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**ILLINOIS
POWER**

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Docket No. 50-461

Document Control Desk
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Supplemental Information Related to Clinton Power Station
Response to Generic Letter 89-10 Supplement 3

Dear Sir:

Illinois Power (IP) is submitting this letter to provide additional information regarding Clinton Power Station's response to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3. As discussed in a meeting with NRC Messrs. A. T. Gody, J. F. Smith and T. G. Scarbrough on January 23, 1992, Clinton Power Station's response to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3 (IP letter U-601806 dated March 11, 1991) provided justification for estimated line break isolation forces which exceed the actuator manufacturer's published ratings and also identified measured test results for the subject valves in Table 2 of Attachment 1. The response did not specifically discuss cases here the as-left torque switch settings also exceeded actuator published ratings. Therefore, it was not clear from the response that the published ratings, for some actuators as discussed below, were exceeded whenever the valves stroked closed.

While performing Generic Letter 89-10 program reviews, IP identified that for ten safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs), the as-left torque switch settings resulted in a thrust which exceeded the actuator's thrust rating. Two of the valves identified were addressed in Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3. These valves are 1E51-F063, the inboard containment isolation valve on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam supply line, and 1G33-F001, the inboard containment isolation valve on the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) supply line. Further investigation identified published actuator torque ratings were also exceeded for 1G33-F001.

A condition report (1-91-12-004) was issued in accordance with site procedures to initiate a generic investigation, document the results, and provide immediate and remedial corrective action resolutions to these issues. Evaluations performed for the condition report have determined that to date, all affected MOVs have remained operable at the higher switch settings. Immediate corrective action ensured that the

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
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number of operating cycles at the current switch settings was maintained within limits established by the manufacturer for valve operation with these higher setpoints. The following remedial corrective actions will be taken during the next refueling outage (RF-3):

- a) Resetting the torque switch to appropriate levels on the following MOVs: 1B21F065B, 1C11F083, 1E21F012 and 1E51F063.
- b) Like-for-like actuator replacement for valve 1G33-F001 due to number of cycles remaining for this actuator.

Independent of the condition report, implementation of a modification to install a larger actuator on the RWCU containment isolation valve, 1G33-F001, is currently planned for the next refueling outage pending delivery of needed components. If this modification is implemented in the next refueling outage, item b. above, will not be implemented.

Sincerely yours,



F. A. Spangenberg, II
Manager, Licensing and Safety

WSI/ah

cc: NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager
NRC Resident Office
Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC