NRC FORM 366 (7 - 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXHIBIT A

NRC Form 366 (9-83)

TITLE (4)

OPERATING

MODE (9)

POWERI

LEVELI

Name

EVENT

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) 100CKET NUMBER (2) (PAGE (10151010101316)81110F10 Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Primary Overcurrent Protection Device on Containment Penetration Inoperable - LCO Exceeded (5) | LER NUMBER (6) | REPORT DATE (7) | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sequential Revision Month! Day |Year |Year Number Number |Month| Day |Year Facility Names Docket Number(s) 01 91 01 5 71 81 81 41--1 0 1 11 2 1--1 0 1 0 1 01 61 11 81 81 41 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 73(a)(2)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(i) .71(b) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) (10) 111010 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 73.71(c) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Other (Specify in XI 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) Abstract below and 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)| in Text, NRC Form 20.405(a)(1)(v) 1 50.73(a)(2)(iii) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 366A) LER (12) Telephone Number Area Dan Moeggenberg, Licensing Engineer COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT Code 51011191614131213161 Component Reportable CauselSystemI Manufacturer to NPRDS Cause/System! Component Manufacturer to NPRDS 11 UPPLEMENT REPORT EXPECTE 14 | Month! Day

I Yes (If yes, complete Expected Submission Date) IXI No	SUBMISSION DATE (15)		1
spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewrit	ten lines) (16)	

During a review of documentation to verify the correctness of a proposed technical specification change request regarding containment penetration overcurrent protection devices, an apparent error was noted in a vendor electrical drawing for reactor coolant system sampling cabinet 20116. The drawing indicated that fuse protection, being relied upon as the primary penetration overcurrent protection device, was bypassed by jumpers. Since no other documentation was found that indicated the jumpers had been removed subsequent to receipt and installation of the cabinet, a special investigation was performed on 5/18/84, at 1620 hours to ascertain the existence of the jumpers. The jumpers were found to exist as indicated on the drawings. An engineering evaluation was promptly performed to allow removal of the jumpers, and the necessary wiring changes were completed by 1800 hours on 5/18/84.

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NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC Form 366A (9-83)

Form 1062.018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approved OMB No. 3150-0104. Expires: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2	10151010101 31 61	RI RI Al

On 5/18/84, a special inspection was performed to resolve an apparent drawing error on a vendor print. The print indicated hard wired jumpers around power and control fusing to three DC powered solenoid valves in the reactor coolant (RCS) sampling system. The jumpers were contained in 2C116, RCS sampling cabinet, supplied by Delphi industries. After visually verifying that the jumpers did in fact exist as shown by the print, an engineering evaluation was promptly conducted and rewiring instructions were provided to the maintenance staff. The jumpers therefore, no additional action to reduce the probability of future occurrences is planned.

The fusing is relied upon as the primary device to provide overcurrent protection for containment penetration 2WR26-3. With the fusing in the circuit bypassed by the jumpers, 2D21 DC motor control center breaker 26 was still available to interrupt possible fault current to prevent damage to containment penetration 2WR26-3.

Since there is no record of a plant change to install the jumpers, it is believed that the jumpers were installed either during the fabrication or installation of the c binet. As such, the error is considered a unit first entered Mode 4 and Technical Specification 3.8.2.5 first became applicable. Because the Limiting per 50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).

Another event regarding containment overcurrent protective devices (breakers) was reported in (50-368) LER 83-049/01T-0.

EXHIBIT A



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 June 18, 1984

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

> Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6 Licensee Event Report No. 84-012-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), attached is the subject report concerning an apparent error noted in a vendor electrical drawing for reactor coolant system sampling cabinet 2C116.

Very truly yours,

John R. Marshall Manager, Licensing

JRM: JRS: ac

Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director Office of Management & Program Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

> Mr. Richard C. DeYoung Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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