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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No. 50-322 OL

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, (Emergency Planning)
Unit 1)

ORAL ARGUMENTS

Location: Bethesda, Maryland Pages: 586 - 714

Date: Friday, June 22, 1984

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PROCEEDINGS:

MR. MILLER: Good morning, gentlemen. You were notified, I think, telephonically and probably by telefax yesterday afternoon, this prehearing conference meeting with counsel and parties, whatever you want to call it, was called by the Board following the receipt of various motions including one for protective order dealing with apparently ongoing discovery matters.

Inasmuch as the period of discovery, I believe, ends in one week, Friday of next week, the Board deemed it its duty as well as an effort to be helpful to the parties to monitor the ongoing proceedings, including discovery, whatever other motions. Therefore, this prehearing conference is set for the purpose of taking up whatever motions there are pertaining to discovery or anything else that might have a bearing upon the schedule or conduct of a hearing.

I assume that, first of all, we'll have counsel identify for the record themselves and the persons who are with them at counsel table, starting with

MR. LANPHER: Lawrence Coe Lanpher, for Suffolk County and with me at the table is Cherif Sedky and Karla J.

Letsche. They noticed their appearances this morning and I believe their envelope's up there for the Board, indicating their appearance.

MR. MILLER: Thank you.

MR. PALOMINO: Thabian Palomino for the State of New York.

MR. ROLFE: Robert M. Rolfe, for the applicant LILCO.

MR. REIS: Edwin J. Reis for the NRC staff and with me is Robert Perlis who has a prior appointment and will have to leave at 10:00.

MR. MILLER: He'll be given leave to depart at 10.

All right. I guess the motion for protective order filed by LILCO on June 21, 1984, and any matters that are pertinent thereto can be our first item for discussion to move on.

LILCO desire to go forward?

MR. ROLFE: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

MR. MILLER: You might give us a background, since these documents, I suppose, were filed rather recently to or by all parties, given the nature of things, so you might give us some background if you would, please.

MR. ROLFE: I will do that. Judge Miller, LILCO has moved for a protective order prohibiting the deposition on George Sedaris, who is a vice president of LILCO dealing with financial matters. Also, we'd moved for a protective order of any other LILCO employees prohibiting the deposition of any other LILCO employee or consultant concerning the questions of financial qualifications to operate the Shoreham plant at low power and the question of whether it

 is prudent to engage in low power testing absent any assurance that a full power license will be granted and thirdly, concerning any possible uncertainty arising from LILCO's financial health on its ability to operate the plant.

In its application for exemption at pages 20 and 21, among the public interest considerations which LILCO posited in support of its application for exemption was an economic consideration and that was that there might be a potential economic benefit from early commercial operations at the plant, which might be facilitated through the early completion of low power testing. All of that is potential, obviously, because no one knows exactly when the licensing proceedings will run their course.

Nevertheless, that was a potential benefit which LILCO cited. I might add right now, so that there won't be any confusion, the figures of 90 million to 135 million which LILCO had in its application for exemption are a bit misleading.

Those are the actual cost per month of the plant and that represents the two to three month costs of the plant. The actual savings from early low power testing would be somewhat less than that, so that figure is not exactly accurate, but that's not germane to the motion LILCO has before the Board today.

MR. MILLER: Let me stop you just a moment there.

You're telling us what was in your application in this regard, that's perfectly proper. You might also include now, however, what if anything the Commission has said in its orders and I suppose that the May 16, 1984, order at page 3, at least does bear somewhat upon the subject that you are now discussing. So, to have the record complete, at one point, I suggest you might describe that as well.

MR. ROLFE: The Commission, in its May 16, 1984, order asks that any application for exemption address exigent circumstances that favor the granting of an exemption under 10 CFR Section 5012A. Among those exigent circumstances, the Commission suggested a number of things that might be taken

MR. MILLER: Keep your voice up so the reporter gets accurately what you're saying, particularly if you choose to quote.

MR. ROLFE: I'm sorry if I haven't. In footnote 3, the Commission said, and I will quote this for the record, a finding of exceptional circumstances is a discretionary administrative finding which governs the availability of an exemption, a reasoned exercise of such discretion should take into account the equities of such situations, of each situation. These equities include the stage of the facility's life, any financial or economic hardships, any internal inconsistencies in the regulations, the applicant's good

faith efforts to comply with the regulations from which an exemption is sought, the public interest in adherence to the Commission's regulation, and the safety significance of the issues involved.

The economic, potential economic benefit which LILCO has posited in its application for exemption fits in, actually in two places here. One, any financial or economic hardships and also the public interest in general. And the public interest might be benefited, as LILCO will show in its proof, to the extent that there are savings which might accrue from bringing Shoreham on line to commercial operation early. These savings, for example, might be in such things a fuel costs.

LILCO will present that evidence at the hearing, through Anthony Nozolillo, who has been identified as a witness and whose deposition is scheduled to be taken on June the 28th.

MR. MILLER: How do you spell that name?

MR. ROLFE: NOZZOLILLO.

MR. MILLER: Thank you.

MR. ROLFE: In any event, the issue which LILCO has raised by its citing of this potential economic benefit is the question of to what extent will there be a benefit from early low power testing. It's not an issue of whether low power testing ought to go forward or whether LILCO is

financially qualified to engage in low power testing. It's simply a question of economics and time.

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As the Board knows in the partial initial decision which was rendered in this case previously, all matters incident to low power testing were favorably resolved to LILCO but for the diesel generator issue.

The purpose of this application for exemption is to allow low power testing prior to resolution of the diesel generator issue. Once that issue is favorably resolved to LILCO, LILCO would have the right to engage in low power testing, without any consideration of whether a full power license might ultimately be granted, without any consideration of financial qualifications.

So by raising the potential economic benefit, all LILCO is raising is the question of whether there might be a benefit from engaging in the low power testing in advance of resolution of the diesel generator issue.

Suffolk County, through its discovery request, which I'll go into in a little bit more detail in a moment

MR. MILLER: Whic discovery request now are you alluding to?

MR. ROLFE: Well, Your Honor, it initially started with the second discovery request which were served on June the 11th, 1984. I think the issues were sharpened

somewhat through the depositions of Messrs. Dirmier and Madden, and I'll describe that for the Board. Generally what Suffolk County appears to want to do, is to turn these hearings into a full scale inquisition into LILCO's financial health and whether the plant should be operated at all.

In the June 11 second discovery request, which was a combination of interrogatories and requests for documents, a multitude of questions and document requests were posed concerning virtually every financial piece of information which L1LCO has. I won't make an attempt to go through all of them, I think if the Board has looked at them, you can see the breadth of these requests.

LILCO objected to the discovery requests on several grounds. One that they included interrogatories and this Board had already ruled that interrogatories were not a suitable means of discovery in this proceedings. But more importantly for today's consideration, LILCO objected that the requests were not relevant to the subject matter of this proceeding and were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Subsequently, the depositions, actually, before the objections were filed but after the discovery requests were filed, the depositions of two Suffolk County consultants, Messrs. Madden and Dirméier, were taken and in those

depositions, although those gentlemen had not reached any opinions yet, they testified that the areas they were looking into were, and I believe I'm quoting, economic matters, 3 financial matters and public interest matters. When pressed as to what exactly that consisted of, my interpretation of what they said was

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MR. MILLER: You don't have the depo before you, I assume.

Your Honor, the transcript was due into MR. ROLFE: my office today and because of the hour at which I had to come up here, I haven't seen it yet.

MR. MILLER: Well, we'll take your best recollection as well as that of all other counsel. We will give you leave now to supply direct quotations from pertinent portions of the transcript. Supplement the record in that record if you will.

MR. ROLFE: Thank you, Your Honor. In any event, my interpretation of what Messrs. Madden and Diemeier said that they were looking into were basically three areas and there were some more particular issues subsumed in these three areas.

But they were, first of all, given LILCO's financial situation and its financial problems that they had read about in the press and through other documents, can LILCO operate the plant safely and does LILCO's financial

condition impact upon its ability to engage in the low power testing.

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SEcondly, they wanted to look at the potential benefits from low power testing versus the potential detriment from ultimately having to decommission the plant in the event that a full power license were not granted. In other words, they wanted to factor in the uncertainty relating to a full power operating license and, as I understand it, render some opinion taking into account the probabilities that a full power operating license might ultimately be granted. They wanted to render some opinion as to whether it was prudent to engage in low power testing early, given this uncertainty.

And, thirdly, they mentioned an area, which I think relates really to the first area of financial qualifications, but that is, what impact on LILCO's ability to engage in low power testing might the thread of bankruptcy or reorganization have.

Further, in the depositions, Messrs. Madden and Dirmeier testified that they had been instrumental in drafting or suggesting the discovery requests which comprised the County's second discovery request to LILCO. When questioned as to what the purpose of of those requests was, they said that the requests were all calculated to get information dealing with those areas of inquiry which I just

described, although in all fairness I must say that in their testimony they tried to keep the areas a bit broader perhaps than I just described and they kept coming back and saying they were germane to financial matters, economic matters and public interest matters. That didn't have a whole lot of meaning to me because those terms were so broad. But I think, and I'm sure the County's attornies will correct me if I'm wrong, it's fair to say that what they intended to get through those discovery requests was information pertinent to the three areas of inquiry I just mentioned.

Your Honor, it's LILCO's position that those areas of inquiry are simply not relevant here. The financial qualifications matter and the question of whether LILCO's financial condition will impact upon its ability to operate the plant is a question which the commission, through its regulations, has removed from consideration in operating license proceedings. In 5057A4, it states that no finding of financial qualifications are necessary for a utility seeking an operating license, that's paraphrasing it.

There was the D.C. Circuit opinion which required reconsideration of that regulation and the Commission issued its financial qualifications statement on policy on June 12, 1984, which is at 49 FEderal Register 24111, which, in effect, continues the policy under 5057A4 with respect to

operating license proceedings.

In short, the question of financial qualification is not a properly pending issue in this proceeding. And what's more, even if it were subject to litigation under the regulations, there is no pending contention in these operating license proceedings concerning LILCO's financial qualifications. And it would be too late to try to raise that type of contention now given that LILCO's financial problems have been discussed in the press an elsewhere, at least since 1983.

Indeed, in Messrs. Dirmeier's and Mr. Madden's affidavits, they stated that the financial problems began in 1983. So any attempt now to introduce that as a new contention would not only run afoul of the Commissions regulations, but it would be untimely. So for that reason, the financial ability of LILCO to engage in low power testing is not an issue and should not be the subject of discovery.

SEcondly, the question of the cost of decommissioning the plant similarly should not be an issue. What you're really looking at, if you try to get into that issue you're trying to take into account the uncertainty that as to whether LILCO will ever receive a full power license. The Commission has already ruled twice in this proceeding that the uncertainties relating to a full power license are

not germane to whether LILCO ought to be able to engage in low power testing. The Commission made that ruling with respect to the emergency planning proceeding and that opinion is at 17 NRC 1032 and then just recently the Commission ruled in similar veins concerning the necessity of an environmental impact statement for low power testing. Again, they stated that the uncertainty attendant to whether you receive a full power license is not germane to whether you ought to be allowed to engage in low power testing.

What's more, the question here is not a question of whether LILCO ought to be able to engage in low power testing. As I stated earlier, and I won't belabor the point, the question is one of timing. When the diesel generator issue is favorably resolved, LILCO will have the right to engage in low power testing. Nobody would dispute that these issues simply wouldn't be germane. All we're asking for here through this application for exemption is the ability to engage in that low power testing early, so the question is simply what might be the potential economic benefits from engaging in that low power testing now versus waiting until when the diesel generator issue is resolved.

And for those reasons, Your Honor, we ask that the protective order LILCO seeks be granted.

MR. MILLER: Very well. Intervenors?

MR. SEDKY: Yes, Your Honor. I will address the

points raised by Mr. Rolfe in his presentation this morning in a minute. One of the problems we have as the Board pointed out, is that the motion for a protective order filed yesterday sometime, I think we received it around 3:00 in the afternoon. We have not had an opportunity to prepare a written response to the motion and anticipate filing something more definitive on it early next week. Having said that, of course, we do have some views on the motion just from looking at it on its face without having really had a chance to talk with our experts

MR. MILLER: Let me interrupt you just a moment for clarity. The Board called this hearing or meeting this morning in contemplation of the very fact that you point out as to time, and Iso in contemplation of the fact that the discovery period ends in one week.

Now, we can waive and exchange documents and so forth and in view of the large number of documents already filed in this case, I don't think we really need many more. We think that experienced counsel such as yourself and your colleagues and other counsel should be able right here and now to look at the guts of this objection, and it's pretty clear what it is and you would know yourself the breadth and scope and nature of the interrogatories and request for documents, whatever it is you filed.

We think that you should be able to do it right

now. You don't need to file anything next week. But this meeting is for the purpose of moving along in an expeditious and prompt fashion, consistent with our other circumstances and a fair hearing of this case.

We've had a schedule established which was consistent with, in fact a little more liberal than that suggested by the Commissioners who are the preeminent authority in our Agency. We therefore want to make clear not only to you but to all counsel, we expect you to do your thinking right here and now, give us your points and we, in all probability, will rule from the bench after we hear you fully and had a chance to confer.

So we wanted to give you the background of the kind of hearing that you're participating in so that you can cover whatever it is you wish as fully as you wish.

MR. SEDKY: Well, I'm sure, Judge Miller, you understand, we have a duty to protect our record and there's a situation here where the other side has had an opportunity to think and research and write up something and we're

MR. MILLER: Well, you had the same opportunity when you filed. Remember, you started this, this is a protective order to discovery requested by you on behalf of your client.

MR. SEDKY: This is an exemption sought by LILCO.

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me?

MR. SEDKY: This is an exemption which was sought by LILCO.

JUDGE MILLER: Sometime ago, consistent with the Commission's order or suggestion, whatever it was, of May 16.

And this is June something, so. We're all aware of the dates, we know the documents filed, now we're just directing you, don't give us excuses, anybody, not just you personally, get right into it because you should know, you filed these things. Proceed.

MR. SEDKY; Very well, Your Honor. I do have to protect their rights here and I do object to having to not have an opportunity to file a written response. I think we have a right to file a written response and unless instructed by the Board specifically not to file a written response, we will file one as soon as we're able to.

JUDGE MILLER: Let me rule. Objection is of record, your objection is overruled. You re directed to the portions of the regulations which give the presiding officer, meaning the Board, the power and the right to change times. And we've changed this time, in view of the circumstances and in view of the fact that the underlying issues of discovery are and should be well known by you and by your client and we don't want to have any pretext. Your record is protected by your statement, but we don't expect to have any less than full compliance. Proceed.

MR. SEDKY: Secondly, Judge Miller, the objection that they filed, the motion for protective order appears to now be changing one of the bases on which the application is sought. They had asserted economic benefits of 90 to 135 million dollars.

Mr. Rolfe now tells us for the first time that that number is wrong. This begins to smell of trial by ambush. I don't know what it is that

JUDGE MILLER: Let's not get into personalities ad hominem or invective, I say it because that's a rather mild approach but we've had experience with all counsel here and all parties here and we just simply want to avoid any personalities and keep everything objective. Proceed, please. Never mind the order, in other words.

MR. SEDKY: Very well, Your Honor, I won't characterize the fact. The fact is that there is now apparently a chang for the basis underlying the application and again we are uncertain at this point just what it is that LILCO is contending is the economic benefit or public interest attendant to the granting of this exemption. And, again, just to protect our record, I would make that point and request that they forthwith amend their application so that we would have an opportunity to address the amended application.

Now, having said that, I will get to the issues before the Board, which is the relevance of financial

information that is being sought in the pending discovery request.

As the Board is well aware, I'm sure relevance is basically a question of whether or not the information sought is probative of an issue that's in dispute in a proceeding. The issue that's in dispute here is whether the granting of an exemption is in the public interest. This is a criterion which is mandated by Section 5012A under which LILCO must operate in this phase of the hearing

To the extent other Boards or the Commission has acted in other phases of this proceeding, to our knowledge, at least to my knowledge, this is the first time 5012A has been before the Commission and this Board.

JUDGE MILLER: In this case, you mean.

MR. SEDKY: In this case.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes.

MR. SEDKY: The discovery requests, of course, speak for themselves. The information that is sought in the request must speak for itself. We do not adopt LILCO's characterization of what those requests seek.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, what do you contend they seek?

MR. SEDKY: They do seek financial information concerning the status of LILCO's operations, projections as to its future, cost estimates associated with low power testing, cost estimates associated with the replacement

diesels and a number of other items. But I think it is fair to say that if the included among the discovery requests are some general requests concerning the overall financial condition of LILCO.

The real issue here is whether, well, let me take the requests that deal with the overall financial condition of the company.

JUDGE MILLER: Yeah, which ones are those, please?

MR. SEDKY: Well, for example, the first one, request number one. Basically is a request designed to elicit information as to the kinds of financial information that's available. Not being privy to their internal operations, we're not able to identify report by report, model by model, financial statement by financial statement, other than those that we know are periodically reported to the SEC or other regulatory body.

But the first one basically is a request that's designed to elicit from LILCO information concerning what kinds of financial reports that you people generating internally, what kinds of financial reports are your management looking at and to ask them to furnish copies of the most recent of those reports, just so that we can have a fix on the universe of the kinds of documents that we believe, if their management is looking at, they must believe that those documents are important enough that we

ought to be looking at them.

Now, so concededly, those kinds of documents, there is a set of documents that call for information concerning LILCO's over all financial condition. And the relevance of that is ultimately it's a question of whether it's in the public interest to have an insolvent or bankrupt company engage in an inherently hazardous activity, even at low power testing.

In testimony to the County and the State of New York proposals have met, we will endeavor to show that due to its financial condition, LILCO will more likely than not, and perhaps to a virtual certainty, be insolvent, bankrupt and/or in a reorganization proceeding by the time it would have been permitted, if permitted by the Commission, to be engaged in low power testing. We simply want to make a comprehensive record on that point.

Let me give the Board the tip of the iceberg.

We have a situation that as of its most recently publicly disclosed information, a company that has spent \$100 million in the first three months of this year. A company that, by its own admission, will have no cash or liquid assets by August 31st, 1984, a company that on September 1st, 1984. owed \$90 million in bond that are maturing on that day. A company that can default, by its own admission, on its payments to nine mile point two. It paid \$11\frac{1}{2}\$ million this

year out of \$114 million payment. It still has to pay \$63 million this year of interest on nine mile point two.

This is a company that is living month to month at the grace of its lenders. Its lenders have already aler ted it to the possibility that the company might be in default in its principal financial obligations and have given, in effect, a rotating 30-day rate period.

Any holders of one third or more of the outstanding debt of nine mile point two can accelerate all of its obligations and as the company's auditors points out, because of cost default provisions in the loan document, an aggregate of almost \$700 million of LILCO that could be called due anytime now, it could happen on June 27th, it could happen on July 27th, it could happen on August 27th, and it'll certainly happen by August 29th.

JUDGE MILLER: What do you base that on, you say it will certainly happen. Do you have some information that you haven't discussed?

MR. SEDKY: No, Your Honor, I told you that on August 31st, if I said the 29th, I meant the 31st.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay.

MR. SEDKY: Now, most important of all, about three weeks ago, Long Island Lighting Company presented a position paper to the Governor of New York. In that position paper they make clear for the first time the following. That it's

not only that they're gonna run out of cash on August 31st, it's not only that they've got a \$90 million payment due on September 1st, but, and this is for the first time known publicly, that the viability of this company, in order to avert bankruptcy, two things have to happen.

One, some governmental agency, or somebody else, have to bail them out of nine mile point two. They have conceded that in the language of their white paper. A condition of their averting bankruptcy is that somebody bail them out of a \$911 million obligation, by my computation. And this is evidence we want to put in.

Now, they don't control that. They're suggesting that the New York Power Authority bail them out, a billion dollar bail out.

In addition to that, they require as a condition of averting bankruptcy that the prudency proceeding that's ongoing in New York, of which their entitlement with respect to Shoreham costs is challenged at a minimum of \$1.8 billion by the Public Service Commission.

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me. Describe for us what you call the prudency, whatever it is.

MR. SEDKY: There is an investigation, Judge Miller, before the New York Public Service Commission concerning whether, because of "serious mismanagement and inefficiency over the whole project" LILCO should be entitled to rate

relief if and when it applies for it, for the full, at that point they were asking for about 3.8 billion based on estimated costs at that time. Now the estimate, of course, if 4.1 billion, but for the full amount.

The PSC staff has taken the position and recommended that \$1.8 billion of LILCO's costs be excluded.

JUDGE MILLER: And that the balance be what?

MR. SEDKY: I'm sorry?

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JUDGE MILLER: If you exclude 1.8 billion, what about the balance?

MR. SEDKY: That they would recommend, that the balance would be put into the rate base. But the point I'm trying to make is that our testimony would show that as a condition for LILCO's economic survival, and this is they're talking about averting bankruptcy, is the billion dollar bail out by the New York Port Authority, and a settlement of the prudency issue which I just discussed before the New York Public Service Commission in which it would not cost LILCO more than 250 million, as opposed to the 1.8 billion that the staff is seeking.

I might add that there are other intervenors

JUDGE MILLER: That's the staff

MR. SEDKY: The staff of the PSC in New York. There are other intervenors, I might add, who are arguing that anything over 1.9 billion in Shoreham expenses, costs,

should be excluded from the New York rate base. So under that formulation, of course, LILCO would have to absorb itself the difference between 4.1 billion and 1.9 billion which I guess is 2.2 billion dollars.

JUDGE MILLER: In this matter that you're describing now, what position has your client taken?

MR. SEDKY: That one of the intervenors

JUDGE MILLER: Your client.

MR. SEDKY; Yes, one of the intervenors in the Shoreham, I!m sorry, in the New York Public Service Commission is Suffolk County and I believe that Suffolk County, or the intervenors of the group.

JUDGE MILLER: I'm interested, you can speak perhaps better, pardon me.

MR. SEDKY: I'm not sure I could, we're not representing JUDGE MILLER: Hold it, we can't both talk and the reporter get it. What I would like, since you're talking about your client and properly so, I would suppose that you would have at least some information as to the position that your client, Suffolk County, has taken in that matter that you told the Board is very important. And I'm inquiring now what's the position.

MR. SEDKY: If I may, Your HOnor, have Mr. Lanpher address that issue, he's more familiar with it that I am. JUDGE MILLER: Yes, yes.

MR. LANPHER: In the prudency case, my understanding is that Suffolk County's position is that, to use a short hand, there's been a great deal of imprudency in that approximately \$2 billion of the costs that have been incurred by LILCO in the construction and in efforts to start up the Shoreham plant, should under all circumstances be deemed to have been imprudently incurred and should never be included in the rate base.

I don't have the exact dollar figure, but it's on the order of the same amount as the Public Service Commission staff or a little bit more, I believe. It's not too far off from the amount which the New York Public Service Commission staff has concluded were imprudently incurred.

JUDGE MILLER: I'm not sure which of you, then, would care to direct this question. We'll hear from Mr. Palomino I'm sure. But what position has been taken in that prudency proceeding issue charterized by the State of New York, can reserve that until Mr. Palomino addresses the Board, if you wish, but if you have information by being intimatel involved, I take it, gentlemen and ladies of counsel are, you can tell us

MR. SEDKY: Your Honor, we're not representing SUffolk County in that prudency proceeding.

JUDGE MILLER: Who does?

MR. SEDKY: The lawfirm of Paul Weis, Rifkind and

Garrison in New York is representing them. Mr. Lanpher obviously is keeping up with it, but we don't certainly have the details.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, it's going to incline us, inside proceedings are being alluded to here and I don't know whether it has any significance or not, but I'm trying to get the facts as we go along. I therefore assume that there is some communication between and among you ladies and gentlemen as the members of one Washington law firm and other law firms, whether they're Washington, New York, or elsewhere, on these matters. And so since we're trying at one point to get as much information as we can, we shouldn't have to stand on protocol I wouldn't think and guess about it. I'd like to know at an appropriate time.

If you want to leave it to Mr. Palomino when he addresses us, that's all right. I like to know what position's been taken in that proceeding by the State of New York.

MR. PALOMINO: I'll address it now. Judge Miller, as far as I know, the Chairman of the Consumer Protection Board of the State of New York is a party to that proceeding. They have made an extensive study as to prudency. They have put in evidence in the proceeding and I don't know the exact dollar amount they're claiming should not go into the rate base due to waste and mismanagement by

LILCO's operators.

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JUDGE MILLER: Well, do you or your client, the Governor of New York, I guess, at least I see Governor Cuomo's name from time to time in these pleadings, do you have any position, do either of you or both of you as to this matter?

MR. PALOMINO: Well, no, the Consumer Protection

Chairman is a member of the executive branch of government.

They have their own counsel.

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me, what does that mean?

MR. PALOMINO: What?

JUDGE MILLER: Member of the executive branch, does that mean that he represents the Governor, do you represent the Governor, what's your status?

MR. PALOMINO: Well, he represents the consumers of the state, but it is an executive agency.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, is it under the control of the Governor?

MR. PALOMINO: I would assume it is under the control of the Governor.

JUDGE MILLER: That's Governor Cuomo whose name we've seen here in these pleadings from time to tome?

MR. PALOMINO: Yeah, his name, yes, same Governor.

JUDGE MILLER: Same Governor, okay. And you, now, what's your status with that Governor, sir? You may have

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explained it before, but I'm not clear.

MR. PALOMINO: I know they're in the proceeding, I know.

JUDGE MILLER: No, I mean you as counsel here. What's your status a, with the Governor of New York and b, with the State of New York? I'm just asking you to clarify it for the record, your role, because I see your name and I'm not totally certain.

MR. PALOMINO: I'm special counsel to the Governor. It's my official position.

JUDGE MILLER: To the Governor.

MR. PALOMINO: And I've been designated by the Governor to intervene in these and to represent him.

JUDGE MILLER: Represent him or the State of New York or both?

MR. PALOMINO: Him and the State of New York in this proceeding.

JUDGE MILLER: Right, okay. Thank you. Proceed.

MR. SEDKY: The final, thank you, Your Honor, Judge Miller. The point of all this, Judge, is that given, and all we've seen is the tip of the iceberg that I described to you and of course our experts will want to explore that in further detail and yes, certainly we have asked for additional information to look and see, for example, whether, you know, things are as horrible as they look on

the surface. Maybe they've got contingency plans, maybe they've got a line of credit. All indications indicate that they don't, and so forth, but we're trying to figure out whether, in fact, this is a company that is predictably insolvent or even bankrupt by August.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, while we're on that subject and since we're looking at equities as the Commission has pointed out in its decision of May 16, 1984, CLI-84-8, beginning as a foot note and then page 2, the counsel has alluded to, which would be foot note number 3, within that portion which you have read, I believe, into the record, or someone has, the reasoned exercise of such discretion to take into account the equities of each situtaion.

And these equities, including, among other things any financial or economic hardships, which I take it you're describing with the discussions of insolvency or bankruptcy and the like. So I'd like to ask, therefore, what if anything, have the activities through the years have your client Suffolk County done either to contribute to such bankruptcy or to seek to ameliorate it?

MR. SEDKY: Well, I don't know. I don't think we had anything to do with the buying of the diesels.

JUDGE MILLER: No, I'm talking about the same picture you're looking at, financial. What has the County done to try to help this utility, if anything?

MR. SEDKY: Well, I think actually the County has made a proposal under which it might be considered applying the plant that's been rejected by the utility.

JUDGE MILLER: The County wants to buy the plant or MR. SEDKY; I think it's made a proposal, they did a study, I guess, so it's probably

JUDGE MILLER: Looking towards the possible purchase of the plant by the County of Suffolk?

MR. SEDKY: Well, I don't want to overstate it because this little

JUDGE MILLER: You're not stating it at all, I'm getting very little information, but I wish, you can confer with your colleagues if you want, I'd like to know what the status of it is. This is Suffolk County, it comes in, give us the whole story.

MR. LANPHER: With respect to Mr. Sedky's previous statement that Suffolk County did a study considering whether to exercise powers of eminent domain to in effect take over the Shoreham plant. That study, to my knowledge, was commissioned by the Suffolk County legislator. It's referred to as the Daverman study

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me, as what?

MR. LANPHER: The Daverman, I believe the spelling is D A V E R M A N. And that it has not been acted on subsequently. So it was a study, it was not a proposal,

just to correct that. JUDGE MILLER: Has that study been made public in any 3 Or is it available? 4 MR. LANPHER: I believe that it's a public document, 5 yes. 6 JUDGE MILLER: And was the study considering at all 7 the possibility and I realize it was simply a study, of 8 future operation of this Shoreham plant by the County of Suffolk or its designee? MR. LANPHER: I can't answer that. 10 11 JUDGE MILLER: Anybody who can answer that? Is there 12 anyone who can answer that? 13 MR. LANPHER: There's no one here. I've looked at that study a long time back, I just don't recall. 15 JUDGE MILLER: Well, was the study to demolish the 16 plant or to operate it? Can we put it in that broad a 17 term? You don't even know that? 18 MR. LANPHER: The study was for the County to exercise 19 the powers of eminent domain to take over the plant. My 20 best recollection is that the plant would not be operated 21 under that condition. 22 JUDGE MILLER: Would not be operated?

JUDGE MILLER: Not be.

MR. LANPHER: Would not be.

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MR. LANPHER: My memory is fuzzy on that, though I can

go and check and I certainly will, to make sure I haven't misstated something here on the record.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, fair enough.

MR. LANPHER: In terms of that proposed, that study, that's all the information I presently had.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, that's fine. You can supply information if and when you obtain it. Now I want to go back to counsel who's entitled to continue his discussion, but I had, you recall, asked about equities and what if anything the County had done to help the economic situation, or the contrary, whatever they've done. You were starting to tell me, I guess, is how this study came up.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, we can, I'm sure LILCO and the County have diametrically opposite views as to whether the County has been helpful or not in trying to resolve this situation. I can say from my personal involvement with Suffolk County we've done alot of economic analyses which led my client, Suffolk County, to believe that the citizens of Suffolk County would be better off economically if the plant were abandoned, never operated.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes, but that's looking at something a little different. I wish you'd address now still the point out what, if anything, Suffolk County has done to assist or ameliorate this financial distress that's being described.

MR. LANPHER: Well that's what I was attempting to do, Judge Miller.

JUDGE MILLER; Well, get right to it.

MR. LANPHER: I gotta say it the way I know it.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I know, but you don't have to give me derogatory remarks about the good people of Long Island. I've heard that a long time and I'd just like to get you directed to the point here. You are asked are there specific things

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, we proposed to LILCO that they abandon the plant, that we would sit with them and negotiate an economic solution with them. We do not favor the bankruptcy of any company on Long Island, including LILCO. We commissioned economic studies for ESRG, Energy Systems Research Group of Boston, Georgetown Consulting Group, and others. We thought and continue to believe that these were sound economic studies that offerred a solution out of the potential insolvency and bankruptcy situation which was looming. The discussions with the LILCO have not been fruitful.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. You may continue with that line of discussion until you feel you've exhausted it, if you will, please.

MR. SEDKY: I'd like, if I may, Your Honor, to refocus on the public interest issue, which is at stake, which is one

of the criteria of Section 5012A.

JUDGE MILLER: That's why we're seeing what is the public interest in the bankruptcy you've described of record. And so we're seeing what's the public interest in not as a County trying to do something to help rather than the contrary.

MR. SEDKY: The point is that given a company that is headed in that direction, it is the County's position that the issue of whether a utility in that condition should, consistent with the public interest, be engaged in this kind of hazardous activity. Such a utility cannot be trusted to engage in a hazardous activity. There can be no assurance that it can even cope with the hazard.

JUDGE MILLER: You're off the point now, you're getting into the results of the alleged insolvency that you've described very poignantly and I'm asking you what brought it about, did the County help to bring it about and regardless of that, what, if anything, is the County doing to try to alleviate it and not to use it as a

MR. SEDKY: I really have nothing to add to what Mr. Lanpher said.

JUDGE MILLER: All riht.

MR. SEDKY: And so what we're saying is that a utility in that condition or in the condition that LILCO's projected to be at he time it receives that low power license, if it

receives one, is such that it can't be trusted to engage in a hazardous activity, that it can't be reasonably assumed to be able to cope with it and several of our requests for discovery address that very issue. How are you going to pay for the testing, what costs are you going to incur in the testing. Just so that the record is clear specifically I'm talking about items 2AI, I'm talking about 6C and D, I'm talking about 9, I'm talking about 11, I'm talking about 12 and I'm talking about 23. I'll be happy to go through each one of those and show that that goes to whether or not a company that is in precarious financial condition can cope with hazards associated with a nuclear facility.

There would be no reasonable assurance that such a company can operate and maintain a plant, that there'd be adequate testing, that health and safety standards would be met. In fact, there's an enhanced risk of merely handling hazardous nuclear materials, where you don't have the financial capabilities of assuring safety.

Finally, of course, such a company has no means with which to deal with any contingencies and accidents, a fire, storm, earthquake, something that, you know, some act of God that's just not in that program could have tremendous public impact that would not have, of a nature that wouldn't occur with a solvent company.

JUDGE MILLER: I suppose that's true now of any such act of nature or act of God and it could happen in Long Island with its problems as you pointed out of nonevacuation and the like. How would the County handle this? What would the County do?

MR. SEDKY: Precisely. The County, fortunately, is not insolvent, so that's the whole point. I mean, you've highlighted exactly the public interest we're talking about.

JUDGE MILLER: So you can buy emergency planning and evacuation with money, is that what you're telling me?

MR. SEDKY: The point, Your Honor, is that if you've got resources, you can react to the kinds of contingency you've identified as being very much in the public interest and here you've got a company that is not going to be able to react to those kinds of contingencies.

JUDGE MILLER: So the County has it and the company doesn't and the County's telling us how bankrupt the company is, is that the position?

MR. SEDKY; The County is not seeking an exemption to handle hazardous nuclear materials.

JUDGE MILLER: What is the County seeking overall?

MR. SEDKY; The County wants to protect its citizens.

JUDGE MILLER: I know that, what else?

MR. SEDKY: That's all it seeks.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, that's very general, broad statement. I suppose

MR. SEDKY: In so doing, obviously, it is protecting its position in these proceedings.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, yes.

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MR. SEDKY: And it believes that the granting of an exemption which requires a consideration and a finding that the exemption serves the public interest for the very reason, Judge Miller, that you pointed out two minutes ago, would not be in the public interest to give this exemption, because this company wouldn't have the resources to react to the contingencies that you yourself identified.

JUDGE MILLER: Would it not then be sound public policy for the County to help to try to contribute towards those resources or obtain them in some way in order to protect both the utility and that aspect of the public interest? Has that ever occurred to the County?

MR. SEDKY: Judge Miller, Mr. Lanpher has already addressed that issue and I have no further.

JUDGE MILLER: Very well.

MR. SEDKY: Anything to address to that. I have a couple of more points.

JUDGE MILLER: Go right ahead.

MR. SEDKY: For purposes of analysis, I think what this Board ought to focus on is, supposing LILCO were

bankrupt today, and they had filed a petition this morning, or its creditors had done it on its behalf, would there really be any question in anybody's mind that in that condition, this utility ought to be engaging in a hazardous activity like loading fuel and testing a nuclear plant. I think the answer simply has to be no.

Mr. Rolfe's argument about how, you know, the only issue here are the diesels and after we get the diesels, why everything's going to be all right. This is very similar to a situation where you have a kid who's going to apply for his first driver's license. And he goes in for a car, diesel driven, coincidentally. The examiner says, listen this car doesn't work, diesels don't work or at least they're defective. The kid says well, listen, tell you what, give me a learner's license and by the time my learner's license has expired, the diesels will have been fixed and in the meantime, I've got this battery rigged, that's gotta drive the car just as well.

Now that issue, of whether the batteries are gonna work just as well as the diesel engine is an issue here and other witnesses are gonna address that.

Now, what Mr. Rolfe says is that the only economic issue this 3oard should consider is this kid who says you know, if you give me the learner's license now,

rather than wait until the diesel's repaired, I will get a job, I'll pay taxes, I'll save society as a whole money and so forth and so forth. And Mr. Rolfe says well, that's the only issue here. That's the only public interest issue because that's the only one I've identified.

Well, we're focusing not on the diesels, we're not focusing on the car. We're talking about a kid who can't see, and it's not in the public interest to give a kid who can't see a learner's license at all. That's the point that we're focusing on.

And it's not a matter of saying gee, let's wait until the diesels are fixed or not fixed, you've got a company that cannot be trusted with a nuclear power plant.

That's all I have.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Anything further? Is Suffolk County's representatives through? I say, are Suffolk County's attornies finished? Okay. State of New York, Mr. Palomino?

MR. PALOMINO: I'll be very brief, Your Honor.

JUDGE MILLER: Take your time, you don't have to be brief.

MR. PALOMINO. I'd like to point out that insofar as the concern about equitable conduct on the part of the State and County, the New York State Constitution prohibits the State or any of its municipalities, including the County

of Suffolk, from giving or lending any of its property, credit or money, to any private individual or organization for profit purposes. So that if equities were being sought in that direction, it would be a violation of the law.

SEcondly, I think the question here is really one of relevance, and I think that that's answered simply in that since they are not going for their ordinary license where the oridinary regulations would apply, and they're here on a waiver, special waiver conditions apply and that the inquiry into finances is relevant to the public interest.

JUDGE MILLER: Do you have anything further?

MR. PALOMINO: No.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Staff?

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I think the first thing to keep in mind and to focus discussion again, we have to keep in mind the financial qualifications of the conditions.

You don't ordinarily go into qualifications. You have to keep in mind the

JUDGE MILLER: What is the present status, really you might just state that for the record.

MR. REIS: The Commission has stated in a policy state ment that Board of Appeal decision does not invalidate the rules, does not vacate the rule, the rule is still in effect and the Board, the Commission has a proceeding going

to reconsider the ruling and whether it will be

JUDGE MILLER: Just a minute, is that based upon, in part at least, the Federal REgister notice of Tuesday, June 12, 1984, which is Volume 29 Federal Register commencing, if not completely on page 24111?

MR. REIS: I believe that you've given the correct citation. The next point I would point out in the background of this motion is the Commission's statement in both 83, CLR 83 17 and recently in 84-9, that we don't look to whether a full power license will be granted, but we presume that it will be.

Well, we are looking at two things that are involved. Reg one, do the matters sought to be inquired into, whether it is relevancy, apply to A, exigent circumstances, or B, into the public interest matters that we have here.

And I think it is only, if it is relevant to one of those two issues that it can be.

In looking at the public interest one first, we must look and consider what I have said what the Commission's prior orders on the fact that it will be assumed the plant operates. And therefore I think it has been essentially ruled out that you consider the overall financial condition of the company because it is presumed that you will get to that stage.

I don't think and therefore I don't think it

factors into the public interest and is a matter that this Commission said should be looked into. And when you look at exigent circumstances, I won't say talked about in their order and that footnote, it is the financial hardship that would be suffered by LILCO.

JUDGE MILLER: If what?

MR. REIS: If they don't get a low power license, in this circumstance. And that's what that footnote speaks to. Now, certainly to the extent that LILCO relies on added costs or exigent circumstances, discovery can take place in that sense.

JUDGE MILLER: Please be specific now. What are you referring to?

MR. REIS: Essentially to what LILCO directs as its basis on pages 20 and 21 of its application for an exemption.

JUDGE MILLER: And summarize that part, if you would please, I bet we have it here somewhere.

MR. REIS: That there would be economic benefit if the low power testing program is completed several months before it would otherwise be completed.

JUDGE MILLER: What page is that?

MP. REIS: That is on page 20 and 21 of the application for exemption. Now, certainly that could be gone into.

Only go to what is asked in the discovery requests and we

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see the amounts of financial data asked for, it's certainly way broader and way beyond what is asked for there.

It generally deals with not a looking at both the cost and savings from an early operation or an early conduct of low power testing, but looks at the general health and financial viability of the company.

These are matters that the counsel for the County have been stated are being looked to in the Public Service Commission proceeding and they are matters of the Commission in adopting its financial qualification rule said, they really rely on Public Service Commission ruling to look at it.

I agree that we are looking at a different regulation and we will have to find if they qualify and an exemption should be drafted under 5012. And 5012 does talk about the public interest.

But the public interest in 5012 is not, especially in view of the Gommission's former opinion in 83-17 and JUDGE MILLER: What's the name of that case?

MR. REIS: That's Long Island Lighting Company, that's one of the CLI 83-17, I don't have the citation, but it was decided by the Commission last June. June of '83.

JUDGE MILLER: What does it hold? What did it hold? Commission decision?

MR. REIS: I don't have the decision in front of me.

But generally it said that in looking at whether to grant a low power license, you don't look to the likelihood of a full power licensing.

JUDGE MILLER: I recall that decision. Go ahead.

MR. REIS: And it was repeated again just in 84-9,
which the Commission issued within the last month or two.
Thus, we feel that a looking into the general financial
well being of LILCO in this very special proceeding, is
uncalled for and without scheme of the Commission's regula-

JUDGE MILLER: That concludes your argument?
MR. REIS: Yes.

JUDGE MILLER: Any rebuttal?

tions.

MR. ROLFE: Judge Miller, just a couple of quick things to clarify the record. First of all, with respect to the timing of LILCO's motion and whatnot, I would simply like to point out for the record that LILCO received the second discovery request on June 12. It served its objections on June 19. Those objections fully set forth the basis that ultimately was incorporated into its protective order so that the County was on notice at least upon receipt of those objections, of all of the points LILCO would argue.

On June the 20th, LILCO's counsel, I received a letter in the afternoon, telecopied from Mr. Sedky,

requesting the deposition of Mr. Sadiris. It was that letter which prompted LILCO's motion for a protective order, which was filed the next day, on June the 21st. So, with respect to the timing, I don't think that any party has been at a disadvantage. Especially since the County was the one that drafted the discovery request in the first place and presumably had an idea of how they would justify them if challenged.

Secondly, Your Konor, I'd like to point out that with respect to the equities and what Suffolk County has done to help this plant or not, I don't intend to ge into that issue. I would point out what Mr. Coe Hallan said on the day after the Commission's May 16 order was issued.

According to Newsday, Mr. Coe Hallan was quoted as saying this is a victory in our effort to keep that plant closed.

So I don't think we're dealing with a situation where Suffolk County is attempting to resolve problems with the plant, but instead to keep the plant closed.

And, finally, I would like to summarize my previous arguments by simply saying that what we have here is an attempt to broaden the issues which LILCO's application for exemption raises. The question here is not, again, whether LILCO ought to engage in low power testing or whether it's able to do that. The question is simply what publi benefit, or what economic benefit might be

occasioned by the granting of this exemption.

And in looking at that, the whole question is one of timing. Should LILCO be able to engage in low power testing early? Because once the diesel generator issue is resolved, LILCO would be able to engage in low power testing without looking at any of these issues, and by trying to bring these issues in under the guise of simply a question of whether low power testing should be performed early, the County is attempting substantially to expand the scope of these proceedings beyond anything contemplated in 5012A, beyond anything contemplated in the Commission's May 16 order and beyond anything suggested in LILCO's application for exemption.

JUDGE MILLER: Anything further? Suffolk County?

MR. LANPHER: THAnk you, Judge Miller. I have just one or two clarifications and Mr. Sedky has one or two.

First of all, Mr. Reis was talking about the two previous NRC decisions. I think one was 8317, the other was 84-9.

We just want to emphasize that 8317 had to do with the application in the Shoreham low power proceeding of Section 50.47D of the NRC regulations, which had to do with whether off site emergency planning findings need to be made prior to a low power license.

And 84-9, the one that came out in I guess either early this month or late last month, has to do with the

National Environmental Policy Act and whether there was a duty in this case for a supplement to be prepared. Neither of those cases address at all the question of what constitutes the public interest under Section 5012A, so we just don't think that they're dispositive at all.

Second, I really want to go back to a question that you raised, Judge Miller and Mr. Rolfe addressed.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes, go right ahead.

MR. LANPHER: And that has to do with what has the County done to help. I want it to be clear, the County has studied this situation. It believes, ad nauseum, and it believes that the plant should not open. Let there be no mistake about that. The County is opposed to the opening of this plant. And we can quote from newspapers and all that. We don't need to.

Since February, 1983, the county's position has been that the plant should not open and we've been attempting to pursue our legal remedies in that.

The situation has deteriorated. It seems to me there have been some law suits filed. In fact, yesterday, I was informed, we haven't been serve to, but Suffolk County was sued by LILCO yesterd value amount of \$4.2 billion.

So what has the County done to help? We think we've done alot. We've attempted to negotiate and to meet

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LILCO and in the exercise of presumably their own good judgment, has decided to pursue other courses. We're ready to meet to resolve the very serious economic issues involved in this case, but a mutually agreeable format for that has not been reached.

MR. SEDKY: Thank you, Judge Miller, I only have some just very brief points to make. The question of the financial qualifications criteria is not before this Board at this time, and we're not addressing it. We're not presuming to be addressing that issue here. I think everybody understands and if they don't, let me make clear that we're talking about financial conditions within the context of a finding of a public interest, not within the finding of some regulatory requirement as a precondition to particular kinds of activities.

Not that we concede the Commission's position that the rules in effect have been voided by the Court of Appeals, but we're not addressing that right now.

Secondly, both the Staff and counsel for LILCO continue to suggest that the only public issue question here is the one that LILCO has formulated, which they're in the process of reformulating, I might add, this 90 to \$135 million savings. WE suggest that the standard of public interest is a regulatory standard, not a LILCO fabricated standard and LILCO can't tell anybody how to limit the inquiry as to the public interest.

The discovery rules make clear that discovery, we're talking discovery here, I mean, alot of the points that have been raised so far might go to the weight of the evidence, might go to efficiency, might go to persuasiveness in the end, and so forth. But right now we're trying to do is get information so that we can file testimony that we believe is relevant to this proceeding.

But, the discovery standard, both as interpreted I am sure by the Commission, and certainly by the Court, is that discovery goes to claims, their claim of \$135 million savings, and defense. Our defense is that it is not in the public interest to have an insolvent company test a plant, whether now or tomorrow or six months from now. If a year from now or six months from now or 30 days from now the financial condition is different, maybe that takes away particular issue out of contention.

But right now, our position is that you can't, I mean for purposes of analysis to reiterate, if this company were bankrupt today, would it be in the public interest to grant it a low power testing license and analytically we don't see any distinction between that question and the testimony we want to put in.

That's all I have.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Mr. Palomino?

MR. PALOMINO: Judge Miller, members of the Board, I'd like to say in response to this proposition it raises that a full power license is presumed. Well, that's not a conclusive presumption and I think this is just the type of proceeding in which evidence should be permitted to rebut it in the public interest. And I think the facts here are ripe for such a rebuttal, whether we succeed or not is another question. But I do think it's very relevant to a public interest and that doesn't preclude it.

The fact that nobody looked at it this way before, I don't think precludes us, or should preclude us from looking at it this way, because I don't know if this situation ever arose before.

Now, I'd like to advert to another subject now, and that is as far as the state of New York. The position of the Governor of the State of New York has been and is, he doesn't want to see any private venture in the state go bankrupt. He told that to LILCO. He's appointed a special committee with people from the First Boston Corporation, Plix Rowaton, people who are experts on bankruptcy and reorganization. I don't know their names because I usually don't participate in their proceedings.

To try and help work out and see what legislation they could get, whatever other assistance they could provide governmentally to have LILCO avoid bankruptcy.

I must be candid with you. The Governor feels that since the County is not participating in this plan and the state can't fill in with its own resources, that it doesn't feel it would be safe to open a plant. And that's why we're here opposing it, but as far as that we're avoiding a LILCO bankruptcy, he is standing ready now to negotiate with them if they want to negotiate.

It was Dr. Catacasino's I think white paper which is insistent on opening a plant and running the risk of bankruptcy. And the Governor said, well, that's a course you've chosen, if you have chosen you will have to run the risk. Because, given those circumstances and our other position, we can't help you.

So that it's not a question of unwillingness or lack of good faith. It's the State has always taken this position. And it's not that we're opposed to nuclear power plants. We want to complete Nine Mile Two.

When it came to Rockland County last year, it was one county out of four we could provide the resources to supplement it when Rockland County didn't participate. And the State did so that it went through. And I wouldn't want, you know, I just want to have the record clear as to the State's position.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. We appreciate your filling in the record, Mr. Palomino. Is there anything further

now on this subject? WE may move on to see if there's any other problems concluding discovery before we bring this discussion or hearing of arguments of counsel to conclusion, at which point we'll take a short recess, I want to be sure everyone has had an opportunity to be fully heard.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that Mr. Lanpher's factual characterizations of the two cases I cited were absolutely correct. And as he said, they are not dispositive but we think the reasoning should be followed

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, I don't wish to belabor the point. I don't fully agree with the characterization of the aid that's been offered to LILCO by Suffolk County or the State of New York, but I don't think it would benefit the record here to engage in an extended discussion of that so I have no further remarks.

JUDGE MILLER: Very well.

MR. SEDKY: Judge Miller, just as a point of procedure, I'm awfully sorry to raise this, but I have a meeting at 11:00 down in downtown, and it may be that I will not rejoin you after the recess. I'm gonna call my office and see, but I hope you would excuse me if I wasn't able to.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, of course we will, we don't want you to be prejudiced in any way.

MR. SEDKY; Certainly, whatever prejudice will be on our necks.

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JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Certainly, you will be excused whenever you wish. Let me move on now to see if there are any other subjects the Board has in mind its responsibilities under the statement of policy of the Commission and just plain good sense to monitor the progress of all cases, concerning a case such as this which is hotly contested, subject to a certain amount of interest.

Our obligation, as we see it, would be both to monitor reasonably closely discovery and any other aspects of the schedule which has been adopted by this Board pursuant to the recommendations of the Commission. We therefore inquire are there other matters, whether or not they are the subject of formal motions or position. I mean, for get the formalities, is there any other problems that you have that could impede the inclusion of discovery according to the schedule established, Friday of next week.

If so, we're giving all of you, all counsel, all parties, the opportunity to tell us if there's anything either that's pending or likely to be pending in the near future that could impact one way or the other upon the established schedule. I'll go in the same order as we did on the previous motion.

MR. ROLFE: Judge Miller, the only potential problem that LILCO sees, and I don't know now whether it will be a problem or not, but I will bring it to the Board's attention.

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LILCO has thus far taken the deposition of seven of the County's consultants. Several more are scheduled to be taken next week. Among the seven having been deposed were Messrs. Deeley and Bochi, who were supposedly investigating diesel generator matters with respect to the EMD diesels. Messrs. Weatherwax and L. Garcia, Messrs. Madden and Dirmier who are the economic consultants, and Dr. Mayer, who is a seismic consultant.

In those depositions which began two weeks ago, each of the deponents advised LILCO that he had yet to reach any opinions or conclusions. One or two of the deponents expressed some general preliminary thoughts. Most of the others just had no conclusions at all. They told us what they were planning to look at and that's all the information we got.

I assume that he County intends to supplement the discovery responses and their deposition testimony when those gentlemen reach their opinions and conclusions. But I haven't received any indication that that would be the case yet. I just don't know one way or the other.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, let us inquire right now, not only of counsel for the County and New York, but of all counsel. Do you plan to and will you supplement whatever extent is reasonably necessary all discovery. Whether it be depositions, we don't have interrogatories, request for

admissions I don't suppose we have, certainly have production of documents. Is it the intention of all counsel to supplement, especially in view of the limited discovery period that we have, all discovery provided in whatever form heretofore. Let me ask you, do you intend to?

MR. ROLFE: Your HOnor, to the extent that it needs supplementation, LILCO will supplement. We've produced virtually all the documents we have. There are a few more that have to be produced that will be produced at depositions.

JUDGE MILLER: Now you say necessary, we would like to have that not just your client looking at it solely in terms of its own self interest, but we'd like to have some reasonably broad scope so that nobody's gonna get cut out of discovery by deponent's interpretation. So let's be real clear and precise.

MR. ROLFE: All right, what I mean by necessary is that anything that would shed new light on the matters previously answered by way of documents or deposition testimony, obviously subject to the privilege requirements. And certainly anything that's inconsistent with answers that have been given before, whatnot.

None of LILCO's witnesses have yet to be deposed. They will be deposed in

JUDGE MILLER: Well, let's assume they will be, lets

not have any exceptions to exceptions. Lay it right out on the table. What are you prepared to stipulate?

MR. ROLFE: I'm prepared to supplement our responses to the extent that any new opinions or new bases for opinions or which, they will be made available to the County as soon as LILCO can do so. Any documents which are generated which either shed new light on things that have been previously been discovered, or are inconsistent with things that have previously been discovered, subject, of course, to drafts of testimony and that kind of thing which would be protected under the Work Product Privilege.

JUDGE MILLER: Don't be too sure about that. There are exceptions to that and you're getting awfully close to trial and so at trial all of those things are producible anyway. So don't place too much reliance on that or waste much time on it.

MR. ROLFE: Well, I'm not.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay.

MR. ROLFE: My point is that subject to the privilege rules, LILCO would supplement.

JUDGE MILLER: Let me inquire just one step further. Our own regulations do make provisions on interrogatories and upon the duty to supplement if directed by the Board, though not of the latter portion of it which goes beyond your duty, if there's anything that changes will be filed.

If directed by the Board, and we normally do enter and have in this case, since we don't have interrogatories, are you prepared to undertake the same degree of supplementation that our regulations provide in the case of interrogatories, if so directed by the Board?

MR. ROLFE: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Let's see, who's next here? I guess the County and the State can indicate to us their position.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, I'd first like to disagree with the characterization regarding the deposition. I don't think it takes any extended argument, I just want it to be clear that I think Mr. Rolfe is incorrect. What the people had was no final opinions. And in each instance, in my recollection though I was not at the deposition of Messrs. Madden and Dirmieir, I was at the other depositions. I guess it's five other depositions, and these people laid out in some detail the areas of their inquiry, their preliminary concerns, what they intended to do to do it.

So in terms of advising LILCO of where we are going with our case, or where these experts are attempting to go, I think there was full disclosure and so

JUDGE MILLER: We're not trying, we're not characterizing, or accepting characterization, we just like to have agreements among counsels so that among yourselves you can fairly provide each other with whatever additional material or supplementation one would expect or hope for.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, we will supplement as required by the regulation. I will not commit to, for instance when we meet with some consultants next week, if we do, I'm trying to remember what the schedule is, or the following week, and we work out, they say well we now think this. I'm not going to commit, Judge Miller, given the time schedule that we're on, that we will, and let's say it's a new concern that they've developed because they've gone through some of the discovery materials that have been produced, or finally have been able to complete a calculation. I cannot commit to immediately writing a letter to Mr. Rolfe or to the entire service list and say we've gone back over the deposition and we now have that. There is not sufficient time in the schedule that you have directed us to supply testimony on.

JUDGE MILLER: Well the first time some of your experts or your witnesses indicate that there is additional matters why couldn't you, in a letter or even a telephone call, say there's this additional matter and

MR. LANPHER: Because, Judge Miller, frankly I can't remember whether things are additional.

JUDGE MILLER: No, you said your witnesses might tell you.

MR. LANPHER: Well, okay.

JUDGE MILLER: I'm assuming that you know, not that you have to make research on.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, I'm not, if you order me to do something, I'm gonna have to obviously decide whether I can take an appeal or whether I just, otherwise I certainly am going to have to obey you. But I'm not going to commit to go beyond the requirements of the regulations in this instance in terms of supplementing our answers to discovery requests, because there's just simply not sufficient time to do that and to perform all the other work that has to be done by, I guess it's July 16 or 15th, whatever the date for submission of testimony. So

JUDGE MILLER: I'm not sure I understand you. We consider that our regulations with reference to interrogatories, which is a type of discovery, if we so direct, and we do normally do it in the beginning, shall be supplemented to the extent reasonably necessary to be additional information or whatever. That's the rule that we're asking counsel to stipulate to. If you don't you realize what we're gonna have to do. We're gonna have to give some additional opportunity for deposition. And that's going to be more time in a tight framework.

We want to protect everybody and we're asking your cooperation.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, I do want to come back to the interrogatory question because there is a question of whether interrogatories are permissible or not.

JUDGE MILLER: No, the original rule we entered, we considered to be ongoing. The discovery shall not include interrogatories. Shall or may include depositions, request for protection of documents. The same rule that we had before this case was resumed.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, the Commission's May 16 order directed that this proceeding be conducted in accordance with the Commission's rules and we interpreted that to, since they vacated the previous order of this Board of April 5th, I believe

JUDGE MILLER: To the extent that, quote the order if you're gonna do it.

MR. LANPHER: As to the schedule and given their further directions, we had proposed, propounded interrogatories, which LILCO's refused to answer and

JUDGE MILLER: Well, that's something you'd better bring up now then, if that's

MR. LANPHER: We have propounded interrogatories because we believe under the Commission's regulations and under the direction that the Commission gave on May 16th, that such interrogatories are proper. And that's something that we were prepared to address to this Board as part of the, I think

you called it, a status report in your order of yesterday.

JUDGE MILLER: It is something we want to take out.

MR. LANPHER: But, getting, I want to, just so there's no misunderstanding on the prior thing we were discussing, my understanding is that Mr. Rolfe wants us to advise him whenever our witnesses come up with any new ideas, basically, to use a short hand.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, in view of their testimony in a deposition, he's asking when it's reasonable to have a supplement and when they're able to testify further than they could at that time. I think that's the framework that we're looking at.

MR. LANPHER: Well, it's a vague standard and I'm not agreeing to it, Judge Miller, because I don't think it's called for under the regulations. And if we had more time to do that, we would. We have not asked for an extention in the schedule that we have here, but I can tell you right now, it's a very tight schedule from our perspective, at least, in terms of putting all the testimony together.

JUDGE MILLER: When are you due to file testimony, by the way?

MR. LANPHER: 16th I think, it's the 15th or 16th.

16th of July. Obviously there's July 4 in there and there's gonna be alot of work that week before. Does that answer your previous question?

JUDGE MILLER: Well, it answers it in part by not answering it, yeah. I guess you can call that an answer.

MR. LANPHER: I thought I answered it as directly as I could.

JUDGE MILLER: You declined to stipulate to use the same rule we have on interrogatories when the Board directs it to the other functions of discovery, which we're allowing here. You say you won't do it.

MR. LANPHER: Unless the Board directs me.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, we can't direct you in a vacuum. We can tell you this, that if there is additional information, data, opinions of expert witnesses and the like which goes beyond that which was reasonably available by interrogatory or as deposition, we're certainly gonna give who ever's involved an opportunity to have a further deposition. Now, that could occur on the night of a trial, too. It can occur pretty fast. So if you want to be under that kind of a time hazard, all right, we're gonna protect everybody.

And that means that we're gonna give opportunity for adequate discovery consistent with the time frame. Now if you're gonna hold back advising counsel by telephone or by letter, of significant new evidence, testimony, data, opinions and the like comes up and as a skillful lawyer, I'm sure you would know when it was coming up. You'd either

know or somebody'd tell you, as is true of all counsel trying this case.

We'd expect at that point that you notify opposing counsel. If you can't agree to do that, then we're going to have to keep open the possibility of directing, either directing additional depositions or of striking the existing deposition and refusing to admit the testimony, and we don't want to go to that expense, but we're gonna be sure that everybody here is protected. And by holding back as you are doing, you are inviting that kind of a situation.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, I just want it to be clear I'm not holding back anything. I'm telling you the practical inability to agree voluntarily to the proposal because, to agree voluntarily and then to skip over something because there's so much that has to be done, I'm very worried that someone would say well, you promised that you were supposed to do something, Mr. Lanpher, and you didn't do it, so you held back. Well, Judge Miller, there's not time here to have the degree

JUDGE MILLER: There's time to be candid with counsel in discovery. The deposition, I mean the interrogatory rule provides for it. I'm asking you to extend that to depositions and you're refusing. So I think that you're not being very consistent in your argument.

MR. LANPHER: It's a wholly different catagory to extend it to voluminous depositions that go hundreds of pages.

JUDGE MILLER: You know what's in there, now don't give me this argument. As a skillful lawyer that you and your associates don't know what's in every deposition of your own and the other people, because you've got enough help, and you do.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, I mean no disrespect, but I'm tired of being called

JUDGE MILLER: No disrespect taken, go ahead and say what's on your mind.

MR. LANPHER: I'm tired of the cliches about skillful lawyers and knowledgeable

JUDGE MILLER: Don't you regard yourself as a skillful lawyer and a member of a law firm which is well staffed and putting the manpower at whatever expense necessary to try this and other case?

MR. LANPHER: Can I finish my statement, please?
There are finite limits on expense.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, we'll say whatever reasonable limits there are. And we won't inquire into the nature of it. But with that qualification, what?

MR. LANPHER: I'm tired of the cliche, yes, I think
I'm a skillful lawyer and a careful lawyer. I try to

JUDGE MILLER: You have demonstrated that to us. As a matter of fact, we believe that you are from the participation that you had when we had the trial for a day and a half. So we have seen you in action and we're not being perjuritave when we say you're skillful, so I don't know what you're tired of. What are you tired of?

MR. LANPHER: I'm tired of the cliches about being skillful in this and the presumption that seems to go with that that automatically I remember the things that are in depositions, or that my colleagues do. I'm very concerned about the practical problem. We're not trying to hold anything back. I don't think my witnesses did hold anything back.

JUDGE MILLER: I don't know, I'm passing no judgment on that.

MR. LANPHER: What I was willing to do was to comply with the regulation which colleague, 2.740E2, you know, supplementation of responses. And we're gonna live up to that regulation, you can be sure that we're going to.

JUDGE MILLER: You're going to supplement the responses, let me get this so we know what we're talking about. The duty to supplement, hold it just a moment, I'll read it.

A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the presiding officer, or agreement of the parties.

Now, that relates to the provisions regarding discovery

generally and under the section 2.740(E), supplementation of responses, which, unless I'm misreading it, addresses interrogatories

MR. LANPHER: (E)2 says that a party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information upon the basis of which he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or he knows that the response though correct when made, is no longer true, and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend a response is in substance and knowing concealment.

We're gonna live up to that obligation, Judge Miller.

JUDGE MILLER: I mentioned that. I said we're going beyond that which would otherwise be in effect fraud, that's the section that I was referring to. That's the duty imposed on you regardless of anything else. And I said we were going to slightly higher duty of subparagraph 3, a duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the Board. And we are directing all parties and we're ordering all parties, if you want an order, to supplement responses where they're contained in answers to depositions, oral interrogatories, anything else, or the production of documents.

We're directing you to do it under the terms and provisions of 2.740(D)(3). Now do we all understand what we're talking about?

MR. LANPHER: I hear your order and we'll certainly comply with it, Judge Miller. I would like

JUDGE MILLER: That's all we're asking.

MR. LANPHER: All you're ordering.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, we first ask and then you chose to ask us to put it in an order. We're putting it in an order.

MR. LANPHER: I would like

JUDGE MILLER: It was voluntary. I'm sorry, go ahead, I did interrupt you.

MR. LANPHER: I would like your clarification, maybe you've had experience in terms of supplementing deposition reponses. Can you give some flavor on what you

JUDGE MILLER: I'm trying to answer you now. I'm not trying to impose burdens on you and others. I know that you're busy. I appreciate fully. I just have to count, stack or measure the volume of documents the Board receives. And we know how much more you folks may be working with. So we fully appreciate, we're not trying to impose an unreasonable burden upon you.

But we do feel that by the same manner in which you address depositions, you can have hundreds of thousands of depositions with some subparts, nevertheless, competent counsel, and if we offend you by that term, I'll say I'm sorry, but I think that you are competent counsel, as are

others. And we're not trying to put additional burdens on you or your law firms, but we do expect in this case, which is important to everyone, that our regulations pertaining to the supplementation of interrogatories may reasonably be carried over to supplementation of information adduced as a result of depositions, production of documents, or whatever other discovery may be employed by any lawyer in this case, as against or in terms of any other witness.

And that's all that we're asking you to do. No more than that, but we think that that is fair and reasonable, even though it may be somewhat onerous.

Now, you wanted clarification, am I giving you enough to give you guidelines? Because we're not trying to be, I mean, that you neither understand or are able to comply with. It does apply to all counsel and all parties, now, not just you.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, so I understand, you're extending the supplementation obligation that is for interrogatories, to the depositions and documents, production requests.

JUDGE MILLER: And other discovery, yes. I only think of those two, but if there's other forms of it, suplement. That's no great, unknown thing, it's not unprecedented, it's known to all lawyers.

MR. LANPHER: Then the regulation that you're extending

is 240, 2.740(E)(1), is that

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I gave it to you awhile ago. We are ordering that supplementation of all discovery data information responses, spontaneous utterances, whatever, be under the same rule of supplementation which our regulations provide in the case of supplementation of information to interrogatories where directed by the Board, not just that if it stands alone without it it would be fraud or something. That's a rather coarse standard.

We're saying go ahead and supplement. And I don't know why it takes us so long to understand the plain meaning of words that are used in the English language.

MR. LANPHER: Okay, thank you.

JUDGE MILLER: You're welcome. Now, anything further on this subject? By any counsel? All right. Then we'll consider that we've covered that subject. Now, I was gonna say your colleague was free to leave, I see that he has.

Because I understand that he has a previous obligation.

Now, what would you like to get into next in the way of clarifying whatever you think needs clarification or consideration by the Board of any problems if they bother you.

MISS LETSCHE: Judge Miller, something which was raised, at least preliminarily a few minutes ago and you indicated, or Mr. Lanpher indicated it was something

we did want to address, was the question of discovery by
way of interrogatories in thisproceeding on LILCO's exemption application. As has been alluded to in connection
with the argument of the motion for the protective order,
LILCO has taken the position in response to the County's
first discovery request, as well as in response to the County's
second discovery request, that it is under no obligation to
enswer interrogatories propounded by the County.

The reason that the County's discovery request did include interrogatories was that because this Board had issued no order limiting discovery in this proceeding on the exemption for an application. Following the Commission's May 16th order, which as you noted, Judge Miller, vacated to the extent inconsistent with the May 16th order, this voids April 6th, 1984 order, this Board issued on May 31 an order establishing a schedule for the hearing on LILCO's exemption application.

That order contained no limitation on discovery, it merely said discovery commences and stated the date upon which it ends. Since the Commission's discovery rules do provide for the use of interrogatories as well as requests for the production of documents, depositions, requests for admissions and other matters, the County proceeded to propound interrogatories to LILCO.

It is the County's view that LILCO's refusal to

respond to, I believe and my count may be off by a few,
28 or 29 of the requests contained in the County's first
discovery request, on the basis that they were interrogatories
rather than document requests, is incorrect. The County
intends to file a motion to compel responses to those inter
rogatories, based upon the County's understanding of the
rules that are in effect to govern this proceeding. And
that is the Commission's rules which give us the right to
seek discovery by way of interrogatory.

JUDGE MILLER: You have not addressed the prior order in this proceeding and we deem it to be the same proceeding by the way, by this Board.

MISS LETSCHE: Weil, I

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me. You haven't addressed that portion of the prior order limiting discovery to, at least, depositions, furnishing of documents, may be other aspects, but not including interrogatories.

MISS LETSCHE: Well, I believe I did address it, I'll address it again for you, Judge Miller.

JUDGE MILLER: What does it say, tell me what it says?

MISS LETSCHE: The Commission's May 16th order

JUDGE MILLER: No, no, I'm not asking about the

Commission. I'm asking about our order, precedently, and

please address it.

MISS LETSCHE: The April 6th, 1984, order of this

Board was vacated to the extent

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JUDGE MILLER: Never mind, I didn't ask you its history or pedigree. I asked you what it provided with reference to interrogatories, it's a simple direct question to a lawyer.

MISS LETSCHE: It is my understanding

Do you have it before you? JUDGE MILLER:

MISS LETSCHE: I do not have it before me, but I can answer your question.

JUDGE MILLER: I'm sure you can answer it. Can you answer it accurately is my question.

MISS LETSCHE: I'm going to try to, if you let me.

JUDGE MILLER: Please do, address it and speak to that and forget for the moment other orders. Go right ahead.

MISS LETSCHE: My understanding is that this Board's April 6th order, which dealt with LILCO's supplemental appli

JUDGE MILLER: We know what it dealt with, whether to provide an interrogatory. Don't dance around it, come right to it, grapple with it, look it in the eye. What did it provide?

MISS LETSCHE: It is my understanding that this Board's order, which dealt with LILCO's supplemental motion for

JUDGE MILLER: We strike that, consider that portion stricken. Counsel admonished, please to answer the questions of the Board. And don't be cute.

MISS LETSCHE: It is my understanding that this
Board's order indicated that, with respect to that
hearing, there were, discovery was not to include interrogatories. It is my further understanding that the Commission's
May 16th order vacated the portions of this Board's April
6th order that were inconsistent with the Commission's
May 16th order.

The Commission's May 16th order provided that the proceeding on LILCO's application for exemption, which is the proceeding in which we are all now engaged, was to be conducted in accordance with the Commission's rules. Pursuant to that May 16th order, this Board on May 31, issued an order entitled Order Establishing Schedule for Resumed Hearing. And in that order there was no limitation on discovery and it is pursuant to that order and the Commission's May 16th order, that the County pursued its rights to conduct discovery as set forth in the Commission's regulations.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. I think we can rule on that one right now. We don't need to hear from ther counsel. We consider this to be the same continuing, ongoing proceedings, the order of the Commission vacated our memorandum and order of April 6th to the extent inconsistent, they do not deem our direction as to nonuse of interrogatories in a limited time period for discovery to be in anyway effected.

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We think that in fact it indicated, by the Commission's own designation of discovery commencing on Day 2 and ending on Day 32, itself a somewhat less than usual period of all discovery. We believe, therefore, there should be no confusion in the minds of the County or its representative that the order entered originally, counsel has so much trouble remembering, definitely excluded the use of interrogatories and discovery. It's ongoing, it's as good today as it was then.

We overrule the County's motion, if it is a motion, to do something variant therefrom and we direct that the continued discovery, which is to end under our order which was based upon the Commission's order next week, be brought to a conclusion on the scheduled date and that all parties and all counsel cooperate to the maximum extent to provide reasonable information to each other.

Now, are there any more motions?

MR. ROLFE: Judge Miller, may I make one comment just so the record will be full? With respect to the interrogatories in that first discovery request, to the extent that documents were also requested with the interrogatory LILCO has produced.

JUDGE MILLER: Those should be produced.

MR. ROLFE: They have been produced, or they will be produced so that all the documentation that might be

pertinent to those questions should be, or will be shortly, given to the county.

JUDGE MILLER: All right. They should be now, we inten only discovery of documents.

MR. ROLFE: I understand that.

JUDGE MILLER: We're not foreshortening that. We expect them all to be produced, made available by each of you to the other.

MR. ROLFE: I understand that, Your Honor. I just want to be clear that we haven't just dismissed the whole request out of hand, because it happened to include an interrogatory, documents that are responsive to those have been produced in

JUDGE MILLER: Very well, continue to do so, all parties to do so. Are there any other motions?

MISS LETSCHE: Yes, Judge Miller, if I might just respond to what Mr. Rolfe stated. The, with respect to document production by LILCO. Separate and apart from LILCO's refusal to answer interrogatories, and I understand the Board has ruled that the County's request that responses be provided will not be ordered by this Board, LILCO has in addition objected to an refused to produce many categories of documents that were requested

JUDGE MILLER: I understand but that was, you're entitled to have rulings on those. We're trying to go into

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every, please designate now what you're talking about and we'll get a response and rule on it, because we want to cover all potential discovery controversies.

MISS LETSCHE: Well, there are several categories of objections that LILCO made and refusal to produce documents and I can go through them if you wish. First of all

JUDGE MILLER: Well, it's your record. I'm gonna try to make an order so to the extent that you want us to look at it and to find out the situation, use your judgment.

MISS LETSCHE: Well, we had intended to file a written motion to compel production because these do involve lage numbers of the responses and we'll be glad to do that if you

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me, with your time up next Friday, you see, you're handicapping yourself and your client, really. Why don't you take this opportunity to do what you had in mind next week and do it now and get it over with.

MISS LETSCHE: I'll be glad to do that if you wish,
I just wanted to make sure that that's really what you
wanted me to do.

JUDGE MILLER: Not what I wish, it's what you wish. Go ahead.

MISS LETSCHE: Well, first of all, LILCO has refused on page 2 of its response to the County's first discovery request, LILCO Has stated that it objects to the production

of all drafts and copies of documents requested as unduly burdensome and oppressive. They say that it's not feasible to obtain these documents and a good faith effort will be made to produce at least a final version of all responsive documents. And as a result, presumably, none of the, no drafts or copies of documents containing handwritten notes or such things have been produced in response to the document request, although the request did expressly include such matters.

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me. I may inquire. Is that getting into this financial things that we're handling separately?

MISS LETSCHE: No, Judge.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, then let us get a response if you've identified the problem. Now, why won't you produce?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, it's a question of feasibility We have received, there were some 90 requests here, not counting subparts, and there were, I don't know how many submitted on April 11 and 12. In response to that, the discovery requests have been circulated to the people at LILCO whom we and the LILCO employees believe would have responsive documents. They have all been instructed to produce those documents.

The problem is that in the course of operating the plant an conducting LILCO's business, sometimes documents

get circulated to four or five different people. Sometimes drafts don't get put in the file where the final document ought to be lodged and it's simply not feasible for counsel

JUDGE MILLER: Well, what is feasible? Now, look, I have heard these arguments for years and I know counsel make them to suit their own predicament. You're all under pressure. I know that. But, let's get down to it.

Produce the maximum extent possible. What can you, what have you produced for the lady?

MR. ROLFE: We have produced and are producing all documents responsive. The problem is I can't certify that I have every draft that may be in existence. I have made a request

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I don't you or any lawyer would. Make every reasonable effort. And she says you filed a response as saying it's too onerous. And I don't know, we don't even have the document before us, but we don't want to have onerous objections, except for what is it they call the truly, or the very truly onerous, which is exceptional.

Now, what is it that you're not producing that she's entitled to?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, everything that I know about has been produced although, well, with respect to copies.

With respect to drafts, I don't believe that all drafts have been produced or documents.

JUDGE MILLER: Drafts of what now?

MR. ROLFE: I'm not sure drafts of what, Your Honor.

I don't know what's out there, is my problem.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I'm getting fuzzier and fuzzier. Now, come on, let's get precise.

MR. ROLFE: Well, I'm not attempting to be fussy, the problem is, when I took these requests to LILCO and I said here's the request, I need the documents.

JUDGE MILLER: Now you're telling me your problems, come on now. If I won't let counsel for the County tell me its problems, I can't let you. What are you gonna produce that you haven't produced. Or what grounds do you have for not producing if you're asserting some ground and we'll rule on it. Let's get on with this.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, the grounds for not producing drafts is simply that it's, as I said, burdensome, very difficult to track down the

JUDGE MILLER: Overruled. All discovery is burdensome whether the large utility, I know there are lots of documents. But assume the burden now, do the best that you can. We're not requiring you to put your head on the line, but we do require a reasonable effort by lawyers acting profesionally. Now, if you've done it, tell the lady. If

you haven't done it, tell her what you're gonna do about it.

MR ROLFE: I will then make a request, and I will produce such drafts of the documents as we have already produced that may be in existence, if that's the Board order.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, we order you to produce all that you can reasonably lay your hands on. I mean, this thing's got a week to go now. We can't all stand and dance around and come to the Board for orders and protective orders and tell us how burdensome everything is. WE know life is burdensome.

What can you, are you holding anything back? If so tell us what and why.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, the only specific documents
I'm aware of that we're holding back have been identified
particularly as privileged documents. I have not collected
from LILCO all of its drafts of documents, which I may
have produced already in a final form. IN other words

JUDGE MILLER: Now, we're not gonna spend alot of time on privilege, I can tell you that. This is a wide open case and we're getting into matters that go into motivation and everything else, so don't come in and expect to get some long winded argument and then order on privilege, especially when it's attorney client. That's a limited privilege and you're practically in the course of trial where

that privilege, as far as most courts are concerned, vanishes.

Say I got a witness statement, it's privileged and he says well, have you got it here, counsel, yeah, get it out of your bag. And this happened a thousand times, they're getting simple answers. So don't lean too heavily on privilege. Let's produce, what the heck, we're in a law suit, we're trying to get the facts, the evidence, and in advance by discovery.

Now, are you complying with that pretty clean simple dictum or not?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, to the extent I understand it yes, sir, I have tried to comply with that. I don't want Your Honor to be under the illusion that I'm attempting to withhold information or documents.

JUDGE MILLER: That's what we don't want to be under.

MR. ROLFE: Here's the situation, if I can give you an example. There may be, suppose there was a memo that was written by one employee to another. I have produced tha memo.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, fine, fine.

MR. ROLFE: I can't certify that I produced every draft of that memo, I may have gone through it

JUDGE MILLER: Do everything you reasonably can do but our concern not with what you've done, but what you

haven't done. If there isn't anything on that category, we'll move on. Tell me there what you know that you haven't done, if that be a situation. And if not, let's move on with it.

MR. ROLFE: I'm not trying to be evasive. Part of my problem is I don't know what I haven't done. I instructed JUDGE MILLER: All right, you go back to your office.

MR. ROLFE: I will.

JUDGE MILLER: Look at what you haven't done, call the lady up on the telephore first, follow it up with a letter and tell her what the status of this thing is and produce everything that you can reasonably be expected to, being liberal in production.

MR. ROLFE: I will do that, Your Honor.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, next. What's next?

MISS LETSCHE: Yes, Judge Miller, in addition, on page 2 of LILCO*s response to the County's first discovery request, they indicate an objection to the request that it supply documents in the possession or subject to the control of LILCO's consultants, persons under contract with LILCO and venders of equipment or services to LILCO, and they state that the basis is that's burdensome and oppressive and exceeds the scope of document requests permitted by 10 CFR Section 2.741, and that it is not limited to documents which are in the possession, custody or control of LILCO.

And it is my understanding that the only documents responsive to the County's request that LILCO has produced are those that are in the custody of LILCO employees, which Mr. Rolfe was just referring to.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, let me inquire about this.

We understand that you might get into matters of trade sectors and so forth, but we think that usually is more in the apprehension than in the reality. We don't want you to limit discovery solely to what you got in your multidudinous files or employees. Reasonably, if it's in possession of some other company you deal with and there's no question of trade secret, something like that, ask them to send it in.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, we've done that and we've been producing documents for our consultants who are not What we haven't been able to do, for example, there's a request in here about our oil supply. And we haven't gone to, for example, Exxon

JUDGE MILLER: I'm not sure of the relevance of that, frankly. Now you're getting into areas where you may have a relevance question.

MR. ROLFE: But this is just an example, we haven't gotten it down to

JUDGE MILLER: As an example, go ahead.

MR. ROLFE: But we haven't gone to Exxon and asked for

all their documents that might shows where the oil comes from. That's the kind of limitation I've interpreted and that's what

JUDGE MILLER: All right, well see, if, you've got interstatially some areas where you can supply more information that might have escaped the broad sweep of the request as she's phrased it. I understand your Exxon situation, but short of that, there's an awful lot of situations where routinely you either have or you can get them.

MR. ROLFE: We've attempted to do that.

JUDGE MILLER: Give her a list of those you can't and tell her where they are, then give the Board a copy, we'll soon rule on that one. Use reasonable effort, that's all we're asking.

MR. ROLFE: I've been trying to, Your Honor. If counsel would advise me on what

JUDGE MILLER: All right, let me do this. We direct counsel on behalf of, I take it that it's the County at the moment, may or may not include the State, and LILCO to sit down Monday, as early as they can get down to their offices and get together to go over these discovery requests, try to agree on as much as you can in terms of the clients that we've indicated.

I might point out now, Commanche Peak, we incorporated that earlier in this proceeding, too, and we still regard this as the same ongoing proceeding, where we said sit down, confer and let us know who's being unreasonable in your judgment before you file motions.

Now, that still applies too. At least the philosophy of it does. So, sit down Monday and go over these things. Much of it you ought to be able to resolve. As lawyers, I won't characterize you as that offends some of you, but as lawyers admitted to practice and as appearances entered here. Get together. All of you, that is all of you where it's an ongoing matter.

I say Monday, that's a short time, I realize, but since Friday is the last day for discovery, you can't be holding off much longer and you've got to have an opportunity to start producing, if there are some that you can put your hands on and produce as much as you reasonably can and I'm gonna ask counsel also, on behalf of the County, keep your requests within reasonable bounds, so far as you can.

There's no sense in putting them to alot of work on something that's of peripheral significance, perhaps, to you.

Yes?

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MR. LANPHER: Can we go 'n to the next?

JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me?

MR. LANPHER: Can we go on to the next?

JUDGE MILLER: It may be subsooned in what we've said

now. We see no point in going through all of these. I think you ought to select out now if you've got some real problems of Board ruling. Give us those, now, we've giving you the thing on the onerous business.

MR. LANPHER: Well, just in terms of the status report, we have conferred, obviously though it was prior to your arlier admonition about privilege, or, by the way, I think you said gee, I don't want to hear about attorney client privilege, because that's not an absolute privilege. I think you meant work product.

JUDGE MILLER: You're correct. I did. Thank you for correcting me. I did mean work product. Attorney client is different, but it has alot of exceptions, too.

MR. LANPHER: Well, I don't think any of us have raised an attorney client privilege with respect to any of the documents that are being produced or been requested. I could be wrong, I just don't recall any.

We have the potential for a dispute over some documents related to seismic matters, which we requested back in April. We did not pursue it because, I don't have to go through the whole history what happened after that, but once, as soon as LILCO advised us, they've advised us, I don't think they served the Board, the didn't need to, is that they have some seismic witnesses they're now going to use. We asked for these documents from LILCO. LILCO

had previously, in April, said they would not produce them because they were work products.

We asked them to reconsider that and they said they had and with two exceptions, documents that I think were inadvertently withheld before, they have continued to withhold them and I haven't had a chance to talk with Mr. Rolfe since your earlier statement.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, all right, good. I think you've identified now that problem area.

MR. LANPHER: 32 documents.

JUDGE MILLER: Let's hear about that.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, the documents are all documents that were put together at the express request of counsel to assist counsel in drafting the original supplemental motion for low power operating license, which was filed on March 20. They were created in this context. Counsel sat down and we drafted an outline and said we want to know the answers to these questions.

LILCO went out and wrote, in some cases, hand written notes and some cases they typed up things, to be brought back to counselor, to give us that information and it was from that that we drafted the supplemental motion for low power operating license.

And it's LILCO's position, Your Honor, that that's classic trial preparation materials as defined by the rules.

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JUDGE MILLER: Well, it probably would be, originally, we would agree with you on that, or with any counsel who asserts that. However, the lapse of time and the approach the point that you're all gonna have to furnish prefiled written testimony, and you're gonna start an adjudicatory hearing, we think maybe that the force of that might be somewhat diluted. Have you given any consideration to that?

MR. LANPHER: If I can do this, so as identify this as LILCO's April 16 response to a document production request, and I'm showing you the, just LILCO listing of the documents withheld under claim of work product privilege, which has a description of subject matter.

MR ROLFE: These are not documents that were used or reviewed in anyway in the preparation of testimony or for preparation for depositions or any form of testimony by the witnesses. Indeed, most of them weren't even prepared by people who are witnesses. And in that context, Your Honor, I think they still come within the privilege.

The County has experts on these areas, the County has heard testimony of some of the LILCO witnesses on April 24 and 25. They are scheduled to depose most of the other LILCO witnesses, in particular, they're scheduled to depose the seismic witnesses on Monday.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I suppose they can depose more adequately, in their judgment, at least, if they have access

to the underlying data that this witness either has produced or has had available to him.

MR. ROLFE: Well, Your Honor, these are not documents which were produced by LILCO seismic witnesses, nor had they been given to those seismic witnesses. These are things which counsel considered originally in developing the seismic testimony, LILCO Has relied on

JUDGE MILLER: How do you develop testimony? Testimony is given by a witness under oath here. What are you doing developing testimony?

MR. ROLFE: I'm not, Your Honor. I mean the consultants.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay.

MR. ROLFE: What I meant to say is this, LILCO's seismic witnesses come from two engineering firms, Sargent and Lundy and Stone and Webster. The documents which we relied upon and which are identified there with respect to seismic information, were put together mainly by LILCO people just for counselor's use, they have not been furnished to the Stone and Webster or Sargent and Lundy people as far as I know. They don't form the basis for any of their work.

JUDGE MILLER: Now let me inquire, counsel says there are just two documents, if I understand him.

MR. ROLFE: No, sir, there are more.

MR. LANPHER: There are 30, there are two which Mr. Rolfe informed me this morning, we had talked with him

before, informed me this mcrning that they were not properly withheld, that he is producing them. But there are approximately 30 others and I would just like to point out, like under subject matter, I mean, a question which our witnesses are intending to investigate and address, depending on the outcome of the investigation. For instance, if there is the SSE at Shoreham, which is a .2 G acceleration, are there systems, vital systems, structures or components for instance, insulators or fuses or circuit breakers or a transformer that might be adversely affected.

I look at the subject matter here for instance, natural frequency of the 69 KV switch yard fuse structure. Well, that's something right in the line from the 20 megawatt gas turbine to the RSS transformer. It's a critical component in getting that power into the plant, just to give you an example.

JUDGE MILLER: I understand, from counsel's statements in part, that LILCO does plan to put on some seismic testimony.

MR. ROLFE: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE MILLER: I suppose prefiled written, plus whatever else may develop, subject to cross examination and the like. Well, if that's correct, counsel certainly has the right to go into the testimony as it's finally filed, but the underlying bases of such testimony. The facts, in other words.

Now, the fact that you've got here certain matters I recognize that it presents a problem to the profession.

And I'm not trying to let anybody get into the brain of counsel that developed it, which I think is really the basis of this trial preparation work product privilege. Also. let each lawyer do his own work, and not pick the brains of his opponent.

So as I point out, we are now getting right down to trial where that becomes less looming in significance. We're now down to where people are going to testify. And when we're down to that point, with the time limitation on discovery, we're concerned that the genesis of this thing, where counsel tells us that you're asked the questions and asked for the information. The genesis of it now is less significant than the descendants. I mean, we're to the point now these people are gonna say something and County's entitled to know in advance, in their depos, about what it is based on there.

We're gonna have to find some solution to this, because you can't wrap that umbrella of initial trial prepartion lawyer request, you can't just shield now information he's entitled to. Maybe you could mask somehow the lawyer part of this thing, but I think you're gonna have to make some information available to counsel.

MR. LANPHER: I'll be heard just briefly.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes.

MR. LANPHER: My understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Rolfe, none of these documents were prepared by counsel. I agree with you.

JUDGE MILLER: I assume that.

MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, that I think that goes in a different category, you know, what counsel, you all must inevitably have mental impessions on that. And I think that really has to be protected.

But these look to me to be essentially factual stuff and just looking through, one of the documents, in fact, was prepaired by Mr. Shiftmacher, who's been one of the LILCO witnesses, I think, if the Board recalls.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes, we recall.

MR. LANPHER: So, these appear to be essentially factual data. Quite frankly, given the extremely short time frame, it's awfully hard for us to develop alot of these data.

JUDGE MILLER: We're conscious of that and we're trying to be fair to all counsel. I think the area now that really he's entitled to some of that, some or most of the information that he's designated, we're willing if you can figure out some way to pull out participation of counsel, because we are interested in protecting counsel's

mental impressions, trial preparation and the like.

But since we're so close to trial and since we are on a very tight frame, I think the burden's on you to figure out some way to protect your own necessary attorney interest and disclose tha information.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion there?

JUDGE MILLER: Okay.

MR. ROLFE: Mr. Lanpher's correct. These are not documents that were prepared by counsel. They were prepared for counsel and to the extent that counsel asked specific questions and saying going out and tell us X or Y, they did that.

These people that prepared these documents are not the witnesses that LILCO will sponsor. To the extent that, well, it's also my understanding tha LILCO's seismic consultants, who will be the witnesses, did not use this information.

Mr. Lanpher is scheduled to despose that seismic panel on Monday morning. I suggest, Your HOnor, that he inquire there and to the extent that this information form the basis of their opinions or they used it in their investigation.

JUDGE MILLER: So long as it came into play in anyway,
I'm not trying to go into the qualitative. They had it
available to them and did or could use it, I think he's

entitled to it precedently as discovery.

MR. LANPHER: I'm concerned because I hear that this is stuff that is important seismic information and for some reason unknown to me, counsel has decided not to give it to these witnesses. I'm getting more and more curious quite frankly, what's in these documents. And to lead all the attorney's questions, I want the facts, I don't want to get into mental impressions of the attorney at all.

JUDGE MILLER: Unless you can come to some agreement, we're going to have to enter an order directing you to produce, giving you certain remedies to mask the attorney's participation, whether by the frame of the question or otherwise, but I'm afraid that information is going to have to be produced.

Now, you can probably do it more conveniently by telling us here and now in a form that's either acceptable to counsel, or at least reasonable, or else we're just gonna have to enter an order and you're gonna be in the situation of having to produce something and they don't want to. You want to think about it?

MR. ROLFE: My problem is, Your Honor, and forgive me if I'm rehashing, mentioned a moment ago, I don't think I am, but the rule puts the burden on the discovering party.

JUDGE MILLER: No, no, let's not get into burden. Now

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we're getting down to that tweedle-dee, tweedle-dum stuff.

MR. ROLFE: What I'm trying to say though is, the reason these documents weren't provided to the consultants is so they could reach their independent analysis.

JUDGE MILLER: Maybe they think that the information provided wasn't shown to them because it might vary their conclusions or worry them a little bit, too. Or open up something for cross. They're entitled to all kinds of reasons, they don't have to define them. This is discovery now, I think you'd better figure out how to produce it.

Voluntarily. Mr. Palomino says there's a difference between voluntarily and voluntary. I'm giving you the chance to produce them voluntarily.

MR. ROLFE: Well, given Your Honor's directive, I will review thos documents and attempt to excise any portions that reflect counsel's opinions. I want the record to be clear, LILCO still objects on the same basis it did, but I will make

JUDGE MILLER: Your objection is part of the record.

Do I have to overrule the objection, we direct their production with the safeguard that you mention and we've mentioned. You may excise or delete or cover up the participation of counsel. But the information which comes from the experts we believe is producible an directed to produce.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor understands this isn't from our

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experts. We're producing all the documents from the experts.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, you had opinions of somebody. The only people who can give opinions that are admissible are experts. If they're not, then we'd throw out ninetenths of our evidence.

MR. ROLFE: Well. Your Honor, that was my whole point You see, these were just in house opinions from LILCO's people. Well, they may be experts, but they're not, we haven't attempted to qualify them, they aren't our witnesses.

JUDGE MILLER: We understand that. But we're not making that the threshhold consideration. All right, anything further now? We're trying to be fair to both of you. I think we've indicated that they are producible. Anything further on this point? All right.

MR. LANPHER: I've got another point.

JUDGE MILLER: What's you next one?

MR. LANPHER: The next question, you, Judge Miller expressed a number of times concerned that discovery ends next Friday under the schedule. WE have asked the Staff to identify any additional witnesses that they may be using. They've been unable to identify any at this time though in a conversation with my colleague, Ms. Letsche, with Mr. Reis, there's clearly the possibility that an

additional witness or witnesses may be used. I'd like to get that clarified on the record whether there is gonna be more witnesses. If so, we may need to take discovery of them.

JUDGE MILLER: Have you been furnished a list or description of the witnesses that Staff counsel has indicated he intends to or is likely to call?

MR. LANPHER: I think it was four that they had prefiled testimony, Mr. Hodges, Knox, Gaskin and one other, but not beyond that.

JUDGE MILLER: Well let me inquire. Mr. Reis, are you planning to or

MR. REIS: We will probably call other witnesses. We have not identified them yet.

JUDGE MILLER: When will you be able to identify them? We suggest you do it very quickly because of the opportunity for discovering. We don't want to start varying these schedules which are modeled upon what the Commission told us to do. Got to do it at some point.

MR. REIS: I know I have to do it and I've been looking to July 16th when I have to file testimony, I knew it would be done by then.

JUDGE MILLER: I know.

MR. REIS: But I was not looking to do it this month because of all the briefs due in the Shoreham proceedings.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I'm afraid we're gonna have to tell you, let's see, now, what is it, you're an expert lawyer, you're very competent, we know you've got problem, but, this case, as far as you and I are concerned, is number one on your agenda. Now, you're gonna have to get those witnesses. You can't wait until it suits your convenience for prefile testimony, because they've got a right to discovery. And you're gonna be depriving them of that if you don't come up at a reasonable time, reasonably in advance of the close of the discovery. They're entitled to take depos. So I think you better do something Monday.

MR. REIS: We are going, for instance, we are going through the depositions being taken of other people, and identifying additional witnesses on the file, on the basis of depositions because we weren't sure where all the issues were.

JUDGE MILLER: Fine, but you can go ahead and supplement repeatedly, you know. Like your SSE's, 10, 12, okay, keep on with the supplementation but give them the list.

MR. REIS: WE will go back to our people and attempt to identify all the wicnesses

JUDGE MILLER: That you might call.

MR. REIS: That we might,

JUDGE MILLER: I know there's some that you may have to list you won't, but at least give them the potential.

MR. REIS: Right.

JUDGE MILLER: Can you do that by Monday, or do that Monday, by 5:00?

MR. REIS: We will attempt to.

JUDGE MILLER: All right.

MR. REIS: I will not say that will be definitive, because I know

JUDGE MILLER: I understand, then supplement it on Tuesday and supplement it on WEdnesday, and so forth, sequentially, but get it in Monday if you will, please, by 5 and then as you decide others might be called, pick up the phone, just like I've told other counsel and call them. That's fair and Staff, I know you've got problems, but here we've got to get these witnesses, because we're in discovery and we're gonna be in trial. Okay.

MR. REIS: There are sections of the NRC and NRR that have not even identified employees who will be giving testimony.

JUDGE MILLER: I realize that. Tell them to get on the ball and that will be your supplement number 4 by Thursday of next week. But start off Monday and Tuesday, now, give them what is, you know, reasonably lacking, you're not saying you're gonna call, but let them know who the people are. Give them a reasonable shot at it, just like you'd like to have a reasonable shot at theirs

MR, REIS: I've been trying to get them to identify myself.

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JUDGE MILLER: All right. You know, see, we're helping you, too, trial preparation.

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MR. LANPHER: Judge Miller, related to that is whether there's going to be a supplemental safety evaluation report being issued.

JUDGE MILLER: I don't know.

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MR. REIS: I don't know that either

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JUDGE MILLER: I haven't heard of any and I'm not about to try to cause one to be produced, I'll tell you that. Because of this schedule, but stand neutral on it.

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MR. LANPHER: I don't mean on the original LILCO motion

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but I mean on pertaining to the exemption.

14 15 JUDGE MILLER: I don't know. I will say if something

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of that kind is contemplated, it would certainly be within

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the same request we just made of the staff, to seasonably

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and like Monday or Tuesday to give that information, at least

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preliminary information and deal fairly, that's all we're

asking and certainly if there's gonna be the possibility

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of anything more coming from the Staff, let them know as soon

as you can, even if it's still in a period of gestation.

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Next?

MS. LETSCHE: Yes, Judge Miller, going back to LILCO's response to the County's discovery request. There are a

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number of requests that LILCO objected to on the basis that they were too broad or burdensome, in which they said that they would produce some, "representative documents" or "summaries if available of information" but they are not producing the documents we're requesting.

JUDGE MILLER: Why didn't you bring this to our attention earlier? This is the very thing that you should, or any party should, because they don't make the rulings and if they make the objection, you've gotta bring it to the Board's attention in some way.

MS. LETSCHE: I agree, Judge Miller, and that's what I'm doing now.

JUDGE MILLER: Yeah, but you're kind of late in the ball game.

MS. LETSCHE: I told you we were gonna file a motion to compel.

JUDGE MILLER: This is the week before the end of discovery and

MS. LETSCHE: We just received this.

JUDGE MILLER: Oh, you did, which one is that?

MS. LETSCHE: This is LILCO's response to Suffolk County's first discovery request. It's dated June 19th. I believe we got it on June, we got it on, I don't know, the 20th.

JUDGE MILLER: The 20th? Okay. So now you're taken

by surprise. You're startled and you see they've got alot of it. Tell me your side and we'll hear theirs.

MS. LETSCHE: Well, my point, Judge Miller, is that we have requested certain documents. LILCO has taken upon itself to decide that the County apparently doesn't really need all those documents and instead it's going

JUDGE MILLER: All right. What is it that you want that you think you truly need to

MS. LETSCHE: I think we are entitled to have the documents we've requested produced, rather than what LILCO determines are "representative documents".

JUDGE MILLER: All right, what are the documents you've requested? What's the nature of them, category

MS. LETSCHE: The numbers of the request to which this objection was raised, are numbers 52.

JUDGE MILLER: What's 52 talking about?

MS. LETSCHE: 52 is provide copies of the documents relied upon for support for the following assertions in the application for exemption. And there are one, two, three, four, five quotations from LILCO's exemption application, with page citations in there. And we've asked for the documents that they rely on for each of those statements. I could read them if you like.

JUDGE MILLER: Hold it. I like not, if I can help it.
MS. LETSCHE: All right. That's

JUDGE MILLER: Why won't you produce those, if they're addressed to the things that you've asserted in your own pleading, why in the world wouldn't you produce those?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, the things they're asking for, I have to give Your Honor an example to put it in context.

JUDGE MILLER: That's what she's objected to. You offer to give examples illustrative rather than the whole smear. What's the problem.

MR. ROLFE: Well, my objection won't make any sense otherwise. For example, they ask for copies of all documents relied upon in support of the assertion that many of LILCO's people have been compelled to devote inordinate amounts of their times and energy to livensing struggles. Taken literally, that could mean every document that's ever been generated in a licensing proceedings.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, take it nonliterally but regard that as addressing the language you yourself chose to use.

MR. ROLFE: Well, Your Honor, that's why we said that we would produce summaries of the people who had been involved and their efforcs, and things like that, but

JUDGE MILLER: Well, why didn't you produce them, or have you?

MR. ROLFE: They're going to be produced in Mr. McCaffrey's deposition on Monday, we're accumulating them.

JUDGE MILLER: You'd better fill his briefcase and start producing them, because if you're gonna plead something, you're jolly well gonna have to answer what you base it on, now you know that.

MR. ROLFE: I understand, Your Honor. WE intend to do that, it's just that

JUDGE MILLER: I know but intent is tomorrow and end of discovery is next week. Why am I the only one conscious of Friday. Everybody acts like they've got plenty of time to file all kinds of motions. We'll rule ourselves, what's your problem?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, there's no problem, LILCO has produced over eight cases of documents.

JUDGE MILLER: Don't tell me what you've done, tell me what you're gonna do in this regard.

MR. ROLFE: Well, that's what we're gonna do, Your Honor, we're gonna produce the summaries that provide this information at Mr. McCaffrey's deposition. That's the practice that has been followed by the County in discovery and so far.

JUDGE MILLER: Never mind the practice. Now, we're getting to the point where you can't have fiddling around and misunderstandings at best of counsel. Now, those documents are producible and I don't know that she has to say I'm only gonna have you give illustrative. Is that

what you told me?

MS. LETSCHE: I'm saying I'm not willing to accept what LILCO decides are representative.

JUDGE MILLER: Yeah, representative is the term.

MR. ROLFE: Well, Your Honor

MS. LETSCHE: Or summaries was used somewhere else.

JUDGE MILLER: Summaries are different category. I understood you to say representative and I agree with you. You're entitled not to have them decide what's representative

MS. LETSCHE: I'll address the summaries separately then.

JUDGE MILLER: All right. What are the summaries, what are you producing or going to produce on the way of summary, summaries of what?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, as far as I know, these are summaries of the costs LILCO has incurred in these proceedings. For example, all their consultants' fees, their lawyers' fees, to the extent there are documents, again, we're not compiling special documents for this.

JUDGE MILLER: No, you're not required to do that, but you're required to produce those documents that were to form the basis of your pleading. Where are you trying to cut it off?

MR. ROLFE: Just, the way I interpret this request

and again, the way it's worded, it would require for example to produce every document showing anyone who's ever worked on licensing proceeding.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, give the documents and give a statement of somebody who's responsible and knowledgable that searches have been made, these are the documents so far as can be ascertained at this time. And be prepared to stand by it. That is whoever says that they make the search, in case it's the subject of inquiry.

MR. ROLFE: Well, we will be, Your FOnor, and he's being deposed on Monday and

JUDGE MILLER: I'm not talking about him being deposed. I'm talking about these discovery requests for documents and I don't know why in the world we're arguing about it now on Friday. I think they should be in hand. I think you should produce them just as soon as you can. To-day, if possible. I assume that you, your people, I know you don't produce them yourself, have made some search and have at least some bundle of these things. Send over what you got and tell them to search over the weekend, if that's necessary.

We're down to time and I am talking about weekends. I've dragged a spot, too. I worked many weekend I didn't want to, guys, and 4th of July occasionally.

MR. ROLFE: I can assure Your Honor we worked many, if

not most weekends.

JUDGE MILLER: All right. I'm glad to hear it. Now, can you produce them and without any shilly shallying about it? I'm not asking you now to sign it in blood, but I am asking a reasonable effort be made and that whoever conduct it or is responsible for that search so certify. That's not unreasonable.

MR. ROLFE: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, what's reasonabl Again, I'm not trying to limit what they're getting, it's just that

JUDGE MILLER: Well, why don't you shove over a bundle and get them started looking through them and then see if that's adequate. Instead of in advance saying my God, it's alot of work, I can't do it and all the rest of it. Do what you can. And I know there are some limitations. But let's discuss them later in terms of what you've done, not what you're worried about or all the rest of it.

MR. ROLFE: We will do that.

JUDGE MILLER: Good. Next.

MS. LETSCHE: Yes, I have another category of objections that LILCO made to our request. They objected to a number of requests on the ground that they, in LILCO's view are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. And there's some particular ones here which I will bring to the Board's attention.

For instance, the request number 63 of the County's first request, was the following. It quoted a statement in LILCO's exemption application which states the plant is now ready to load fuel and conduct low powered testing. Based on observations made during the site visit, the assertion can't be literally true, so we've asked LILCO to produce documents that relate to, that identify the activities or approvals that have to be accomplished or completed or obtained before fuel loading and low power testing could actually commence.

So that we can evaluate this statement LILCO's made in its application. LILCO objected to that, refused to produce any documents, saying that the information sought is beyond the scope of the issues raised by LILCO's application for exemption.

I think LILCO's just clearly wrong, as based on a statement in LILCO's application and we're entitled to those documents.

JUDGE MILLER: Counsel?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, the status of construction in the plant is not an issue in the proceeding and that's the reason. I think from the documents

JUDGE MILLER: What is the statement that you made in your application for exemption that the counsel's referring to?

MR. ROLFE: I believe counsel quoted it correctly,
Your Honor. I guess the reason that we don't think it's
a litegical issue is that, and perhaps counsel was guilty
of throwing in something by way of background that was not
important to the request for an exemption itself.

JUDGE MILLER: See, that's what happens, when you don't screen your utterances. Hyperbole never really saves you much time. Why can't you simply withdraw that if it's not really relevant. Strike it. If it is relevant, they're entitled to know about it. If it's not relevant, it should be stricken.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, I will by Monday, either withdraw it or produce the documents.

MS. LETSCHE: Judge Miller, if I could interject here, counsel's withdrawing a particular clause or statement from their application does not make that the issue raised by that statement not relevant.

I think it is very relevant whether or not

JUDGE MILLER: No, wait a minute, relevance is

determined by the Board and relevance is going to be

determined on the issues that we're charged with, not what
you or they or anybody thinks.

MS. LETSCHE: I understand that.

JUDGE MILLER: Now, you're not gonna create issues because they say something and you want to challenge them.

You can't impeach on an immaterial issue, you understand that?

MS. LETSCHE: Yes, Judge, yes.

JUDGE MILLER: If it's an immaterial issue, I want it withdrawn so you won't even try to impeach, hence won't need discovery, you follow me?

MS. LETSCHE: I understand that. My point is that the issue is whether the plant is now ready to load fuel and conduct low power testing.

JUDGE MILLER: What difference does that make from your point of view?

MS. LETSCHE: Well,

JUDGE MILLER: I mean, if it's ready to or if it's not ready to, I don't really see the relevance of that in this exemption request, frankly.

MS. LETSCHE: If it's not ready to, Judge MIller, then there's no exigent circumstance that leads to the recessity for an exemption and a license.

JUDGE MILLER: Then presumably that's not what what they'r asking either. They're saying exigent circumstances you do XYZ, that you're entitled to inquire into.

MS. LETSCHE: But what they're requiring the license to do, and the exemption, Judge Miller, is precisely to load fuel and conduct low power testing. That's what they're asking for so

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JUDGE MILLER: To be permitted so to do by virtue of an exemption request by by the Commission.

MS. LETSCHE: Correct. So whether or not the plant is in fact in a position to do that so that there could exist circumstances that would justify the issuance or the granting of an exemption, is clearly relevant to whether or not that exemption should be granted. That's my only point.

JUDGE MILLER: May be clearly relevant to you, it's not so clear to me, frankly, that we're not getting off into at least peripheral issues and we're trying to keep this into a contained matter for inquiry. However, I will inquire of counsel, I want to be sure you're not being barred from something that you're legitimately entitled to go into. What is that situation, why do you say, why did you say, whether 'ou strike it or not, or whether you furnish the documents or not, why did you put it in. Why did you call the Boat's attention?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor

JUDGE MILLER: Remember now, this is an exemption request. There are certain requirements.

MR. ROLFE: I understand, Your Honor.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, bring yourself within it.

MR. ROLFE: It was brought to the Board's attention,
Your Honor, to again advise the Board of the status of the

plant in conjunction with our request for a low power license. Again, I

JUDGE MILLER: Do we need that, for an exemption hearing? What do we care one way or the other, as far as materiality is concerned?

MR. ROLFE: I don't think it is material.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I'm trying to find out if it is, even though you withdraw because counsel says that she believes at the bean, now I'm trying to get the bases of both of your legal opinion. What's yours?

MR. ROLFE: Whether it is completed as of the date of this request is not material is best I can determine now.

JUDGE MILLER: That's the whole plant? Completion of the entire plant, is that what you mean? If, what is if?

MR. ROLFE: The construction activities.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, of the whole plant?

MR. ROLFE: Yes, well, the other reason it's not material, Your Honor, there are no contentions in this proceeding pertinent to that. As I understand the proceeding, if this Board were to grant the exemption, and then authorize the issuance of a license, the Staff would then have to make sure that certain things were done before the license were actually issued, and that's within the Staff's prerogative, but it's not an issue that's the subject of any

contention or anything that specifically LILCO is right.

JUDGE MILLER: You're shifting now the basis. Before now we see what's within contention, the exemption regulation itself has its own requirements. And before the staff starts doing anything, before we do anything, the Commission's gonna look at this as they very plainly told you.

MR. ROLFE: That's right.

JUDGE MILLER: They're not just gonna look at the technicalities as they might view it, they're gonna look at their responsibility in terms of that whole exemption procedure. Now, that's more, or could be more than contentions. So don't exculpate yourself necessarily by looking at contentions.

MR. ROLFE: Well, I don't mean to exculpate myself, but what I'm looking at is what an issue to be litigated here.

JUDGE MILLER: That's what we want to know.

MR. ROLFE: And the things that the 5012A, that are raised here are the public health and safety issues that the Commission identified in its May 16 order. And I don't think the status of construction is relevant to that.

JUDGE MILLER: Sorry, I got the wrong message. Go ahead.

MR. ROLFE: And then there's the exigent circumstances which LILCO has pleaded in its application for

exemption and I don't think the status of construction as of now is pertinent to that. That's not to say that the Staff won't have to look at it down the road if the license is authorized, that's what I'm saying.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, I'm still not too enlightened as to why you pleaded it in the first place and whether you pleaded it or not, whether it has any relevance or materiality to this ongoing trial.

MR. ROLFE: I think the reason we put it in the the application to begin with, was by way of background, not because it was strictly material to the issues which we raised. And I don't think it's material to the exigent circumstances which we have cited.

JUDGE MILLER: The Board is doubtful as to its relevance, but we'll give counsel of the County one more opportunity to show us, assuming that it's either stricken or voluntarily removed from the application, making that assumption, what is your position then?

MS. LETSCHE: Judge Miller, the County's position is that in order to prevail on its application for an exemption, LICO must show exigent circumstances that justify the granting of that exemption.

In addition, in this proceeding, the County is entitled to make its own affirmative case as to why it may not be in the public interest, or there may be exigent

circumstances or equities that weigh on the other side of
the balance that would go against the granting of an
exemption.

The whole question, what I heard Mr. Rolfe saying earlier this morning, was that the whole issue was one of timing, whether to get this license now, whether they should be permitted to load fuel and to begin low power testing now rather than sometime later. Therefore, it is the County's view that the issue of whether or not, and this is the issue that's stated in LILCO's own application, whether the plant is now ready to load fuel and conduct low power testing is directly relevant to whether or not there are any exigent circumstances existing that would justify the granting of an exemption.

Because, if the plant is not ready, in fact, it's gonna take six more months before fuel could be loaded, then there are certainly are no circumstances now that justify the granting of an exemption.

JUDGE MILLER: By the same token, your client wouldn't be hurt in any way, either, since you're opposing the early granting of an exemption request, and now you're supposing so positiously that it won't be done, it can't be over six months. You've just, it seems to me, destroyed the basis of your own objection. Can't get hurt.

MS. LETSCHE: Well, that was just an example I was

giving you.

JUDGE MILLER: I know, I liked it though, I think it's illustrative. I think we're going to sustain the objection, we're gonna make you make an election right now. Are you gonna strike it or are you gonna produce what she wants?

MR. ROLFE: May I ask the Board a question, actually, direct it to counsel?

JUDGE MILLER: Well, you can ask the question, you may or may not get an answer. But go ahead.

MR. ROLFE: Well, the question is, Your Honor, because I'm trying to avoid any problems down the road, this request is 68, is an interrogatory, it requests no documents at all. If what the County is

JUDGE MILLER: Just a minute, is that correct? If it's an interrogatory, then we've already this ruling.

MS. LETSCHE: Well, I had understood that the position, from what Mr. Rolfe said, that with respect to interrogatories, LILCO had taken the position that they would produce documents that included the information requested in the interrogatory, if such documents existed. So if Mr. Rolfe is correct

JUDGE MILLER: That may or may not be true, but the Board has ruled, contrary to your impression and argument, that our earlier ruling eliminating interrogatories continues throughout this whole proceeding. Whatever forms

and twists it may take. Therefore, we're not ruling on interrogatories as such. And I didn't realize that was what you were asking us to do.

MS. LETSCHE: Well, in that case, I'll just, I can send out a document request this afternoon which says give me the documents that relate to this. I mean, that's a technicality. I understood that Mr. Rolfe was producing documents that contained information that was requested in interrogatories and if I'm incorrect in that, then I have misunderstood what the rest of his response is.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, that's something between you two that you'll conduct when you hold this conference on Monday, straighten out any misunderstandings or understandings, as the case may be.

As far as we're concerned right now, do you have documents as opposed to interrogatories, which bear upon this matter?

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, I'm sure there are documents.

I don't know specifically what they are.

JUDGE MILLER: In that event, let's not quibble as to the form of the request if there are some that are cognizable by you. Well, once again, I'm gonna ask you to make an election.

MR. ROLFE: To obviate this so that there won't be any potential error down the road, LILCO will produce what

documents it has.

JUDGE MILLER: All right. I think that's probably sound policy. All right, next.

MS. LETSCHE: Yes, Judge Miller, I have a few more, I wonder if we could take maybe just a quick five minute break?

JUDGE MILLER: How many more do you have?
MS. LETSCHE: Four or five.

JUDGE MILLER: All right, we'll take 15 minutes, while I'll ask you during that time to confer with your co-counsel and with counsel for LILCO. We may be able to resolve some of these without having to go through, and you know pretty well now what the Board's ruling will be. We'll take 15 minutes, please.

(Brief recess.)

MR. LANPHER: -- had to go to the phone and he says that you can go ahead without him.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Have you had a chance to confer?

MS. LETSCHE: Yes, we have and we have agreed to

everything except one issue, we've managed to resolve,

we hope.

JUDGE MILLER: Good. What's that?

MS. LETSCHE: The issue that is left involves three requests by Suffolk County, they are numbers 87,88 and 89 in the first discovery request. In all of these requests

are, I believe, well, I should look, I was gonna say, are interrogatories but include a document request. And I'm gonna have to go through and see if that's true or not.

I think Mr. Rolfe would agree with me though that what we are talking about here is the production of documents, even though these are in the form of interrogatories. They all go to the issue of whether, go to questions related to the training which allegedly is going to be a benefit that will accrue from LILCO's getting this exemption application. They have a section of their exemption application that discusses in detail the training benefits that they believe are going to accrue.

These questions are designed to obtain information about the existing experience or qualifications or training of the operating and other maintenance personnel who LILCO intends to rely upon to operate the plant at low power.

And, therefore, in the County's view are clearly relevant.

LILCO's objection to these is that they would not lead to admissible evidence and that they are also burdensome.

JUDGE MILLER: Counsel?

MR. ROLFE: You Honor, LILCO has alluded to the training benefits that will accrue from low power testing in its application for exemption. LILCO has provided documents concerning the training that will occur. These requests, in LILCO's opinion go far beyond that issue.

What is asked for here is all current LILCO employees who are licensed reactor operators, to identify them by name, what shift they work on, the number of years they've been there. The identity of all individuals who notified LILCO that they're going to leave the company, all individuals

JUDGE MILLER: Leave the company, what's that mean?

MR. ROLFE: I can just read it to you, it says

notified LILCO that he or she will leave LILCO's employ
and state the date on which he or she will leave LILCO's
employ.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, you can strike that.

MR. ROLFE: And then there's 88 asks for the same information but with respect to all individuals other than licensed reactor operators who are involved in the management chain of command for Shoreham, from operator supervisors, through the Chairman of the Board. And then 89 asks for the same information basically with respect to all individuals who have been hired by LILCO to serve as reactor operators at Shoreham, but who have not yet begun working for LILCO.

It's our position, Your Honor, that the training benefits will be described by the training itself and you don't need to know the names of the individuals who are gonna be trained or how long they've been working there

or whether they may leave the company or whatever.

JUDGE MILLER: Forget leaving the company, we think that's wholly immaterial. However, they're asking you really for the names and status of various people who are or will be in the chain of operation. And since you're asking for low power operation, which is the kind of operation perhaps, I think they're entitled to that.

Surely your personnel office can dig up that information from your computer. You know, I don't mean you personally, but your client certainly knows where he can lay his hands quickly on the operators, that kind of thing. I haven't heard, now, as to who's notified going to leave, we'll sustain the objection to that as being immaterial.

Is there any other matters now besides the inquiry as to the names and status of operators?

MR. ROLFE: Well, they ask for the same things with respect to management of Shoreham all the way up through Chairman of the Board.

JUDGE MILLER: I'm doubtful about that one. What's that have to do with low power operation?

MS. LETSCHE: Well, the question, the actual question that was asked, Judge MIller, is the individuals who are involved in the management chain of command for Shoreham from operator supervisors, those are the people who are

supervising the actual operators who would be performing those functions during fuel load and 3 JUDGE MILLER: Well, the operator supervisors is, we think is cognizable, but now what's beyond there? MS. LETSCHE: Well, we asked for through the Chairman of the Board because JUDGE MILLER: All right, we'll strike that. We will give it to you, however, as to management supervisors connected with operators, in any reasonable fashion. 10 MS. LETSCHE: Okay. 11 JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Now, what's the other category? 12 MS. LETSCHE: I think that was it. 13 MR. ROLFE: Operators who had been hired but not yet 14 begun their work. 15 JUDGE MILLER: I don't know if anybody knows that. If 16 you know it, tell them, all right. Is that the extent now 17 of the controversy on discovery? 18 MS. LETSCHE: That's all that the County has. 19 JUDGE MILLER: Fine. Does anybody else have anything? 20 MR. ROLFE: You Honor, the only thing I would add, I 21 assume that Your Honor's earlier ruling about the Work 22 Product Privilege applies to all parties, and not just the 23 documents withheld by LILCO.

JUDGE MILLER: Definitely applies to all parties.

MR. REIS: May I ask, make an inquiry? I'm not sure

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that I'm getting all documents for all the discovery request responses, all requests that have applied. Are the parties serving all parties with requests

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JUDGE MILLER: Well, all active parties, I assume.

Not everybody on the service list, necessarily, answers,
but all active parties

MR. REIS: But all parties. Is there a discovery request on LILCO, you're serving them on us?

MS. LETSCHE: Oh, of course. Yes, the only thing we do not, we have not made a practice of giving you copies of the documents actually produced in response, and I don't think LILCO's been doing that, either, but we certainly

JUDGE MILLER: Well, you describe them and say that if they wish, that they can notify you and you will. I think something like that's what you 've been using.

MS. LETSCHE: They get the responses which indicate we are turning this over or we're not turning that over. So that certainly the Staff does receive.

JUDGE MILLER: Be sure that the Staff is on your list as an active party of both discovery requests and information supplied.

MS. LETSCHE: They certainly are on our list.

MR. REIS: It might just be my perception that I didn't get some documents, I'm not sure at all.

JUDGE MILLER: I know, sometimes you, we'll try to make

sure that you Staff is promptly copied on that type of everything they're entitled to.

MR. ROLFE: Judge Miller, I have one other thing. I hope it won't be a problem, on I believe May the 23rd, LILCO propounded a document discovery request to the County. Their formal response would have been due, under the 30 day rule, I think today. We've not gotten it. I assume a formal response will be forthcoming, but if not, I guess we ought to take that up now.

MS. LETSCHE: Actually, it is going out today.

MR. ROLFE: Fine, then no problem.

JUDGE MILLER: Then there's no problem.

MS. LETSCHE: We've actually, we've produced documents beginning, I believe, on June 10th or 11th. We've produced almost everything, I think there are a few more going out tonight, but actually you got everything as of the middle or the beginning of last week in response.

JUDGE MILLER: I think that is correct. We've noticed that the documents have been coming through that the County has been furnishing both seasonably and apparently you have pretty good quantity, so unless you have any particular objection that you want to bring to the Board's attention, we think that discovery is proceeding reasonably.

MR. ROLFE: Your Honor, I didn't have any specific objection, I just didn't have any way to know whether we'd

gotten everything they intended to produce, this will solve it.

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to rule from the bench on this motion for protective order insofar as it relaes to the producibility of financial data, information, records and the like. As counsel has pre-

JUDGE MILLER: All right. As I told you, we're going

The Board will rule that such financial informa-

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viously described it to the Board.

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tion is not relevant, or is irrelevant to this inquiry. The Board believes that the order of the Commission, which is

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our summary or guideline here, does provide for the evidence

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pertaining to discovery and finding of the exceptional

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circumstance question as it's set forth in our regulations

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in cases which you've all referred to.

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We believe that the financial or economic hardships referred to under the category of equities, which all parties are free to address, both in discovery and in affirmative proof, is limited to those which the Board is charged with looking at in this proceeding, namely those matters, financial or economic hardship or other matters, which relate to the earlier commencement of activities under a low power license of any kind or character, whatever phase, as compared or contrasted with the time that low power operations could be taken up as a result of the decisions of other Boards or the Commission.

In other words, whether or not the earlier commencement of low power operations as a result of the exemption request proceeding, this proceeding, as compared with the other date, the later date, is the limit of our inquiry into financial or other considerations. And insofar as there are other matters that seek to go into it by any party, as a matter of fact, we deem them irrelevant to this proceeding.

We therefore grant the protective order if that be the procedural posture precluding or denying the document requests or other discovery requests that go beyond the earlier versus the later low power operation, as limited to the perameter of an exemption request.

To the extent that there are motions to the contrary, if there be, and I'm not sure, on the part of the County or the State, they would be denied.

So you may proceed with discovery but your financial and other documentary information will be limited to the financial or economic hardships as set forth by the Commission and understood by the Board.

Any question? I suggest that you get together now, because there undoubtedly are some discovery information they're entitled to under our limited view of the issues that probably hasn't been produced. So we think you should as quickly as possible get together on that, let

them have everything that hasn't been turned over.

All right. I think that we have ruled on a number of these things. WE direct the parties to regard our rulings as issued here today as being controlling in the discovery phase, at any rate, of this proceeding, because of the time limitation and other factors. We will endeavor to enter a short written order Monday, but it will simply be the skeleton form for the rulings that we've made here today, so that you may be able to proceed, whatever course you wish to take on the basis of our rulings here today.

Is there anything further? Thank you very much, appreciate your coming.

CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS 2 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before 3 the NRC COMMISSION LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY In the matter of: (Docket No. 50-322 OL) 5 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 6 Date of Proceeding: Friday, June 22, 1984 Place of Proceeding: Bethesda, Maryland 8 9 were held as herein appears, and this this is the 10 original transcript for the file of the Commission. 11 12 13 14 TOM BERRY 15 Official Reporter 16 17 18 Tom Berry 19 Official Reporter 20 21 22 23

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