

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/84-20(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-483

License No. CPPR-139

Licensee: Union Electric Company
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1

Inspection At: Callaway Site, Reform, MO

Inspection Conducted: February 16 through May 15, 1984

Inspectors: B. H. Little

B. L. Jorgenson

R. J. Leemon

Approved By: *P. R. Pelha for*
W. L. Forney, Chief
Projects Section 1A

5/31/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on February 16 through May 15, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-20(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the Senior Resident Inspector including action on previous inspection findings, followup on IE Circulars, inspection of SER Items, SER Supplement 3 Verification Items, inspection of Plant Procedures, operator staff training, operational staffing, preoperational test records, inspection of Title 10 Requirements, NRC site tours, and plant tours. The inspection involved 354 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, including 72 inspector-hours during off shift hours.

Results: Of the eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- **S. E. Miltenberger, Manager, Callaway Plant
- **D. F. Schnell, Vice President - Nuclear
- **C. Naslund, Superintendent Startup
- **J. V. Laux, Supervisor QA Startup
 - C. A. Brewer, Test Program Coordinator
- **A. P. Neuhalfen, Assistant Manager - Operations and Maintenance
- **R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager - Quality Assurance
- **M. E. Taylor, Operations Superintendent
- *R. H. Leuther, Maintenance Superintendent
- *J. E. Davis, Compliance Superintendent
- *K. L. Wickes, Instrument and Control Supervisor
- **J. C. Gearhart, Supervisory Engineer - QA
- *S. Smith, Consultant - Maintenance
- *S. Petzel, QA Engineer
- *G. Shanker, Consultant - QA
 - S. Putthoff, Operations Supervisor
 - G. Belchik, Supervisory Engineer - Maintenance
 - R. Huber, Systems Engineer
 - N. Morris, Operations Supervisor
 - R. McCann, QA Engineer

*Denotes those present at the Management Interview on April 13, 1984.

**Denotes those present at one or more exit interviews.

In addition, a number of equipment operators, NRC-licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, and other members of the Operations and Maintenance staffs were contacted.

2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Noncompliance (483/83-32-01): This item identified test control deficiencies relating to the environmental conditions of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps endurance Preoperational Test (CS-03AL03), operation of the NF02 Emergency Diesel Generator without the required backup cooling water available, and untimely documentation of a nonconforming condition identified during the performance of the ECCS sump test.

The inspector completed a review of the licensee's response and the corrective actions regarding the above deficiencies. The corrective actions included retesting, inspections, procedural changes, and the indoctrination of startup test and operating personnel. The inspector considers the licensee's corrective actions to be adequate. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) Open Item (483/84-13-01): This item resulted from an inspection of Callaway Plant operating procedures. The inspector found that the

plant procedures in place met regulatory requirements and satisfied licensee procedural commitments; however, some procedural areas were considered to have potential for operator oversight and were provided to the licensee for evaluation.

Lack of sign-off lines for procedural actions: The inspector found that the general operating (sequencing) procedures contain verification lines and the prerequisites also contain verification lines. Normal operating procedures contain valve line-up sheets which provide verification lines. This item is considered to be closed.

Notes are used in lieu of Caution Statements: The examples provided to the licensee during the previous inspection have been corrected. The licensee has included the evaluation of "notes" in their procedure updating program which is currently in progress. This item is considered to be closed.

Limit and Set Point Conversion: The inspector previously noted that limits and setpoints are given in units which the operator must convert to read on plant instruments. The licensee included this item during the review of operating and emergency procedures. Dual values (Technical Specification value and indicated value) are now provided in procedures to eliminate the need for operator conversion. In addition, a Tank Data Book provides direct conversion for tank levels and alarm points. This item is considered to be closed.

Lack of Tolerances: The inspector previously noted that variables are required to be maintained at specific values without tolerances. The licensee is continuing the review of this item. Tolerances have been provided to assure Technical Specification compliance or are provided where instrument values dictate operator actions. This item is considered to be closed.

Changes to Technical Specifications: The inspector previously noted that changes to the plant Technical Specifications have caused a number of surveillance procedures to be in error. Activities relative to finalizing Technical Specifications have resulted in numerous surveillance procedure changes. The licensee has implemented a surveillance procedure validation program. Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-00551 has been implemented which provides for the revision of surveillance procedures resulting from Technical Specification changes. This item is considered to be closed.

Procedure Deficiency Lists: The inspector previously noted that a number of procedure have deficiency lists attached. The licensee is currently involved in procedure updating, which includes data obtained during pre-operational testing. This updating will be completed prior to procedure use. Other deficiencies will be cleared as base data is obtained during future startup testing. This item is considered to be closed.

3. Followup - IE Circulars

(Closed) IE Circular No. 81-12: Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection System. The inspector verified that IE Circular No. 81-12 was received and evaluated by the licensee. Callaway Plant Operations Surveillance Procedure (OSB-SB-0001) was revised to provide independent testing of each trip function, and position verification to ensure that the breakers actually trip. This item is considered to be closed.

4. SER Supplement 3 Verification Items

The Callaway Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement 3 contains items which require verification by NRC Region III prior to fuel load. These items are as follows:

<u>Open Item Number</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Reference SER Supplement 3 Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
483/84-20-01	Sealing of PORV position indication devices	3.10	3-3
483/84-20-02	Motor Control Center tops have been bolted	3.10	3-3
483/84-20-03	*Verify voltage drop analysis	8.3.1.2	8-2
483/84-20-04	*Remove steel hanger	22, I.D.I	22-4
483/84-20-05	Remove conduit	22, I.D.I	22-4
483/84-20-06	*Install filing cabinet	22, I.D.I	22-4

*These items are closed, see Section 5 of this report.

5. Inspection of SER Items

(Closed) SER Items (483/83-32-08, -09, -10, -25): The following items are considered resolved based on the NRC Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) Site Audit Report dated April 13, 1984.

<u>Description</u>	<u>SER Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
Indication of block of signals which initiate auxiliary feedwater	7.3.2.7	7-2
Four level channels in two out-of-four logic to actuate feedwater isolation.	7.3.2.8	7-2
Additional alarms, on plant computer	7.3.2.9	7-2
Bypass indication.	7.5.2.2	7-2

(Closed) SER Item (483/83-32-31): Natural Circulation Testing and Training - Confirmatory Item SER Supplement 2 (14-1). This item relates to special natural circulation testing, training and procedure validation to meet the requirements of TMI Task Action Plan Item I.G.1.

FSAR - SNUPPS-C, Section 18.1.18.2, commits to special training, testing and procedure validation which the NRC staff concluded that when accomplished would satisfy the above requirements.

a. Training

The licensee developed special training programs and procedures to satisfy the training requirements. This included the Control Board Certification Course and Mitigation of Core Damage Course. These courses were held at the Callaway simulator and utilized the following Plant Emergency Procedures:

- ES-01 Reactor Trip Recovery Using Natural Circulation
Cooldown (includes natural circulation verification)
- ES0-2A Natural Circulation Cooldown with no Accident in Progress
- ES0-2B Natural Circulation Cooldown with Potential Voids
in the Reactor Vessel Head

The inspector completed a review of the above training program and training records. The training has been completed by all NRC licensed operators which included training in the initiation, maintenance and recovery from the natural circulation mode, training to recognize when natural circulation has stabilized and training to control saturation margin, RCS pressure, and heat removal rate without exceeding specified operating limits. The verification of operator training is closed.

b. Testing and Procedure Validation

The licensee has developed an Engineering Test Procedure ETT-ZZ-09240 (Natural Circulation Test). This test is scheduled for completion during the low power test phase. The inspector found that this procedure did not provide for the validation of plant natural circulation cooldown procedures. This item was discussed with the licensee on May 4, 1984. The licensee agreed to revise Test Procedure ETT-ZZ-09240 to provide procedure validation as a test objective and to provide a procedure step for verification that the plant natural circulation cooldown procedures are evaluated based on test performance data.

This item is open pending verification prior to exceeding 5% core power (483/84-20-07(DPRP)).

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-20-03): Voltage Drop Analysis, Confirmatory Item SER Supplement 3 (8.3.1.2). This matter addresses the potential

common mode failure of redundant safety related electrical equipment that could result from a degraded-grid-voltage condition. To resolve this matter the licensee performed "Electrical Distribution System Voltage Verification Test" Preoperational Test CS-U90023.

SER Section 8.3.1.2 specifies that test field measurements should not "be more than 3 percent lower than the analytical results". Preoperational Test CS-U90023 establishes the validity of the mathematical model used in performance of the analyses. The inspector verified that the test results were within the specified 3 percent value of the analytical results. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-20-04): Remove Steel Hanger (SER Supplement 3 Confirmatory Item 22.1.D.1). This was a human engineering discrepancy identified during a recent onsite NRC Audit. A large steel hanger had been mounted approximately head high directly in front of the auxiliary shutdown panel. The inspector verified that the hanger has been removed. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-20-06): Install filing cabinet (SER Supplement 3 Confirmatory Item 22.1.D.1). This was a human engineering discrepancy identified during a recent onsite NRC audit. A file cabinet containing emergency procedures and spare parts was to be installed in the auxiliary shutdown panel room before fuel load. The inspector verified that the file cabinet has been installed in the auxiliary shutdown panel room. The cabinet contains a panel tool, spare panel lights, a battery powered light and off-normal operating procedure OT0-ZZ-00001 (Control Room Inaccessability) and OTS-ZZ-0001 (Cooldown from Outside the Control Room). This item is considered to be closed.

6. Inspection of Plant Procedures

General

An inspection of Callaway Plant Procedures was performed to ascertain that the licensee has established administrative controls for the development and implementation of plant procedures including procedures for the review, approval and periodic updating of plant procedures. An additional inspection objective was to assess the licensee's operational readiness relating to personnel/procedures/equipment interfaces including the adequacy and accuracy of Technical Specification Surveillance Procedures.

The Resident Inspector was assisted by other NRC Region III inspectors. Additional plant procedure inspections are documented in NRC Inspection Reports Nos. 483/83-32(DPRP) and 483/84-13(DPRP).

a. Specific

The inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications and related surveillance procedures for the following systems:

Emergency Diesel Generators
Residual Heat Removal
Reactor Protection
Containment Isolation
Rod Control

Findings: Plant systems and equipment inspected were consistent with the Technical Specifications. The surveillance procedures were found adequate to satisfy the Technical Specifications.

b. Procedures and Checklists

The inspectors reviewed procedures and some associated checklists to verify compliance to basis documents, particularly the proposed Technical Specifications, and to make technical evaluations concerning the controls and instructions provided in the procedures examined. Some procedures were also selected for "walk-through" with appropriate plant staff to support evaluations on their clarity and accuracy.

(i) Documents Reviewed

- (1) OSP-NE-C0001 "Diesel Generator Rocker Arm Lubrication"
- (2) OTN-NE-00001 "Standby Diesel Generation System"
- (3) OSP-NE-0002 "Operations Surveillance Procedure - Standby Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test"
- (4) MSM-KJ-QK0001 "Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection"
- (5) ISF-SB-00A32 "Instrument and Control Functional Test Surveillance Procedure"
- (6) OSP-GP-00001 "Containment Integrity Verification" - including Checklist
- (7) OTG-ZZ-00001 "Plant Heatup Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby" - including detailed verification of Attachment 1 electrical system operability requirements against proposed Technical Specifications.
- (8) OTN-EJ-00001 "RHR System Valve Lineup for Safety Injection Standby" - including Checklists
- (9) ODP-ZZ-00013 "Control of Input Leads and Annunciators"
- (10) ODP-ZZ-00006 "Operating Shift Routine Logs"
- (11) OSP-KJ-V0001 "Section XI Diesel Generator After-cooler Mode 1 Valve Operability"

- (12) MTE-ZZ-QY002 "Inspection and Electrical Test of Air Circuit Breakers"
- (13) MPM-KJ-QC002 "Diesel Air Start Compressor Valve Inspection"
- (14) MPM-KJ-QK-001 "Standby Diesel Generator Valve Adjustment"
- (15) MPM-KJ-QW001 "Standby Diesel Generator Temperature Regulator Overhaul"
- (16) OSP-SE-0003 "Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Calculation"
- (17) Operations Technical Off-Normal (OTO) Procedures
 - (a) OTO-SE-0003 Power Range Nuclear Channel Failure
 - (b) OTO-BB-0002 Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal
 - (c) OTO-ZZ-0003 Direct Boration
 - (d) OTO-SE-0002 Intermediate Range Channel Failure
- (18) Operations Technical Alarm (OTA) alarm responses
 - (a) 20A EDG NE02 Phase Imbalance Alarm
 - (b) 66E RTD Bypass Flow Low Alarm
 - (c) 77A Power Range NI High Voltage Failure Alarm
 - (d) 70B RCP Vibration Alert
 - (e) 79A Rod Urgent Failure Alarm
 - (f) 81C Rod Bank Lo-Lo Limit Alarm
 - (g) 78D Intermediate Range NI Compensation Voltage Failure
 - (h) 76A SSPS Channel B General Warning
 - (i) 76B Reactor Bypass Breaker B Closed
 - (j) 76C Reactor Bypass Breaker B Operable
 - (k) 78A Power Range Channel Deviation Alarm

- (l) 87B Pressurizer Pressure High-Reactor Trip
- (m) 61F Rad. Monitor Heat Tracing Low Temperature Alarm
- (n) 20B EDG NE02 Undervoltage or Underfrequency
- (o) 23D EDG NE02 "Trouble" Alarm
- (p) 22E NB02 Bus Degraded Voltage Alarm

(ii) Findings

- (1) Some procedures were found with several Temporary Change Notices (TCNs) attached. In one case, more than half the procedure package consisted of TCNs. This made procedure evaluation difficult and could adversely affect error-free procedure implementation. The bulk of the TCNs are recommended for incorporation as permanent changes during the next procedure revisions. No constraints were noted as controlling either the number of TCNs which may be concurrently in effect or the length of time a temporary change may be applied until permanently incorporated in a procedure revision.
- (2) During the "walk-through" of procedures and checklists in the plant, the inspectors noted that a number of component identification tags remain to be installed on valves and instruments, and installation of valve locking devices remains incomplete. The licensee has programs underway to address completion of both these items. Positive identification of components in safety-related systems and positive control of such components (using locking devices where appropriate) are considered essential to assure that the systems can be operated and controlled in compliance with requirements.
- (3) The main control room, the relay room, the diesel rooms, an RHR pump room and heat exchanger room, and various other plant areas were toured as part of the process of evaluating operator/procedure/equipment interfaces.

In the control room, numerous alarm conditions existed as a natural consequence of the "off-normal" system configurations currently required; i.e., system "normal" is typically based on power operation conditions. Review and discussion with licensee representatives established "nuisance" alarms may be bypassed under Procedure ODP-ZZ-00013, which neither limits the number of bypassed alarms nor the length of time bypasses may remain in place. Further, operations crew cognizance of alarm bypasses may be limited to a monthly Shift Supervisor "audit"

of the associated log. No provisions were noted to assure that the control operators are aware, on every shift, of which alarms will not work. Such awareness is essential to a thorough knowledge of safety-related system and component status in an operating plant.

A number of other comments evolving from area tours were provided to the licensee for consideration. These included such items as communications capabilities between the control room and the relay room, room/space lighting, room identification, and means to quickly and efficiently locate components in the potentially radiation-affected areas.

- (4) The general conclusion was reached that the procedures examined were consistent with the requirements of basis documents and that personnel have an adequate level of familiarity with procedures (and plant equipment addressed therein) to perform procedure-specified activities in a safe manner.

Some procedures or checklists were found to evidence prior validation via earlier "walkthroughs" or, in some cases, use of the plant-specific simulator. In other cases, it appeared additional validation could prove useful in improving procedures for post-licensing implementation, particularly in the areas of surveillance test procedures and alarm responses.

A number of comments concerning individual procedures and their interface with plant personnel or equipment were discussed with the licensee during the course of the inspection. Some comments were provided to the licensee for consideration as potential improvements in clarity and/or workability. Examples included erroneous or confusing cross-referencing to other procedures or the proposed Technical Specifications; instructions for stepping back and forth between procedures at a critical point in procedure implementation; an overly long "CAUTION" statement; and a valve missing from a Checklist (for which immediate corrective action was initiated).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Master Tracking System

The inspectors reviewed a sample of items from the licensee's Master Tracking System for identification of matters requiring resolution prior to achieving selected milestones or modes of plant operation. This review was performed to evaluate the licensee's assignment of due date (using the proposed Technical Specifications as the limiting element) and to ascertain the general nature of items remaining to be resolved in selected systems. The inspectors' sample covered about 250 items which the licensee currently identifies as being acceptable for completion after fuel load.

a. Systems Reviewed

- (i) Auxiliary Feedwater System
- (ii) Reactor Protection System
- (iii) Containment Isolation System
- (iv) Emergency Fuel Oil System
- (v) Essential Service Water System
- (vi) Component Cooling Water System
- (vii) 125V DC System

b. Findings

No instances were identified where the licensee proposes resolution of deficiencies beyond the limits of the proposed Technical Specifications. No instances were identified where the licensee's schedule for deficiency resolution threatens to cause confusion or error in system operation.

The general character of deficiencies is predominantly paperwork oriented, except in the Essential Service Water and Component Cooling Water systems, where hardware maintenance and/or modification items constitute a significant portion of the overall list. Close attention will be required in the processing of modifications to assure timely updating of system drawings, procedures and checklists for use by the Operations organization. The licensee is addressing these items.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Independent Inspections

a. Security Alert

The inspectors observed control room functioning as a command and communications center in response to threats over the plant public address system by an apparent prankster. During this evolution, and on other occasions during the inspection, the control room became crowded and noisy to an extent which could detract from disciplined and safe control and communication in an operating facility. This was discussed at the Management Interview of April 13, 1984.

b. Control Room Evacuation Exercise

The inspectors assisted in observation of the licensee's test implementation of his draft procedure for main control room evacuation

(in case of fire, for example) and safe shutdown at the alternate control panel and switchgear rooms. Observations were provided to the Region III fire protection inspector who has lead responsibility in this area.

c. Equipment Tagout

An inspector accompanied an equipment tagout activity for observations relating to equipment accessibility and positive identification, isolation, and tag placement.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Management Interview

A management interview (attended as indicated (*) in Paragraph 1) was held at the conclusion of the inspection on April 13, 1984. The following matters were discussed.

- a. The inspectors indicated that the number of Temporary Change Notices (TCNs) currently attached to some procedures will make error-free implementation difficult. The licensee should give attention to reducing and limiting the number and duration of outstanding TCNs.

To minimize the potential for operator error the licensee's Administrative Procedure APA-ZZ-TAP10 requires that: "The changes to the procedure will be made in the exact spot, or as close to as reasonably possible, in the body of the procedure."

Additionally on April 30, 1984, the licensee assigned five Operations staff members the task of completing procedure revisions.

- b. Completion of component identification and valve locking programs was identified as essential to assure that safety-related systems can be controlled in compliance with requirements. The licensee indicated locking device installation will receive priority attention before the subject systems become "operable", and that complete component identification is being pursued on a safety-related systems first basis.
- c. The current controls for bypassing alarms and computer inputs, which do not assure continuing operator awareness, were described by the inspectors as unacceptable for an operating plant. The licensee agreed to evaluate this matter.

Subsequent licensee action satisfied the inspectors concern in this area. Procedure ODP-ZZ-00013, Control The control of Computer Input Leads and Annunciators, was revised to require that a work request be issued and a defeat sticker attached to alarm windows. These items are included in the shift turnover review.

- d. Access and activity controls in the main control room, to support orderly control and communication, were discussed. The licensee expressed confidence in his plans and procedures for implementation of these controls during operations.

The inspectors expressed the general conclusion that the personnel/procedures/equipment interfaces appear ready to support safe operation. The licensee was found to be aware of work which remains to be done to support achievements of future milestones and to have specific programs in effect to accomplish this work.

The licensee has established adequate administrative controls in implementing and maintaining a viable procedure system. These procedures have received the required review and approval and were developed in accordance with the specified format. The surveillance procedures contained sufficient detail to satisfy Technical Specification requirements.

10. Operating Staff Training

An inspection was performed to verify that the licensee has developed and implemented a documented training program in conformance with FSAR commitments and regulatory requirements. The inspection included interviews with both licensed and non-licensed personnel, and a review of training records, the Callaway training manual and procedures, the FSAR (Section 13.2) and the proposed Technical Specifications. The inspector also attended selected training classes and observed the licensee's operating staff performance during plant simulator exercises.

The inspector verified that the licensee has developed and implemented a formal training program that conforms to FSAR commitments and NRC requirements. The licensee's training manual defines training responsibilities and authorities, and provides for scheduling, examining and record keeping. The Callaway Plant Manager is responsible for the training of plant personnel. A full time Superintendent of Training is responsible for administrating the training program.

The licensee has a plant-specific SNUPPS simulator onsite. The inspector observed the performance of the instructors and operators during plant training drills and NRC licensed operator examinations. The instructors and operators demonstrated that they were knowledgeable of plant normal and off-normal procedures and performed the exercises in a professional manner.

To provide on-shift "hot participation experience", the licensee implemented the shift Operating Advisor Program. The program included the selection, training, examination and certification of personnel having previous operating experience. The inspector observed portions of the advisor simulator training. The examination of the operator-advisors was witnessed by an NRC Inspector (Region III Operator Licensing Section). The licensee's on-shift advisor's training program has been completed.

The inspector interviewed maintenance, instrument and control, Rad-Chem and QA/AC personnel and reviewed training records. The training records documented the actual training received.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Operational Staffing

An inspection of the licensee's operational staffing was performed to verify that the licensee's organization structure and staffing is in accordance with FSAR commitments and the proposed Technical Specifications.

FSAR, Section 13.1, describes the licensee's organization, staff position responsibilities and experience, and commitment to meet or exceed the qualification requirement set forth in ANSI/ANS 3.1 (1978), and Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training".

The inspector interviewed members of the licensee's staff and reviewed personnel training and qualification records. The inspector verified that the licensee's operations and technical support staff met FSAR commitments and regulatory requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12. Preoperational Test Records

An inspection of this area was performed to ascertain that the licensee has established administrative controls and facilities for the collection and maintenance of quality assurance records. This inspection included a review of FSAR and regulatory requirements, Callaway Administrative Procedures, Plant Organization and Responsibilities (APA-ZZ-0001), Records Management (APA-ZZ-0220) and Startup Administrative Procedure - Document and QA Record Control.

The inspection also included a review of preoperational test procedures and results, personnel training and qualification records, and QA/AC audits and surveillance. The inspector interviewed the Superintendent, Administration - Records and inspected the Records Storage Vault.

The inspector verified that the licensee has established administrative controls for the maintenance of QA records and that the controls established are in accordance with FSAR and regulatory requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13. Inspection of Title 10 Requirements

This inspection was performed to verify licensee conformance to Title 10 CFR Requirements. The inspector verified that 10 CFR Part 19 posting requirements including "Instruction to Workers" have been accomplished within the plant and at entries to the plant secured areas. The inspector verified that licensed material control is in compliance with 10 CFR 20.207.

During the Preoperational Test Phase, the inspector reviewed construction deficiency reports, plant modifications and changes to tests. These activities have been appropriately reviewed, approved and reported in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures, and conform to regulatory requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

14. NRC Site Tours

During this inspection period the Senior Resident Inspectors accompanied NRC Headquarters and Region III Management during site tours, interviews with licensee management and staff, interviews with licensed and non-licensed operating personnel and observation of licensed operators performance during plant simulator drills. The following visits were performed to assess the operational readiness of Callaway plant and personnel.

April 5-6	C. Norelius, R. Warnick, W. Forney; NRC Region III Division of Projects and Resident Programs
April 11	J. Holonich, S. Black; NRR Licensing
April 16	Commissioner Asselstine and staff B. Davis, NRC Region III Deputy Administrator C. Norelius, NRC Region III Division Director (DPRP)
May 3-4	W. Little, R. Walker; Region III Division of Engineering
May 9	J. Keppler, NRC Region III Administrator (and staff) H. Denton, NRC Director of NRR (and staff)

During these visits the licensee discussed organization and staffing including staff training and operating experience, and provided status of manpower and remaining critical path work.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

15. Plant Tours

The inspector toured site and plant areas frequently during this inspection period to observe housekeeping conditions and practices, ongoing maintenance and testing activities. The inspector reviewed control room logs and observed shift turnovers.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

16. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein.