

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 98 AND 100 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

NOS. DPR-44 AND DPR-56

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS NOS. 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

Introduction

By letter dated March 16, 1984, The Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) requested that the Technical Specifications for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, be changed to permit an hourly fire watch patrol in areas with operable fire detectors in the event a fire barrier is found to be non-functional. The request reflects the recent installation of fire detection systems in most areas containing safety related equipment. In addition, the licensee requested that changes to certain footnotes pertaining to the establishment of effective dates for a fire barrier Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) be approved. These footnote changes would permit adjustments in the implementation schedule of this LCO.

Evaluation

The licensee requested the modification of the LCO action statement for fire barriers to reflect the recent installation of fire detection systems at Peach Bottom. The requested change conforms to the guidance provided by the Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (NUREG-0123, Rev. 3). The Standard Technical Specifications require in the event of a non-functional fire barrier either a continuous fire watch in areas without fire detectors, or an hourly fire watch patrol in areas with operable fire detectors. As presently written, the Peach Bottom Technical Specifications (Section 3.14.D.3) state that a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour in the event a fire barrier is found to be non-functional. However, the licensee has installed fire detection systems in most areas containing safety related equipment. The proposed amendment would revise the non-functional fire barrier action statement (3.14.D.3) to permit the hourly fire watch alternative where there are operable fire detectors. This proposed change is fully consistent with the guidance provided in the Standard Technical Specifications. In addition, the licensee

proposed to amend the footnotes to Section 3.14.D.2 concerning the effectiveness date of that section. Upon effectiveness of Section 3.14.D.2 all fire barrier penetrations required to ensure safe shutdown shall be functional. In previous correspondence between the licensee and the NRC staff, an effectiveness date of March 1, 1984 was established based upon estimated completion date for the licensee's fire barrier and seal penetration upgrade program. Due to unforeseen difficulties as outlined by the licensee's letter of February 10, 1984 to the NRC, completion of its upgrade program has been delayed beyond March 1, 1984. Therefore, the licensee has requested that the effectiveness date of Section 3.14.D.2 be revised to reflect the scheduled completion of the fire barrier and seal penetration program; for Unit 2, the effectiveness date would be no later than the end of the current Unit 2 refueling outage and for Unit 3, no later than September 15, 1984. The staff has reviewed the justification for delays to the full implementation of the licensee's fire barrier and seal upgrade program outlined in the licensee's letter of February 10, 1984 and finds that the requested short extension of time for completion of this program is acceptable. Based upon this conclusion, the staff finds that the requested change of effectiveness is also acceptable. In addition, until the specified time that this Section becomes effective, the current provisions of Section 3.14.D.1 requiring functional fire barrier in the cable spreading room, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, battery rooms and control room are still required.

We therefore, conclude that the proposed addition to Section 3.14.D.3 and the proposed change to the footnotes of Section 3.14.D.2 are acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupation radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: June 20, 1984

The following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation: G. Gears