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Georgia Power  
the southern electric system

D. O. Foster  
Vice President and Project  
General Manager  
Vogtle Project

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June 4, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

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
Reference: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Unit 1, 50-424, Reactor  
Coolant Crossover Leg Elbow, GPC letter to NRC, GN-343, dated  
4/18/84.

Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Gentlemen:

In the above referenced letter, Georgia Power Company indicated that the NRC could expect to receive a final report on this subject by June 6, 1984. Georgia Power Company has received various reports from Westinghouse Electric and its architect/engineers and has concluded that the indication discovered on the reactor coolant crossover leg elbow does not constitute a reportable condition.

This letter contains no proprietary information and may be placed in the NRC Public Document Room upon receipt.

Yours truly,  
  
D. O. Foster

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EVALUATION FOR A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD  
EVALUATION FOR A SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY

Reactor Coolant Crossover Leg Elbow

Initial Report:

On March 20, 1984, Mr. C. W. Hayes of Georgia Power Company reported to Mr. John Rogge of the USNRC a potential deficiency concerning an indication detected on the reactor coolant system crossover leg elbow. Georgia Power Company, in an interim report on April 18, 1984, stated that the NRC could expect a final report on this subject by June 6, 1984.

Background Information:

On October 9, 1983, Pullman Power Products initiated nonconformance report MD-6028 for an indication detected on the reactor coolant system elbow for steam generator number 3, weld 005-W-02. This indication was observed to be linear in nature, 1-3/4" long, and orientated in an axial direction approximately 5/8" away from the toe of the weld. Pullman Power Products proceeded to tightly buff the questionable area. The light buffing did not clear the indication, but caused it to open up.

Upon receipt of the Pullman Power Products nonconformance report MD-6028, Westinghouse site personnel conducted a visual examination of the subject area. The Westinghouse site welding engineer noted the buffing in the area of interest and, using 5X and 10X magnification, he observed traces of arcing and molten metal. This indicated that the surface may have been subjected to an arc strike and weld splatter.

Westinghouse personnel also reviewed the Quality Data Package for the elbow to determine if any problems had been encountered in this area by the fitting supplier, ESCO Corporation. These records confirmed that the machined weld preparation end had undergone two radiographic examinations (i.e. as-cast and machined) in accordance with Paragraph NB-2573 of ASME Code Section III 1971 criteria of ASTM E186-67, severity level 2. A further check of the liquid penetrant examination records established that all examinations of the elbow during field fit-up prior to welding showed smoothly machined weld end surfaces.

Engineering Evaluation:

After buffing, the resultant cavity measured 2-1/4" long x 1-1/4" wide x 0.150 inches deep. The as-built measured thickness in the areas was recorded as 3.10" while the minimum required thickness is 2.48". Therefore, the blended cavity with a depth of 0.150" would not result in a violation of the minimum wall thickness requirement. Even though the cavity could have been left "as-is", it was weld repaired to restore the surface to the original dimensions.

Conclusion:

Since the cavity could have been left "as-is" there cannot be an adverse affect upon the future safe operations of the plant. Therefore it can be concluded that a reportable condition does not exist.

Quality Assurance Program Review:

A review has also been made of the various quality assurance programs and it has been determined that there has not been a quality assurance program breakdown.