assigned compensatory action duties for fire seal deficiencies in fire barriers between the turbine building, the west electric bay tunnel, and the fire protection system [KP] foam room (see LER-91-024).

The miscellaneous oil storage room contains approximately 15 full or partially full 55-gallon drums of various lubricating oils for routine use throughout the plant. The oil storage room doors are normally locked, the doorways are diked, and the room is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system [KP] with a flow alarm in the main control room.

The east and west electric bays contain portions of non-safety-related and Safety Division 1 and 2 safety-related medium voltage (4160 VAC) and low voltage (600 VAC) power distribution systems [EA, EB, EC, and ED]. Both electric bays are provided with automatic fire detection and fire suppression equipment. The west electric bay tunnel contains

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JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	9 2	0 0 6	0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED, USE ADDITIONAL NRC Form 3764 (17)

Safety Division 1 cables to and from the equipment in the west (Division 1) electric bay as well as cables for emergency core cooling equipment provided with power from the Division 1 emergency diesel generators [EK] and numerous control and instrumentation cables.

Since the primary purpose of a fire watch is to provide early fire detection and warning, an ineffective or inadequate performance of fire watch duties in the area could result in postulated fires in any of the areas being more severe due to delayed fire detection and/or delayed fire fighting actions by the fire brigade. Because the areas involved contain equipment associated with both safety divisions, damage as a result of postulated fires could cause more impairment of systems and components required for 1) mitigation of accidents discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and/or NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A, or 2) achieving safe shutdown than was assumed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

As a result, the event is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to the inadequate performance of fire watch duties required by Technical Specification and under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) as a condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of safety functions of systems needed to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Corrective Action

1. The fire watch was relieved by another individual and disciplined. Completed January 22, 1992.
2. Each fire watch and fire watch supervisor will be required to read this LER to reinforce the employee's understanding of plant management expectations concerning fire watch duties. Due date March 20, 1992.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LER-92-001 noted three (3) other instances where fire watchstanding requirements were not met.